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INTRODUCTION 
 
授人以鱼不如授人以渔 
孔子 
 
Give a Man a Fish, and You Feed Him for a Day. 
Teach a Man To fish, and You Feed Him for a Lifetime. 
Confucius 
 
The current change in capitalism is marked by a return to strength and a multiplication of 
forms of the rent that goes hand in hand with a more general overturning the relationship 
between income, wages and profits. This evolution has given rise to very different 
interpretations, both theoretical political implications. 
In particular, according to a widespread approach in Marxist theories, which was rooted in 
the Ricardian political economy, the annuity is seen as a pre-capitalistic legacy and an 
obstacle to the progressive dynamics of capital accumulation. On this basis it was 
considered that true capitalism, pure capitalism, and effective capitalism would be 
capitalism without annuity. 
Such a vision, replacing the key role of the land’s rent with that of the financial one, is now 
proposed to interpret the crisis of the Fordism adjustment mode and the growth of the 
European Union since the 1980s. According to this analysis, the sense of the current crisis 
would be in the conflict between the vocation to the annuity of financial capitalism and the 
“good” productive capitalism, which is responsible for logic of the accumulation 
favourable to the growth of production and employment. 
From this interpretation, as suggested by the analysis of numerous economists, the 
proposal is a sort of neo-ricardian compromise between wage earners and productive 
capital against the power of finance. This compromise should allow to re-establish the 
hegemony of managerial capitalism of the Fordism era and, hence, the conditions of close 
to full employment, and all this in a context of substantial continuity with the Fordism 
organization of work and adjustment of the salary ratio. 
This grid of reading seems to be wrong in two terms: it is wrong with the statute of the 
annuity in capitalism, judging it as an external category in relation to capital dynamics and 
opposed to the category of profit; the denunciation of the return to the perverse forces and 
effects of the annuity to be disconnected from any analysis of the underlying 
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transformations, following the Fordism crisis, intervened in the forms of division of labor 
and labor-capital relationship. 
In relation to this interpretation, the thesis that I intend to pursue in this work can be 
expressed through two research questions: 
1) Is it possible to quantify the allocation of risk sharing among different firm’s 
constituents? 
In other words, given a shock to corporate sales, endogenous or exogenous, the undisputed 
result is that it will affect the annual profit. But is this process always true? Is it true that a 
decrease in revenue is absorbed, in the same amount, by profit? 
2) Supposing there are several channels through which firm risk sharing may occur, which 
percentage of a demand shock is smoothed by which smoothing channel? 
By taking this variable as a starting point, the elaborative objective is to analyze the 
underlying interrelationships of the most significant items that insist within the company. 
The ultimate aim of the work is to answer the above questions, to analyze how 
management actions can avoid an harmonization of profit from one period to another and 
then study other variables of the income statement might also be affected by a shock or a 
diminutive variation in the quantum that they represent, which are represented in this way, 
in the eyes of the managers, as voices that have bearing capabilities for implicating the 
profit smoothing process. 
As a result of the crisis of real subsidence, profit, such as income, tends to represent more 
and more as a pure dissociated distribution relationship, in most cases, from every positive 
function in organizing production and growing wealth. 
Salary, income and profit are, according to Marx, the three major categories of income 
distribution that arise from capitalist relations and how these have a historical character. It 
is in this perspective that I will try to produce conceptual tools to understand the mutation 
of wage, profit and annuity in the contemporary economy, deepening in particular the 
category of profit. 
Below are the main theories on profit by making an excursus on classical and neoclassical 
theories, continuing with the analysis of profit in business vision (chapter 1). The study 
continues with an in-depth study of the annuity, highlighting the three main empirical 
lines: (a) Entrepreneurial Rents Theory, (b) Managerial Rents Model, and (c) Rent 
Appropriation Theory.  
Also in Chapter 2 I introduce the phenomenon of profit smoothing corporate, accounting 
and financial level. Earning management policies will also be discussed and how these can 
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affect the true income statement of the company. It will be seen that the profit smoothing 
policy is fully in such circumstances and will even be analyzed, as the concept of profit 
smoothing is also part of Gordon’s financial model on dividends.  
In Chapter 3, however, an excursus of the financial policies employed by China in recent 
years will be made in order to fully understand the Stock Market’s financial market. In 
addition, another aspect to not underestimate was to analyze the reasons for China’s 
growth and expansion. Note that the choice to analyze China in my thesis was not casual. 
First, during my PhD years, I had already assessed the profit smoothing system, in 
particular by analyzing all listed companies in the London Stock Exchange, assessing that 
there were indeed high values of companies that used this system. Subsequently, the 
analysis has expanded to address many of the developed countries of the European Union 
(Chapter 5). The fundamental question that led me to analyze listed companies in Shanghai 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchange was whether the profit smoothing phenomenon was of 
interest to developing countries such as China.  
For data collection I experienced a Visiting Exchange semester in China at the 
Southwestern University of Economics and Finance (SWUFE) in Chengdu, Sichuan, a 
formative and stimulating experience that allowed me to interface with software such as 
CSMAR, but also special people and rich in energy that has allowed me to bring my data 
collection work to China. 
The methodology used for the study of profit smoothing is described in Chapter 4. Chapter 
4 will also include the research hypotheses and highlight the first results on the general 
effects of the underlying phenomenon. 
Finally, in Chapter 5, the findings are explained, it will tend to give an explanation to the 
profit smoothing phenomenon and will be input for further research. 
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1.1 Profit in traditional argumentation way 
Profit can be defined as a form of income that may arise in an economy without a plan or 
central authority that decides on the production and distribution of the social product. The 
profit’s definition does not end in only one conceptual category; rather it is exposed to a 
variety of economic, social, cultural and political uses and meanings. Any attempt to 
clarify the content of this notion removes the character of “absoluteness” and “neutrality” 
by unifying it uniquely to a particular economic vision. 
Economic science offers very different notions of profit, not only in relation to the 
economic and social relationships to which it refers but also depending on the particular 
cognitive aim pursued from time to time and the technique of analysis adopted. 
Economic profit theory should answer many questions, but the debate on this subject is 
still lit and this reflects a sense of uncertainty and stalemate that characterizes all the 
literature on it. Profit has always been a multi-dimensional concept, which does not fall 
into one economic discipline. Besides having various basic arguments, profit is also a 
source of numerous studies and business techniques that often are outside from simple 
accounting rules. Many, from the classical economists, have tried to approach the issue of 
profit and its assessment; others have governed just the accounted nature and added, in an 
already busy contest, many theories and definitions on the subject. The evolution of 
business knowledge, finance and economics’ knowledge have allowed an increase in 
previous studies on the subject of profit. Firm and its management have become, over the 
years, the main focus of managerial analysis, assuming both relevance increasingly global 
and interdisciplinary. The rules and economic directives require continuous management 
apparatus, overwhelmingly, on the ability to persist over time, in conditions of economic 
and financial equilibrium. Changing the appearance and nature of the firm, changes 
accordingly the approach of business manager and the role of profit management. Profit 
has always analyzed as a residual item in the firm but changes its shape, and it is 
approached by most as a strategic financial variable. 
Profit must be closely related to the concept of enterprise, and in that sense, the very 
determination of profit justifies the existence of all the company’s production equipment 
and is considered indispensable and underlying any business activity. At a company level, 
profit is considered as a goal to itself or, alternatively, in connection with other goals such 
as growth or efficiency.1 																																																								1	In fact, profit can no longer be considered as a residual variable, that is, defined as the residual amount after 
	 12	
Before analyzing all the literature and theories of economists who have debated the notion 
of profit,2 it is necessary to clarify how and through which mechanisms the search for 
profit can influence the business behaviors and finally it is appropriate to dissolve some 
inherent nodes both the role of profit as an economic category and its nature. 
From these initial considerations, it is understood that, in the first place, the subject or 
recipients of the profit should be identified and their means to be appropriate to the latter. 
The need to differentiate, in a theoretically way, the profit from the worker’s wage, from 
the natural resource owner’s income, from the interest generated by the liquidity loan, 
manifests itself at the same time as the historical process of capitalist division of labor.3 In 
this case the historical recalls are fundamental: on the one hand the progressive 
fragmentation of trades into specializations, the fragmentation of craftsmanship and the 
expansion of the merchant system have prompted the making of entrepreneurs-merchants, 
concerned about buying the products to bring them to the markets, and to sell raw material 
to every single producer, gaining a profit. On the other hand, the separation of workers 
from work tools, the organization of work in the factory, and the continuous technological 
changes have overwhelmingly overlooked the overproduction of production, creating new 
problems with regard to its appropriation and its intended use for purpose consumption or 
accumulation. In parallel, a new social structure emerged, in which a class - that of 
entrepreneurs-producers - took the power to decide how, what and how many to produce.4  
The literature clearly dictates the shift from one to another definition of profit: a purely 
“subjective” and the other “objective”. The first trend concerns a vision linked to the 
primary remuneration of the entrepreneur, in favor of an “objective” view, where profit is 
the remuneration of the enterprise first.5 
In order to reasonably interpret the concept of such a profit, it is necessary to clearly 
distinguish the function and role of the enterprise, always maintaining a vital link with the 
profit itself. 
																																																								2	In the continuation of the elaborate, we will have an overview of the most important and relevant business 
and business theories, such as those of Adam Smith, Ricardo, Mill and Karl Marx.	3	Job division is a key topic in economic theories and generally involves all human organizations, from small 
communities, such as the family, to the largest multinational corporations. Work is one of the factors of 
production and its organization plays an essential role in the functioning and evolution of any type of society. 
In general, job division increases average job productivity, but can only be applied extensively if it is favored 
by a market expansion.	4	See also Pesante L.M., Come servi. Figure del lavoro salariato; dal diritto naturale all’economia politica. 
Franco Angelo Edizioni. 2013. 5	Zappa G., Le produzioni nell’economia delle imprese, Giuffrè, 1956. 
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The function that has always been attributed to the enterprise is that of the transformer and 
economic generator suitable to increase tangible and intangible assets and monetary 
wealth. It does not only aim to increase quantitatively the economic wealth, but the broader 
one to generate wealth in quantity and quality capable of generating consensus on a large 
number of subjects.6 The firm’s function in the market system is, therefore, to produce 
goods and services for exchange, in the formation of adequate employment opportunities 
for system resources, and it concretizes itself in the creation of value under economic 
conditions. 
The role of the firm is the form that historically has responded to the motivations of 
production: with profit, the enterprise produces wealth, and profit-making parties can 
achieve greater and/or better satisfaction of the needs.7 
Historical analysis shows that profit is one of the most powerful reasons for production, 
and thus one of the most important “endogenous” factors of productivity. Profit, on the one 
hand, drives individuals to risk their capital, investing them in productive activities; on the 
other hand, is the strongest motivation for creating new business. Profit becomes both a 
means to ensure remuneration and capital maintenance as an instrument to increase labor 
pay and to produce satisfactory interest on the loan capital. 
One last point to point out to the profit-enterprise relationship is that the latter, as an 
institution, presents itself as a historically determined reality, objectively related to its 
function, its “economically sound”.8 The pursuit of such a model, inspired by specific 
technical efficiency requirements and valorization of marketed production, allows the 
regeneration of the means used in the previous production cycles, thus making it possible 
for the firm to repeat its business. In the instrumental sense, the enterprise, providing a 
significant contribution to the process of generating economic wealth, gets legitimacy to 
exist and continue to operate. The growing consensus that the community has attributed to 
the enterprise has allowed it to be institutionalized, ensuring its stability and permanence 
within the framework of social institutions. Alongside the function and related objective 
(technical and economic) conditions of its operation, however, the enterprise is 
characterized by being a “social system”. In it, the subjective element contributes to 
																																																								6	Borgonovi E., Imprenditorialità, consenso sociale e sviluppo dell’impresa, in Sinergie, vol. 70, 2006. 7	Mella P., Il ruolo dell’impresa nell’economia contemporanea. 1989. 8	The concept of economy (cost-effectiveness) summarizes the company’s long-term ability to efficiently 
utilize its resources by effectively achieving its goals.	
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defining the specific, general and partial objectives that guide the evolutionary dynamics, 
conveying the way in which the instrument is actually used.9 
Over two centuries of theoretical reflection, economists have kept the focus of attention 
and study on entrepreneurship, formulating a wide range of responses to the issues 
mentioned about profit. 
The conducted analysis presents some of the most significant theories of profit in their 
historical succession in order to highlight the progressive refinement of elaborations on the 
studies and referring them to the conceptions of the economic and social organization to 
which they are connected. 
Profit, as we have seen, is among the most intuitive, and at the same time, controversial 
notions of economy and enterprise management. The doctrine agrees to re-enter the profit 
in the general logic category of “income”.10 Historically, the profit is coupled with the 
entrepreneur’s income: it is considered as a real remuneration of the entrepreneur’s 
abilities (organizational, managerial, decision-making, etc.). As we will see later, emerge 
differences in the articulation of the elements that make up the profit. By briefly reviewing 
classical economic theory, and then deepening it further into the subsequent paragraphs, it 
is possible to note that, for Smith, Ricardo and Stuart Mill, profit represents the total 
amount of remuneration of the capitalist entrepreneur. Neoclassical authors, however, in 
making the classic concept of profit as a remuneration of the capitalist entrepreneur, 
identify two distinct components in this remuneration: interests that remunerate the 
entrepreneur’s capital and the salary intended to reward the entrepreneur himself for his 
work of direction and coordination of production factors. In other words, starting with the 
income of the entrepreneur, designated as “gross profit”, the neoclassical theorists come to 
isolate a “net profit” after having eliminated from the first the interests of the funds lent 
and the directional salary.11 The necessary corollary about the link between risk and profit 
is then the attribution of profit, understood as “residual”, to the subject that endures this 
kind of risk, namely the entrepreneur. Along the stages of capitalist evolution, above all 
with the affirmation of the great enterprise, successive authors, both Anglo-Saxon and 
French, begin to lay the groundwork for moving from a conception of profit as the 																																																								9	Gatti M., Biferali D., Volpe L., Il governo dell’impresa tra profitto e creazione di valore in Sinergie, vol 
79, 2009. 10	A conception of profit as the “primary source of savings” is present in Demaria G., La politica economica 
dei grandi sistemi coercitivi, Cedam, Padua, 1969, p.116. Alchian, on the other hand, perceives profit as a 
factor behind the process of selecting the business environment. See Alchian A., Uncertainty, Evolution and 
Economic Theory, Journal of Political Economy, no. 3, 1950.	11	That is, the remuneration of the entrepreneur if he takes his job within the firm.	
	 15	
entrepreneur’s remuneration (both gross and net) to the remuneration of the corporate 
firm.12 Such a move is already anticipated by Zappa, who, considering the profit as a 
composite entity, states “[...] the profit of the enterprise is not the typical remuneration of 
the “entrepreneur” but it is a composite income that is compounded by a single and 
complex set of remuneration of many factors that together in the production of a business 
contribute to the formation of profits or operating losses.”13  
Re-writing the purely economic theme of the study, as extreme terms, it is possible to 
propose some opposing views of the economic system: a) the economic system as a market 
economy; b) the economic system as a capitalist economy, i.e. as a society with a particular 
organization of work and a specific class structure. 
Advocates of the first conception assume that the foundation of inter-individual economic 
relations is an institution - the market, precisely - that allows the collection and distribution 
of information deemed useful by each operator to make production decisions and spending. 
The profit here is fundamentally the income that anyone can perceive whenever others, or 
rather of others, experience the presence of imperfect market imperfections, take advantage 
of moments of the instability of a normally stable economic system, react to occasional 
changes in the economic situation, realize potential but still latent in the economy. In this 
context lie the theory of profit of Léon Walras14 and the recent theory of Israel Kirzner. 
In the second conception, however, the profit originates from the plus-pledge, from the 
division of the working day between work required and plus-value. Here I refer mainly to 
Karl Marx’s theory. 
 
 
1.1.1 Classical economist’s thinking 
Classic economists identify the primary task of political economy in seeking laws that can 
regulate the distribution of the social product, in the form of wages, profits, and annuities, 
to their recipients: wage-earners, entrepreneurs, and landowners. 
The analysis of the profit’s problem marks a real stage in the wider study of economic 
dynamics. It contributed to it with a critical work, lasting over a century, the greatest 																																																								12	See n.11.	13	Zappa G., Le produzioni nell’economia delle imprese, Giuffrè, Milano, 1956, pag. 426. According to the 
author, the nature of the profit as composite income would reconnect to the disappearance of the figure of the 
classical entrepreneur following the affirmation of the large corporation. 14	Considered by Joseph Schumpeter as “the greatest of all economists”, Leon Warlas was the father of the 
first complete wording of the theory of general economic equilibrium.	
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economists in every school; enormous work that was absolutely necessary given the 
“diversity” of the various points of view, manifested primarily by the distinctions between 
short and long periods of time, between statics and dynamics, between generic profits and 
pure profits, between productive function and distribution function and still, very 
important, between imputation and distribution. To understand today’s problems of profit, 
it is absolutely necessary to mention the most important phases of this succession of 
theoretical moments. 
According to the classics’ thinking, profit was intended as a specific income, which for 
some (F.A. Walker, W. Bagehot, A. Schäffle) consisted of a pure interest in the invested 
capital of the entrepreneur, while others also embraced remuneration which goes to work 
(salary theory of profit) in addition to the risk premium for loss of capital (A. Smith, A. 
Cherbuliez, R. Malthus, J.R. McCulloch, J. Stuart Mill, and then among the Italians, E. 
Nazzani and A. Graziani). 
The classical economy (in particular, A. Smith, D. Ricardo and K. Marx) defines profit as 
the difference, in a given productive activity, between the total value of the products and 
the production costs for raw materials, energy sources, tools production and labor, and 
attributes to it a residual character and a tendency to decrease over time. On this 
assumption, Marx founded his theory of exploitation of the working class assuming that 
the work was the only “enhancing substance” and that therefore the value of economic 
goods depended only on the amount of work incorporated therein. It follows that profit, or 
“plus- value”, is an income abusively abandoned to wage earners, ultimately a theft. 
It is necessary to step back and return, first, to the analysis of Adam Smith’s contribution, 
considered by many as the founder of modern economic theory. In the “Wealth of 
Nations”, Smith considers profit as remuneration attributable to the capitalist entrepreneur, 
reconnecting it to the process of capitalist accumulation and emphasizing the economic 
benefits deriving from the pursuit of personal interest.15 Smith distinguishes the profit from 
interest by assimilating the first to the proceeds derived from the stock of capital to the 
subject that this capital manages or uses. On the contrary, interest corresponds to the 
revenue earned by those who offer their capital to third parties.16 
According to Adam Smith, the market, that is the exchange of goods, was not originally 
intended for profit that is to earn an amount exceeding the production costs of the product 
itself. Conversely, whoever exchanged it did, at least, between something that had 																																																								15	Smith A., Wealth of Nations, 1776.	16	Volpe L., Il profitto come rendita negoziabile, Cedam. 2013. 
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produced in a given time with something that had been produced through a coincidence of 
working time. Working time, that is the amount of effort needed to create a commodity, is, 
according to that view, the measurement unit at the base of the exchange or market activity 
and the right exchange is where a working time is traded at the same time as work, where 
the product of such work is different and precisely that diversity gives a real sense of 
exchange. The working time necessary to create a particular commodity is then the 
economic value, that is, the value-work contained in it, that is, the cost of production. Each 
commodity exchanges with a commodity with an equal production cost. Real wealth is 
work, which money represents only in terms of abstract quantity, as a “universal 
commodity”, or universal means of exchange, facilitating the exchange of goods on the 
basis of their equivalence in terms of their value of the amount of work contained. 
Starting from Adam Smith’s contribution, the economists’ reflection on the role of profit 
begins, even under the pressure of growing conflict in the relationship between the 
entrepreneur and the labour factor.17 
So far it has been considered the possibility that the worker works independently, 
exchanging his products with other products of value (labour time) that tend to be 
equivalent to their own. According to Smith, in a modern context, this principle of work-
value equivalence is no longer the basis of trade. According to Ricardo, however, it 
remains valid in this context. However, in it, which is in the modern capitalist system,18 the 
worker no longer works for himself but as an employer. Precisely for this reason, the 
distribution of proceeds deriving from the exchange of goods produced by human labor is 
here deeply different from the above situation. Since the entrepreneur, exercising a 
dominant role over the worker, as he provides the tools to the base of his own work, he can 
claim part of the commercial proceeds from the marketing of the products created by the 
worker himself. 
Continuing therefore with the Smith’s line of thought, Ricardo formulates the well-known 
economic principle that excludes any increase in salary not accompanied by a simultaneous 
fall in profits. Ricardo thus measures the distribution of income in terms of the amount of 																																																								17	Graziani A., Teoria Generale del Profitto, 1887. 18	There are several studies on the origins and interpretations of capitalism. According to some, the historical 
roots of the capitalist economy are to be found in long-distance business and in the activities of the financial 
centers of the Middle-Ages and of the European Renaissance, which led to the emergence of capitalism as a 
dominant system from the sixteenth century. Other interpretations -such as that provided by classical 
economists- link capitalism to the industrial revolution of the eighteenth century, with the fence of lands, the 
creation of an independent labor market, the birth of manufactures and a capitalist production, Capable of 
using the technological change of the era, drastically accelerating growth and consolidating the power of the 
bourgeoisie.	
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labor employed, rather than the quantity of physical goods.19 According to Ricardo, 
workers do not participate in the distribution of overpayments since the wages they receive 
tend to settle in the long run, at the subsistence level: it follows that income distribution is 
characterized by the harsh contrasts between profits and wages and between profits and 
annuities. In the long run, the overpayment is divided between earnings and profits. Profit 
is determined, given the subsistence wages, through the concept of differential income.20 
Profit thus assumes a typically residual connotation and is emptied of intrinsic meaning to 
be considered as all that is produced in excess to the subsistence level of workers. 
With reference to the “natural tendency of profit to shrink”,21 Ricardo reconnects to 
Smith’s interpretation of the role of profit as a result of the process of capitalist 
accumulation. With the shrinking of profits, the motives that induce the entrepreneur-
capitalist to accumulate capital will fade in turn as a result of the lack of adequate 
remuneration for the risk they face in the productive use of capital.22 And it is in this sense 
that is necessary to recount Ricardo’s analysis, or it can be said that the theory on the role 
of profit represents the development of Adam Smith’s stationary state theory. 
Lionel Robbins23 writes: “Smith thought the profits were determined by demand and 
supply, and that in the long run, due to this competitive process, the accumulation of 
capital would lead to a fall in profits. Ricardo questioned it. Ultimately his objection was: 
if there is a proportional expansion of capital and work, why should there be a drop in the 
profit rate, given that demand for scarce property is almost insatiable? It must be 
something that has to do with declining returns, Ricardo thought”. 
Ricardo stated that the profits were residual, that is, what remained after the payment of 
wages on the gain realized by the sale. This, however, implied that the profit was not only 
dependent on salary but also on earnings, and then, the wage would have to depend on this 
real dynamic, while in reality it was almost always a fixed quota. 
																																																								19	Ricardo D., On the principles of political economy and taxation, 1817. 20	That is, a sort of price of scarcity due to the limited fertility and better-localized markets than the markets.	21	It is Karl Marx who in the Third Book of Capital attributes the crisis of the capitalist system to the law of 
the tendency of the profit rate, or to the natural tendency of the economic system (based on the exploitation 
of surplus labor and surplus value) to see the ratio between surplus value and capital, or profit.	22	See n.7.	23	Lionel Robbins was an English economist known for his contributions to economic theories, derived from 
Marshallian bases. He is considered one of the greatest exponents of Marginalist theory. Robbins became 
famous in the academic environment for his economics definition: “Economics is the science that studies 
human behavior when, given a ranking of goals, choices on alternative means of using scarce resources have 
to be made”. 
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The “Essays on Some Unsettles Questions of Political Economy” of 1844, and the 
“Principles of Political Economy” of 1848, summarize, review and develop the 
achievements of Smith, Malthus, and Ricardo, and together update Mill’s ideas. All the 
studies and writings by Ricardo and Smith led Mill to think as real, at least in accounting 
terms, the existence of a wage-fund, to be considered as a budget estimate, and this is 
considered to be one of the few points theoretically firm in an extremely dynamic and 
uncertain reality. In short, Mill extended to the whole society the concept that total wages 
come from the existing capital fund as a sum of all the special capital employed in 
businesses. Individual wage is the product of a division between the total social wage-
found and the total of the population that aspires to employment, or which is already 
occupied. Hence the assertion that wages is paid by capital (considered as wage advance). 
Capital is about wages, its limitation on the one hand, and its guarantee of existence on the 
other. 
Even for Stuart Mill it is quite natural that man works on the basis of selfish motivation to 
earn. The production process, even when it comes to organizing itself in the form of 
manufacture, responds to a natural tendency of man to activity, which is not limited to the 
necessary and indispensable production to the satisfaction of primary needs but tends to 
expand. Under a general profile, the problems of social injustice can, according to Stuart 
Mill, be tackled by simply intervening in the distribution of profits, i.e. by increasing 
wages and reducing the earnings of entrepreneurs. On the level of profit and salary 
definition, Mill himself was so brilliant on one side as well as vaguely for another. Its 
theorization of the wage-fund, that is, of the existence of a wage-fund as part of the initial 
fixed capital that the capitalist anticipates (and thus does not derive from the profits 
deriving from the sale), can be used in both reactionary and progressive ways, both to 
reach compromises and fairer contracts. When Mill realized that the prevalent use was a 
reactionary mold, he came and retracted it and his self-criticism aroused his suspicions. 
Mill, in his “Principles of Political Economy”, resumed, as I have already said, Ricardo’s 
analysis, trying to adopt it in his time. He then abandons the theory of value-work as 
Ricardo has formulated and insists on the theory of cost of production, trying to justify the 
existence of profit. He notes that the theory of value-work in Ricardo’s formulation tends 
to characterize social wealth as a result of the operation of only one factor, the work. He 
emphasizes, there is “another necessary element besides work”. This element is the capital 
and since capital is the result of “abstinence” or “expectation”, i.e. the sacrifice endured by 
the capitalists who give up immediate consumption, the price of the goods must allow both 
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the remuneration of the factor work, and the remuneration of abstinence. Consequently, 
profit is nothing but the “remuneration of abstinence”.24 The theory of production cost so 
understood is a theory that tends to define the price of goods as a remuneration of the costs 
borne to produce them, including the remuneration of the capitalist’s sacrifice.25 
To the thesis on the profits expressed by Smith, Ricardo, and Mill, Marx moves articulate 
criticism. The source of profit, as Smith explains, is due to an act of domination that the 
wage earner suffers from the capitalist who takes away part of the product of his work and 
appropriates it in the form of profit. Marx observes, however, that any firms divided into 
classes legalize phenomena of the appropriation of the work of others. Thus, in the light of 
Smith’s view, the wage earner of capitalist society does not differ from the slave or the 
worker subjected to any external authority, nor does the capitalist differ from the master or 
the owner present in any other historical society. Ultimately, Smith fails to explain profit as 
a form of specifically capitalist income. The same is true for Ricardo’s theory, which sets 
the residual profitability of the other income and appears to be postponed to a specific 
organization of social work, but ultimately makes it dependent on the profit from the 
conditions of land cultivation and the survival of workers. These weaknesses found in 
Smith’s and Ricardo’s theories of profit are, according to Marx, attributable to the whole of 
the “classical” political economy: the lack of distinction between the social process of 
production in general and the process of capitalist production. 
In the capitalist economy, Marx observes,26 it is not produced for use but for capital 
appreciation, observing the movement of goods can see as. In the capitalism, the purpose 
of the exchange is not to sell goods against another merchandise that suits different needs, 
with the intermediation of money that acts solely as a means of circulation (G-M-G), but in 
the transfer of sum of money or power purchase order to obtain a sum of higher purchase 
power. Initial money M is valued -that is, becomes M’, greater than M- only by purchasing 
an intermediate form that allows it (M-G-M’). If you stay in the circulation sphere, there is 
no kind of exchange that will secure this result. The wage earner also freely contracts the 
remuneration of his/her working capacity, assuming in the exchange a legal position 
																																																								24	Stuart Mill J., Principles of political economy with some of their applications to social philosophy, 
abridged with introduction by Stephen Nathanson, Hackett Publishing Company, 2004. 25	Gioia V., Perri S., Corso di istituzioni di economia, Manni, 2002. 26	Marx deepens the relationship between exploitation and crisis in his major work, Capital, whose goal is 
not “simply” to explain the functioning mechanisms of capitalism but also to criticize the mystified 
representations developed by economists (from which the subtitle Criticism of Political Economy).	
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identical to that of the counterpart or the seller of any goods. The “workforce”27 which he 
sells on the basis of a free contract has an exchange value equal to the working time28 
needed to produce what it is necessary to maintain and reproduce, just as a unit of freely 
traded goods is worth the many units of the other commodities that can be produced in an 
identical working time. The wage-earned, by surrendering the use of the workforce, has, in 
fact, made the work of the capitalist available. Thus, a working day of a given length can 
be divided into two parts: part intended for the reproduction of the workforce and 
equivalent to the wage, and a part of “plus-work”, which translates into “plus-value” when 
considering the value of the commodity produced by three additions: constant capital or 
value of the means of production, variable capital or labor force value and plus-value.29 
When the capitalist finally sells the goods and realizes the plus-value, the difference 
between M’ and M, which gets on the basis of the prices that are formed in the markets, 
breaks down in the annuity for the use of natural resources, interest in the use of liquid 
funds and the producer’s profit. Ultimately, therefore, profit is the income of the capitalist 
mode of production: it is the source of the plus work,30 that is, the capitalist organization of 
labor. 
 
 
1.1.2 Arguments of the neoclassical economic view 
Subsequently of economic analysis and theory began to distinguish within the residual 
profit of the classical economy different elements that could only appear as one at a time 
when business management was generally in the hands of those who possessed everything 
or almost all of the capital invested in them. Later on with the neoclassical school, or 
marginal school, they tried to assert profitability. Particularly when the entrepreneur’s 
figure detached itself from that of the capitalist -through the spread of societies and the 
development of credit and the capital market- one realized the previous confusion between 
interest and profit and how it was necessary to purify the latter’s the interest of the 
venture’s capital invested in his enterprise. 																																																								27	Unlike classical economists, Marx makes a clear distinction between workforce and labor. Workforce is 
the set of physical and intellectual abilities employed by workers in the production process. It differs from the 
labor actually delivered because it represents only the ability to work, which results in actual work only when 
the production process starts. 28	The workforce is itself a freely available commodity on the market. 
29 Marx K., Capital, vol. III. 1894. 30	“The surplus-value consists of [...] the surplus of the total amount of work incorporated in the commodity 
with respect to the amount of work paid that the commodity contains” (Capital, Book III, 68).	
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Neoclassical or marginal school (Walras, Wicksell, Marshall) marks a radical overcoming 
of Marxist conflict and, abandoning the concept of overweight, proposes instead to 
consider profit as a mere income, which constitutes the remuneration of the capital 
productive factor based on its marginal productivity. The element of distinction is precisely 
considering profit as a kind of opportunity cost that the entrepreneur has to support in 
choosing to invest capital in his enterprise rather than employing them elsewhere. Sraffa 
and Robinson, among others, have severely criticized this approach,31 underlining the 
erroneousness of the simultaneous determination of wages and profits by the implicit 
mechanism of the market mechanism. According to them, the theorization of marginal 
school does not take into account the fact that the amount of capital cannot be regarded as 
fixed because it is closely related to the performance of the profit rate.32 
The capital was thus understood by L. Walras and E. Von Böhm-Bawerk33 as a further 
factor in production and interest as the cost attributed to it, while the remuneration paid to 
the entrepreneur for time and work devoted to the firm as if it were of a management wage 
and not of profit. In open contrast to the residual profit definitions, F.H. Knight (comments 
on Knight’s theory will be discussed in more detail in the following paragraphs) and G.L. 
Shackle have in turn considered them as the risk premium assumed by the entrepreneur. In 
the neoclassical theory, the competitive business tends to maximize its profit and the 
research of the latter is the stimulus to innovations and the spring of economic 
development. Particularly important has been the performance of the profit rate as the ratio 
between profit and capital itself. From a macroeconomic point of view, M. Kalecki, N. 
Kaldor, and L. Pasinetti consider that it is linked to the economic cycle, which determines 
profit margins in relation to the production level of the entire system. Statistical surveys of 
the trend of the profit’s assay show an uneven trend of variation. While, on the one hand, a 
long-term increase in the rate of profit does not prove to be a very recent year, on the other 
hand, it does not appear that some classical economists have predicted that the profit rate 
would inevitably follow an unstoppable descendant parable (Ricardo, Marx). In developed 
countries capital growth was indeed higher than the demographic, but the same increase in 																																																								31	Piero Sraffa, The Laws of Returns under Competitive Conditions, The Economic Journal, XXXVI, 1926, 
pp. 535-550 (translated in Italian, Le leggi della produttività in regime di concorrenza, in Economia Pura, by 
G. del Vecchio, Utet, Turin, 1937). 32	Piero Sraffa, Produzione di merci a mezzo di merci. Premesse ad una critica della teoria economica, 
Einaudi, Turin, 1960 (Italian edition curated by Sraffa himself with the help of Raffaele Mattioli); New ed. 
Edited by Fabio Ranchetti, Einaudi, Turin, 1999. 33	According to Bawerk, capital is not an original factor in production, such as land and work, but it is their 
backwardness. Its value, however, should not be measured on the basis of work and land used in the past, but 
rather of the ability to produce goods in the future. 
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labor costs, the diversification, and expansion of demand for new products has required 
increasing investments in technologies to increase productivity and boost new productions, 
which also kept the demand for additional capital high and thus supported the level of the 
profit rate. 
Recently, with the development of entrepreneurial holdings in which there is a split 
between ownership and firm’s control, the maximization goal of profit has been replaced 
by objectives closer to the managerial direction of maximizing utility and power (R. 
Marris, R. Cyert, J.B. Baumol, J.K. Galbraith) - a specific paragraph will also be devoted 
to this aspect. 
If we want to draw some conclusions from the above analysis and by making a synthesis of 
the economics of classical and neoclassical economic approaches, it is plausible to state 
that the key points of profit theory are the following: 
I. Profit is independent of the concrete form of economic organization of society because 
its essence is not related to what will be of greater income but to dynamic changes. So in 
the economy, profit would exist (i.e. the production factors would be underpaid) only if 
dynamic changes took place. 
II. Profit is not an element of cost but price. This is explained by the fact that the product 
has a final and marginal utility greater than those corresponding to the activity of 
productive services, as a result of the growing needs that is the essence of the dynamic 
economy. Only if the future production cycles were the same as the previous ones the 
attribution of the product would only benefit the production factors (through an increase in 
their price), but then the conditions of the stationary economy would be without profit. 
III. Profit comes from progress. Firstly, for the existence of dynamic changes, which are 
neither strictly periodic nor regularly consistent, appear as uncertain or indefinite. It is this 
uncertainty that risk theory was closely linked to profit. Uncertain changes occur due to 
ever-new variables (such as population, tastes, capital, inventions, frictions, etc.) which 
they constantly transform the cost and demand curves. The only existence of dynamic 
changes would nevertheless generate profit if the entrepreneur did not reach lower costs 
than others think. And generally it takes, because there is a profit, a price p far greater than 
the cost c of “reducing the marginal (and total) usefulness of what the entrepreneur 
perceives, if any, the profit compared to the marginal (and total) usefulness corresponding 
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to he would eventually lose if the outcome of the economic operation had not been lucky 
for him”.34 
From the above three points there are three important consequences: 
1. Profit does not exist in a uniformly progressive society because the “uniformity” of the 
transformations would eliminate any uncertainty and therefore imputation would be 
mathematically and not economically discounted for the future; 
2. Profit is not necessarily a monopoly gain, although monopoly and quasi-monopoly 
elements are more or less significant gains in earnings; monopoly gain is, from the point of 
view of productivity, connected with pay less the basic factors of production; 
3. The profit of each entrepreneur depends on his ability to predict the indefinite future and 
this is related to the speed of transformations and their degree of expectation. That is why 
the State if regulating production and thus reducing risks, could lower the price of 
entrepreneurship. 
The neoclassical view of the economy, as proposed through Marshall, Robbins, and 
Chamberlin, has undoubtedly played a decisive role in the analysis of the twentieth 
century, enjoying a nearly unquestioned monopoly situation over the last fifty years. The 
reasons for this domain are known and largely due to the “perfect”35 rules that its method 
prescribes to those who use it. Economists who recognize this approach are required to 
formalize a problem in terms of an objective function, which must be maximized in respect 
of a set of constraints (the “model”), exploiting the degrees of freedom available to the 
decider (the economist). According to the neoclassical view, the firm is in fact composed 
of a set of factors organized in order to produce and market an asset that can be sold at a 
price at least equal to the a sum of the remuneration paid to the resources employed. 
Among the factors involved in the production include the ability to properly organize the 
resources, as well as any research and development activities, whether it relates to new 
production processes or to new products. This approach assumes implicit hypotheses and 
leads to precise conclusions. 
In the neoclassical theory, the firm performs the task of producing or transforming goods 
or services (inputs) into other goods or services (outputs). The production process 
associated with each good therefore constitutes a self-contained machine, which can 
modify its operating modes in the face of exogenous variations (such as the price of the 																																																								34	Gustavo Del Vecchio, Capitale e interesse, Torino, Einaudi, 1956. 35	The “perfect” method, described in Ricossa (1986, p.69), implies (1) the definition of an ideal situation 
(which in the case of these pages is the neoclassical competitive equilibrium), (2) the diagnosis of the 
separates itself from perfection (usually a market failure), (3) the economic policy intervention.	
	 25	
product or the production factors employed) but which, however, works according to well-
known mechanisms or foreseeable.  
In the introductory model to the theory of the neoclassical enterprise, it is assumed that: 
I. The owner of the business is also the manager of the enterprise; 
II. The company’s goal is to maximize profits (difference between revenues and costs); 
III. The benefits and costs (both social and private) of the firm are fully expressed by 
revenues and costs. 
The theory of the neoclassical enterprise, therefore, studies the choices that the firm needs 
to maximize profits, under the constraints imposed: (a) by all accessible techniques; (b) by 
the market structure in which the enterprise operates. The fact that the enterprise, in 
neoclassical theory, discounts the “perfect” rules does not necessarily mean that it ignores 
the uncertainty. It should be emphasized that, in this context, uncertainty concerns solely 
the values assumed by exogenous variables - whether these are prices of goods or factors, 
whether they are related to technological (exogenous) or institutional (exogenous too) 
variables. In other words, uncertainty does not affect the operation or efficiency of the 
machine that transforms input into output. Nor does it concern the entrepreneur’s activity, 
which in fact is considered equivalent to an official organizer-controller, who chooses the 
most suitable production function according to the objective assigned by the “model” and 
verifies that the factors are coherently combined with that choice. Certainly, the 
neoclassical entrepreneur is not an innovator or, more generally, an operator who tries to 
discover new opportunities, new needs to meet. The “perfection” of the neoclassical view 
would exclude, at least in potency, the uncertainty and the presence of persistent 
information asymmetries. Consequently, the presence of better entrepreneurs-organizers 
than others (entrepreneurs-organizers) would not be eligible for a more efficient production 
function and thus lower costs than competitors. It follows that the single enterprise, as it 
operates according to a known production function, can be replicated a large number of 
times, equal to the number of undertakings for whose aggregate production there is an 
adequate demand for a price not lower than the average cost. Given the available 
production factors, this number depends on production technology (machine size that 
minimizes production costs) and demand characteristics. 
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1.1.2.1 Alfred Marshall. Short and long-term 
Alfred Marshall, 36  the first economist to systematize the theoretical body of the 
neoclassical doctrine of the enterprise, introduced the idea, widely accepted since then, that 
the firm’s choices could be referred to two distinct moments: 
1. Short-term; 
2. Long-term. 
In the short-term, the capacity of an enterprise to build, that is, the maximum amount of 
output obtainable over a given period of time, is fixed. In the long-term, however, the 
entrepreneur is able to change the plant’s capacity. 
The short-term and long-term distinction can also be made using the concept of the 
variable factor (input) and fixed factor (input). A factor is variable if its use varies with the 
amount of product produced. A factor is fixed if the usage does not vary with the amount 
of product produced. In the long-term all the factors are variable. In the short-term, at least 
one factor is fixed. 
Entrepreneur choices are different whether it’s short or whether it’s a long-term one. In 
fact, in the short-term, the neoclassical entrepreneur must decide the amount of output to 
produce (between zero and plant capacity) with the aim of maximizing profit under the 
constraint of technique and market structure. We assume, initially, that the market structure 
in which the company operates is a perfect competition and focus on the bond of the 
technique. At a given historical moment, the entrepreneur can use a finite set of production 
techniques (available technology) to get a certain output. Such a set could also consist of a 
single technique. 
In the theory of the neoclassical enterprise, it is assumed that the rational entrepreneur will 
limit his choice to all the efficient Pareto techniques. A technique is not Pareto efficient if 
you can get the same amount of output with a lower use of at least one input. The set of 
efficient Pareto techniques, within which the entrepreneur can operate his short-term 
choice, is defined by the production function. The short-term production function is the set 
of efficient techniques to produce the y-output quantity in the unit of time considered using 
the L and RM quantities of variable inputs (labor and raw materials), given the size of the 
output, implant K. 
The short-term production function can be expressed in analytical terms as follows: 																																																								36	Alfred Marshall wanted to merge theory and historical knowledge to understand the complex causes that 
work in economic life. He thus designed to bring evolutionary into the economic discourse following the 
road indicated by Hebert Spencer. This combination of needs represented the peculiar aspect of Marshall's 
design, which characterized him in the Marginalist revolution.	
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y = f(L,RM,K) with K as a constant 
 
In the neoclassical theory of the firm, there is a strong logical link between production 
function, firm costs and the goal of maximizing profit. Consider the case of the short-term 
production function with only one variable (labor). If the company assumes a new worker, 
it will face an increase in the cost of the wage. At the same time, considering the curve of 
the marginal product, it also appears that the amount of product offered by the company 
increases, and hence revenues. So in the short-term, the entrepreneur will hire a new 
worker if the additional income that this guarantees (which changes for successive units of 
engaged worker) is higher than the wage. 
Introducing the concepts of Margin Cost and Average Cost easily evidences the 
relationship between the production function and the cost of the enterprise: 
                                                             𝑀𝐶 = 𝑑𝑇𝐶𝑑𝑦                                𝐴𝐶 = 𝑇𝐶𝑦         
Because the costs of an enterprise can be distinguished in Variable Costs (associated with 
variable factors) and Fixed Costs (associated with fixed factors), we can write: 
ATC = AVC + AFC = !"! +  !"!  
Consider the case of the production function with only one variable factor (the labor). 
 
y = f(L,RM,K) with RM and K as a constant 
 
TC = WL + rM + iK 
Where W is the salary (wage) while r and i are the unit costs of M and K. 
So, in perfect competition, a short-term entrepreneur will choose to produce a quantity of 
output that will equal the market price at marginal cost when this is higher than the 
variable average costs. 
 
 
 1.1.2.2 Equilibrium characteristics 
These premises allow I to define the characteristics of the neoclassical firm’s own 
equilibrium configurations. In the presence of homogeneous products, there is a perfect 
competition where prices are near the minimum average cost. With differentiated products, 
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however, there is a monopoly competition, where the price is higher than the minimum 
average cost. In both cases the freedom of entry into the industry will tend to cancel the 
unitary profit of the enterprise, understood as the difference between the price and the 
average cost. Not always, however, the neoclassical enterprise has near-zero profits. In the 
light of what has been said in the previous paragraph and contrary to what some of the 
members of the Austrian School37 have said, positive profits can also be found in a 
competitive market, as long as there is uncertainty and entrepreneurs are differentiated 
between them. In the middle to long-term, however, less efficient operators will be able to 
reproduce the production methods of the best competitors. The profits will be so erosive, 
unless exogenous growth opportunities (e.g., opportunities for technological advancement 
or marketing) do not allow the reproduction of risk situations. In such a case, the typical 
conditions of the short term would again occur and therefore a new differentiation 
phenomenon. Of course, this implies that the neoclassical period does not describe a longer 
time interval rather it describes a sum of short periods in succession. The contest depicted 
here allows two sets of preliminary conclusions about the neoclassical perspective. On the 
one hand, the business function runs out almost exclusively in choosing between different 
production functions. A competitive regime therefore reflects a long-term steady context. 
Unexpected external shocks and raises regulatory issues solely in the presence of any 
apparent market failures can only disturb this. As far as business activity is concerned, 
however, there is no doubt that everyone can be entrepreneurs, because any businessman 
(Robbinsian) has to follow the track already run by other entrepreneurs, which however, it 
respects a predetermined pattern, which defines both the objective to be pursued and the 
method of calculation that allows it to achieve this goal. Finally, and thus the second part 
of reasoning is reached, even competitive equilibrium would be “perfect”, since interaction 
between neoclassical firms would lead to maximization of social welfare by defining it as a 
good Pareto’s configuration. The issue of income distribution is thus transformed into 
redistribution.38 																																																								37	The Austrian School argues that the only valid economic theory should derive logically from the basic 
principles of human action. In addition to its formal approach to theory, often called praxeology, the school 
has always preached an interpretative approach to history. The praxeological method allows deriving the 
laws of the economy valid for every human action, while the interpretative approach deals with individual 
historical events. The major contributions of the Austrian School in Economics are: (a) the theory of price 
distribution; (b) the emphasis on the convenient nature of each choice; (c) the theory developed by Hayek 
and von Mises on the economic cycle, also referred to as the Austrian economic cycle, which highlights the 
expansion of credit due to monetary policy and the fall in interest rates; (d) the hayekian concept of 
intertemporal equilibrium; (e) the view of Hayek and von Mises of the price as an index of scarcity.	38	Colombatto E., Dall’impresa dei neoclassici all’imprenditore di Kirzner, 2000. 
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1.2 Economic governance of the firm  
The academic debate focuses on a twofold order of issues: the extent to which profit 
should be pursued and the identification of the subject and subjects to which it should be 
targeted. 
In classical theory, as is well known, the entrepreneur, by virtue of a perfectly rational 
behavior, acts to maximize his utility function, represented by profit.39 
 
 
1.2.1 Productive and distributive logic 
The transition from the entrepreneur to the enterprise qualifies two distinct logics of profit: 
one of the production matrixes, the other of the distribution matrix. Finding these two 
logics seems extremely interesting and of great utility: from a practical point of view, a 
comparison between the two logic allows to capture the implications in terms of divergent 
corporate governance actions. 
Productive logic identifies profit when producing wealth through business activity; 
distributive logic instead relegates profit when distributing wealth generated by the 
business activity. 
In the first case, the profit coincides with the outcome of the business activity; on the other 
hand, profit only occurs when the firm’s profit (or net product) is distributed.40  
From a quantitative point of view, profit is what is left of revenues, covered by various 
management costs, amortization, provisions, and new appropriations. It always includes a 
definable share as a “restoration contribution”, capable of reintegrating the “consumed” 
economic capital over the period and ensuring the survival capability of the enterprise 
system. In this regard, profit is part of the firm’s gross proceeds, that is, as part of a sum 
that, before assuming the economic and accounting characteristics of profit, must be 
reduced by what is needed to bring capital back to the previous measure.41 																																																								39	On the importance of profit as an element that connotes the capitalist economic model, see Sen A., The 
Profit Pattern, Lloyds Bank Review, no. 147, 1983.	40	In terms of production, profit “is the entity that, over time, increases the company's availability, covered 
that is all production costs. It stems from an activity of producing only when it is organized in such a way as 
to be profitable” see Del Punta V., Profit and Maximization: Closure to a Study Conference, Economic 
Policy Review no. 10, 1969.	41	Production logic appears to be the driving force behind the evolution of the concept of risk from a static 
field, whereby the risk is present in any economic environment, in a dynamic environment, where the risk 
tends to assume the meaning of uncertainty of result due to environmental economic mutations. The 
economic theory of profit is inspired by the criterion for which every factor in production is remunerated for 
the contribution made. If these contributions are added to the initiative and the organization (which makes it 
possible to overcome the risk and uncertainty elements) and the costs are attributed to the entrepreneur, the 
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Productive logic obviously entails a conception of profit as income, residual and non-
contracted. The presence of a profit, understood not just as a mere difference between 
revenues and costs but also as a guarantee of asset recovery, should therefore support the 
firm’s development project over time.42 
Distributive optics calls into question the ways of distributing profit. Potentially, in fact, a 
“distributive” problem arises whenever the wealth generated by the enterprise has to be 
redistributed. Consequently, the distribution optics requires considering the profit by 
highlighting the position and the role of ownership over other stakeholders. The property, 
besides giving impetus to business ventures, brings venture capital, taking on its business 
risk. This risk must correspond, as a counterpart, to the need for adequate remuneration, 
albeit in a residual form, through appropriate levels of profit.43 To see, the dichotomy 
between productive and distributive logic accompanies the evolution of capitalism over 
time and follows the reflection of the doctrine on the problem of the economic governance 
of enterprises, aimed at regulating relations between different subjects, bearers of interest 
in a same common company. Distributive optics is typical of large corporations in which 
ownership separation and control are determined. 
The nineteenth century is marked by the birth of the company as a tool for the realization 
of the productive function, inseparably linked to the figure of the entrepreneur. With the 
transition to a “modern” form of capitalism, rooted in the large corporation, states the 
separation between ownership and control. In the big business, there is no longer a 
coincidence between those who manage the company’s resources, orienting them towards 
expected levels of expected profitability (in line with risk) and who holds the residual 
control rights. If classical and neoclassical theories focus on ownership and control in the 
hands of the individual subject (entrepreneur/capitalist), managerial theories make it 
distinct attributes, property, and management attributes. 
The difference between productive and distributive logic thus incorporates, ultimately, a 
reflection on the firm’s autonomy over ownership. At this point, the reflexes, even and 
above all in terms of government action, are reflected in the application of a productive or 
distributive logic to the two aspects initially mentioned, relating to the extent of profit and 
its destination. Production logic emphasizes the profit in terms of surplus, which is 
primarily to reintegrate and increase the firm’s assets. In that case, profit is the goal of 																																																																																																																																																																								
latter should also be attributed its benefits in the form of profit. See Ceccherelli A., Business Economics and 
Business Administration, op. 	42 Amaduzzi A., L’azienda nel suo sistema e nell’ordine delle sue rilevazioni, Utet, Torino, 1966. 43	See Golinelli G.M., L’approccio sistemico al governo dell’impresa. L’impresa sistema vitale. 
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ensuring long-term survival conditions for the enterprise. In the distributive perspective, on 
the contrary, profit gradually loses the residual character and appears specifically aimed at 
meeting the expectations of the property. However, a stronger firm’s permanence in its 
own context, namely the increase in probability of its survival over time, appears 
incompatible with the adoption of merely distributive logic. It not only “profligates” profit 
as “business income”, but it also changes it to the government’s action.  
Conversely, productive optics is much more in line with the described need for autonomy, 
and with a systemic logic of corporate governance. It is logical that the subjective 
rationality of the various participants, in fact, prevails in a systemic rationality, aimed at 
seeking of the ever-higher probability of survival. It is in this context, typical of the 
systemic approach that is vital to corporate governance, which points to the inadequacy 
and dangers of a “global” application of distributive logic, revealing further reflections on 
the relationship between pursuit and destination of profit, enterprise survival and value 
creation process.44 
 
 
1.2.2 Governance structure and transaction cost 
In 1937 Ronald H. Coase changed the way people saw economic organizations when he 
published “The Nature of the Firm” (1937). Half a century later, Williamson and Winter 
(1993) published a collection of writings shedding new light on contemporary issues and 
creating tools that allowed Coasean ideas to be tested. Their discussion focused on the 
search for economic efficiency. Transaction costs were the explanatory basis for the way in 
which economic relations were organized. Since then several authors, including 
Williamson, have reviewed and applied the core concepts of Transaction Cost Economics 
(TCE). The controversial definition of transaction costs permeates the governance mode 
among economic actors.45 
The original model conceived by Williamson (1991) analyzes the governance modes, seen 
as the results of the search for gains through the choice of cost-minimizing factors, 
basically as a function of the transaction dimensions (asset specificity, uncertainty, and 
frequency). Joskow (1993) emphasizes the difficulties in data collection and the problems 																																																								44	Gatti M., Biferali D., Volpe L., Il governo dell’impresa tra profitto e creazione di valore, in Sinergie, vol 
79. 2009. 
45 For a sample of approaches to understanding the limits to the firm, see Arrow (1974), Williamson (1985, 
Chapter 6), and Klein (1996). On the internal organization of the firm – Coase’s third question – see Argyres 
(2009). The economics literature on internal organization has tended to draw primarily on agency theory, not 
transaction cost economics.  
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of measurement in empirical research, which caused theoretical testing to progress only 
very gradually. Empirical evidence allowed Joskow (1993) to restate his proposition that 
the governance of contractual relations systematically varies according to the degree of 
asset specificity. However, the author highlights the fact that there are factors that 
relativize the univocal integration trend directly related to the existence of the high 
specificity of the assets. In this sense, the cost transaction discussion and its relation to the 
definition of governance structure are at the core of the Coasean debate. Thus it is relevant 
to revisit the literature and some empirical proof to assess which factors determine the 
governance structures.46 
The coexistence of different structures in the same value chain, whose assets are not 
different in terms of specificity, is an important issue for Transaction Cost Economics, 
since it predicts a convergence toward the most efficient structures. 
Williamson (1996) associates the concept of institutions with that of governance for 
microanalyses of the individual transaction. The institutional environment (rules of the 
game) is taken as granted, and the economic players willfully align transactions with 
governance structures to optimize revenues. Thus, institutions are governance mechanisms 
and their study is directly related to the optimum decision regarding lower transaction 
costs. 
Arrow (apud Williamson, 1996, p. 5) defines transaction costs as “costs of running the 
economic system”. Based on this concept, Williamson states that the choice of governance 
mode is made through a comparison of the costs of one governance mode with those of 
others. In this sense, “the study of governance is concerned with the identification, 
explanation, and mitigation of all forms of contractual hazards” (Williamson, 1996, p. 5). 
The contractual issue is at the core of the debate on the costs of running a transaction 
(Coase, 1972). Such issue contributes toward the progress of the “Theory of the Firm”, 
inasmuch as it points out other relevant determinants of the firm’s productive efficiency. 																																																								
46 Ronald Coase’s landmark 1937 article, The Nature of the Firm, framed the study of organizational 
economics for decades. Coase asked three fundamental questions: Why do firms exist? What determines their 
boundaries? How should firms be organized internally? To answer the first question, Coase famously 
appealed to “the costs of using the price mechanism”, what we now call transaction costs or contracting 
costs, a concept that blossomed in the 1970s and 1980s into an elaborate theory of why firms exist (Alchian 
& Demsetz, 1972; Williamson, 1975, 1979, 1985; Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978; Grossman & Hart, 
1986). The second question has generated a huge literature in industrial economics, strategy, corporate 
finance, and organization theory. “Why”, as Coase (1937, pp. 393–394) put it, “does the entrepreneur not 
organize one less transaction or one more?” In Williamson’s (1996, p. 150) words, “Why can’t a large firm 
do everything that a collection of small firms can do and more?” As Coase recognized in 1937, the 
transaction-cost advantages of internal organization are not unlimited, and firms have a finite “optimum” size 
and shape.  
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For Williamson, the contract is a complex institutional arrangement involving the different 
aspects of an economic transaction (the basic unit of an economic relation), such as 
planning, promises, competition and governance (Williamson, 1985, p. 30). 
The existence of distinct dynamics within the internal logic of the transactions translates 
into a complex puzzle of theoretical and empirical knowledge. These internal divergences 
of the transaction are understood through the attributes that lead the economic agents to 
negotiate. Based on the TCE, Zylbersztajn (1995, p. 137) infers that “the prevailing 
governance structures are the optimizing result of the alignment of characteristics of the 
transactions and of the institutional environment. Thus optimization is seen in the 
neoclassical style, meaning the search for efficiency”. 
Therefore, it is possible to make a Darwinian assumption that an efficient governance 
structure should prevail as a winning structure. And it is a fact that there is a process of 
expelling inefficient structures - which may last until the result is achieved. The path 
dependence may allow for the persistence of inefficient structures. The necessary time for 
the most efficient structure to win would depend on a series of factors, among which is 
asymmetric or incomplete information or even institutional rules - formal or informal - that 
prioritize certain structures. 
Here, we can ask, “How does TCE define the choice of the organizational structure?” 
According to Williamson (1975) and to Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978) different 
governance structures reflect inherent transaction attributes. Efficient, cost-minimizing 
structures result from their alignment with the transaction attributes (frequency, uncertainty 
and asset specificity), considering the agent’s behavioral presuppositions (bonding 
rationality and opportunism). 
A degree of asset specificity would be the main attribute of the transaction used to explain 
a firm’s governance strategies. Specific assets are those that are non-utilizable in another 
activity or by another agent, except with loss of value. The more specific the asset the more 
the firm will internalize the transaction via vertical integration. Klein, Crawford, and 
Alchian (1978) argue that whenever the asset becomes more specific, the cost of hiring 
generally increases more than that of vertical integration. The basic idea is that a firm 
appears in situations where it is not possible to draw up good contracts and where it is 
important to allocate power (Hart, 1997). 
Therefore, the specificity of the assets is considered as one of the main elements that can 
explain the transaction costs. The second dimension to be considered in the analysis of the 
transactions is the frequency, i.e., the repetition of the same kind of transaction, whose 
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importance is seen in the dilution of costs for the adoption of complex mechanisms 
throughout several transactions, as well as in the formation of a reciprocal reputation 
among agents. This concept is also used by Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978) and Kreps 
(apud Azevedo, 1996, p. 26) who consider that the cost of an opportunistic action is 
determined by the present value of the future flow of resources involved in the bilateral 
relation. 
The third dimension is uncertainty, which involves the understanding that it is impossible 
to foresee future events, i.e., the contractual arrangement cannot ex-ante establish price, 
delivery dates, quality and acceptance of the goods negotiated. Therefore, no contract is 
complete. Thus an opportunistic action from one of the parties is possible: the costs 
associated with such an action are the transaction costs. 
Most empirical works focusing on transaction costs try to confirm the thesis of the 
alignment of the governance structures - market, contract and vertical integration - 
resulting from the intensification of the transaction costs (Joskow, 1993). They also try to 
demonstrate that asset specificity is one of the most important determinants of the three 
transaction attributes. This means that whenever the investment in specific assets increases, 
the cost of performing a market transaction increases more than that of a transaction in 
more complex structures, thus reaching vertical integration (Willianson, 1985). 
 
 
1.2.3 Definition model of the governance structure: Williamson’s View 
Williamson’s analysis (1985) departs from the perspective of comparative static by 
positing a model that relates the degree of asset specificity to the governance mode cost. 
The author considers that the decision on how to organize production systems is 
conditioned by a degree variation in the specificity of the asset involved. 
The hierarchy is characterized by an internal organization (vertical integration). For 
Williamson (1985), while incorporating a transaction, the internal organization increases 
the firm’s power to impose itself on the structure of the production system. The adoption of 
the hierarchy occurs when the costs of this governance structure are inferior to those 
obtained via the market. The governance structure characterized by vertical integration is 
mainly determined by the characteristics of the specific assets used in the chain. The higher 
the asset specificity, the larger the prizes given by the adoption of the hierarchy as a 
governance mode. The advantage of the latter vis-à-vis market organization lies in its 
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better capacity to adapt to environmental change conditions.47 
The type of contract used in this mode is relational, with more flexible transactions and 
with the possibility of a continuous negotiation, in which adjustments are permanent and 
on-line and, consequently, in which the original contract is no longer an exclusive basis for 
negotiations (Macneil apud Jank, 1996, p. 35). The adoption or intensification of the 
hierarchical mode requires increased bureaucratic costs and decreased incentives from the 
market to the agents (Zylbersztajn, 1995, p. 141). If these costs are higher than the benefits 
arising from the other modes, such a situation enables the adoption of either market or 
hybrid governance modes. 
However, when considering the governance mode as an element that explains the “Theory 
of Contracts”, Williamson (1985) accepts that this definition of the optimal structure is not 
so biased in an economic transaction because contracts thereof tend to be incomplete. 
Brousseau and Fares (2000, p. 410) state, “agents therefore design incomplete contracts 
that are not implemented and are ex ante designed as a complete set of (possibly 
contingent) behavioral rules that will ex post solve all coordination problems. Instead, they 
design decision-making devices that ex post will indicate the behavior required by 
contractors to ensure the most efficient coordination and the guarantee the enforcement of 
mutual commitments”. 
Thus the decision making process in a transaction will derive from the contractual parties, 
which can be vertically (hierarchically) integrated, and based either on negotiation (hybrid) 
or on a third party (market). Ex ante a transaction, there is a set of rules and there are 
authorities established by the governance mechanisms. Brousseau and Fares (2000, p. 410) 
verify that authority and enforcement belong to the inherent nature of the governance 
structure, and that its definition is associated with the capacity of the agents that deal with 
such coercion mechanisms in the transaction. Such arguments call for a new discussion of 
Williamson's model, and a verification of its methodological limitations to define the 
governance structure as a tendency to seek efficiency in the transaction. 
 
 
 
 																																																								
47 Whether the firms will integrate thus depends on the comparative costs and benefits of contracting, not on 
the underlying production technology. Indeed, if contracting costs are low, the related diversifier may 
actually compete at a disadvantage relative to the single-business firm, because the diversified firm faces the 
additional bureaucratic costs of low-powered incentives, increased complexity, and so on (Williamson, 
1985).  
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1.2.4 Rediscussing Williamson’s Model 
Zylbersztain (1995, p. 83) points out an important restriction to Williamson’s model when 
he states that if, in a first moment, scale and scope economies are negligible, there is a 
limited possibility that other decision elements exist, regarding the integration of a certain 
production step. In this sense, there are variables only for the costs of production and of 
organizing the information and the resources required in the process of making the product. 
There is no alternative for new allocations of resources, since the firm is limited to a non-
existence of economies of scope, and since it is based on the definition of already 
strategically chosen products (beyond the definition of what and for whom to produce; the 
definition here is only how to produce). 
Thus, the total cost is the sum of the production cost and the governance cost, the latter 
referring to administrative and bureaucratic costs. Initially, the governance cost has to be 
examined as a variation between the bureaucratic costs associated with the internalized 
production and the governance mode via market (Equation 1). Within these limits exposed, 
this cost is only related to the specificity of the assets. For instance, if the specificity is low, 
the organization will have high adaptability in the social environment. That decreases the 
costs of managing resources and, consequently, makes the governance cost via market 
lower than the hierarchic (DG > 0,) cost. As Zylbersztain points out (1995, p. 83), if the 
hierarchic governance cost (B) is higher than that of the market (M) “this means that with 
lower degrees of asset specificity the market is more efficient than the firms in terms of 
transaction costs, since it avoids bureaucratic costs”. On the other hand, when the 
adaptation to the environment becomes more difficult, uncertainty becomes more 
preeminent and greater adaptation of the firm to external changes is necessary. Here, the 
governance costs via market (M) become higher than the hierarchic costs (B), because the 
relative costs to control and adapt the organization to environmental changes become lower 
than those relative to the free market. There is a limitation regarding the change of the type 
of governance structure involving the balance between the costs adapting to the 
environment and to the firm (DG = 0). In this sense, the higher the need to adapt to the 
organization, the higher the need for controls and bureaucracy and, therefore, DG tends to 
zero. From this moment on, the more uncertainty becomes preeminent, and the firm 
demands the more adaptation, the more the option for hierarchical governance is 
consolidated (bureaucratic and internal control). 
 ∆𝐷𝐺 = 𝐵 𝑘 −  𝑀 𝑘                                                     (1) 
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Where:  
DG = Governance cost variance; 
B(k) = governance’s hierarchic cost as a function of the specificity of the asset; 
M(k) = cost of governance through the market as a function of the specificity of the asset. 
Once the constraint to the economy of scale is eliminated, it is necessary to take the 
production costs into account. At a given moment, it can be advantageous for the firm to 
have governance via market, but the firm would not profit from scale economies if its 
processes were hierarchic (or vice-versa). Thus, it is necessary to assess the total cost as 
the sum of the gains by the production cost (scale) and of the governance (bureaucratic) - 
Equation 2. 
For Williamson (1985), both costs are associated with the type of asset used and, therefore, 
the decision regarding the best governance structure will rely on the combination of scale 
and bureaucracy in its evolutionary process. The limit between the definitions of structure 
will occur when the governance costs and the total costs are null. If such values are inferior 
to zero, then the prevailing governance structure will be the hierarchic one, due to the 
higher need for adaptability by internal controls and by scale economies. 
 𝐶𝑇 = 𝐶𝑖 𝑘 − 𝐶𝑚 𝑘 + 𝐵 𝑘 −𝑀 𝑘                    (2) 
 
Where:  
CT = total cost; 
Ci(k) = hierarchical cost of production as a function of the specificity of assets; 
Cm(k) = cost of production through market as a function of the specificity of assets; 
B(k) = hierarchical cost of governance as a function of the specificity of assets; 
M(k) = governance cost through market as a function of the specificity of assets. 
The Williamson model is strongly criticized for three reasons. The first two come from 
Demsetz (1993) and Barzel (1997); they include the cost of information as an important 
element to define the governance structure. North (2005) points out that the persistence of 
heterogeneous governance structures may be a result of factors such as institutional path 
dependency. 
Demsetz’s criticism (1993) is based on the analysis of profit maximization or the 
efficiency in the replacement of the firm by the market, which occurs if the cost of using 
the market becomes relatively higher than the cost of the hierarchy. That means that the 
	 38	
extension of the firm will be that one defined by the equality among the marginal values of 
the transaction costs and those of the hierarchy. According to the author, the cost of 
information is what will define the governance structure adopted. Thus, to understand its 
existence it must be recognized that the hierarchy is a resource employed in a world where 
knowledge is incomplete and obtained at a high cost. 
The author contends that internal production does not mean a clear elimination of the 
transaction cost. Likewise, the purchase of goods from another firm, instead of internal 
production, implicitly involves another firm’s administration costs (of the hierarchy), so 
that hierarchical costs are not eliminated when goods are purchased through the market. 
The administration (hierarchy) will be working in a more disperse manner among many 
firms. Even if each firm is an individual entity, administration costs exist: those of 
planning and carrying out tasks. Besides, it is not correct to infer that production would 
become individualized if the transaction cost were zero. 
The independent individual or cooperative production through the firm will depend upon 
on the extension of the economies of scale (scope) and on the hierarchy. The degree of 
decentralization will not depend only on the transaction cost, because this is not the only 
cost the firm will take into consideration. There are many other costs, including that of 
production. Thus, to say that firms produce their own inputs when they are cheaper does 
not mean that the transaction costs are lower than those of administration (hierarchy). An 
increase in the transaction cost does not lead to a replacement of the market coordination 
with the administration (hierarchy), but to a replacement of the hierarchical coordination in 
small firms (higher quantity) with another type of coordination in larger companies (lower 
quantity). 
For it, the emphasis given to the cost of transaction implicitly assumes that all firms can 
produce goods with the same facility. The market is seen as a perfect replacement in a 
firm’s production when the transaction cost in the market is compared to that of hierarchy 
within the firm. This analysis implicitly presupposes that information has no cost for the 
purpose of production. That means that what a firm can produce another firm also can, so 
that the decision to buy or to produce depends on the differences in the transaction costs 
Demtsez (1993, p. 165) posits, “each firm is a bundle of commitments to technology, 
personnel, and methods, all contained and constrained by an insulating layer of information 
that is specific to the firm, and this bundle cannot be altered or imitated easily or quickly. 
The components of this bundle that are emphasized by transaction cost theory are 
important, but not exclusively so”. 
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The transaction cost plays an important role determining how the firm is formed, but its 
vertical limitations depend on the productivity that will be reached according to different 
arrangements. Particularly important in the determination of the benefits of the cooperative 
production are the considerations based on knowledge. Continuous association of the same 
persons facilitates the accumulation of information by the firm (gains of scale) and by the 
persons (specificity of the human capital). Thus the limitations of the vertical integration of 
a firm would be determined by the economy of conservation of the expenditures on 
knowledge. A single firm - vertically integrated- would find it difficult to acquire and keep 
the necessary knowledge archives to control the cost and the quality to make good 
managerial decisions if their uses were multiple. 
Another line of the analysis focusing on information for the understanding of the firm’s 
configuration is found in evolutionary theory. Winter (1993) holds that the firm in this 
approach is seen as a repository of productive knowledge, which involves the idiosyncratic 
characteristics that distinguish it from superficially similar firms in the same line of 
business. 
The evolutionary theory suggests that the concept of asset specificity is important to 
understand the working of the firm as a repository of knowledge. This theory emphasizes 
that the firm possessing an established routine has resources that can be used with great 
profit. Thus, the firm works as a repository of knowledge mainly due to the time necessary 
to associate the inputs, particularly those regarding human services, with the firm. The 
costs and benefits arising from the adjustment define a specific mode of governance, which 
is constantly influenced by the pattern of transaction in force. Thus the process of changing 
the way things are done in a firm involves incremental adjustments in a complex 
independent system. Naturally, the market supplies the information that guides the firm’s 
strategy and global profitability. 
It is thus necessary to understand the factors favoring firms by opposition, examining 
others that present lower performance or those that merely copy success. The concept of 
asset specificity is fundamental to understand the working of the firm as a repository of 
knowledge and its growth. But it is also necessary to ally such analysis with a wider 
concept, in which the environments of the transaction must be characterized so that they 
can give a basis for the analysis of the types of routines of the transactions that are viable 
in different environments. 
The second criticism of the view of Williamson’s approach originated in Barzel (1997). 
The author states that the Williamson’s focus is not general, but rather, it is contained 
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within a wider theoretical model whose information is the general variable that explains 
the existence of the transaction costs. For the author, transaction costs are costs associated 
with the transfer, capture and protection (maintenance) of the rights. Given that a 
transaction involves several dimensions and that for this reason it is complex, there are 
costs that are hard to measure. Barzel affirms that the concept and measuring of transaction 
costs are more complex than that proposed by Williamson and the definition of governing 
structure is dependent on other elements besides the specificity of assets. 
Transaction costs will exist when there are information problems, regardless of the 
existence of specific assets.48 Thus, even if the degree of asset specificity is very high, 
there would be no need for vertical integration if the initial rules for contracting were 
transparent and the distribution of the quasi rent, i.e., of the rights to the property of the 
income generated, were well defined. However, if there were a large variability in the 
income generated and difficulty measuring it, one of the parties could capture that income, 
which would bring high costs for monitoring and protecting rights. This means that when 
the residual rights to the asset, which is shared by those participating in the relation, are not 
constant, and then there is a mutual effort to capture the biggest part of this indefinite 
fraction of the income. Therefore, the maximization of the net value of an asset involves 
property and the pattern of property. In this way, the pattern of property will be defined by 
the variability in the assets’ value. Thus, integration acquires a relevant role in the 
definition of the governance structure when there is a situation of high uncertainty of 
information and prohibitive costs to delineate rights. On the other hand, when the rights are 
perfectly delineated and there is no cost to obtain information about the product, the 
relevant transaction cost will be zero. 
According to this point of view, Williamson’s model only partly explains the real 
motivation to integrate. It is not difficult to ensure the rights to an asset when the flow of 
services it generates can be promptly verified, because it is relatively simple to impose a 
charge commensurate with the level of service transacted. Whenever the flow of service is 
known and constant, there are no costs to ensure the rights to the assets. If it varies, but is 
predictable, the rights are also ensured. Naturally, the variability can reduce the value of 
the assets, but it does not necessarily affect the certainty of the possession of the rights. 																																																								48 The problems and costs of measurement pervade and significantly affect all economic transaction. Errors 
of measurement are too costly to eliminate entirely. The value of equally priced items will differ, then, and 
people will spend resources to acquire the difference. Such resource expenditure is wasteful, and it is 
hypothesized that exchange parties will form such contracts and engage in such activities that reduce this 
kind of resource use. See Barzel Y., Measurement Cost and the Organization Markets, Journal of Law and 
Economics, vol. 25, n.1 (1982).	
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However, when the flow of the income of the transacted rights is subject to random 
fluctuations and both parties can profit from that, then the delineation of the rights is 
problematic. 
Thus, if the degree of asset specificity is the same, Barzel’s approach can suggest an 
important argument for the coexistence of different governance structures in a production 
chain: the difficulty of measuring information. This means that, in opposition to the 
Williamson’s view, when the same asset specificity is considered in a production chain, the 
coexistence of governance structures would not be only transitory. Also, it does not mean 
that we would be at the indifference point between a governance structure and another one. 
Rather, it means that there would be a region of indifference between one or another 
situation because of the difficulty measuring information among the different production 
chains, i.e., despite the same degree of asset specificity, the conditions of uncertainty or of 
difficulty of measurement would lead to the coexistence of different governance structures. 
In his defense of empirical studies focusing on the issue of firm configuration based on the 
role of specific assets, Joskow (1993) posits that their approach was due to their capacity 
for instrumentation. However, the author contends that there is no unified theory. Several 
economic characteristics will thus influence the decision of whether the firms will become 
integrated or not. 
The works of Muris, Scheffman and Spiller (1992) follow this line of thought. They have 
observed that investments in specific assets in the soft drinks industry in the US were 
important for the initial configuration of the firm's governance structure. The alteration in 
the governance structure, from the time the distribution channel was employed to the mode 
of vertical integration, was caused by changes in the market configuration. 
Thus, since there were no changes in the specificity of the asset, the firms adopted the 
strategy of a more complex governance structure because they needed a higher level of 
regional information about the demand. The efficiency in Williamson’s and Barzel’s views 
must be particularized according to the type of demand the firm meets. Thus it is possible 
to have the same production system meeting different demands, which makes the existence 
of more than one type of efficient structure possible. 
The last criticism refers to the importance North gives to path dependence to explain the 
persistence of governance structures. According to the author, economic performance is 
determined, to a great extent, by the type and quality of the institutions that give support to 
the markets. North (2000, p. 37) defines institutions as a structure that is imposed by 
humans upon themselves to facilitate interaction. Corroborating with North, Langolis 
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states, exemplifies and questions: “But what happened in the century between the railroad 
and the Internet? Why did high levels of verticalization persist until the late twentieth 
century, long after the passing of the original entrepreneurial design problem that gave rise 
to most of these firms? The answer has to do with path dependency and the nature of the 
selection environment”. (Langlois, 2005, p. 28). 
This indicates that the decision may be the technical consistency and efficiency of the 
chain seeking optimization of resources, but the way humans interact over time and the 
institutions that permeate and influence them may be decisive in strategic decisions, like 
the type of governance structure adopted. 
Stemming from the criticism, it can be observed that the definition of the governance 
structure is more complex than if it is considered a function of the specificity of assets. The 
authors discussed here emphasize that information and the decision-making context may 
also be important elements to understand the type of governance structure in a chain. These 
two variables will be amplified to strategies and the influence over the governance 
structure will be evaluated. 
Therefore, it is possible to frame a hypothesis referring to the coexistence of governance 
structures. This means that the coexistence of distinct governance structures would be 
centered on the strategic issue of each group of firms meeting different market needs. In 
order to discuss this hypothesis this study will evaluate: the importance of the strategic axis 
for the definition of a governance structure starting from the influence of the type of 
market served (and the coexistence of markets with the same production structure); and the 
interdependence between the production strategy and commercialization. 
 
 
 
1.2.5 Markets Served 
The decision concerning the type of governance structure based on Williamson’s approach 
considers the direct relation between asset specificity and total costs. However, a firm’s 
economic efficiency must be also determined by the optimization of the use of its resources 
per market served. In some cases, the same asset can enable the firm to meet different 
market segments. For instance, the poultry market can meet the demand for whole broiler 
or broiler cuts using the same production technology. 
Such a possibility decreases the asset specificity, but not the firm’s capacity for adaptation 
and internal control and its control of the environment. In this aspect, this consideration 
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eliminates the second restriction to the Williamson’s model (present in Equations 1 and 2). 
It also emphasizes the need to evaluate the economy of scope to define the type of 
governance structure. Therefore, there will be governance costs distributed among the 
manufactured products. As for the production costs, they can be lower in virtue of the 
existing economy of scope. Equation 3 shows that the total cost will be distributed among 
manufactured products. If the total cost is lower than the sum of the costs of each 
individually manufactured product without the appropriate synergies relative to the 
economy of scope (Cta, b < Cta + CTb), there can be a new configuration of governance.49 
 𝐶𝑇!,! = [𝐶𝑖! 𝑘 − 𝐶𝑚! 𝑘 + [𝐶𝑖! 𝑘 − 𝐶𝑚! 𝑘 + 𝐵!,! 𝑘 −𝑀!,! 𝑘        (3) 
 
Where: CTA,B = total cost of products A and B  CiA(k) = cost of production  of product A 
hierarchical  as a function of the specificity  of the asset.  CmA(k) = cost of production  of 
product A through the  market as a function of the  specificity of the asset.  CiB(k) = cost of 
production  of product B hierarchical  as a function of the specificity  of the asset.  CmB(k) 
= cost of production  of product B through the market  as a function of the specificity  of 
the asset.  BA,B (k) = cost of hierarchical  governance as a function of the  specificity of the 
asset.  MA,B (k) = cost of governance  through the market as a function  of the specificity of 
the asset. 
As seen in equation 3, the total cost will be a function of the individual production costs 
and the governance cost that has synergy (bureaucracy optimized with the increment of 
new products), as observed in Winter and Demtsez. Each product will have its own basic 
governance cost, but part of this cost is common to more than one product, which allows 
for a reduction of the same insofar as it aggregates new products (thus configuring the 
economy of scope). Thus, the governance cost at a t1 moment is not a ratio between the 
governance costs at t0 because of the amount of product diversification (two products 
would imply half the governance cost for each one). Part of the governance cost is 
duplicated and thus the reduction of this cost is not very significant, event though it exists. 
With this reduction, the quantity of assets to shift the market governance to the hierarchic 
mode happens at a previous level of specificity (k1<k0). In this sense, it is possible to infer 
a tendency to change the governance structure based on the existence of the economy of 																																																								49	The served market is that segment of the total market that the firm actively attempts to serve. It is difficult 
to define, but the concept is essential to the measurement of variables such as relative and absolute market 
share and growth rate. It is therefore imperative that this task is undertaken creatively before embarking on 
precise strategy formulation.	
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scope. The latter can result from a strategic definition of the firm and from the level of 
information it can obtain from the markets being analyzed. On the other hand, if the total 
cost of the scope (CTa,b) is higher than the sum of the costs of each individual process, it 
is necessary to decide which market to participate in (loss reduction by scope) or which 
governance to adopt. Thus, the evaluation of the relation between the choice of the 
production scope and the type of governance is not so evident because it will depend 
exclusively on the existence of economies of scope. This tends to happen mainly in 
processes with significant economies of scope. To evaluate such economies, it is necessary 
to reanalyze issues such as market functioning, product type, competitors, demand 
characteristics and market size and to turn all these data into market information. The 
higher the level of information, the higher the capacity for decision on the most efficient 
governance structure. 
It is important to emphasize that despite the fact that the scale economy is a horizontal 
relationship (gains stemming from the diversification of production) it may be a source of 
optimization of governance costs and may alter the vertical relationship (governance 
structure).50 
In serving distinct markets with the same production technology, bureaucratic costs are 
optimized and the total for different products and markets become less than the sum of all 
individual parts (if the firm served each market separately). This optimization may reduce 
the governance cost for each product produced below that of a single product. Such a 
reduction in governance cost may make viable the change in the governance structure from 
market to hierarchical, increasing the firm's control, reducing risk, without significant 
changes in costs. 
As firms increase their scale of supply there is a tendency to reduce mean bureaucratic 
costs, which, despite keeping the same technology and specificity of assets, make changes 
in the type of governance structure viable. 
In fact, horizontal decisions, like the increase of supply scale, may have vertical impacts, 
from the governance structure perspective. For Williamson, this alternative was not 
considered because it did not contemplate the possibility to increase the potential of scale 
economies, in other words, producing different products utilizing the same technology. In 
making this scale economy viable, a productive chain has different commercial ties 																																																								50	This approach defines the firm as a governance structure that is coordinated by a hierarchical authority 
(Williamson, 2002). Williamson considers authority as the heart of the employment relationship individuals 
have with the firm.	
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(serving different markets with the same technological structure) and reduces its mean 
bureaucratic costs. The larger the variety of production and commercialization utilizing the 
same production technology, the smaller the mean bureaucratic cost and the larger the 
incentives for the relationships in the chain to tend towards hierarchical and away from 
market relationships, seeking to reduce risk at a lower cost (mean bureaucratic cost). 
Another aspect referring to the strategic definition of the type of governance derives from 
the demand side and of the interdependence between production and commercialization. 
 
 
1.2.6 Interdependence Between Production and Commercialization Strategies 
In addition to the economy of scope relative to production costs, it is possible to have an 
economy based on the capacity to serve different markets, thus reducing risks and 
maximizing opportunities. In this sense, profitability would be distributed through the 
different products commercialized, and, as compensation, a differentiated governance 
structure would be required. 
By means of an econometric model, scholars have proven that there is a correlation 
between the dynamics of the internal and the external market, even though they are 
distinct, which strongly influence the strategy of the firms. The decision to migrate from 
one market to another depends on the comparison of different structures between the cost 
of information (transaction) to carry out that strategy and the revenues received when sales 
are made in this new market. If the estimated cost were lower than the projected gains, the 
firm would incur in such costs to enter the national or international market. 
The average profit of firms can be expressed through the following relations: 
                                     𝐿! = 𝑃!"# × 𝑄!"# − (𝐶𝑓𝑟! + 𝐶𝐺!)𝑄!"#                                                      (4) 
                      𝐿! =  𝑃!"#×𝑄!"# + 𝑃!"# 𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑚 𝑄!"# − (𝐶𝑓𝑟! + 𝐶𝐺!)𝑄!"# + 𝑄!"#                                     (5) 
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where: Pint = is the price in the domestic  market, which is a function of the  international 
price;  Qint = is the quantity sold in  the domestic market;  Pext = is the price in the 
 external market, which is a  function of the currency  exchange rate;  Qext = is the quantity 
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sold in the  external market;  Cfr = is the production cost;  CG = is governance cost and; 
 Cproc = is the cost of processed  product;  Pint and Pext = are market data. 
Concerning governance, empirical research has shown that the firms integrated by 
contract, a trend among all exporting groups, guarantee a less variable price for producers 
than firms purchasing inputs on the spot market (Silva and Saes, 2004). A formal contract 
with the processing segment and with the distribution channel decreases the level of 
uncertainty. The offer in the internal market, in turn, depends on international prices that 
are functions of the exchange rate. Thus, considering a constant demand in the internal 
market, the profit of the L firms depends on the goods prices in the international market. 
Since there is an inter-relation between the national and international market, and 
considering the price in the international market as given, the firms are also price takers 
and the demand is inelastic at external market price. However, if this price is inelastic in 
the international market, any alteration in that market will significantly affect the internal 
market. Non-exporting firms have their strategies subject to the behavior of the internal 
market, and, to a certain extent, of the market of processed goods. Thus, this increased 
complexity and difficulty to access information (please read markets) would lead to 
different governance structures in the chain. 
Innovative firms (market leaders) and most imitative exporting firms direct their in natura 
produce to the external market; in the internal market they compete for the processed 
goods, which have another pattern of competition and a more inelastic demand when 
compared to the in natura produces, and are less dependent on the international price 
dynamics. This inter-relation among national markets, international markets and different 
types of products allied to the competitive characteristics of the whole market, enable the 
continuity of slaughtering firms, in this market, with a smaller scale of production and a 
less vertical governance structure. 
Regarding this aspect, Williamson (1985, p. 125) comments on the influence of the power 
of the market in the definition of the governance structure. To corroborate his statement, he 
presents the results of Porter and Livesay’s study, in which they observe, “the incidence of 
oligopoly and large size was much less frequent among manufacturers that did not 
integrate forward than among those that did”. 
An example was developed by Muris, Scheffman and Spiller (1992) for the soft drink 
industry. The governance structures observed in both of the two largest firms, Coca-Cola 
and Pepsi-Cola, in the North-American market have undergone an important change in the 
last thirty years. According to the authors, the changes that resulted in vertical integration 
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with the distributing companies were motivated by strategic considerations, given the 
significant market changes, particularly regarding the growth in the size of the companies’ 
clients. The efficiency in the geographically dispersed production decreased due to the 
economic cost associated with the relative concentration of the buyers and the need for a 
market strategy extrapolating the regional distribution of the bottlers. During the first years 
of the industry, a centralized control of these operations was impossible due to the 
difficulty in monitoring and communicating. 
In that manner, the interdependency between the form of commercialization and the 
structure of production makes the governance relationship in the production chain 
dependent not only on the specificity of assets, but also on the way that production and 
commercialization are linked. 
The efficiency of the firm, throughout its production chain, is linked to the relationship 
between the productive phase, discussed by Williams, and the way in which the production 
is commercialized, which is not considered by that author. This peculiarity denotes that 
besides technology, the governance structure throughout the chain can be defined from the 
firms' production and commercialization strategies. 
In this situation, the economy of scope assumes a determining status, because it develops 
alternatives for placement of production, reducing mean bureaucratic costs. Horizontal 
decisions (economy of scope - production mix and/or production channel, as exemplified 
in the poultry chain), in this situation, assume a determining status in a vertical relationship 
(definition of the more hierarchical governance structure). 
Technology is, therefore, an important decision variable in the governance structure, but 
not the only one, as Williamson pointed out. Information, institutional path dependency, 
market and production strategies, are also relevant variables to understand the definitions 
of governance structures in a chain, allowing for the coexistence of different structures 
with the same production technology or specificity of assets. 											
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1.3 The concept of profit in business vision 
Profit in business vision is the remuneration that the entrepreneur has to do to carry out his 
business.51 The income perceived by the entrepreneur in the form of profit can be split into 
several elements: 
I. As remuneration, or remuneration for the active role-played in the production process, 
similar to what happens to the wage; 
II. As an interest, since the entrepreneur invests in the production process own capital that 
is remunerated in the form of interest; 
III. As a premium, for the economic risk associated with the company’s management. An 
important distinction, due to Marshall, is that focused on the difference between the 
entrepreneur’s normal profit and extra-profit. 
In the first case, profit is considered as that part of the cost of production that the 
businessman is responsible for his work in the production process and is, therefore, a non-
residual share of the production cost.52 
In the second case, however, if the additional income that the company derives from the 
sale of its assets is higher than the cost of production (including normal profit), the 
entrepreneur perceives an extra profit not justified by any production factor, but merely by 
specific market conditions (innovative product, increased global demand, etc.). Justifying 
profit as a remuneration of entrepreneurial work has generated a wide-ranging debate 
among economists, especially as regards the distribution of national income. As already 
mentioned above on the subject of profit and to summarize what has been written so far, it 
is apparent that classical economists, especially Smith and Ricardo, argued that profit 
constitutes the remuneration of the property of the capital factor and the managerial 
capacity of the entrepreneur. In this case, profit is the residual part of production, that is, 
what remains after deducting production costs (essentially wages and raw materials). The 
analysis of classical economists, however, referred to a capitalist economy in which the 
distinction between active capitalist and passive capitalist was not yet clearly defined.53 
Continuing the analysis, it is recalled that, according to Marx, the profit share capitalized 
by the capitalist is represented by the surplus value or that part of the work of the workers 
who is not paid through the wage (subsistence) paid by the entrepreneur. Marx claimed 																																																								51	We have already seen, in the preceding paragraphs, how this approach changes from the view of classical 
economists to neoclassical ones.	52	Already from this first setting it is noticed that profit can only be analyzed as a residual business variable.	53	The first is the one who works directly in the production process, organizing and directing the work of the 
firm, while the latter provides only the financial capital to start the production process.	
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that workers produce a quantity of goods that is considerably higher than the wages they 
perceived; this portion of additional products forms, after being sold, the profit share 
capitalized by the capitalist who thus exploits labor. 
Continuing with the analysis, it is also recalled that according to Marginalist theory, every 
productive factor receives its specific remuneration; in the case of profit it is the 
remuneration of the entrepreneurial capacity factor. Accepting neoclassical reasoning is 
denied the Marxist criticism of the theory of surplus value, as profit is no longer the 
appropriation by the capitalist of the work of others, but just the reward of his abilities. In 
Schumpeter’s analysis, profit is understood as a dynamic income that derives from 
innovations under uncertainty in the future and remunerates the uninsured risks of 
businesses.54 The introduction of innovation is defined as an entrepreneurial act and 
entrepreneur who does it: the result of this act is entrepreneurial profit, a phenomenon, 
according to Schumpeter, typical of the market economy. Whenever an innovation 
becomes general acquisition, losing its value, the economic development process will 
introduce another, which will result in new profits. Where there are no innovations, there 
are no profits. 
In the economy and according to a more business view, profit is the income that is derived 
from an entrepreneurial activity, understood as the surplus of total revenue on total costs, 
of one or more commercial or financial transactions or the entire management of company. 
According to the classical economy, as seen above, profit is the difference between 
revenue and cost and has a residual character. This residue is actually made up of different 
elements that could only appear as a whole at a time when business management was 
generally in the hands of those who owned almost or all of the capital invested. If, then, 
classical economists (especially Smith, Ricardo and K. Marx) for obtain the profit took 
away production costs only later when the entrepreneur’s figure becomes ever more 
complicated and complete and approaches that of the capitalist, it is intuitive that the 
above-mentioned calculation for profit is too scarce and does not take account of easily 
identifiable cases by integrating classical study and observation with a contemporary eyes. 
 
 																																																									54	With the basic Theory of Economic Development (1912), Schumpeter added to the “static” approach of the 
general equilibrium of the economy, a “dynamic” approach, capable of explaining the reality of development. 
Here is the original definition of development given by Schumpeter: “Each production consists of combining 
materials and forces that lie within our reach. To produce other things means to combine these things and 
these forces in a different way”.	
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1.3.1 Profit and profitability 
An enterprise’s profit is the company’s revenue less explicit costs and amortization. 
The economic profit of a business is the revenue of the enterprise less the cost-
opportunity55 of its resources. It is often lower than the accounting profit. 
The accounting records of companies, in particular the income statement and the balance 
sheet, are intended to provide information to operators outside the enterprise, such as 
investors or financial institutions, as well as to the tax office, and must therefore be 
objective and verifiable.  
The costs that appear in the accounting documents are not necessarily appropriate for the 
decision-making process within the company. Business decisions require measuring 
economic costs, which are based on the concept of opportunity cost. Economic costs may 
not coincide with historical accounting costs.56 
In the formal theories of business conduct, it is preferable to analyze the economic costs 
compared to the historical accounting costs. This does not mean excluding the accounting 
costs of business studies; there are many situations, such as the evaluation of past 
performance of an enterprise or the comparison of two companies in the same industry or 
the assessment of financial soundness, where the use of documents and accounting reports 
is enlightening.  
The concept of cost opportunity provides the best basis for making good economic 
decisions, whenever the company has to decide between alternatives. An enterprise that 
deviated consistently from this cost concept would lose opportunities to earn higher profits; 
firms that are better able to seize profit opportunities or stay short of capital as investors 
depress their market price could also ultimately foreclose it. 
The difference between economic costs and accounting costs corresponds to that between 
economic profits and accounting profit. 
 
Accounting Profits = Revenues - Accounting Costs 
 
Economic Profits = Revenues - Economic Costs = Accounts Profits - (No Economic Costs 
- Accounting Costs). 
																																																								55	The cost-opportunity of productive factors is given by their value in the best-paid alternative uses. It may 
differ from the historical cost, i.e. the sum actually paid for the purchase of the good, service or factor, and 
depends on the alternative uses for which it is calculated.	56	Balconi M., Fontana R., I costi nel breve periodo e nel lungo periodo. 
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Economists often use the quasi-rent57 term as synonymous with economic profit. 
 
 
1.3.2 Profit as a business objective 
The prospect of profit should be resumed as a “nervous center” within the enterprise 
system. Profit maximization is an action line that maximizes the difference between total 
revenue deriving from the sale of the good or service produced by the company and the 
total costs incurred for its production. In the prevailing economic theory, profit 
maximization is assumed to be the fundamental objective of the enterprise. The 
entrepreneur behaves rationally, hence by homo oeconomicus, he tends to maximize profit. 
The logic that supports this hypothesis is simple and intuitive. Since the entrepreneur 
aspires to get a profit, through his business, is to believe that he will see his aspirations 
realized by a great profit rather than by a modest profit. Even with a very big profit, if he 
discovered that with the same effort and therefore the same costs, it is possible to obtain a 
larger quantity of product, that is, higher revenues, it would undoubtedly seek to eliminate 
the waste and continue on this road until no further improvement was possible. By 
introducing time and risk factors, the company is expected to maximize the long-term 
management result to the extent of a limited degree of overall risk management.58 
Maximization has been taught by classical economists but, over time, it has also been 
internalized in neoclassical theory, re-emerging, more recently, within the current of 
thought based on the coincidence between economic responsibility and corporate social 
responsibility: the latter, pursuing maximum profit, ensures not only the interests of those 
who own it, but also general welfare conditions.59 
We have seen how economic and managerial literature on the concept of profit appears to 
be aligned in assimilating nature to a form of residual income. However, some authors 
have tried to interpret the concept of profit in a different way. In particular, it is peculiar, 
more than anything else, to interpret the profit as a goal to be pursued,60 a vision that leads 
to a more general reflection on the “multipurpose” of business behaviors. The most 																																																								57	Temporary gain, given the positive difference between the average price and the average cost, obtained 
from the firms that produce at lower costs than their competitors. In a competitive market, companies 
generally have different average costs, while average revenue is the same.	58	This theory opposes the theory of business survival, which says that the purpose of the corporate group is 
to ensure the continuity of the corporate body. Here the profit is used to strengthen the firm and avoid risky 
activities.	59 Friedman M., Capitalism and freedom, Chicago University Press, 1962. 60	Rather than simple residual variable.	
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frequent and intuitive objectives have been described in terms of optimizing multi-variable 
objective functions, maximizing profits and maximizing profits over the long term, or, on 
the contrary, renouncing maximizing logic, resulting in a “satisfacentist approach”.61 
Where the debate on the nature of profit as a residual income focuses on the identification 
of the subject to which the profit should be devoted, the maximizing arguments reveal the 
interest of literature for the right measure in which profit must be pursued. We have 
already seen how the goal of classical economic theory is to maximize the firm’s profit. 
The search for maximum profit represents, for classical authors, the microeconomic 
criterion for excellence, capable of giving rationality to entrepreneurial behavior.  
The neoclassical thesis of maximizing profit incorporates a vision of the enterprise as a 
“black box”, whereby the pursuit of profit protects the satisfaction of individual needs of 
all parties involved in business activity. In the basic competitive model or the “Walrasian 
model”, business analysis is only a component of price theory and asset allocation. In fact, 
the firm is a “black box”, which combines production factors to produce the goods, but is 
not an object of analysis; exclusively the markets drive the entrepreneur’s behavior. 
Markets instantly provide all the economic information that needs to make a decision. As a 
result, the internal organization has no role in allocating resources.62 
The maximization hypothesis is actually greatly simplified. In particular, it presupposes 
that the firm’s choices are the unique and coherent expression and that its managers 
carefully carry out the directive that they have given to them by the owners and that the 
employees perform as accurately the tasks provided for in their contracts of recruitment. 
It should be noted that companies do not all behave according to the same model. Very 
small businesses, for example, will follow a different approach from the very large ones or 
still able to enjoy a market power. The great distinction in this regard goes between 
competing companies and those operating in markets other than competitive ones 
(oligopoly, monopoly, imperfect competition). 
As far as the relationship between profit and entrepreneur is concerned, the business and 
economic structure that existed at the beginning of the industrial revolution has undergone 
a slow evolution that has led to different characteristics. The same figure as an innovative 
																																																								61	The “satisfactentist” approach finds a significant theoretic antecedent in the work of Herbert Simon, 
Administrative behavior, Macmillan. 1947. Administrative Behavior, Il Mulino. 1967.	62	Hodgson G.M. Evolutionary and competence-based theories of the firm, in Journal of Economic Studies, 
vol. 25, 1998. 
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entrepreneur,63 so important in Schumpeter’s analysis, has become more difficult to define. 
More and more often, the individual enterprise has been replaced by firms formed in a 
corporate form: the executives of these companies, being only a small part of the owners, 
since share capital is fractionated, have no interest in high profits, but they research a 
stable trend of the company from which they receive employment and income. As a result 
of this evolution, businesses often do not seek maximum profit,64 but a profitable profit. 
Reflections of this new strategy are: 
• The so-called practice of “administered prices”, that is, the practice of not 
changing the selling price of the product to any change in the average unit cost 
level and any change in demand; 
• Excess production capacity: the unused production capacity margin allows the 
entrepreneur to cope with any increase in demand for the product (e.g.: for a 
sudden increase in income) or failure of a competing venture and similar 
phenomena. 
There is a change in business goals here. This stimulus to look for new ones ranges from 
limitations to profit maximization, which mainly concern the behavior of the entrepreneur 
who cannot be totally free to carry out any kind of action, even to force the difference 
between cost/revenue. The enterprise lives in an organizational environment with precise 
features and rules to be respected; moreover, the behavior that the enterprise will take in a 
long-term perspective produces short-term actions that deviate from the maximization of 
profit (for example, endure high R&D costs that will yield its returns only in the long 
period). Finally, an enterprise will not adopt those behaviors that, while maximizing profit, 
will expose it beyond the risk threshold it is willing to take. In reality, the business group’s 
intention meets the limits above all on a practical level, for example in the event of market 
crises, in the long-term, the entrepreneur should behave in a way that does not conform to 
the desired one, reducing the prices of finished products by cutting the cost of research and 
development indispensable to innovation and reducing investment in attractive 
development areas. 
																																																								63	The entrepreneur, for Schumpeter, is the innovator: the one who combines the means of production 
differently “to do something new” and gain a commercial advantage (monopoly yield from innovation): it is 
the entrepreneurial function to combine, in creative, non-adaptive, plants, skills, materials to create a new 
product, or experiment with new production methods, or exploit new markets.	64	From here, the theories that have so far come to the fore, and in particular the maximization of profit, 
make room for new arguments.	
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Another limit that the entrepreneur might encounter on a practical level is diversification 
that, in order to increase profit, he should also transfer his skills and availability to other 
markets, in order to maximize cash flow or revenue. Sometimes, however, the entrepreneur 
is blocked in his desire to emerge from the uncertainty of the new markets, from the lack of 
courage to run a risk. 
Other limits of profit maximization, as we have already mentioned, concern the 
subordination of the social function and therefore the satisfaction of the community: in 
fact, a businessman concentrating mainly on achieving an ever-increasing profit, little will 
be done, for example, on the quality of the product that will increasingly tend to be 
standardized and will have little focus on the specialization of the workforce employed or 
the assistance offered to consumers right after the sale of the product. 
But surely, profit maximization also has several benefits: firstly, it enhances the prestige of 
the company and the success of the people working and managing the company, so that it 
can achieve various economies of scale on the market, for example in the bargaining with 
the suppliers which it will have a greater influence thanks to the increased reputation. 
Criticism at the maximization of profit engenders the reflection of economists and business 
scholars. In particular, Winter points out the following three lines of criticism to maximize 
profits. Firstly, according to the author, it is sensible that the enterprise may have an 
objective but this would not be summed up in maximizing profit.65 On the other hand, 
affirming that the entrepreneur can maximize variables other than monetary profit 
obviously refutes the neoclassical theory of maximizing profit as a “criterion of objective 
rationality”. 
Secondly, it would not be sensible to speak of the purpose of the enterprise, but only of the 
goals of the individuals that compose it. Compared to these goals, the maximization of 
profit does not seem reasonable.66 
Third, says Winter, maximizing profit would not even be considered a goal, as it is 
impossible to achieve, given the information and computational boundaries of decision-
makers and the complexity of the context in which said decision makers are involved.67 																																																								65	In this regard, Scitovsky believes that the utility of the entrepreneur is sensitive not only to profit but also 
to leisure. Consequently, maximizing this function would be equivalent to seeking a lower value than the 
maximum profit. Scitovsky T., A note on Profit maximizations and its implications, Review of Economics 
and Statistics, n. 1, 1943.	66	A representation of the firm as a coalition is provided by March J.G., Simon H.A., Organizations, 
lackwell, Malden (MA), 1993 (trad. It), Teoria dell’organizzazione, Etas, Milan, 1995.	67	See Winter S., Economic Natural Selection and theory of the Firm, Yale Economic Essays, n. 4, 1964, 
with particular reference to paragraph “A criticism of the assumption of profit maximization”. About the 
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The criticisms mentioned above are added to the other ones highlighted by some 
managerial and behavioral matrix studies. Synthesizing them is above all Saraceno, which 
links criticism to profit maximization to the conditions in which business decisions are 
taken and in particular: i) in the presence of a plurality of organisms and individuals who 
have varied interests and objectives; ii) existence in the conduct of enterprises of non-
income targets, such as income continuity, increase in size, maximization of sales volume; 
(iii) the nature of the forces which have the power to contribute to determining the 
management directives and to induce, in view of their expectations and pressures, reasons 
other than profit.68 
In essence, according to the aforementioned contributions, the maximization of profit is 
liable, under uncertain conditions, to provide a realistic explanation of the behavior of both 
the enterprise and the entrepreneur.69 This thesis, in fact, shows limits to the emergence of 
the large enterprise, in which management enjoys wide discretion. 
The debate on whether or not to allocate the company to the goal of maximizing profit also 
associates the theme of its destination. With reference to this latter aspect, there is an even 
more marked differentiation between the economic-political interpretation of profit and 
that developed within the business-managerial doctrine. This factor is reflected in a 
diversity of focus: (i) economists on the role of the entrepreneur and the reasons why the 
profit should belong to the latter; ii) businessmen, and business scholars in general, on 
profit as the income of the enterprise/corporate body, which is a source of life and 
development. 
The model of the traditional enterprise replaces a model of managerial enterprise where 
such problems exist, and in achieving the goals the managers of the government enjoy 
some discretion. Objective rationality replaces the concept of limited rationality that makes 
possible behaviors that are as satisfactory or acceptable, other than maximizing. The 
passage of the command into the hands of the managers introduces, in fact, new motives, 
which may differ from those of property-oriented maximization of profit. Those who rule 
																																																																																																																																																																								
limits of maximizing settings, see Simon H.A., Administrative Behavior, Macmillan, New York, 1957 (ed., 
Administrative Behavior, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2001); Golinelli G.M., Economia e finanza nel governo 
dell’impresa, Sinergie, no. 61/62, 2003.	68	V. Saraceno P., Il governo delle aziende, Libreria Universitaria Venezia, Venezia, 1972. 69	See Enke S., On maximizing profits: A distinction between Chamberlin and Robinson, The American 
Economic Review, n. 4, 1951; Volpi F., Massimizzazione del profitto e motivazioni dell’imprenditore, 
Giornale degli economisti e annali di economia, n. 1/2, 1965. 	
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can be brought to defend their utility function in which they converge a plurality of goals 
from the earnings, prestige, reputation, and service to others. 
Hence the emergence of new theories that can be grouped into three lines: 
- Maximizing theories, according to which the firm pursues maximizing behaviors, but 
relating to functions other than profit; 
- Satisfactory theories, according to which the enterprise puts into behavior satisfaction, 
aiming to reconcile the objectives of the various actors; 
- Theories of re-maximizing profit. 
 
 
1.3.3 Problems in maximizing profit as a business goal 
Now, let’s go to the analysis, and to try to find a possible solution to the problem of 
business purpose, which, purified from possible misunderstandings, remains complex and, 
to some extent, ambiguous. In fact, the problem arises with the emergence of the great 
managerial business, which, as it is evident, operates in a very different context from 
perfect competition, and ownership and control are separate. The need to identify the 
general and ultimate aim of the enterprise arises from the fact that, in order to take 
decisions and take measures to achieve intermediate objectives, it can not be excluded 
from checking the exact correspondence between them and the purpose of the business; 
correspondence that must exist from the determination of goals. 
Usually when talking about the firm’s general goals, the first word that jumps to the mind 
is profit. This is because in the classical and neoclassical theoretical framework profit 
maximization is considered to be a general purpose of the enterprise, that is the ultimate 
aim of which is to pursue all business, since only with the maximization of profit will it be 
certain that capital resources and work, by definition “scarce”, be employed in the best 
possible way. In fact, we can no longer share the choice of doing so with the ultimate goal 
of the enterprise since, in reality, maximization of profit correspond to the best possible use 
of scarce resources only when it falls within the theoretical framework of perfect 
competition: the theoretical framework differs in a macroscopic way from the one in 
which, in the everyday reality, companies find themselves in the business. Obviously, these 
premises do not find room in the real context in which the large management business has 
to operate because it operates in a very different way from those for a market that can be 
defined as perfect competition. The firm is structured in several plants; produces several 
goods; it has an organization that is constantly changing but has static traits; is 
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characterized by a clear separation between property and control; responds to a multitude 
of both internal and external stakeholders, who demonstrate the legitimate expectations of 
having a high degree of power through their privileged relationships with the firm itself; 
etc. 
From what has been said so far it is obvious that the principle of maximizing profit, while 
consistent with the assumptions of the classic and neoclassical model, cannot be 
transferred to a real business management context. As mentioned above, we can add 
further observations with reference to the impossibility of using the principle of 
maximizing profit as the ultimate goal of business: in fact, this principle is linked to the 
possibility of realizing processes of actual maximization, and as such objectively 
measurable, and to the definition of profit, which is not univocal. In fact, maximization can 
be intentional when, in other words, the subject in question intends to maximize something 
or to accomplish when, at the end of the period within which the maximization would have 
to come, it will be assessed whether the objective function of maximization has been 
maximized in reality. The intention to maximize something takes on a precise meaning 
only when it is possible to objectively measure this maximization and to identify a certain 
specific goal that can be reached to believe that it has maximized the subject in question: in 
reality it is impossible conduct a fully objective and efficient analysis of the various 
strategic options, individual operational actions, etc.; with the consequence that it is 
impossible, in reality, to define a priori a certain objectively maximally achievable amount 
of profit achievable over a period of time, or, as a matter of course, measure whether or not 
such supposed maximization has been achieved. At this point, there is nothing left to 
address the last possible objection of who claims that profit maximization can be regarded 
as the general and ultimate goal of the firm: he could argue that maximizing profit as a 
general purpose of enterprise, is to be understood as maximizing in the long-run, but that 
does not make sense since, among other things, it is not possible to define exactly the 
period of measurement, i.e. the long period of which it is not determined or identifiable and 
for this, it is impossible, afterwards, to investigate the correct pursuit of this alleged 
general purpose. 
We can say that it is difficult to give a definitive definition of profit as the level of it is the 
result of managerial decisions that determine it with rules and criteria that reflect the 
motivations and attitudes of managers themselves: we can therefore have two companies 
perfectly identical which produce the same goods, which have had the same trend in sales, 
revenue, turnover and more but have differing profits on the basis of different assessments 
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of the individual entities that make up the management of the two companies. Also on the 
basis of this consideration, how can profit be maximized if it is the result of subjective 
choices? The answer is, of course, that it cannot and therefore cannot be considered that 
profit is the ultimate goal of business action, since the pursuit of an adequate profit is 
certainly a fundamental and indispensable condition for achieving any ultimate purpose 
firm. 
 
 
1.3.4 Theoretical settings for the purpose of the enterprise 
They can be shown, grouping them into three categories,70 all the numerous theories 
developed over the last few years with reference to the purpose of business. Within these 
categories, more or less extreme positions can be found, but in presenting them, they will 
use the most adherents to the reality of the major managerial business dominating the 
international markets. In the first category, all theories can be collected which, in one way 
or another, state how the enterprise has as its purpose the maximization of functions and 
objectives other than profit. In the second category we can gather the theoretical settings 
that see, as the purpose of the business, the satisfaction of a multiplicity of goals. In the 
third category, we can recap the theories that are based on the maximization principle of 
profit that is revised ad hoc to be more fitted to enterprise reality. 
Within the three categories we have just given, we can now consider individual theoretical 
positions, which are worth to exemplify, theoretical positions which, however, do not 
deviate too much from the reality of large managerial firms. With reference to the first 
category we have: 
1. The model of Baumol and Marris:71 the first group of theories assumes the interpretation 
of Baumol (1959), which considering the structure of the managerial enterprise 
hypothesizes the maximization of turnover as the primary purpose of the enterprise, which 
in turn other utility functions are linked to the managers.72 However, the development of 
revenue is based on the achievement of a minimum level of profit that can silence the 
expectations of shareholders. A criticism of these models lies in the fact that references to 
relationships between companies and competitors have been completely forgotten; there is 
no clear link to specific competitive situations: it is assumed that turnover can be 																																																								70	Caselli L., Le parole dell'impresa, Franco Angeli, 1995. 71	Marris R., The Economic Theory of Managerial Capitalism, MacMillan, London, 1964. (trad. it. “La 
teoria economica del capitalismo manageriale”, Einaudi, Torino, 1972). 72	Baumol W.J., Business Behavior, Value and Growth, Macmillan, New York, 1959. 
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maximized through a policy of reducing the sale price or increasing advertising spending, 
but the competitors’ reactions to such choices are not considered. 
This model, taken up by Marris and set in theory in 1964, claims that in the modern 
enterprise, characterized by a clear separation between ownership and direction, managers, 
who are responsible for the management, prefer, by personal prestige, power, material 
well-being, etc., to manage big companies and to have high turnover, which results in their 
tendency to maximize the growth rate of invested capital. On the other hand, such subjects 
owe their power and position to ownership, which is usually represented by the 
shareholders in the managerial business, so they will have to act properly against them so 
that they do not lose their position. In this trade-off, between the desire for growth and the 
need for security of its position, existing for managers, according to Marris, profit plays a 
primary role. In fact, on the one hand, in so far as it is reinvested in the enterprise, finances 
its development by favoring the pursuit of the managers’ objectives, on the other, for the 
part distributed in the form of dividends, it guarantees the satisfaction of the shareholders 
to confirm the position of management. The manager could obviously try to privilege a 
retention and reinvestment policy of the firm’s profits, but such behavior would result in 
lower dividends and a possible dissatisfaction of shareholders who would then sell their 
shares with the result of a decline in the stock market price and greater risk of hostile 
escalation in the case of a public company, or, in the event of a more stringent control of 
the stock company, i.e. when it comes to shareholders with reference or control, would 
replace the management. According to Marris, therefore, in the big managerial business, it 
is maximized through a valuation system used by managers, which has two different 
elements: the growth of the company and the security of its managerial position. Profit, in 
this perspective, is a mere tool to meet both needs. Maximizing growth and maximizing 
profit are, however, incompatible, as, beyond a certain growth threshold, profit tends to 
decrease progressively due to the onset of diseconomies of scale and the excessive risk of a 
push diversification. It is therefore necessary that managers carefully choose the best 
balance between business growth and profitability. The maximization of the firm’s 
development rate must be linked to the availability of capital and the willingness of 
shareholders to finance the size growth of the enterprise pursued through diversification 
strategies as well. It is the achievement of certain levels of profit guaranteeing the 
satisfaction of shareholders’ expectations regarding dividends and capital gains if the 
management is only geared to a size-wise growth of the enterprise by applying a policy of 
non-dividend distribution, shareholders would be forced to sell their participation shares 
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(danger of hostile climbing). Then, it is necessary to analyze the combination of 
dimensional growth and the “valuation ratio”,73 a minimum valuation rate equals a value 
just above the level at which it may take for shareholders the convenience to sell. 
A not so dissimilar setting was adopted by Williamson (1964),74 according to which the 
management of a big enterprise pursues the maximization of its utility function (“spending 
preferences”: quali-quantitative factors, managerial slacks, that is, staff costs and 
discretionary powers, access to funds to be used discretionarily), compatible with a 
minimum profit margin, in order to avoid negative reactions to shareholders and the 
financial market, which could endanger the security of its work. This utility function is 
based on three main factors of satisfaction: (a) benefits and number of workers: a large 
number of people to be coordinated by power and importance to the manager by getting 
satisfaction; (b) freedom of action: it concerns the possibility for the manager to authorize 
expenses not strictly necessary with the role it covers. This delights him in personal 
prestige and sense of power; (c) discretion in making investments: this is the ability for the 
manager to decide discretionarily, i.e. without addressing higher hierarchical levels, on 
rather large investments.  
The utility function is therefore maximized in accordance with the profit constraint and 
above-mentioned dividends to meet shareholders’ expectations. Williamson also notes that 
when the business works well all three factors behind the manager’s utility function are 
positive, while, logically, in difficult situations they are absorbed by the need to reduce 
unnecessary costs. So, when the managerial utility function resets, by resetting the three 
factors above, it would fall into a maximization model of profit. 
Williamson’s theory can be seen as a distribution model of profits between shareholders 
and managers. If we take a perspective of separating between ownership and control, in 
fact, the distribution of some of the managers’ profits can be interpreted as the need to pay 
in addition to the normal pay, the business function entrusted to non-proprietary subjects. 
However, the model works only if a minimum acceptable level of profit to the shareholders 
is ensured.75 																																																								73	The amount of operating income may be affected by the interpretation of the financial statements if this is 
used as an active asset. Income is normally divided between dividends and self-financing. If the dividends are 
normal, that is, in line with those that distribute the competition, and usual, that is, in line with those that the 
company has distributed in the past, the capital market does not react negatively. In this case, it is said that 
the “valuation ratio” between the stock exchange and the equity is safe, so new shares (capital increase) can 
be issued without the fear that they will remain unsubstantiated.	74	Williamson O., The Economics of Discretionary Behavior, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1964. 75	Williamson O.E., The Economics of Discretionary Behavior: Managerial Objectives in a Theory of the 
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2. With regard to the second category we have the following the model of Cyert - March:76 
authors give an application, with reference to the behavior of large corporations, to the 
theme of limited rationality introduced by Simon. As part of the “satisfactory” scenario, 
the studies of Cyert and March start from the assertion that the institutions, and therefore 
the companies have no goals as such, but they are generated by the people that operate in 
them.77 The large corporation in particular represents a complex organizational structure in 
which there is no single decision unit, but a multiplicity of decision-makers each carriers of 
their own interests. The company can therefore be conceived as a coalition of different 
groups and people: shareholders, managers, workers, customers, suppliers and financiers 
with their own needs. Through a bargaining process, which Cyert and March define as 
“negotiated” among all parties concerned, they define the company’s objectives, which 
should match the satisfaction of the largest number of subjects.  
The crux of the theory emerges from the conflict of interests between the various decision-
making groups, which, due to the complexity of the businesses and the substantial lack of 
resources, tend to amplify the conflict by stressing their roles in generating business 
performance. Conflict management provides for a negotiation of allocation between the 
different areas and functions of the enterprise and coincides with the budget process; each 
area presents its proposal of goals and expense that are reviewed by senior management 
who also compares them to past performance and allocates resources to ensure the highest 
level of satisfaction within the organization. 
Cyert and March also refer to Williamson as a benefit concept that, in their theory, is seen 
as an additional benefit not only of managers but also of all subjects involved in business 
activity. The concept of “organizational slacks” can thus be summed up in a benefit that 
goes beyond what is necessary to have the membership and consent granted to the subjects 
involved in the business activity. Like the slacks for managers, previously seen in the 
Williamson model, even in this case, such benefits will increase in business-friendly 
business times and then, if necessary, decrease in the event of a crisis in order to recover 
the resources needed for the enterprise, reducing unnecessary costs. 
In order to increase internal satisfaction, further payments are made in terms of dividends, 
capital gains, bonuses, and fringe benefits, bonuses that tend to increase and decrease in 
relation to the firm’s situation. 																																																																																																																																																																								
Firm, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1967. 76	Cyert e March, A Behavioural Theory of the Firm, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1963. (trad. It. 
“Teoria del comportamento dell’impresa”, Franco Angeli, Milano, 1973. 77	Cyert R.M., March J.G., The Theory of Behavior of the Firm, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1963. 
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3. The last current is to re-validate the principle of maximizing profit; in spite of the 
uncertainty in which companies operate and achieving their objectives with greater 
difficulty, they are not so different from those that aim at obtaining the highest profit. The 
firm’s survival is the “spring” that drives companies to adapt to the outdoor environment 
by innovating, increasing their size, seeking alliances, and seeking market niches. The time 
factor, for example, can be understood by considering the value of expected future profits 
in a time span by applying an appropriate discount rate that also takes into account risks 
and uncertainties. With regard to the managers’ motivational framework, however, they are 
not free to deprive shareholders of an adequate dividend, and as far as competition is 
concerned, this may be particularly high even in a real oligopolistic context. Despite the 
criticisms, and despite the difficult relationship between theory and the empirical use of the 
principle of maximizing profit, this is still an ideal to tend and bring down the logic with 
which to guide behavioral and managerial choices in a rational and efficient manner. 
 
In fact all these theories can be traced back to a single basis, that is, that the general 
purpose of the enterprise is its survival: enterprise survival is the ultimate universally 
acknowledged goal to which, however, one can not give up regardless of the theoretical 
category to which it belongs. 
This is because the survival of the enterprise is a symptom and a synthesis of its ability to 
evolve and adapt to everyday challenges and to the changes in the environment in which it 
operates, is the expression of the company’s ability to last over time, going beyond a static 
equilibrium, a more or less predictable context, etc. The purpose of business survival is a 
general and underlying constraint on managers’ choices in formulating intermediate 
objectives: this is a general constraint that, while not satisfying directly any motivation, 
must be respected by the choices that management will make in considering strategic 
options for achieving the goals. In the long-term, the overall purpose of the company’s 
survival is to provide a guiding principle for interpreting the policies and strategies put in 
place by the company; survival therefore assumes a very large meaning to cover all the 
actions that the enterprise performs, all the responses that it gives to environmental 
changes, and so on. It is the most general purpose of survival that leads the firm to expand 
into new markets, grow internally and through acquisitions, diversify, conduct marketing 
research, seek collaboration and co-operate with other businesses, etc. It can be said that 
the generic purpose of enterprise to survival is that which better than any other purpose can 
explain in the short and middle, as in the long-term, the strategic, organizational and 
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managerial action of the enterprise. We can conclude that digression by saying that the 
ultimate goal of survival can be better expressed as a tension towards the continuation of 
the existence of the enterprise through its ability to self-generation and regeneration over 
time that can only be achieved through a continuous redesign of one’s destiny and a 
constant generation of economic value.78 																																
	
 
 
 																																																								78	With reference to the necessity/self-generating capacity, we refer to the concept of autopoiesis developed 
by Vicari S., L’impresa vivente, Etas Libri, 1992.	
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1.4 Profit as a negotiable income 
In general economic terms, it is called “income” the total revenue (and benefits) that 
individuals and families have in a specific time span. Revenues then differ from one 
another -assuming different denominations- in relation to the productive factor that 
determines them: in essence, it is defined as wages, labor income; profit, capital income; 
land income, income derived from the possession of natural goods such as land; economic 
annuity, measures the economic surplus attributable to a very productive input whose 
supply is limited. 
The analysis of economic and managerial literature reveals the important role played by 
the profit as the engine for the development of firms operating in capitalist production 
systems. Literature identifies, besides profit, two additional forms of remuneration for the 
“factors” of production, in increasing degrees of uncertainty and risk.79 First, the most 
reliable, contractually- guaranteed form of remuneration to a given subject, compared to 
the best alternatives to employment or the holding of an economic activity, is the so-called 
cost-opportunity. Secondly, the subject’s economic income is defined as the contractual 
predetermined surplus on such cost-opportunity.80 Lastly, in the presence of uncertainty 
and imperfect information, the inability to contractually determine the over-opportunity 
cost opportunity identifies, as is known, the economic category of profit. 
At this point, it is appropriate to integrate the study of the profit made in the first chapter 
with the analysis of the economic outturn, but it is still necessary to make an in-depth study 
of the annuity in a broader sense.  
The concept of revenue is of great theoretical complexity. Three closely interwoven 
elements allow to simultaneously considering its role in reproduction of production 
relations and capitalist distribution. 
The first element allows characterizing the genesis and essence of capitalist revenue as the 
result of a process of expropriation of the social conditions of production and reproduction. 
In this sense, revenue is the other face and denial of the common. The importance of the 
role of the revenue in the dynamics of capitalism depends in fact, on what Karl Polany’s 
case, can be analyzed as the conflicting succession of historical phases of de-socialization, 
de-re-socialization and then de-socialization of economy again. The formation of modern 
landowners revenue coincides with the process of enclosures, with this first expropriation 																																																								79	Mueller D., Information, mobility and profit, in Kyklos, vol 29, 1976. 80	Schoemarker P.J.H., Strategy, complexity and economic rent, in Management Science, vol 36, 1990. See 
also Volpe L., Il profitto come rendita negoziabile, CEDAM, 2013. 
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of the commune, which was one of the prerequisites for the transformation of land and 
labor into fake goods. We have here the common trait that encompasses, in one and unique 
logic, the first enclosures, and the “new enclosures” concerning knowledge or the key role 
played by the “current privatization of the currency” in the development of financial 
income and the destabilization of welfare state institutions. Despite these elements of 
continuity, however, it is important to point out a decisive peculiarity of the current 
neoliberalism de-socialization process of the economy with respect to other historical 
phases: the expropriation of the commune not only takes place today on conditions such as 
earth belonging to a pre-capitalist exterior, in the traditional sense of Rosa Luxemburg. 
Today’s de-socialization of the economy process points above all to the elements of the 
commune that the struggles have built at the most advanced points of capital development, 
laying the foundational and structural bases of an economy beyond the logic of capital. 
This is how we can define, at least potentially, elements of a post-capitalist exterior, as is 
the case, for example, for the man-made collective guarantee and manpower provided by 
the welfare state. 
The second element, which makes it possible to characterize the revenue, is as follows: the 
annuity is the income the owner of certain goods perceives as a result of the fact that such 
assets are scarce (as in the case of natural resources corresponding to the so-called 
traditional common goods) or especially they are made available in low quantities (as in 
the case of so-called intangible commodities). In other words, the existence of the 
sovereign depends of property’s form and / or monopoly power positions that benefit from 
the existence or deliberate creation of an artificial scarcity of resources by imposing higher 
prices than those justified by their costs of production, as is demonstrated, for example, 
today by the policy of extending and reinforcing Intellectual Property Rights. 
Finally, and it is the third element, the capitalist annuity (as opposed to the feudal one) can 
be characterized as a pure distribution relationship, since it no longer performs any 
“function or at least any normal function in the production process”.81 
In short, the annuity is a credit or a property right on tangible or intangible resources, 
which entitle to a levy on the value created by the work from a position of externality to 
production. 
The economic revenue is equal to the difference between the maximum amount that an 
enterprise would be willing to pay for input services and the reserve value of the input 																																																								81	Marx K., Capital, vol. III. 
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itself. Economic annuity and economic profit are closely linked. The economic profit of an 
enterprise depends on the price it pays for the very productive input. If the enterprise 
acquires the input at a price equal to its reserve value, the enterprise can achieve a positive 
economic profit, but if it buys it at a price equal to its reserve value plus the economic 
annuity, as defined above, the company’s profit will be zero. So, the economic outturn is 
the potential increase in the company’s economic profit resulting from the use of a very 
productive input, and the actual economic profit will depend on how much of the rent goes 
to the enterprise and how much the owner of the input. 
 
 
1.4.1. Ricardian return, Paretian rent and monopolistic annuities 
Retrieving the classification developed by Amit and Schoemaker,82 it is possible to identify 
three major earnings-related qualifications. 
The first corresponds to the notion of Ricardian return, meant to represent extra profits 
from available resources in fixed or limited amount. 
Ricardo’s retirement is the expression of the “avarice” of nature: the obstacles that this 
opposes to man’s efforts cannot be effectively overcome with adequate investment. It is 
not an absolute gain that is in normal conditions for all landowners; if all the lands were 
equally fertile, there would be no Ricardian yield: it is a gain of differential character for 
pros of the more fortunate landowners. It derives from the different cost structure of the 
various firms or from the cost dynamics of the same firm considered at different times of 
time (rising costs). It is a price phenomenon in conditions of free competition; in its 
essence, connected to natural phenomena, is, however, completely independent of the 
particular features of the juridical structure of society: it would also occur in the absence of 
an exchange economy. However, for a clear understanding of the phenomenon, consider it 
in relation to the conditions of such an economy; in this sense are much important the 
famous Ricardian theses: the annuity, in itself, is not the cause of the price but has an 
effect; the price of the products determines the annuity and this, in turn, affects the price of 
land to all, and exclusive, the advantage of landowners whose interests are in conflict with 
the interests of the other classes and collectivity resulting from their aggregate . 
The second qualification expresses the concept of Paretian retirement expressed by 
neoclassical theorization and identifiable in the difference between the remuneration 																																																								82	Amit R., Schoemaker P.J.H., Strategic assets and organizational rent, in Strategic Management Journal, 
vol. 14.1, 1993. 
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deriving from the use of first best and second best of a given resource.83 Moreover, a 
concept related to that of Paretian retirement is perceptible in so-called quasi-rent. For 
quasi-rent, we mean a temporary gain, given the positive difference between the average 
price and the average cost, obtained from the firms that produce at lower costs than their 
competitors. In a competitive market, companies generally bear different costs from one 
another, while average revenue is the same. Those who manage to be productive at lower 
average costs enjoy a quasi-rent. Generally, it is believed that this type of retirement is 
generated only in the short term, because in the long-term the inflow of other enterprises, 
the reorganization of existing ones and the disappearance of those that are in loss, result in 
a balance in which the price, which has dropped due to competition and increased supply, 
covers exactly the total costs. However, this situation can only occur in a model of pure 
competition, and the further away from it, the more it will be possible for companies with 
lower average costs to obtain quasi-rent even in the long-term.84 In summary, the notion of 
quasi-rent is the difference between the value of a resource in the negotiation relationship 
for which it is specific and the value of the asset in the best alternative use: it is the surplus 
resulting from increased resource productivity. 
The third qualifies for monopoly rents. In fact, this type of annuity can be added to the 
Ricardian rent, that is, extra-profits due to market power, where companies operate in a 
sector where competition is limited by small numbers (oligopoly or monopoly) or by 
differentiation of the product, which generates the existence of niches protected by the 
action of competitors (monopoly competition). Of course there is the problem of 
preventing the competitive mechanism from being compromised by the existence of 
dominant positions or collusive behavior between companies seeking to obtain high profits 
through agreements and market power rather than through the demonstration by each firm 
of its own specific capabilities. 
 
 																																																												83	The first best requires the same conditions as the Pareto optimality. The latter, uniquely identified with the 
vision of social welfare characteristic of traditional economic theory, relate to the production and the 
exchange of goods (economic efficiency).	84	Klein B., Crawford R., Alchian A.A., Vertical integration, appropriable rents, and the competitive 
contracting process, in Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 21, 1978. See also Marshall A., Principles of 
economics, Macmillan. 1890. 
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1.4.2 Entrepreneurial Rents Theory 
The complex relationship between entrepreneurial dynamics and its development 
environment is an ever-evolving research area, despite the fact that it has been and is still 
very much debated today.85 
Here, in particular, attention is focused on the forms through which entrepreneurial activity 
manifests itself, when the entrepreneur finds hostile conditions in the local context of 
reference. The effectiveness of entrepreneurial activity, in unfavorable contexts, is a crucial 
area of research between the aspects of management that is widely understood86 and is 
indeed one of the major competitive advantage measures (Stevenson and Jarillo, 1990; 
Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). The performance of a venture depends, in fact, on the 
“adequately” the entrepreneur (or corporate governance body) -through the guidelines, 
decisions and capabilities to recognize and decode the signals from the environment- is 
able to interpret his role.87 In particular, it is assumed here that, for the purpose of business 
performance, the conditions of tuning -from a systemic point of view- are fundamental to 
the environmental condition and the type of behavior adopted by the entrepreneur 
(Golinelli, 2000). 
The theory of entrepreneurial income is rooted in studies of the efficient tool for generating 
and appropriating economic outlays. Such opportunities, arising from imperfections in 
product markets, are the result of changes in technology, demand conditions, or other 
factors. Changes that, as noted, individual subjects or groups can intercept and turn to their 
own advantage, or attributable to the innovative capabilities of individuals. Entrepreneurial 
income theory identifies the factor that can trigger the generating process of economic 
rents in the presence of asymmetries of knowledge about a given entrepreneurial 
opportunity. 
Entrepreneurial rent, therefore, means a level of profitability is higher than “normal”, that 
is, sufficient to make a productive activity worthwhile due to control and the use of 
appropriate and unique resources, not eroded by reproduction of resources by other firms 
and by competitive leveling. 
More in detail than Paretian tradition, two authors all stand out in that theoretical group: 
Milgrom and Roberts. They elaborate their own peculiar specification of the concept of 
rent, introducing precisely the conceptual category of entrepreneurial rent, defined as the 																																																								85	See Golinelli, 1974; Covin e Slevin, 1989; Romanelli, 1989; Buttà, 1991; Baccarani, 1995; Gimeno, 1997. 86	See Gartner, 1985; Low e MacMillan, 1988; Rullani, 1993. 87	Cfr. Lumpkin e Dess, 1996; Golinelli, 2000. 
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value created when economic actors combine existing resources in different and new ways. 
Starting from this conceptualization, the theoretical philosophy also marks the difference 
between entrepreneurial and quasi-rent. The creation of the latter assumes a situation 
similar to those necessary for the creation of business rents. Nonetheless, the notion of 
quasi-rent shows a significant distinctiveness: that is, the ability to determine the difference 
between revenues and costs in a certain or otherwise recognizable way, and hence ex ante. 
By synthesizing, the distinction between the two concepts is linked to the uncertainty 
surrounding the investment in new resource combinations. 
Thus, the first theoretical group emphasizes the role and ability of the entrepreneurial 
subject in recognizing the opportunities for generating new resource combinations 
(subjective sense). The key points of this strand can be summarized in three macro-groups: 
a) the presence of an objective reference to the Paretian tradition in qualifying the concept 
of quasi-rent; (b) the progressive decline of the margins between profit and economic rent 
under conditions of uncertainty, with the tendency to assimilate the profit to the category 
of quasi-rent; (c) the contribution provided to business theory by identifying in the firm the 
most “institutional mechanism” best suited to achieving it, given the uncertainty, the 
coordination between generation processes and the appropriation of quasi-rent. 
 
 
 
1.4.3 Managerial Rents Model 
The managerial rent model has a point of contact and distinction from the previous 
theoretical theory. Similarly to it, it is worth reading a profit in terms of composite rent. On 
the contrary, unlike the previous one, this approach has a vision of a contractual rather than 
an institutional type of enterprise. The most reverent authors of this model were Alchian 
and Demsetz, not to mention the contributions made by Jensen and Meckling.88 The 
authors theorize the concept of firm as a “nexus of contracts” like a set of contracts 
between several factors of production. 
The Property Right Theory (PRT) is essentially due to Alchian and Demsetz (1965). 
According to Alchian, “property rights are the rights of an individual to use resources; 
these rights are supported by customs, social customs, ostracism, laws, individual power”.  
																																																								88	See Alchian A.A., Demsetz H., Production, information costs, and economic organization, in American 
Economic Review, vol 62, 1972. See also Jensen M.C., Meckling W.H., Theory of the firm: managerial 
behavior, agency costs and ownership structure, in Journal of Financial Economics, vol 3, 1973. 
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Thus a property right is a right to use the resources sanctioned by laws or social 
conventions and/or behaviors. What is fundamental to the Business Theory is the 
distinction between the legal concept of ownership law and the economic concept of 
property law: the legal concept concerns the ownership and use of resources; the economic 
concept concerns the use of resources in terms of profit and the ability to transfer and/or 
exchange resources for that purpose. 
What is critical in fact in economic terms is the distribution of earnings generated by the 
joint commitment of different contractual parties. In fact, not only ex-ante allocation of 
residual royalty rights will affect partner engagement, but also the expected profit 
distribution will affect individuals participating in collective efforts. 
Here, from an economic point of view, what defines the property of a firm, and hence the 
very existence of the firm, is the right to control the result. 
In the model, there is a clear reference to Resource-Based Theory and, more generally, to 
the current thinking that emphasizes the importance of human capital. The key assumption 
of the model concerns the ability of top management to use its superior skills for decision-
making and implementation of operating plans to determine the creation of economic rents. 
Scholars like Mintzberg emphasized the lack of organizational literature about the 
characteristics of managerial work. According to the authors, there were no empirical 
studies that would allow a description of managerial activity, and contributions that 
provide unitary and comprehensive view of the manager. Most of the authors who first 
dealt with the theme of managerial skills focused exclusively on one of the many 
dimensions of the managerial role: principally leadership (Likert, 1961, Fleishman and 
Harris, 1962) and decision-making (Barnard, 1938 Simon, 1947; March and Simon, 1958; 
Cyert and March, 1963). Only later, other studies have analyzed the broader spectrum of 
behaviors adopted by managers. Antonacopolou and Fitgerald (1996) define competences 
as “the virtues unique to each individual who are expressed in the process of interacting 
with others in a given social context”. Competences therefore are not limited to knowledge 
and skills, or to the expected performance standards and expressed behaviors; they also 
include attitudes, perceptions and emotions and are constantly defined and redefined by the 
interaction of personal and situational factors (social, political, etc.). Within the context of 
situational factors, social, formal and informal relations assume of particular importance, 
established with the members of the management team and the organization itself. The top 
management skills are the central element on which the model of managerial rents is 
pivotal, which considers the abovementioned critical skills in order to increase the firm’s 
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probability of success and thus its survival in a given context.89 This model identifies the 
source of top management skills in the tacit measure of the underlying knowledge. It is 
precisely from the peculiarities of managerial competences that derive an equally peculiar 
concept of economic rent. The conceptualization of the latter has a strong link with the 
concept of the Ricardian rent, linked to the differences in productivity between scarce 
resources. Specifically, this model focuses on income derived from “superior” products 
and services to other companies or by highly efficient and organizational processes or 
routines difficult to imitate. The model also qualifies as a management rent the share of the 
firm’s total profits deriving from the top management skills.90 
To sum up, the qualification of the management rent concept emerges from a further 
consideration of how profit is understood within the model under consideration. It can be 
seen that the firm-specific character of such skills appears to stimulate the creation of 
quasi-rent rather than economic annuities as well. 91  It is inferred that where top 
management is distinguished for the accumulation of highly firm-specific human capital, 
its potential for generating income at another enterprise will tend to be lower.92 
The theme of the appropriation of managerial quasi-rents occupies a very important area 
within the model precisely because it is necessary to protect these rents through 
appropriate isolation mechanisms. They are geared to ensuring the appropriation of the 
rents resulting from the managerial superiority of the executives compared to the attempts 
of imitation made by competing companies and attempts at expropriation abroad. 
By synthesizing, as in the previous model, the distinctive features of managerial rents 
emerge: a) the treatment of corporate profits as “composite rent”, incorporating, in its 
amount, quasi-rent arising from the exploitation of top management; (b) the close 
interrelationship between the generative and distributive processes of quasi-rent, so that the 
creation of the latter contributes to the profits of the enterprise only in the presence of 
adequate assurances of appropriation by management; c) the mitigation of the conflict 
between ownership and management in the light of a common tide towards the 
appropriation of their respective quasi-rent and the consequent emergence of the firm as a 
																																																								89	Eliasson G., The firm as a competent team, in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol 13.3, 
1990. 90	Castanias R.P., Helfat C.E., 1992. 91	It should be noted that the notion of quasi-rent expresses the difference between the value of a resource in 
its first better utilization and the value according to the first alternative user.	92	Klein B., Crawford R., Alchian A.A., 1978. 
	 72	
“nexus of contact” capable of guaranteeing a more adequate coordination of the interests of 
distinct stakeholders.93 
 
 
1.4.4 Rent Appropriation Theory 
The theory of ex ante negotiation on the rent is a sort of compromise between the first and 
the second model presented. This theory, on the one hand (as in the model of 
entrepreneurial income), provides a more complete explanation for the processes leading to 
the generation of quasi-rent: in fact, the theory of ex-ante negotiation emphasizes the 
opportunities offered by the exploitation of the knowledge resource. On the other hand 
(with reference to the model of managerial rents) the theory under discussion provides a 
richer interpretation of the mechanisms of appropriation of quasi-rents. 
From the point of view of the qualification of the concept of rent, the theory in question 
presents many points in contact with the model of managerial rents.94 
In this latter area, in particular, various contributions demonstrate that the presence of 
asymmetries of knowledge may give rise to opportunities for ex ante negotiation on the 
retirement of certain categories of stakeholders.95 Before describing the contents of that 
theoretical current in more detail, however, it does not seem superfluous to point out that 
both the “stakeholder” and the “asymmetries of knowledge” are assumed to have a peculiar 
connotation within it. On one hand, the term “stakeholder” refers to categories of subjects 
characterized by a strong interest in the development of new capabilities, or which can play 
a decisive role in this development, as it is triggered by the ability to capture the economic 
rent. On the other hand, the notion of “asymmetries of knowledge” identifies asymmetry-
related conditions not so much of knowledge (know-what), but differences in so-called 
practical or procedural knowledge (know-how). In particular, according to the approach 
under consideration, there would be a significant source of negotiating power in the 
presence of asymmetries of knowledge. In fact, these are asymmetries that allow specific 
stakeholder categories to have access to a specific knowledge and innovative capabilities, 
unique and unavailable to other stakeholders. More specifically, the theory of ex ante 
negotiation on rent combines the very understanding of the link between competitive 
advantage and the generation of profits to the joint analysis of the asymmetries of 																																																								93	Volpe L., Il profitto come rendita negoziabile, CEDAM, 2013. 94	It is from the model of managerial rents that resumes the Ricardian interpretation and the concept of 
resource-based of the rent, as well as the implicit vision of the enterprise as a “nexus of contract”.	95	Coff, 2010. 
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knowledge and the negotiating power expressed by various stakeholders in relation to the 
firm. Negotiating power, in turn, as a “normal” mechanism for the expression of property 
rights and, hence, of ex ante determination of the profitability attributable to specific 
stakeholders. 
An element of the theoretical current under consideration appears to be particularly 
significant, namely the identification of profit as a key driver of government choices. Note 
Child: “it is customary to assume that a certain level of profit represents a return deemed at 
least sufficient to ensure the availability of the resources needed to implement present and 
future development plans.” 
To this purpose, it emphasizes the centrality of the processes that determine the 
appropriation of profit by distinct bearers of interest towards the firm, highlighting the 
influence they have on the process of generating profit. This theoretical line implies a 
conception of profit as a rent not only “composite” but also negotiable. The theory of ex 
ante negotiation on rent provides a more complex theoretical justification for the 
generative processes of quasi-rents linked to human capital of top management. This 
theory seems to integrate and extend the theoretical lens on property.96 In order to fully 
understand how the firm’s competitive advantage is reflected through profits, the theory of 
ex ante negotiation considers it inadequate to ascertain the existence of rent generation 
opportunities, in turn resulting from asymmetries of knowledge among different 
stakeholders. In conjunction with these asymmetries, this theory poses the need to analyze 
the negotiating power97 of the various bearers of interest in the enterprise.98 
Again, we can outline the fundamental points of the theory, among which: a) the peculiar 
nature attributed to profit as a “composite and negotiable” rent; (b) the relevance of the 
negotiating power of internal stakeholders (top-management) in determining the size of the 
“cake” generally appropriate by the firm, subject to the outcome of the ex ante negotiation 
processes on quasi-rent originating from asymmetries of knowledge for the benefit of top 
management; c) the emergence of a new concept of the enterprise as a “nexus of 
stakeholder”, which integrates and extends the traditional contractual vision of the firm 
through the crossing of two commonly separate approaches: resource theory and Property 
Right Theory. 																																																								96	Demsetz H., Toward a theory of a property rights, in American Economic Review, vol. 57, 1967. 97	It is understood as a “normal” mechanism for the expression of property rights and, consequently, for ex-
ante determination of the appropriate share of profitable interest by specific stakeholders.	98	Milgrom P., Roberts J., 1992. See also Holmstrom B., Milgrom P., The firm as an incentive system, in 
American Economic Review, vol 84, 1994. 
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1.5 From profit to value creation and sharing 
The awareness of the objective value of the enterprise, about the contribution to collective 
well being, is such as to overcome the most brilliant ideological dilemmas on the 
distribution of the wealth produced. In the concept that Amaduzzi provides for the 
production firms, the company’s finalism is “clearly on the achievement of income in the 
economic sense of profit.” 
Profit gives meaning and measure to the value of the business; is the recognition of 
entrepreneurship, risk, success, even if determined with the competition of fortune. The 
value of the enterprise cannot be separated from that of profit; the correlation between the 
two sizes is certainly fascinating to convince a certain school of managerial thought to 
wager all corporate policy on the exasperated search for maximum profitability. The 
question that arises is yet another; are the reasons of the very essence of profit that must be 
pursued, beyond the objective conditions of economic equilibrium, in dual relativity, 
tendency in durable time and relational with respect to a compatible environment. The 
profit-generating function can not therefore be left out of a wider context of equilibrium 
conditions that also contemplates the assimilation of the system of risks, constraints and 
degrees of freedom to the business of the enterprise; conditions from which verification 
depends ultimately on the soundness of the judgment of economic value. Even this more 
advanced and in any case less simplistic approach to so many empirical or pseudo-rational 
formulations does not seem to make justice to the thousands of inconsistencies, 
contradictions and even abuse of evaluation. The transition to the analysis of the financial 
value of the firm’s capital further entails the introduction of other variables relating to both 
the peculiarities of the trading and equity markets, and the strategic governance framework 
of equilibrium and conflict of interest. The result is particularly complex and it is difficult 
to think of formulating a value strategy based on a single proposition mission, goals and 
choices. It is therefore possible to approach an enterprise strategy approach and SBA 
(strategic business area) aimed at optimizing the objective conditions of the firm’s 
economic equilibrium through research, achievement and exploitation of competitive 
advantage. Economic analysis through a “value matrix” obtained by crossing “business 
activities” with “business areas” can certainly favor the intelligence of selectively targeted 
interventions on the “value chain” and the “competitive differential”. After that, the 
financial analysis goes through the formulation of a corporate strategy or group holding, 
through which the focus of the mission objectives moves to another order of business 
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profiles that, in addition to the value distribution, governance and, last but not least, 
conflicts and balance of interests in corporate governance. 
The firm’s economic value basically provides the ability to generate new wealth through 
the organization and management of integrated processes of production and exchange of 
goods and/or services. 
There is thus an instrumentality link between the generating function of the wealth value 
expressed by the corporate system and the value of the enterprise itself.99 One could say, 
emblematically: “the firm is worth because it creates value”. 
Prophetically to a proper strategic analysis of the value processes that concatenate the 
enterprise’s economy, it is good to bring clarity to three essential points. 
At the first point we note that if there is a logical correlation between the economic value 
generated by the firm, as a vital sign of its durable existence, and the value of the 
enterprise as such it, is equally true that the respective conceptual categories, as the “value 
generated by the firm” and “the value of the firm” must be kept separate, even though they 
are close to each other. Different is, in fact, the order of magnitude that characterizes them 
because different is the economic attribution and, likewise, the very purpose of their 
measurement, representation and interpretation. Is not questioned the interaction between 
the economic and accounting categories that respectively form the income and working 
capital on the one hand and, on the other, the firm’s value. 
However, even if we intended to commensurate the economic capital of the firm by 
abstracting the book value matrix, it would still be indispensable to surpass analogous or 
simulated processes, perhaps not entirely useless, empirically, albeit scientifically 
inaccurate. A “value accounting” set up to meet the need to determine the firm’s economic 
capital can, in fact, be related to the connection with the accounting information system 
from which derive the original value generated by the firm. Quantities that proceed, as far 
as the flows, progressively configurable, from the market value of the product, to the added 
value, to the operating income, to the net income of the year. For capital, apart from the 
distinction between invested capital and risk capital, it is also possible to have interim 
situations (possibly three or four) to significantly influence the level of availability of 
resources. But, ultimately, it is on the fundamental relationship between operating income 																																																								99	Amaduzzi argues that “the firm’s function is to generate and auto-generate production processes and to 
achieve equilibrium conditions for an indefinite period” further observed that “even the problem discussed in 
theory of the firm’s assessment as an economic complex can be better solved, if add the consideration of the 
degree of self-generating power of the enterprise to be evaluated”. See A. Amaduzzi, Self-Regenerating 
Function of the Enterprise and Evolution of Principles, RIREA, no. 1-2, 1989.	
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and the average invested capital that, suitably “normalized”, involves the further 
methodological development aimed at extrapolating and elaborating, directly or indirectly, 
the configurable firm’s value as economic capital. It is, however, good to emphasize the 
different conceptuality between the classical accounting representation of “equity capital” 
or equity (understood as an abstract fund of values against which the profit for the year is 
compared) and that of “economic capital”, quantitative expression of the firm’s value. 
Diversity of the configuration and purpose of the equity capital and economic capital, 
which is reflected in their respective evaluations dictated by equally different principles, 
criteria and methods. 
The second point to consider is that the financial statement is, in any case, an indispensable 
aid for the assessment of economic capital, and this is because of its congenital signposting 
behavior in revealing trends and situations, both and perhaps above all, high semiology 
induction that can be retracted by the skillful ones as experienced “financial analysts”; 
induction that can certainly benefit in assessing the compatibility of the firm’s 
development plans with respect to the conditions in place of the firm’s economic 
equilibrium. Conversely, it would be unwise to overestimate the chances of knowledge that 
the financial statement can offer, because the congenital limits are well known. One of the 
major constraints, perhaps the largest one, in the accounting and, in reflection, of the 
financial statement concerns the inadequate measurement and representation of the value 
of so-called intangible assets (patents, trademarks, technological know-how, intellectual 
skills, etc.) that even feed the value process as critical factors of success and, in any case, 
of competitive advantage. The so-called “intangible assets”, although not detectable 
(unless explicitly disclosed in its cost) is a determining factor for the company’s economic 
value and cannot therefore be ignored in any way. Moreover, it is also important to 
consider that accounting outweighs those exogenous circumstances to the enterprise and 
that, moreover, they are, in fact, true variables that complement the “combinatorial value 
calculation”. We intend to refer to the various weighted “interest rates” on invested capital 
and corporate, market and environmental risk systems, the extent of which depends on the 
size of the economic capital. It is well known, in fact, as in increasing interest and risk 
wise, it corresponds, inversely, to the generalized decline in the firm’s value. 
The third point, certainly not least, concerns the analysis of the value for those firms that 
are in the company’s possession and, in particular, those with quoted shares on the stock 
exchange. For such firms, the value of “stock market capitalization”, as well as depend on 
the company’s economic outcomes, the economic situation, and market trends in general, 
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is influenced by further multiplicity of circumstances to which attention should be paid. Of 
particular importance and consideration here are the firm’s structural, corporate and 
financial evolutionary dynamics, which correspond to decisions of extraordinary or 
exceptionally intense strategic value. Nevertheless, the same corporate governance profiles 
for inherent expectations, interests, and consequent interventions can significantly affect, if 
not entirely, altering or disrupting the stock market trend, even in open contradiction with 
the “key indicators” of business economy. 
Ultimately, the economic value of the enterprise, as a vital phenomenon, is the expression 
of the prospective conditions of equilibrium and development, both organic and functional, 
of the corporate system. As a magnitude, value commensurability requires more advanced 
tools than traditional accounting, while providing (in particular, the financial statement) 
indispensable basic information. Nor, on the other hand, as mentioned above, can rely on 
so-called “empirical methods” adopted by financial analysts, methods that, too often, have 
turned out to be clamorously fallacious; as well as mathematical-predictive models whose 
validity, though relative, if acceptable for large generalizations, is not at all demonstrable 
for individual cases. The answer that, more rationally, can enlighten the knowledge about 
the firm’s value of the economic capital can only come from an unspecified “value 
accounting”: an accounting, obviously, in the elliptical sense, that knows to conjugate the 
derivatives of the system of corporate training (statements and development plans) from 
which to portray the basic value’s matrix, with further determinants (immateriality, interest 
rates and risk profiles) that complement the calculation of the enterprise’s value.100 
 
 
1.5.1 Stakeholder views 
The seventies and eighties of the last century are characterized by a heated debate on 
business goals. Scholars led by Freeman (1984)101 support the stakeholder theory,102 which 
derives from the systemic matrix theories, then from those on “open systems”, which 
currently convey the debates between enterprise and the context of reference. This 
highlights the simultaneous possibility of action and reaction between the enterprise and 
																																																								100	See G. Bruni, Contabilità del valore per aree strategiche d’affari, Giappichelli, Torino, 1999. 101	See R.E. Freeman, Strategic Management. A Stakeholder Approach, Pitman,Boston, 1984. 102	Stakeholder theory consists in extending the mission of the enterprise to the pursuit of social instances; 
firm no longer focuses exclusively on generating profits to satisfy shareholders but is also geared towards 
promoting the well-being of society through the interplay of each interlocutor with whom it interacts.	
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the reference environment, 103  which refers to the complex interactions between the 
behaviors of the various third parties involved, which for various reasons have interest, 
condition or are conditioned by the choices of the organization. The latter is nothing more 
than a description of business reality that emphasizes the effects that productive activities 
generate on all involved parties, both internal and external. Therefore, the business, to 
achieve and maintain its own success, needs to have established relationships with the 
bearers of interest. It is necessarily to meet the expectations of those people whose 
behaviors can affect into the business success. “Relational” resources, though not intended 
as inputs in business processes, act and result in competitive advantage over competitors. 
This approach implies that not only the company, for its own success, needs support from 
bearers of interest but also that business success coincides with meeting the expectations of 
third parties involved. The firm therefore must not only act with the goal of maximizing 
profit but also with the aim of achieving the interests of all stakeholders104 by distributing 
the wealth produced in a homogeneous way.105 The stakeholder theory highlights how the 
company needs explicit and lasting commitment to the stakeholders,106 far beyond the 
statutory obligations. From the experience, it is deductible that generating wealth for 
shareholders is facilitated by the presence of harmonic relationships with the surrounding 
environment and with the subjects involved: good levels of reputation107 can facilitate 
value creation.108 The stakeholder theory can be considered as “a genuine theory though a 
perfectible one”.109 The visual power of the model stakeholder and its simplicity has 
contributed to the success of the stakeholder concept. By doing this, stakeholder 
management, understood as a process through which managers manage to reconcile their 
																																																								103	See G.M. Golinelli, M. Gatti, L’impresa sistema vitale. Il governo dei rapporti inter-sistemici, in 
Symphonya. Emerging Issues in Management (www.unimib.it/symphonya), n. 2, 2000-2001. 104	Stakeholder’s term originates from corporate strategy studies and is first published in a memorandum of 
the STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE of 1963. Stakeholders are considered those groups without 
which an organization does not survive; see G. Rusconi, The Social Enterprise Budget. Problems and 
Perspectives, Giuffrè, 1988.	105	The other group of scholars argued that a firm that engages in social objectives to the detriment of 
earnings would only hurt society instead of helping it.	106	See A. Marra, L’etica aziendale come motore di progresso e di successo. Modelli di organizzazione, 
gestione e controllo: verso la responsabilità sociale delle imprese, Franco Angeli, Milano, 2002.	107	The image of a company with a good socio-ecological reputation is crucial to establishing loyalty 
relationships between consumers, workers, shareholders and the organization, for more in-depth information, 
cf. J.J.Lambin, Changing Market Relationships in the Internet Age, UCL Press Universitaires De Louvain, 
2008. 108	See S.Pivato, N. Misani, A. Organini, F. Perrini, Economia e gestione delle imprese, Egea, 2008. 109	See F. Lèpineux, Stakeholder Theory, Society and Social Cohesion, Corporate Governance, n.5, 2005. 
	 79	
goals with the demands and expectations of different stakeholders,110 has become an 
important tool for transforming ethical aspects into management practices and strategies. 
We saw how Freeman published in 1984 the contribution entitled “Strategic Management. 
A Stakeholder Approach”, which illustrates the plurality of third parties involved in 
business management and, moreover, “re-conceptualize the nature of the firm to encourage 
consideration of new external stakeholders beyond the traditional pool shakeholders, 
customers, employees and suppliers, legitimizing in turn new forms of managerial 
understanding and action”.111 The stakeholder theory112 is certainly included in theories on 
open systems and is inclined to a balance between systemic rationality and subjective 
behavior. This theory provides a “new way to organize thinking about organizational 
responsibility. By suggesting that the needs of shareholder can not be met without 
satisfying to some degree the needs of other stakeholders”.113 The term “stakeholder” 
refers to a person or group of persons involved in the business activity or of which the 
enterprise is concerned: the biunique nature of the internal/external relationship between 
the enterprise and the context of reference is expressed. The firm can be considered as a 
system that involves all stakeholders and, therefore, attention is drawn to the network of 
relationships between the various subjects, both internal and external, which may have 
implications for the dynamics of the whole organization. Stakeholder management requires 
the identification of efficient methods of coordinating relationships with the many involved 
people interacting with the company and trying to match the often-diverging expectations 
of stakeholders with business. Instrumental vision means stakeholder management as a 
viable way to achieve business success; whatever is the purpose, stakeholder management 
fosters the achievement of the goal successfully.114 The descriptive approach aims to 
represent the various third parties and their interactions, in fact, the enterprise is considered 																																																								110	See A.B. Carrol, The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility: Toward the Moral Management of 
Organizational Stakeholders, Business Horizons, July/August 1991; S. Sciarelli, Etica e Responsabilità 
Sociale nell’Impresa, Giuffrè Editore, 2007. 111	See J.Jonker, D.Foster, Stakeholder Excellence: framing the evolution and complexity of a stakeholder 
perspective of the firm, Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, 9, 2002. 112	Stakeholder Theory finds its moral foundation in the Kantian principle of respect for people, the principle 
that these subjects must be treated as fine in themselves and not merely as means for some end; see N.Bowie, 
Management Ethics, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 2005.	113 	See D. Foster, J. Jonker, Stakeholder Relationships: The Dialogue of Engagement, Corporate 
Governance, 5, 2005; see also: D. Hawkins, Corporate Social Responsibility: Balancing Tomorrow’s 
Sustainability and Today’s Profitability, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006. 114	Garriga e Mele say, “Instrumental stakeholder theory assumes that the corporation is an instrument for 
wealth creation with CSR conceived as a strategic tool to promote economic objectives”, see E. Garriga, 
D.Mele, Corporation Social Responsibility Theories: Mapping the Territory, Journal of Business ethics, vol. 
53, 2004. 
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a constellation of shared and conflicting interests among the various stakeholders; finally, 
the normative assumes that the firm must consider all stakeholders, respecting moral 
values or principles of a philosophical nature. Regulatory theory, as stated, requires that 
management in compliance with certain moral principles treat all stakeholders. Donaldson 
and Preston (1995) state that the normative value depends on two significant theses: the 
first implies that the stakeholders identify themselves because of their interest in the 
enterprise, irrespective of whether or not there is a functional interest of the enterprise 
towards them; the second assumes that the interests of all the different stakeholders are 
intrinsic value and deserve consideration for themselves in the managerial decision-making 
process, regardless of the ability of a particular stakeholder group to promote the interests 
of another group. These interests have intrinsic value, and then deserve consideration and 
respect, not just in the instrumental sense of other purposes.115 
This theory contrasts with the argument supported by Clarkson, who classifies stakeholders 
in primary and secondary. 116  The company fails to survive without the constant 
participation within the corporate life of the main stakeholder group. The stakeholders are 
shareholders, investors, workers, consumers, suppliers and all identifiable stakeholders as 
public stakeholders, governments and communities that provide infrastructure and markets. 
Strong is the interdependence between the enterprise and those subjects. If stakeholders 
from the main stakeholder group, such as consumers and suppliers, become dissatisfied 
and move away from the enterprise system, even if only partially, would make the same 
vulnerable and weakened, unable to continue their business. Primary stakeholders, defined 
as “risk-bearers”, are those who have an economic interest in the company that bear a risk. 
It is stated that the enterprise can be defined as a system of major stakeholder groups, such 
as a series of intimate relationships with the interests of the groups, although characterized 
by different goals, rights, implications and responsibilities. Business survival and 
continuous success depend on the ability of its managers to be able to create enough 
wealth, value and satisfaction for the stakeholders belonging to the different stakeholder 
groups to ensure that every single group is feeling part of the stakeholder system company. 
Excluding the participation of third parties is the cause of business system failures.  
The secondary stakeholder group is comprised of those who influence or are influenced by 
the firm’s business but are not considered fundamental to business transactions and are not 																																																								115	See E. D’Orazio, Verso una teoria normative degli stakeholder, notizie di OLITEIA, XXII, vol. 82, 
2006. 116 	Cfr. M.B.E. Clarkson, A Stakeholder Framework for Analyzing and Evaluating Corporate Social 
Performance. 
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essential to the survival of the organization. This category includes media and groups with 
special interests. 
Subjects included in this category have the ability to mobilize public opinion in a favorable 
way or contrary to company performance. The fact is that the company does not depend on 
its survival by the secondary stakeholders, although the latter may, by their behavior, cause 
considerable damage. 
Management, though thought to be an employee of the company, is considered a bearer of 
interest in itself in relation to the important role-played. The position of management as 
stakeholder of the firm depends on the following factors: size and degree of company 
complexity, in fact, in large companies managerial delegation is more articulate and covers 
many aspects; the proprietary structure, as in the case of an unimpaired stock, facilitates 
the management’s position; the implementation of incentive mechanisms, such as aligning 
management’s retribution with the results achieved, thus balancing property expectations 
with those of managers, and finally the presence of an efficient financial market, which can 
affect the firm’s choices as it allows the property to control the work. 
 
 
1.5.2 Shareholder views 
In the literature on business, the concept of value creation has long ago been recalled. The 
same companies have incorporated this concept into their vocabulary and use it often by 
identifying it with the goal of ordinary management and extraordinary interventions. 
Businesses must create value for their stakeholders. 
Who are the business stakeholders? They are a plurality of subjects: they are clients, they 
are workers, the territory, and they are the creditors. A special stakeholder category is 
shareholders, then, risk capital providers.  
There is a natural conflict between the interests of stakeholders, or at least some 
stakeholder categories, and those of shareholders. Here the role of financial markets comes 
into play. Creating value for shareholders means with a certain approximation to generate 
income, and thus, second, profit. Financial markets, more generally, are available to 
provide resources to businesses provided they create value. The rules of finance, as well as 
those of economic theory, are fair: those who create wealth gain further funding and ensure 
the prospect of growth. Financial markets tend to favor the shareholders’ logic. It is to be 
said that the approach to the issue of value creation allows highlighting a European-
Continental tradition to some extent opposed to Anglo-Saxon. 
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While the first tends to attribute equal importance to all stakeholders and to emphasize in 
this sense the need for moral behavior of companies, the second tends to attribute 
prevalence to the figure of the shareholder, or the bearer of capital. This leads to enhancing 
the relevance of the rules of finance and, from this point of view, to accepting severe rules 
of judgment by the market. 
While it is now possible to highlight the continuation of the first dotted counterpoint, it is 
undeniable that the globalization process that has affected the markets in general and the 
financial markets in particular has led to an increasing homogenization of the firm’s 
objective functions towards the Anglo-Saxon scheme. The recent events, all known, clearly 
show how the interests of the market (of shareholders) prevail over those of other 
stakeholders. It must be ethical behavior, understood as behavior that tends to a 
composition of the interests of the various stakeholders, to avoid a degeneration of market 
laws. The role of regulation that imposes these minimal rules is important, and needs to 
acts as a discipline and sanction element, but it is also necessary that internal forces be 
created for firms that address them towards moral behavior. From this point of view, a 
literature on intangibles in businesses should be reported, which are factors that affect the 
value of businesses in a way complementing their ability to create wealth and which can be 
synthesized in the culture and the business climate, managerial skills and ultimately, in the 
broad sense of morality that informs the management. 
In the notion that the company is nothing more than a set of contracts, signed by a number 
of subjects, each in search of maximizing their utility, it is a commodity, bought and sold 
on a market at a certain price. In perspective of the shareholder view, corporate finance 
provides the methodologies for valuing the invested capital in the company and the 
decisions of the directors that influence its value. The assessments concern the estimate of 
costs, benefits, and inherent risks and consequent decisions on capital utilization. 												
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TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF PROFIT SMOOTHING 																															
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2.1 Smoothing 
An earnings management strategy that has survived the test of time is smoothing 
(Buckmaster, 2001).117 Smoothing is the dampening of fluctuations in the series of 
reported earnings. There are two types of smoothing: real and artificial.118 Real smoothing 
involves making production and in- vestment decisions that reduce the variability of 
earnings. Artificial or cosmetic smoothing is achieved through accounting choices. 
There are a number of differences between the two types. First, because earnings are a 
random variable that depends on past production and investment decisions, real smoothing 
is likely to precede artificial smoothing. Second, real smoothing involves decisions that 
reduce the volatility of economic earnings. In contrast, artificial smoothing involves both 
over-statement and understatement of economic earnings: It overstates low earnings and 
understates high earnings. In that way, the series of reported earnings has the same average 
as the series of economic incomes, but with lower variability. 
 
Income Smoothing processes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figura 1. Income Smoothing process. Source: adapted from Eckel (1981, p.29). 
 																																																								117	Smoothing has been studied extensively. For a survey of research before 1980, consult Ronen, Sadan, 
and Snow (1977); Ronen and Sadan (1981). An incomplete list of later studies includes the following: 
Belkaoui and Picur (1984), Moses (1987), Booth, Kallunki, and Martikainen (1996), Hunt, Moyer, and 
Shevlin (1996), Saudagaran and Sepe (1996), Subramanyam (1996), Carlson and Bathala (1997), DeFond 
and Park (1997), Chaney and Lewis (1998), Chaney, Coleman, and Lewis (1998), Oyer (1998), Barth, Elliott 
and Finn (1999), Godfrey and Jones (1999), Barth, Elliott, and Finn (1999), Hallock and Oyer (1999), Hwang 
and Ryan (2000), Payne and Robb (2000), Kanagaretnam, Lobo, and Yang (2004), Cheng and Warfield 
(2005), Abdel- Khalik (2006), Myers, Myers, and Skinner (2006), Tan and Jamal (2006), Tucker and 
Zarowin (2006), and Grant, Markarian, and Parbonetti (2007). See Buckmaster (2001). 118	According to Ronen and Yaari (2007), there are two types of smoothing: real and artificial. Real 
smoothing involves making production and investment decisions that reduce income variability. In contrast, 
artificial smoothing is achieved through accounting practices.	
Flowchart of income 
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Smoothing can also be pernicious; in that reported earnings are made to be close to an 
earnings trend line that differs from what management truly believes it to be. To the extent 
that smoothing is pernicious, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) is likely to affect the relative 
occurrence of real and artificial smoothing. Intuitively, accruals management seems more 
appealing than real smoothing because it does not reduce the firm’s value as much. On the 
other hand, real smoothing has the added benefit that it is less transparent and thus much 
harder to detect and deter (Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2005). 
Now we try to understand the motivations to smooth along the two dimensions of capital 
markets and governance. The capital-market-oriented motivation centers on the 
informational value of smoothing and the demand for consumption smoothing. The 
governance motivation centers on the smoothing incentives of an agent in multi-period 
principal–agent relationships.  
 
2.1.1 Capital Market 
The capital-market incentives for smoothing can be divided into two categories. The first 
concerns the stock market; the second concerns the banking system, which allows 
individuals to borrow and save funds in order to finance private consumption. 
2.1.1.1 Stock Market 
The first question to be addressed is whether smoothing affects valuation. Practitioners 
seem to think that it does. Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005), surveyed chief financial 
officers (and officers with similar financial reporting tasks but different titles, such as 
controllers, vice presidents, etc.). 119 
Smoothing is beneficial when it conveys valuable information on future results. As Ronen 
and Sadan (1981) Chapter 3, Suh (1990), Sankar and Subramanyam (2001) have noted, 
smoothing can be beneficial by reducing distortions in market prices. To illustrate, suppose 
that the firm lasts two more periods. At the beginning of the first period, its books value is 
€10,000. By the end of the first period, it generates profits of €50,000. It is known that the 
second-period earnings are either €140,000 or zero with equal probabilities. The firm alone 
learns the true second-period earnings before it reports the first-period financials. Suppose 
that the second-period earnings are €140,000. The valuation of a firm that reports the truth 
is €130,000, which is the total of its first-period book value, €10,000, the first-period 																																																								119	They report that 96.9% of their respondents preferred a smooth earnings path.	
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reported earnings of €50,000, and the expected second-period report (=1⁄2 x 140,000 + 1⁄2 
x 0). Since the second-period outcome is €140.000, this firm’s value is €200.000, so its 
value is underestimated by €70,000. In contrast, a firm which smooths the first-period 
report by reporting half of its total reported earnings at the end of the first period, €95.000 
(=1⁄2 x (€50,000 + €140,000)), is correctly valued at €200.000 (=10,000 + 95,000 x 2). 
Smoothing, then, improves the information content of its reports.120 
In this example, smoothing is accomplished by reporting the average earnings, which 
reduces the variability of reported earnings to zero. Yet any first-period report between 
€50.000 and €95.000 dollars would reduce the variability of earnings! This raises a 
question regarding the optimal degree of smoothing. 
Chaney and Lewis (1995), and John, John, and Ronen (1996), provide answers that rely on 
the costliness of signaling value through smoothing. Chaney and Lewis analyze a two-
period reporting model with two types of firms: high value, h, and low value, l, h > l, 
where the market cannot distinguish between the two. Since the first-period managed 
earnings must reverse in the second period, the reports of the two types in each period are 
as follows: 
                    𝑅!! = 𝑋!! + 𝛾! 𝜇! − 𝑋!! + 𝛿!                      𝑗 = ℎ, 𝑙                (7)                     𝑅!! = 𝑋!! − 𝛾! 𝜇! − 𝑋!! − 𝛿!                     𝑗 = ℎ, 𝑙                  (8) 
 𝑅!"  is the report of a type j, j=h, l, in period t, t=1,2; 𝑋!"  is the economic earnings, 
generated by a mean-reverting process, 𝑋!" = 𝜇! + 𝜀! , 𝜇! are the means, and 𝜀!  are white 
noise terms with known variance. The reporting strategy is made up of two variables, the 
first-period smoothing variable, 𝛾! , 0 < 𝛾! < 1 and the first-period bias variable, 𝛿!. 
Clearly, if the market cannot distinguish between the two types, it understates the value of 
a type-h firm and overestimates the value of a type-l firm. The type-h firm therefore has 
incentives to choose a report that separates it from the type-l. Chaney and Lewis prove that 
in a separating equilibrium, type-l firms report the truth, and the type-h firms combine 
smoothing with a positive bias that is costly because it increases taxes. Although this study 																																																								120	Under uncertainty, beneficial smoothing can backfire when management’s expectations are not realistic. 
In that case, smoothing increases the prediction error of the value of the firm (Hoogendoorn, 1985). To 
illustrate, suppose that the managers of both firms in our example erroneously assume that the second- period 
cash flows will be zero. Hence, to smooth, the firm reports €25,000 ((50,000+0)/2). The market’s valuation 
now is €60,000, which underestimates the firm by €140,000, in contrast to the valuation of the truth-telling 
firm, €130,000, which is only €70.000 short. 
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calculates the optimal bias in the first period, clearly, there are many profiles of 𝛾 and 𝛿 
that yield the same report. The equilibrium therefore is not unique. 
In John, John, and Ronen (1996), smoothing results from signaling value to investors 
because of the tax implication of reporting profits earlier. The point is that a signal is 
valuable only if it is costly enough to deter low-value firms from mimicking high-value 
firms. Taxation provides such a signal, where shifting taxable income to an earlier period 
causes the series of reported numbers to exhibit a smoother path than the series of 
economic earnings. 
Earnings management is neutral when it has no effect on cash flows. Goel and Thakor 
(2003), describe neutral smoothing. They analyze stylized rational expectations 
equilibrium. The firm’s shareholders are principally uninformed traders, who, for liquidity 
reasons, must sell their shares after the publication of the accounting reports. They sell to 
informed traders, who acquire costly value-relevant information that can neither be 
communicated by the firm nor publicly observed without cost. The informed traders 
recoup the cost of the signal by trading with the uninformed traders, and the higher the 
variance of the firm’s income, the greater the informed traders’ profits and the higher the 
incumbent share- holders’ losses. Hence, a firm’s stock price is negatively correlated with 
its volatility. This provides the firm with incentives to smooth to reduce volatility. There 
are four possibilities along two dimensions: the firm smooths or does not smooth, and the 
market expect or do not expect smoothing. Clearly, in equilibrium, either the firm smooths 
and the market correctly expect it to smooth, or the firm does not smooth and the market 
does not expect it to do so. The latter profile cannot be an equilibrium be- cause if the 
market does not expect the smoothing, the firm can increase its price by reducing the 
volatility of the series of reported earnings. Hence, the only equilibrium profile is the 
former: (a) the firm smooths and (b) the market expects it to smooth. 
Smoothing is neutral because the market undoes the smoothed report to learn the truth. In 
other words, the payoffs to all players are the same as the payoffs had the firm reported the 
truth and the market believed the report. The reason that truth-telling equilibrium is not 
feasible is that the dynamics are those of the “signal-jamming” equilibrium in sender–
receiver games: If a deviant firm (the signal’s sender) does not smooth, it is punished be- 
cause the ignorant market (the receiver) evaluates its income stream at a lower price to 
“correct” for smoothing. (These dynamics also drive Dye, 1988, discussed in Chap. 8; 
Stein, 1988; and Elitzur, 1995, discussed in Chap. 2). 
Another study with neutral smoothing is Elitzur and Yaari (1995). The authors analyze 
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multi-period decision making by a manager who times ac- counting accruals and his 
trading strategy in the firm’s shares during his tenure with the firm (his compensation 
package comprises a base salary, a bonus based on accounting earnings, and stock). 
Lifetime consumption considerations yield a smoothed series of reports. Smoothing is 
neutral if the market is perfectly rational with sufficient information to know the truth.121 
Firms may have incentives to smooth without signaling management’s true expectations of 
future earnings because they perceive that a lower variance in the series of reported 
earnings affects valuation favorably. (For an empirical documentation of the link between 
variance and the valuations based on reported accounting earnings, see, e.g., Bitner and 
Dolan, 1996; Hunt, Moyer, and Shevlin, 1996; Subramanyam, 1996; Hann, Lu, and 
Subramanyam, 2007.) The question is under what circumstances a firm can perniciously 
smooth in a rational market. 
Pernicious smoothing can occur if the market lacks sufficient information (see the 
discussion in Elitzur and Yaari, 1995). It involves pooling equilibrium in signaling games, 
where pernicious smoothers mimic firms with a genuinely smoother earnings series. 
Trueman and Titman (1988), analyze the case in which firms take a loan. Because of the 
risk of bankruptcy, debt-holders require a higher rate of return for firms with more variable 
income. The fact that some firms cannot smooth gives sufficient credibility to the 
smoothed reports of firms that can to make it worthwhile to smooth. As Newman (1988), 
and others argue, it is not clear why firms with stable earnings will not take measures to 
distinguish themselves from those that try to pool with them to reduce their cost of capital. 
Yaari (2005) shows that when firms wish to beat a target in future periods, the firm hoards 
reserves of reported earnings to beat the target. When current earnings are high, the firm 
understates earnings, which is consistent with smoothing. However, when, earnings are 
low, the understatement of earnings increases earnings variability (the opposite of 
smoothing). 
 
 
2.1.1.2 The Banking System 
Consumption smoothing can motivate smoothing of reports (e.g., Monsen and Downs, 
1965; Dye, 1988; Suh, 1990; Christensen and Feltham, 1993; Sivaramakrishnan, 1994; 
Boylan and Villadsen, 1998; Haas, 2000; Sankar and Subramanyam, 2001; Srinidhi, 
Ronen, and Maindiratta, 2001).  																																																								121	Smoothing is not innocuous when the market is unable to filter the noise in the report to learn the truth. 
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To illustrate the argument, assume that the firm lasts two periods, stochastically generating 
earnings of 𝑥!, t=1,2, in each period. Because economic earnings are unobservable, the 
manager’s compensation in period t, 𝑆!, is based on the accounting report, 𝑚!: 
 𝑆! = 𝑆 𝑚! ,   𝑆! = 𝑆(𝑚!) 
 
The only restriction on reported earnings, m, is that in the long run they equal the truth; 
that is, given the firm’s internal rate of discount, r, 
 1+ 𝑟 𝑚! +𝑚! = 𝑦 
Where 𝑦 = 1+ 𝑟 𝑥! + 𝑥! 
 
Suppose that the manager alone has perfect knowledge of the second-period earnings, 𝑥!, 
when the firm issues the first-period report, 𝑚!. The decision on 𝑚! affects the timing of 
the recognition of the firm’s value, y, between the two periods, because once 𝑚!  is 
disclosed, 𝑚! is determined: 𝑚! = 𝑦 −  (1+ 𝑟)𝑚!. 
If the manager’s goal is to obtain a perfect consumption-smoothing path, 𝑐! = 𝑐!, then 
if 𝑆! = 𝑆!, perfect smoothing of the reports ensues, 1+ 𝑟 𝑚! = 𝑚! = 𝑦/2. 
The argument that consumption smoothing yields smoothed reports is based on two 
assumptions: first, it is presumed that the capital market is imperfect, so smoothing the 
reports is the only vehicle to achieve consumption smoothing. If the capital market were 
perfect, the reporting strategy would maximize total compensation, and the manager would 
achieve his optimal consumption path through transactions in the capital market. 
Second, the argument assumes away the hoarding of compensation, which might affect the 
reporting strategy (Yaari, 1991). In other words, what prevents the manager from reporting 
y and earning S(y) in the first period and zero in the second period, and dividing 
consumption between the two periods by hoarding a portion of S(y) in the first period? 
Hoarding is optimal if the compensation is a sufficiently convex function of the report. 
 
 
2.1.2 Governance 
The relationships between smoothing and governance are captured by the principal–agent 
relationships between owners and managers. Owners face the challenge of designing a 
mechanism—a compensation contract—that induces the manager to make the “right 
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decisions.” 
A clue regarding the effect of moral hazard on smoothing is provided by the finite-horizon 
principal–agent literature, which documents that the cur- rent-period compensation must be 
conditioned on the history of outcomes (Lambert, 1983; Rogerson, 1985a; Christensen and 
Feltham, 1993, 2005). If the agent has the option to choose the timing of the report that is 
the basis of the contract, he is likely to smooth the stream of reports when the total of the 
reported numbers and the sum of the outcomes are equal. The question is whether the 
owners allow it. Allen (1985b) proves that a long-term contract dominates a series of short-
term contracts because it allows inter temporal risk sharing and provides additional 
information. This result suggests that smoothing is likely to be desirable to the principal. 
On the other extreme, in the perfect capital market framework of Holmström and Milgrom 
(1987), for example, there is no difference between a contract that pays the manager 
periodically and a contract that pays the agent just once at the end of the contract’s period; 
in such a framework, artificial smoothing is valueless, since the timing of reported earnings 
is unimportant.122 
Admitting the manager’s actions into the analysis leads to dividing our discussion between 
real smoothing—actions that produce smoother accounting reports—and artificial 
smoothing—smoothing merely the series of reported outcomes. 
Real smoothing involves production and investment decisions. Oyer (1998), who studies 
smoothing by salespeople, explains how it is done: 
Consider a company that sells parts to car manufacturers. Car 
manufacturers are concerned with inventory costs and want to avoid 
buying materials they never use. Also, they are likely to purchase 
parts at a contracted price, so threats of future price increases are not 
an effective way to rush orders. Now consider a company selling 
complex and expensive computer systems to corporations. The sales-
person may be in a position to share or hide information about price 
and technology changes. Similarly, the executives of the computer 
company can share or hide information from the public and 
sometimes even from the salesperson. In this way, unlike agents at 
the parts company, the computer salesperson and the executives for 																																																								122	Additional studies that have dealt with a multi-period contract versus a series of short-term contracts 
include Townsend (1982), Fellingham, Newman, and Suh (1985), Fudenberg, Holmström, and Milgrom 
(1990), and Spear and Srivastava (1987), Malcomson and Spinnewyn (1988). 
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whom he works can influence the date a computer is purchased and 
shipped. The computer salesperson has more opportunity to attain 
quota in current and future years, while computer executives can 
move sales to the year where they have the most impact on their own 
compensation. 
This timing influence, which I will call “timing gaming”, can take 
two forms. The salesperson can “pull in” potential business from the 
next fiscal year to make quota this year, or the salesperson, knowing 
he has achieved quota or giving up for the current year, can “push 
out” business to the next year. Without knowing salesperson 
turnover rates and the form of the sales distribution, it is not possible 
to determine for sure whether the pull-in or push-out effect 
dominates. (p. 156). 
Although the literature on the finite-horizon repeated principal–agent game had detected 
inter temporal links in the choice of actions (Lambert, 1983; Rogerson, 1985a), the first 
study that analyzes the connection be- tween moral hazard and real smoothing is that of 
Lambert (1984). 
The analytical literature offers insights into the incidence of artificial smoothing in 
principal–agent relationships. The mechanics are similar to those presented in our 
discussion of smoothing under limited borrowing conditions (Penno, 1987; 
Sivaramakrishnan, 1994). When the agent knows current earnings and has an imperfect 
signal on future earnings, the agent smooths the first-period report around the future signal 
when he is restricted to communicating only the current period’s outcome. Hence, although 
the current report is not truthful, it is forward-looking.123 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1995), examine the reporting strategy of an incumbent manager 
who is anxious to keep his job. The manager has to cope with the reality of information 
decay, which implies that being successful one period ago is less meaningful than being 
successful today. They prove that the agent smooths the report: If it is very good news, 
deflating it by deferring reporting to the future “saves” it from the information decay. If the 
information is bad news, inflating the report ensures continuous employment.124 																																																								123	Artificial Smoothing.	124	The importance of future earnings, emphasized by this model, motivates the empirical tests in DeFond 
and Park (1997), Elgers, Pfeiffer, and Porter (2000), and Payne and Robb (2000). For recent corroboration of 
the theory, consult Ahmed, Lobo, and Zhou (2006). 
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One question that has plagued the principal–agent works on smoothing is whether it is 
beneficial or pernicious to the principal. Demski (1998) formulates conditions for each 
case. The harmful case is obvious, in that artificial smoothing reduces the quality of the 
accounting message in its role as a monitor of the agent’s effort because it garbles the 
message. Even here, however, there are different shades of gray, as, in some in- stances, 
the principal (weakly) tolerates smoothing. The beneficial case obtains when the 
opportunity for smoothing arises only if the agent exerts the high, desired level of effort.125 
Arya, Glover, and Sunder (1998), prove that smoothing can improve the welfare of a 
principal who cannot commit not to fire his manager in response to poor short-run 
performance. The threat of early termination of employment is costly because the 
requirement that the contract guarantee the agent his reservation utility level can only be 
met with a higher compensation cost. (This result depends on the parameters of the 
problem because earnings management is also costly; inflating the first-period report to 
cover up for poor performance delays the principal’s ability to infer that the incumbent 
manager is inefficient and should have been replaced by a more efficient manager sooner.) 
Similar to Ronen and Sadan (1981), Suh (1990), and Sankar and Subramanyam (2001), 
show that the informativeness of smoothing is valuable, albeit costly, too. The former notes 
that the cost of smoothing is that earnings are a less informative signal on the agent’s 
effort, and the latter observe that the cost arises from providing the privately informed, 
utility maximizing manager with more discretion over the choice of accounting treatment. 
Srinidhi, Ronen, and Maindiratta (2001), study the optimal reporting strategy of a manager 
who cannot access the capital market, but who can use his private knowledge of future 
outcomes to smooth his consumption stream in an infinite horizon model, through the 
smoothed stream of reports. They show that the manager smooths and that smoothing is a 
policy that satisfies the GAAP requirements of consistency, un-biasedness, and cash-flow 
convergence. 
 																																																													125	This issue applies to the single-period case as well. Verrecchia (1986), analyzes the one-shot principal-
agent game in which the principal does not observe economic earnings but knows that the agent can acquire 
at a cost a signal that improves the financial reporting so that it coincides with the economic earnings. 
Verrecchia shows that the principal may prefer to allow the manager to manipulate the report in order to 
obtain a better signal to monitor the agent’s unobservable effort.
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2.2 Real earnings management policies 
Real earnings management policies consist of manipulating the firm’s result through “ad 
hoc operations”,126 which also reflect on real activities and not solely on their accounting. 
In fact, in order to put in place such policies, it is necessary to actually execute transactions 
and enter into contracts with counterparties outside the company or group. Such actions are 
not accomplished in order to achieve the economic advantage that is usually associated 
with them, but “to obtain benefits that are not proper to that particular economic 
operation”:127 in fact, the will is to arrive at a desired representation financial statement, 
functional to the pursuit of further objectives, and real operations are a mere tool for 
achieving set goals. For example, if they consider it convenient to maximize their 
operating result, directors may decide to postpone the no-capital cost of research or 
development expenditures in order to avoid charging these costs in the income statement 
and thus not depressing the profitability of the period; in this way, management prefers the 
effects associated with short representation,128 even at the cost of losing the opportunities 
and benefits associated with such discretionary expenses. 
By way of example, with regard to transactions concluded with entities outside the 
company, managers may anticipate or delay discretionary costs, among which, in addition 
to research and development costs, even advertising or staff training, may modify ordinary 
maintenance on the assets, can act on sales prices or choose which asset to sell the 
instrumental assets (with the provision of plus/minus values).129 
Intragroup transactions undertaken with the aim of achieving precise budgetary targets, 
such as trade in goods or services, are easier to achieve in order to allow for the accounting 
of the related costs or revenues in the financial statement of the companies belonging to the 
same group;130 or, equally, easy to implement are the budget policies that are achieved 
through transactions between a single company and majority shareholders, such as formal 																																																								126	The expression is made by Verona (2006, p.71): “In ad hoc operations, accountancy technique is not used 
to modify the interpretation, classification or valuation of management operations. In this class of budget 
policies, some of the operations are sometimes carried out, sometimes only formally, not in order to achieve 
their natural economic result, but to achieve the goal of being represented in the budget, giving the 
impression that they have been put into practice to achieve other ends”.	127	See Verona (2006, p. 72).	128	Short-term.	129	See Florio (2011, p.21).	130	Severino (1992, p. 66) in his contribution refers to the case of ad hoc operations occurring within 
corporate groups, in which “an intercompany commercial or financial transaction may allow to conceal 
losses or perhaps reduce the pressure taxation, offset the positive performance of some companies with 
negative performance of others”.	
	 94	
indebtedness towards third parties, which in fact represents an increase in risk capital by 
the shareholders.131 All these ad hoc operations are characterized by greater feasibility 
because they are supported by the collaboration and trust between the various companies 
of the group or between a single company and members. 
Returning to transactions with non-inside counterparts, according to Roychowdhury, in 
order to avoid any losses in the balance sheet, administrators may grant price discounts at 
the end of the financial year and thus temporarily increase sales, delay research and 
development costs, produce more than they plan to sell for the purpose of reversing part of 
fixed costs through inventory of finished products. In the opinion of the author, shared 
here, these decisions may, however, have a negative impact on the firm’s value: for 
example, aggressive price policies to increase short-term profitability will potentially lead 
consumers to expect discounts in the future (with resulting in greater difficulty selling at 
the price list), while overproduction entails increased inventory management costs and 
generates excess inventories to be placed on the market in subsequent years.132 
Conversely, if the purpose is to minimize the operating result, research and development 
costs or advertising costs are anticipated, the organization of personnel training courses is 
anticipated, or assets that are deemed to generate capital losses are anticipated too. 
From the above, it is concluded that real earnings management policies are based on the 
management discretion of the directors and affect the time distribution or the amount of 
costs and/or revenues; these policies affect the normal business practices of the firm, 
deviating from the ordinary way of doing business:133 “In order for this form of earnings 
management to manifest itself concretely, there is a need for differences in the ways and/or 
the times when an operation would was completed in the normal course of the operation 
and the manner and/or the times with which the transaction was carried out in order to 
achieve the target set.134 However, real budget policies generally lead to a “purely formal 
result” from a middle to long-term perspective: 135  the configuration or timing of 
management operations is changed in order to achieve predefined revenue targets for the 																																																								131	In this regard, Verona (2006, p. 73) writes: “Formal indebtedness towards third parties, which essentially 
hides an increase in risk capital, could be identified as a fictitious operation. This is, in practice, a real risk 
capital increase made in the company by the shareholders and masked by a formal subscription of “loan to 
third parties””. 132	Verona (2006, p.75).	133 	Roychowdhury S. (2006), Earnings management through real activities manipulation, Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, vol. 42, n. 3, p. 338. 134	Florio (2011, p.22).	135	Verona (2006, p.72).	
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period but this entails adjustments in the opposite direction in the coming years, in fact 
with a neutralization of the total real effects. For example, if the company reduces R&D or 
advertising spending in the current year, it is presumed to be forced to increase these 
expenses in subsequent periods in order to support growth and image not adequately 
sustained in the past; or where the company has given customers favorable discounts or 
favorable terms of payment to speed up sales at the end of the year, they may encounter 
more difficulties in the future to market the product under the standard conditions and will 
therefore face a contraction in demand. 
An element that unites all real earnings management policies and distinguishes them from 
those of accounting profit management is that “the use of management discretion affects 
the real economic and financial situation of the firm and not just the representation of that 
is given in external information”:136 such policies, in addition to having a real (and not 
merely appraisal) impact on the result of the period, also reflect the actual cash availability 
of the firm or its debit and credit standing. 
However, these are operations whose concrete instrumentation is difficult to recognize as 
they fall within the usual commercial operations, which are solely attributed to the 
discretion of the directors in the management of the company: it is not possible to 
distinguish with absolute certainty which of these are implemented solely for reasons of 
economic convenience, present or prospective, and which ones are performed on the basis 
of the achievement of a predefined earnings-related earnings in the financial year.137 
 
 
2.2.1 Earnings management policies based on end-of-period valuations 
On the other hand, it is more significant for the purposes of the subsequent development of 
the work to focus on the earnings management policies that take place through accounting 
maneuvers when preparing the financial statements or already during the year. These 
budgetary policies are based on the technical discretion available to those who are in 
charge of these tasks, or with decision-making functions for the purpose. Unlike the real 
earnings management policies do not affect the firm’s reality, but affect only the 
economic-financial representation that is being made. 																																																								136	Mattei M. M. (2006), Dalle politiche di bilancio all’earnings management, d.u.press, Bologna, p. 113. 137	See also Schipper (1989), in Commentary on Earnings Management, Accounting Horizons, vol.3, p.92: 
“It might be difficult to distinguish empirically between investment or production decisions (such as choosing 
the level of expenditures on research and development or on advertising, adding or dropping a product line, 
or acquiring another firm) that are undertaken purely to maximize share values and those undertaken purely 
to manage earnings”. 
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Accounting earnings management policies may, in turn, be distinguished depending on 
whether the margin of maneuver affects the classification of the values in the financial 
statements or concerns the valuation of accounting positions at the end of the financial 
year. In this work, policies of the first type are omitted and this second subset, which is 
known in the literature with the term accrual earnings management. 
This denomination derives from the term “accruals”, which refers to those non-monetary 
income components (including the devaluation of goodwill) or that during the year they 
did not have a monetary manifestation because they refer to non-monetary processes still 
terminated at the end of the financial statements. These components originate from the 
assumption that the financial statements have to be drawn up in accordance with the 
principle of economic competence (at international accounting standards it is referred to as 
accrual basis), which requires the recognition of costs and revenues at the time of their 
economic maturity regardless of their monetary manifestation. These are unreliable values, 
which can not be determined in a unique and absolute way, and therefore require an 
inevitable assessment of management at the end of the term: it results in estimated and 
conjectured values, which are easy to implement budget policies,138 or to provide a 
distorted and trendy representation of reality.139 
The need for knowledge and decision making to reach a result of the period cannot 
therefore be ignored by the technical discretion implied in the assignment of a value to 
posts reflecting transactions that are still ongoing at the end of the financial year. 
International accounting standards take note of, for example, leaving various options in the 
valuation of an accounting item (such as the FIFO method or the weighted average cost of 
valuation of inventories), requiring the budget drafters to estimate the presumable 
recoverable amount of a immobilization in order to make any impairment at the end of the 
period, require management to allocate common costs over several years and, more 
generally, to grant valuation benefits that enable the implementation of earnings 
management policies. 																																																								138	Coronella (1997, pg. 48), referring explicitly to accrual earnings management, defines fiscal policies as 
“attitudes to the instrumental use of valuations, in order to show an inconsistent economic, financial and 
asset situation, more or less distant from reality”.	139	Ronen e Yaari (2008, pag. 371-372): “Accruals arise when there is a discrepancy between the timing of 
cash flows and the timing of the accounting recognition of the transaction”. The authors then distinguish 
between accruals normally related to the level of activity of the enterprise and the accruals that derive from 
the exercise of a certain discretion by the directors: “Non-discretionary accruals are accruals that arise from 
transactions made in the current period that are normal for the firm given its performance level and business 
strategy, industry conventions, macro-economic events, and other economic factors. Discretionary accruals 
are accruals that arise from transactions made or accounting treatments chosen in order to manage 
earnings”. 
	 97	
The presence of accruals therefore results in an in-eliminable discretion, which, however, 
“must not be used instrumentally to eliminate the impartiality of the budget, should not be 
used by the directors as a pretext to take advantage of the option of arbitration”.140 In fact, 
the presence of potentially manipulable values does not in itself lead to information that is 
certainly untrustworthy, but simply facilitates any opportunistic behavior of the budget 
editors. It is desirable, however, that directors are not instrumental in end-of-term 
valuations to pursue corporate or personal goals but rather take advantage of the discretion 
granted to provide a true representation of the firm’s financial position and financial 
performance. 
Accounting earnings management policies may affect the most varied accounting positions 
and the maneuver spaces in the determination of these values are used to alter the 
quantitative size of the economic results in both directions: 
- for example, they can help to improve a disappointing operating result both over 
valuation of stock inventories and alignment of asset value at the higher current fair value; 
- by way of example, in order to reduce the profit, discretionary charges can be used, such 
as higher amortization or provisioning provisions, or can avoid capitalizing on costs that 
could be deferred in future years. 
The areas of discretionary valuation afforded by the international accounting standards also 
allow a considerable variation in the value attributed to the financial statements and 
therefore may have, individually or cumulatively, a significant impact on the result of the 
individual financial year. However, Mohanram (2003) points out that accounting policies 
implemented through accounting maneuvers can be considered inter-temporal transfers 
between administrative periods and are usually neutral in a long-term perspective:141 firms 
can have the convenience of “taking loan” or to “save” income shares from or for future 
years by anticipating or deferring income and expense, but such valuation choices 
generally have no impact on the total income recorded by the firm over its life. In fact, “the 
fiscal policies that rely on estimated and conjectured income components (…) do not 
exhaust their effects in the implementation exercise, but have an opposite effect on the 																																																								140	See Verona (2006, p. 29).	141	Mohanram P.S. (2003), How to manage earnings management? Accounting World, p. 6: “Earnings 
management can be considered an “inter-temporal” transfer of income between periods. If a firm is 
aggressive with its accounting, it is in a sense borrowing from the future. If a firm is conservative, it is saving 
up for the future. None of this matter is in steady state, because of the natural reversal in accruals”. 
Similarly, with regard to income minimization and income maximization policies carried out through 
accounting manipulations, Ronen and Yaari (2008, page 342) write: “Since the total reported earnings and 
total cash flows are equal, the present minimization will lead To future maximization, and vice versa”.	
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performance of one or more subsequent years”.142 By way of example, if the budget 
drafters assign a high value to finished product inventories in order to increase the positive 
income components and inflow the balance sheet assets, in the following year this will 
automatically result in a negative component of equal amount, with a counterpart impact in 
the profit statement. 
In the following, considering only earnings management policies based on end-of-period 
evaluations, an analysis of the various implementing modalities with which these practices 
can be carried out is carried out. In particular, one can face a policy of income smoothing 
where the goal is to stabilize incomes during the financial years, to minimize income 
strategy or, if necessary, to big bath earnings management if the directors tend to break the 
result of period, to income maximization practices where management is acting in view of 
achieving the highest achievable profit. These cases do not exhaust the many behaviors 
that may be related to budget policies, but represent the most widespread and most popular 
forms of earnings management in the literature. 		
2.2.2 Income smoothing policies 
The income smoothing policies consist of an attempt to level the incomes, possibly along a 
growing trend: the will is to provide a stable business image of the income earned, 
avoiding large fluctuations in the level of profits that could perceive the firm as the most 
risky. Therefore, through taxation equalization policies, administrators mask the variability 
of operating results, trying to make a non-existent earnings-related equilibrium appear over 
time. 
The target threshold to be reached, in the perspective of income smoothing, is identified in 
the result of the previous year, which “must be at least reconfirmed and possibly 
improved”,143 albeit with low increases, compatible with further slight gains in the coming 
periods. Stability maneuvers are therefore long-term policies that require monitoring and 
ongoing intervention by the directors, in order to allow “coordination” with the income 
results of contiguous exercises: “It is necessary, in fact, that the compressions and 
expansions of accounting income are carried out systematically with the relative increases 
and reductions in actual income. It is therefore not a matter of increasing or decreasing the 
																																																								142	Florio (2011, p.26).	143	See Florio (2011, p. 50).	
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accounting income for contingent reasons and irrespective of the outcome of previous or 
subsequent years”.144 
Consequently, if the result for the period does not reach or exceed the target value 
represented by the economic result of the previous financial year, the directors take 
corrective action to increase or reduce profit appropriately: in favorable terms they make 
provisions or charge higher discretionary costs, in the adverse periods they use funds, turn 
to the future negative income components, or try to anticipate revenue. Therefore, unlike 
the earnings management forms, in this case the direction of manipulations is not univocal, 
but varies according to how the result before the accounting maneuver is compared to the 
result of the previous year.145 With particular reference to goodwill, income smoothing 
policies can be achieved by affecting, on the basis of the need for representation, the 
impairment loss recognized as a result of impairment tests: specifically, if pre-policy 
earnings management profit exceeds the target income to be achieved, management should 
intervene accounting for a goodwill devaluation for a higher amount than that resulting 
from a neutral valuation in impairment testing; conversely, in the event that the result ante 
budget policies is lower than the result of the previous year, the directors should 
manipulate the test results in order to avoid entering a goodwill impairment value or 
otherwise to detect it for an amount lower than that actually due. 
Management takes such policies because that stable results are desirable both at the time 
the company presents itself and is involved with the capital market and in dealing with 
other corporate realities. Considering the firm least risky in terms of earnings strength, 
shareholders should be willing to receive a lower remuneration from the invested capital; 
similarly, considering the most reliable solvency business, external lenders should be more 
inclined to grant more favorable credit rates: all this would result in lower capital cost for 
the firm, with safe benefits in terms of capacity self-financing. At the same time, suppliers 
and customers, relying on the firm’s ability to continue over time due to its stable 
profitability, may want to start with this long-lasting business relationship, also by offering 
better terms about offered services or payment terms. 
Always with regard to the stakeholder-to-business ratio, the stabilization of distributable 
profits is very often effective in ensuring the stabilization of dividends, and thus allowing a 																																																								144	See Verona (2006, p.171-172).	145	Ronen and Yaari (2008, p.383), with regard to income smoothing policies implemented through 
accounting choices, thus expressing “artificial smoothing involves both overstatement and under statement of 
economic earnings: it overstates low earnings and understates high earnings. In that way, the series of 
reported earnings has the same average as the series of economic incomes but with lower variability”. 
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constant remuneration of the shareholders. In addition, stable or slightly increased 
dividends, due to their financial and economic strength, usually have positive effects on the 
corporate image: the ability to generate a constant cash flow is positively perceived by the 
market and can have a positive impact even on stock capitalization. 
 
 
2.2.3 Big bath earnings management 
A behavioral manipulation of the alternative economic result compared to the one 
described above falls under the name “big bath earnings management”. 
Big bath earnings management is concerned when, in a year already characterized by 
losses or inadequate performance compared to market expectations, budget drafters are 
working to further decrease this result by overestimating the costs of expertise. In essence, 
it is considered that managers take advantage of an already negative result to record even 
heavier losses.146 
To account for additional budget costs, management may especially focus on estimated 
and conjectured amounts: fund provisions, high depreciation of assets, under-valuation of 
stock inventories, heavy devaluation asset due to impairment tests. In particular, with 
regard to goodwill presented in the balance sheet, it may be expedient to record a 
significant “una tantum” devaluation in an already negative exercise, perhaps avoiding 
further value reductions in near future financial years. 
The underlying reason for adopting these policies is as follows: in the impossibility of 
achieving the goal result -or zero, the income of the previous year, the expected profit from 
shareholders or analysts- overestimates the discretionary costs and exceptionally devaluate 
assets in order to reduce costs (including depreciation) and impairment losses that will 
occur in the following years. The attempt is to create the “prerequisites for improving the 
firm’s future performance”147 by anticipating accounting positions that could have a 
negative impact on the result of subsequent periods. 
The underlying expectation is that “the achievement of a non-recurring loss of budget is 
somewhat “offset” by the market, as financial analysts and investors tend to focus on 
future income”148  expectations rather than on income in the final balance. In addition, 
investors’ reactions to the announcement of non-achievement of the expected outcome 																																																								146	The expression “to take a bath” means, in fact, to suffer a major financial loss.	147	See Florio (2011, p. 56).	148	Florio C. (2007), Impairment test dell’avviamento e big bath earnings management: alcuni riscontri 
empirici, in Rivista dei Dottori Commercialisti, vol. 6, p.1201. 
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should not differ in proportion to the recorded gap: less than target results are perceived in 
the same way as the market. Therefore, the firm should not be strongly affected by the 
further worsening of operational performance driven by earnings management practices. 
In addition, Tokuga and Yamashita (2011) observe that the likelihood of big bath policies 
is very high in the face of a change in management. According to the authors, firms seek to 
use the upgrading to the vertices as an opportunity to remove those elements that may put 
pressure on future performance. In particular, newly appointed management could 
experience heavy losses in the first year of office and try to take responsibility for the 
management that preceded it. The two authors then report the case of a “friendly 
change”149 between predecessors and successors: in this case, large devaluation and other 
discretionary costs are accounted for by the management outgoing at the same time as the 
resignation, so that the new summit to achieve a satisfactory income as a result of its 
establishment at the top of the company. 
 
 
2.2.4 Income minimization and income maximization policies  
The other two forms with which earnings management can be presented are income 
minimization and income maximization. As we can easily deduce, it is about income 
minimization or income maximization if the behavior of the directors is oriented, 
respectively, to the reduction or maximization of the operating result. The two policies are 
in the opposite direction; in fact, as has already been observed, the intervention of the 
directors is not always aimed at improving the performance of the income but depending 
on the needs of representation and the objectives pursued, may have a different impact on 
the budget of the manipulative policies put in place. 
In the policy of income minimization, in fact, the due prudential appreciation of the firm’s 
facts when drafting the financial statements (which involves “reasonable underestimation 
of the firm’s assets”)150 is shifted from the deliberate and tendency to minimize the profits 
of the directors, but the distinction between these two attitudes is not easily 
																																																								149	Tokuga Y., Yamashita T. (2011, page 2) divide managerial changes into hostile and friendly depending 
on the relationship between outgoing and incoming directors: “Changes of management can be divided into 
“hostile changes” and “amicable changes” according to the relationship between the predecessors and 
successors. Hostile management changes involve hostile relationships and amicable management changes 
involve amicable relationships”.	150	The expression is making by Severino (1992, p. 61). In preparing the financial statements, the IAS / IFRS 
principles require a prudent appreciation of company facts in order to secure third parties that have business 
relations.	
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recognizable:151 there are in the case of earnings management practices where in the 
assessment freedom there is no limitation to prudence so to say “rational”, but tend to 
exceed in the cautionary assessment of some economic values in order to voluntarily cut 
the income to achieve a predetermined goal.152 
The income minimization policies can be implemented by underestimating positive 
components of income or by overestimating the negative components: as an example, 
possible ways of implementing are the underestimation of inventories of finished products, 
excessive provisions for future expenses or losses, the recording of substantial devaluation 
of tangible and intangible assets (including goodwill). Such manipulative operations 
correspond to undervalued assets or over-valued items: assets recorded at a book value 
lower than the real value, less inventories in state assets capital, funds constituted in a 
deliberately excessive amount compared to the actual needs.153 
Minimizing policies, underestimating invested capital or overestimating passive assets, 
originate in hidden reserves,154 which in turn are a source of self-financing unclear. In fact, 
the negative components of income that are charged to the income statement (such as 
higher amortization, devaluation asset, fund provisions) do not result in a related cash 
outflow, while reducing the result for the period. This prevents the release of financial 
resources in the form of taxes or any dividends and these resources remain in the 
company’s willingness to proceed potentially to further investments or the financing of 
current management activities (unless the resources are absorbed from commercial credits 
or have not already been invested in other assets): non-disbursement is, in fact, a source to 
																																																								151	Pini (1991, pp. 90-91), with reference to budgeting policies aimed at minimizing income, he comments: 
“It is not always easy for the expert budget user, or for the social control bodies, to understand if the 
outcome of the evaluations expressed is the result of an estimation reasoning in which the reference to the 
prudence mask, at least in part, is the voluntary nature of the error which results in deliberate 
underestimation of the asset or over valuation of the liability of the balance sheet (...)”.	152	Courses (2013) stresses that, in the context of international accounting standards, prudence “is cautious 
in exercising the judgments necessary to carry out the required estimates in uncertainty so that the activities 
or Revenues are not overstated and liabilities and costs are not underestimated”. The author continues to 
point out “improper and excessive application of this principle (...) would lead to the creation of occult 
reserves, thus affecting the reliability of the budget to which the same prudence is subordinated”.	153	Verona (2006, p. 222) notes that some funds, which are allegedly in nature, may voluntarily be set-aside 
for an excessive amount. It also adds that "the provision of the" credit risk provision "is one of the 
transactions with the highest degree of subjectivity between the various liabilities of the liability: it is difficult 
for the directors to carefully determine the degree of solvency of the loans, often in their own Valuations are 
affected by the incidence that these provisions may have on the result of the exercise. "	154	The term “hidden reserve” also refers to those funds that are improperly constituted by provisions 
exceeding the economic needs, which, as they are inflated into the balance sheet, increase the liability, and at 
the same time reduce the profitability and consistency of the company’s assets.	
	 103	
enable greater autonomy of the enterprise from a financial and asset point of view.155 In 
addition, the lower net profitability is only temporary and allows subsequent earnings to 
record higher results thanks to the reduced or absent amortization of fixed assets, the 
utilization of the provisioned funds, and the lower negative components due to initial 
inventories: the income reduction measures in the exercise affected by income 
minimization policies, it is precisely the creation of hidden reserves to which they draw in 
subsequent periods. 
Going to consider the reasons for implementing such policies, it should be noted that the 
reduction in the period’s result is usually aimed to bring the profit back to a qualified level 
as satisfactory, that is to say that it reaches the target but does not distance itself 
excessively upwards. This will arise from the consideration that there are few benefits from 
the wide over-targeting of earnings, and investors and financial analysts are likely to revise 
their forecasts for future performance, resulting in greater difficulty for the company to 
reach them and therefore more likely that expectations are easily overlooked in the coming 
years.156 Any disappointment in expectations in subsequent periods, on the contrary, may 
result in disinvestment by shareholders and a fall in stock prices. 
This form of earnings management can also be used in order to depress the share price 
before buying a treasury stock from the company or corporate tops. In this case, the 
reduction in the result of the period is functional to bring out lower distributable profits and 
presumably reduced dividends;157 Such circumstances may be perceived by the market as a 
negative sign and, consequently, may result in a downturn in the share price that facilitates 
buy-back transactions by the firm or a possible increase in the management concerned to 
acquire control (the so-called management buyout operations): the firm or the directors are 
facilitated in their intent since they can guarantee the purchase of the securities at an 
“subsidized” price. Administrators could also resort to income minimization policies and 
thus cause a temporary reduction in stock price quotations simply for speculative purposes: 
																																																								155	Severino (1992, p. 59) makes reference to this aspect of income minimization policies: “By controlling 
the budgetary values in a restrictive sense, a consolidation of the company can be achieved in terms of 
financial autonomy and capital. In this way, the available profit is reduced as dividends payable to 
shareholders and thus reduces the possible flow of company’s “forces” to the outside”.	156	Mohanram (2003, p. 3): “When firms are way above their targets, they may again have an incentive to 
reduce earnings. Typically, there is little benefit in going way above a benchmark. (...) Further, reducing the 
extent of over-performance prevents the ratchet effect. The ratchet effect is when expectations are adjusted 
upwards when performance is strong. If firms do too well, expectations for the future are adjusted 
accordingly making future targets more difficult to attain”. 157	In the absence of adequate reserves of distributable earnings, a reduced operating result has a direct 
impact on the dividend policy.	
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this is a phenomenon known as insider trading. In this case, managers take advantage of 
the private information they have (unlike the market) to obtain personal benefits that, in the 
present case, consist of acquiring stock of the company they administer at a price that they 
know they are underestimated and therefore profitable, and then proceed to a sale of the 
package when quotes are regenerated, in line with the true economic value of the 
business.158 
Finally, the policies under consideration are also often implemented to reduce the 
excessive tax burden that would otherwise entail on operating income prior to 
manipulation. For this purpose, however, the devaluation of tangible and intangible fixed 
assets is not possible. In fact, if the firms, following impairment tests, align the carrying 
amount of asset to the less recoverable amount, this devaluation does not account for 
taxation and therefore does not allow cutting the taxable income.159  
However, at the end of the financial year, which is affected by the implementation of 
income minimization policies, the firm’s economic situation is worse than the actual one. 
Generally speaking, the effect is a minor or a lack of dividend distribution (which is 
equivalent to greater financial holdings retained within the enterprise), and a related occult 
strengthening of the assets. At the same time, however, the corporate image may be 
affected, and therefore, may be negative financially: debt service providers could 
experience a higher risk of insolvency and thus increase the rate of interest on loans; for 
their part, shareholders, considering the low level of dividend pay, may be more reluctant 
to invest further in the company in the event of a rise in share capital or even may be 
induced to divest the shares already held. Therefore, if the management decides to 
implement such budget policies, it must also consider carefully the possible counter-effects 
that could counterbalance the results that they are aiming to achieve. 
Conversely, income maximization maneuvers have a counterproductive purpose compared 
to those of the newly treated policies, that is to say the outcome of business management is 
better than it really is. In order to maximize the operating profit, administrators can 																																																								158	In theory, the quotation price of the shares should reflect the present value of the future dividends to be 
distributed by the company, which in turn represent the economic value of the company. However, at any 
time, stock prices may not be perfectly aligned with that economic value because of the lesser information 
available to market participants: in particular, prices may be affected by the manipulation of the financial 
results executed by managers who, not being caught as such by the market, entail a misguided revision of 
expectations (up or down) about future dividends and a consequent adjustment in investment decisions by 
shareholders. Faced with these situations, directors can take advantage of mispricing to purchase/sell 
securities depending on whether the shares are undervalued or overvalued, respectively, over the firm’s 
economic value.	159	Cipriani V. (2013), Ias/Ifrs, dal bilancio a Unico: immobili, impianti e macchinari, Fisco Oggi Rivista 
Telematica, 2013. 
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overestimate the positive income components or underestimate the negative components. 
Amongst the multiple maneuvers to which leverage can be made include over-valuation of 
inventories, postponing future assets recognition of asset value losses (including 
devaluation of goodwill), depreciation of reduced amortization or non-provisioning to 
funds. The above-mentioned manipulations, therefore, aim to provide a better 
representation of the firm’s financial and capital situation than the actual one and, if 
necessary, allow for no losses already occurring. Generally, they can bring benefits in 
terms of corporate image perceived by stakeholders and consequently allow for easier 
access to finance or subscription capital increases. In the latter case, among other things, 
due to the tendency of an increase in share price due to good performance, the company is 
guaranteed greater financial income when placing new shares in circulation: in fact, with 
the same share capital increase, the company has a higher price than the nominal value of 
the shares, and this difference consolidates the firm’s assets as a share premium reserve. 
Moreover, interventions aimed at maximizing the result of the period are often explained 
by the need not to violate the clauses contained in the financing contracts and thus prevent 
the occurrence of a re-negotiation of the loan on more difficult conditions for the enterprise 
or with the will to temporarily support stock market quotation, particularly in the context 
of extraordinary transactions or capital increases. In addition, management may use such 
accounting maneuvers for strictly personal purposes, such as receiving a higher 
remuneration, where this is partly variable and depends on achieving certain income levels 
or in order to obtain the re-appointment of the assignment. In the present case, in the case 
of the renewal of the Directors’ duties, income maximization policies can be found to mask 
poor income performance and thus avoid being foreclosed or obtaining a higher benefit 
allowance in the event of a failure reconfirms or, alternatively, to occupy better occupation, 
as a role in the direction of society, following the turnover.160 Finally, as regards income 
minimization policies, management may be induced to inflate the firm’s share price 
through manipulation of rising earnings, in order to take advantage of over-valuation of the 
securities to sell at a reasonable price the shares in its possession. 
However, at the same time, income maximization policies determine the unfavorable 
impact on the enterprise. First, the company has to sustain a higher tax burden than what it 
would have on real income, with no ups and downs. That is, unless the positive 
components of income recognized in the financial statements are fiscally irrelevant or the 																																																								160	Ronen e Yaari (2008, p. 93). 
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deferred costs for future periods are not in any case unjustifiable.161 Another negative 
aspect of the policy of income maximization is the fact that as accounting manipulations 
aim to inflow the profit leads to a progressive redemption of the capital, i.e. there is a 
dummy increase in the net equity because it does not correspond to an actual value of 
assets or other assets, net of liabilities: Florio points out that the value shown in the 
financial statements “is more than the capital actually available to the business and 
economic reality”.162 This situation leads to a potential injury for creditors and members 
who, on the basis of the financial statements, are led to trust in a wealth that is probably 
only apparent. This may also be reflected in the potential distribution of profit (dividends) 
not actually earned, with relative depletion of the firm’s assets: dividends distributed 
possibly are in part without an economic foundation and, more importantly, weaken the 
enterprise from a financial point of view. Even in the case of income maximization 
policies, management must evaluate and weigh the benefits and risks that arise from the 
implementation of such budget maneuvers: in particular, it must be aware that, in the event 
that the shareholders’ meeting decide on a distribution of dividends, in the face of 
profitable distributions only fictitious, there is an actual liquidity subtraction to future 
business management and this could seriously damage the enterprise. 
 
 
2.2.5 Underlying reasons for the implementation of financial statement policies 
At the conclusion of the paragraph and this brief overview of the main aspects of earnings 
management policies, it is appropriate to systematically present the various incentives 
underlying the impairment of the economic result for the year and, more generally, the 
statement of financial position presented in the financial statements. In fact, in presenting 
the conceptual definition of earnings management policies, it has been observed that, in 
order to be in the presence of such practices, there must be a potential purpose underlying 
the accounting or management maneuvers.163 It is now time to go for the “real cause” that 
drives management to implement financial statement policies, the ultimate goal that is to 
																																																								161	What is meant here is that inflating the positive components of income or avoiding the inclusion of 
negative components, the company goes to higher taxation. However, if these factors are of no relevance to 
the tax discipline, even the misalignment between the tax load before and after manipulations does not occur.	162	See Florio, (2011, p. 54).	163	With regard to this aspect of budgetary policies, Severino (1992, p. 81) in his contribution thus states, “in 
order to arrive at the budget maneuver, it is necessary to pursue certain objectives which are not aligned 
with the faithful representation of the economic situation, capital and financial assets of the company”.	
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be achieved. The reasons why, in part, have already been mentioned in the course of the 
discussion are explained and argued. 
Firstly, it is important to say that businesses and groups are not self-contained, but interact 
with stakeholders in various ways that make up the surrounding environment. As they are 
embedded in such a wider context, their operation is affected by constraints and 
interactions with the external environment, and administrators, aware of this, may have the 
convenience of providing non-neutral information on the economic and financial situation 
to influence third party investment or financing decisions. In essence, management takes 
advantage of information asymmetry about business performance, which characterizes the 
relationship between both external and internal stakeholders, and exposes a not entirely 
faithful contest to affect the convergent interests of the company in various ways and to 
make sure that an image is found in favor of the achievement of the goals pursued by the 
directors. Management therefore resorts to financial statement policies to generate positive 
(or sometimes even negative164) opinion about the firm’s economic and financial dynamics 
in interest bearers and thus to avoid adverse reactions to the external environment which 
otherwise are feared could arise where it comes exposing the actual business situation or 
actively influencing and activating stakeholder attitudes in order to reach well-defined 
goals.165 
Ultimately, with a capacious representation of business management and conscientious 
dissimulations of the firm’s real income, financial and equity position, the directors seek to 
direct third parties to behaving in a manner consistent with the particular purposes they 
intend to achieve. In this aim of creating false expectations in the economic operators 
outside the firm or in any case in the subjects not directly involved in the management 
activity, the administrators can leverage the least degree of knowledge of the firm’s real 
estate owned by external stakeholders and minority shareholders compared to those who 
work within the firm. 
Going more specifically, but without any claim of exhaustiveness, the most important 
motives underlying the budget policies are now being analyzed. 
In general, the reasons behind the implementation of budgetary policies can be 
distinguished in market incentives and contractual incentives, depending on whether the 																																																								164	See about the big bath income minimization policies.	165	Pini (1991, p. 53-54). Among the styles of implementation of the fiscal policies, the author distinguishes 
the consequentialist style (which is characterized by the fact that the possible negative reactions of the third 
parties are taken into account in the drafting of the budget) and persuasive style (which is distinguished by 
the willingness to create certain consequences in the external environment).	
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purpose is to influence the stock exchange or, more closely, to influence specific contracts 
entered into by the company. The incentives underpinning the implementation of financial 
statement policies may then be either business or private, depending on whether the aim is 
to take advantage of the company or to achieve personal goals of managers, sometimes at 
odds with the interests of the company. Indeed, if the administrators provide a financial or 
economic image of the firm or group different from the real one, benefiting from it can be 
both the firm as well as indirectly the management. 
Considering market incentives first, these are linked to the trend of stock market quotations 
on the market and can act both in terms of price increases and decreases, depending on the 
circumstances. As previously mentioned, it is common practice for financial analysts to 
prepare forecasts about the performance of listed companies. The company may, therefore, 
have the specific objective of not denying the expectations expressed by analysts and 
hence reaching or possibly overcoming the expected earnings outcome. In fact, a company 
that achieves or even exceeds the financial analyst’s expected result generally benefits 
from an increase in the price of its shares.166 Conversely, firms with disappointing results 
compared to the expected target often severely affect this negative outlook and may see 
their stock prices falling. Ronen and Yaari (2008) also point out that analysts’ forecasts 
represent, in fact, market expectations and that the first rule for a listed company is not to 
disappoint expectations of the market.167 The administrators could therefore adjust some 
accounting positions in order to bring an outcome in line with analysts’ expectations and, 
on the other hand, to ensure a favorable trend in equity securities. 
Also considered crucial are the two thresholds represented by the overrun of the 
accounting balance and the achievement of a result at least equal to that of the previous 
financial year. In particular, on the basis of purely psychological arguments, a profit, albeit 
low, is welcomed by the market in a very positive way compared to a modest loss, rather 
than rationally justifiable.168 Therefore, it is plausible that companies avoid exposing mild 
losses and “if the result is not too far from zero, adopt accounting policies to make it 
																																																								166	Ronen and Yaari (2008, page 209) note that the market rewards companies that reach or beat the 
expectations of analysts: it was noted, in fact, that “a significant stock price premium for meeting or beating 
(missing) analysts earnings forecasts”. Florio (2011, p.73) writes: “Companies that reach or exceed the 
performance level expected by financial analysts get a significantly higher listing than companies that do not 
reach the performance level expected by analysts”.	167	Ronen and Yaari (2008, p.137).	168	See Mattei (2006, p. 197-198).	
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positive, believing that market reaction is disproportionately more negative where instead 
of just a positive result the company has a slightly negative income”.169 
As for the other critical threshold, i.e. achieving an equal or slightly higher result than that 
of the previous year, Mattei observes that “interrupting a continuous series of improvement 
in net operating results significantly penalizes the performance of the shares of companies 
in financial markets”.170 Consequently, management is expected to manipulate accounting 
positions at least in order to achieve, if not exceed, the income level achieved in the 
previous period. 
Firms therefore pay attention to possible unfavorable market reactions in the face of failing 
to meet the three critical thresholds171 and administrators could implement upward fiscal 
policies by intervening on various income components. With reference to goodwill, it is 
conceivable that the administrators “scrap” the impacts of the impairment test to avoid 
having to account for devaluation when this implies the impossibility of achieving the 
target result. Consistently with this hypothesis, it is believed that companies with good 
earnings performance and a solid financial situation have less incentive to conceal any loss 
of goodwill that, in this context, the listing should not be strongly affected by the 
devaluation: the negative sign that the market is expected to show that the expected lower 
benefits appear to be weaker when the target threshold is still reached (in spite of the 
devaluation) compared to the case of firms already in financial and economic 
difficulties.172 
In addition, with regard to market incentives, financial statement policies could be put in 
place with the intention of improving profitability and thus supporting the share price close 
to an acquisition (where, of course, the firm represents the target) or other operations of an 
extraordinary nature. In this case, the rising values are altered and the negative components 
of income are dissipated in the periods immediately preceding the acquisition, mergers, 
divisions, and divestments of the firm branches, so that subsequent transactions may take 
place under more favorable conditions for the company and its members. However, 																																																								169 	Prencipe A. (2006), Earnings quality. Analisi della qualità degli earnings in una prospettiva 
internazionale, Pearson Education Italia, Milano, pag. 127. 170	See n.168.	171	In their contribution, Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999) argue that there is a priority order as well as 
the threshold values to reach: the three authors find it more important for firms to avoid losing than to deliver 
a result in improvement compared to the next exercise; the last in the scale of the goals is the will to reach the 
result provided by the analysts.	172	In their contribution, Verriest and Gaeremynck (2009) suggest that better performing companies are more 
likely to recognize a possible reduction in the value of goodwill since a devaluation is not particularly 
neglected by the market in a context that is still characterized for good profitability and financial solidity.	
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administrators may have an interest in downtime manipulation if they themselves intend to 
acquire the company in order to refine the management buy out transaction at a cheaper 
price. In addition, even where the extraordinary operation is set up between companies 
belonging to the same group, management can be encouraged to implement accounting 
policies that are likely to depress income performance: for example, in the case of 
intergroup mergers, the embedded administrators to respond at group-level strategies, may 
be worsened by the operating income of their company in order to establish a coupon 
relationship for the benefit of the merging company.  
Lastly, market incentives to manipulate rising earnings are in line with other non-recurring 
transactions involving the sale of the firm’s equities on the market. In particular, such 
incentives can be found in proximity of share capital increases with the issue of new paid 
shares -where, as has been seen, the improvement in earnings performance is aimed at 
raising stock quotation and thus raising more financial resources with the parity of nominal 
capital issued- or by an initial public offering (IPO), i.e. the initial listing of the company’s 
securities on a regulated market; in the latter case, income maximization policies are 
implemented on the assumption that better financial statement outcomes in the periods 
preceding the quotation often mean the initial bid price of the highest shares and thus still 
greater incoming financial resources.173 
Given the other category of incentives, or contractual incentives, these are mostly linked to 
clauses contained in financing contracts or are related to management remuneration. 
In the case of issue of bonds or in bank financing contracts, so-called debt covenants or 
loan covenants are often introduced, which impose financial or management constraints 
and investments and are designed to secure the creditor against the risk of default of the 
debtor in repaying the loan.174 Failure to comply with the covenant involves the creditor’s 
ability to renegotiate the terms of the loan (e.g. increase in the rate applied or expiry 
review) or even termination of the contract and withdrawal of the loan. Therefore, in the 
presence of such clauses, administrators implement earnings management policies in order 
not to violate the constraints contained therein. In particular, where the covenants provide 
																																																								173	Florio (2011, pp. 60-61), Ronen and Yaari (2008, pp. 145 et seq.). On this point, Prencipe (2006, p. 32) 
states: “As a general rule, companies that are less well-known than those already listed, accounting results in 
the periods immediately preceding the acquisition date are of particular relevance to the market valuations”.	174	Clauses may include, for example, achieving minimum income levels, dividend distributions limits, the 
obligation not to exceed a certain debt ratio, or the commitment not to sell certain fixed assets or to not 
proceed with further investments.	
	 111	
for a minimum income level, the incentive cannot be to detect impairment losses on 
goodwill or other assets in order to preserve the profitability of the period. 
Finally, there are incentives more strictly managerial, that is, they concern the 
compensation due to the managers or their stay in office. Management remuneration plans 
are often divided into a fixed part and a variable part, referring to the achievement of 
predefined income levels: no premium is recognized where the operating result is below 
the minimum income threshold, a pro-rated bonus is expected if this is between the lower 
limit and the upper limit in the plan and if the result exceeds the upper limit, marginal 
remuneration increases tend to be nil. 175  Therefore, Mattei (2006) believes that 
administrators are likely to put in place financial statement policies aimed at maximizing 
the result of the period (i.e. income maximization policies) in the presence of a useful ante 
manipulation of just below the threshold value that allows the bonus to be obtained. If 
profits are extremely high, in addition to the higher level included in the incentive plan, 
managers are supposedly an incentive to implement accounting maneuvers aimed at 
reducing profit (the so-called income minimization policies) and thus create hidden 
reserves from which draw in future exercises with disappointing results. Finally, if the 
result deviates excessively from the minimum payout threshold, it is plausible that 
administrators, while unable to receive a bonus during the financial year, further reduce 
income by imputing discretionary costs (policy called big bath earnings management): in 
this way, they create the conditions for achieving a positive result more easily in the 
coming years, with a view to obtaining prizes at least in subsequent periods.  
In line with these considerations, Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996) report two possible 
arguments about the correlation between income performance before accounting 
manipulations and timing of devaluation’s asset. On the one hand, if the bonuses of the 
directors are recognized on the basis of the company’s economic result and the latter is 
much lower than the target threshold, management is encouraged to anticipate the 																																																								175	Healy P.M. (1985), The Effect of Bonus Schemes on Accounting Decisions, Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, vol. 7, n. 1-3, 85-107. Regarding the remuneration of managers, in addition to this approach 
proposed by Healy, there are other contributions in the literature, which include additional contractual 
incentives that may lead to the implementation of budgetary policies. In particular, Ronen and Yaari (2008) 
point out how management’s remuneration can comprise, in addition to cash components (bonus plus wages), 
shares or options (stock options) to which manipulative behavior of directors can be reconnected to raise the 
course of the shares and thus increase their overall remuneration. In this regard, Mohanram (2003, pg. 4) 
identifies among the various reasons behind the acquisition of the title of “learning resources”, “the incentive 
to get options at as low a strike price as possible and the incentive to exercise them at as high a price as 
possible. (...) Managers are more likely to postpone disclosure of good news and accelerate negative 
disclosures in the time periods just prior to option grant awards. As options are typically given at the money, 
this allows them to get options at a potentially lower strike price making them more valuable”.	
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recognition of asset loss losses. On the other hand, according to the smoothing earnings 
policies, companies that have an unusually positive result tend to show impairment’s 
devaluation, probably because the operating result exceeds the upper limit provided by the 
remuneration plans.176 
Ultimately, where remuneration is partly variable, managers may put their personal interest 
in perceiving higher remuneration and may, in doing so, pursue a financial statement 
objective that is not necessarily in line with what would be the other internal stakeholders 
and the firm as a whole. Mattei believes that managers are “rational and self-interested 
subjects, and therefore exercise discretion in their role in maximizing their utility”.177 
Usually the interests of the administrators coincide with those of the firm, so pursuing their 
personal goals also benefit the enterprise at the same time. However, in some 
circumstances -and this is the case for managerial remuneration- the two interests may not 
be aligned and the work of the managers will only benefit those, at the expense of all other 
stakeholders, including minority shareholders. In view of the fact that “minority 
shareholders of listed companies possess virtually the same informational possibilities as 
non-internal stakeholder”,178 administrators can, in fact, put into practice faulty behaviors 
that also weaken this category. 
The administrative body, however, may be expedient in the near future of the mandate to 
make a greater profit than the actual one in order to obtain the renewal of the mandate from 
the shareholders’ meeting. On the other hand, as before, a change in the top of the 
company can undergo big bath policies by management just settled -linked to the desire to 
record losses to be attributed to the previous administration and thus to clear the field from 
futile unsatisfactory results- and by the outgoing directors, where the replacement at the 
top of the company is defined as “friendly”.  
Summarizing, internal and external stakeholders react differently to the publication of the 
financial statement and the data contained therein. Therefore, in drafting this document, the 
administrative body takes into account the foreseeable reactions of third parties and seeks 
to guide their decision-making processes by leveraging on a deliberately distorted and 
tendentious representation of business events. By implementing profit management 
policies, administrators adjust the content of the financial statement in accordance with the 																																																								176	Francis J., Hanna J. D., Vincent L. (1996), Causes and Effects of Discretionary Asset Write-Offs, Journal 
of Accounting Research, vol. 34 Supplement, p. 123. 177	Mattei (2006, p. 112-113).	178	Verona (2006, p.52-53).	
	 113	
objective that, from time to time, is influenced by and influencing the financing, 
investment or commercial choices of the various stakeholders. Through accounting 
manipulation and consequent alteration of disclosure to third parties, the firm may, for 
example, have access to grants that otherwise would not have access to,179 it may acquire 
new capital from investors not directly involved in management choices such as 
shareholders minority or small savers, can guarantee a better stock quotation. Managers 
can also show the firm financial and financial standing to maintain close relationships with 
suppliers and customers, who are reassured, respectively, about the solvency of the buyer’ 
firm and about the guarantees from this promise. Finally, a better representation of the 
firm’s reality, managements can lead to more personal benefits, such as higher 
remuneration or renewal of office. 																																																																																				179	Verona (2006, p. 237) states in this regard: “It is undeniable that by showing a better financial situation 
than the actual one, it could allow the company to exploit more market opportunities (credit opening, rates 
more advantageous funding) and, consequently, to improve the prospects for future income, in the same way 
as other conditions”.	
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2.3 Income Smoothing 
Income smoothing has been defined as “the deliberate dampening of fluctuations about 
some level of earnings which is considered to be normal for the firm” (Barnea, Ronen and 
Sadan, 1976, p. 110). The practice is conjectured to be widespread (Worthy, 1984; Foster, 
1986; and Ronen and Sadan, 1981), but evidence in support of deliberate smoothing is not 
convincing. Accordingly, the objective of this study is to determine the pervasiveness of 
smoothing in accounting practice, and to describe the type of companies that smooth 
income. 
Income smoothing has received much research attention.180 Early empirical researchers in 
accounting examined ex post data to determine the existence of smoothing behavior.181 The 
general premise was that if smooth earnings resulted from the choice of a smoothing 
variable (such as choice of depreciation method, pension cost amortization, intangible asset 
amortization, extraordinary charges and credits, investment tax credit, purchase versus 
pooling, inventory method, and dividend income under the cost method of reporting a 
subsidiary) then income smoothing behavior must have occurred. Most of the researchers 
found evidence to conclude that firms choose accounting policies in a fashion that smooths 
reported income over time (Ronen and Sadan, 1981). 
There are two different types of smooth income streams: those that are naturally smooth 
and those that are intentionally smoothed by management (Eckel, 1981).182 A naturally 
smooth income stream results from an income generating process that produces a smooth 
income stream. An intentionally smoothed income stream can be the result of real 
smoothing or artificial smoothing techniques. Real smoothing occurs when management 
takes actions to structure the economic (revenue generating) events of the organization to 
produce a smooth income stream. Artificial smoothing occurs when management 
manipulates the timing of accounting entries to produce smooth income streams. 
 
 
 																																																								180	See Morduch, J. (1995). Income smoothing and consumption smoothing. The journal of economic 
perspectives, 9(3), 103-114. Trueman, B., & Titman, S. (1988). An explanation for accounting income 
smoothing. Journal of accounting research, 127-139. Fudenberg, D., & Tirole, J. (1995). A theory of income 
and dividend smoothing based on incumbency rents. Journal of Political economy, 103(1), 75-93. Tucker, J. 
W., & Zarowin, P. A. (2006). Does income smoothing improve earnings informativeness? The Accounting 
Review, 81(1), 251-270. Beidleman, C. R. (1973). Income smoothing: The role of management. The 
Accounting Review, 48(4), 653-667. 181	For a review of research, see Ronen ans Sadan (1981) and Imhoff (1981).	182	Figure the previous paragraphs (especially §2.1).	
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2.3.1 Approaches to the study of income smoothing 
 
2.3.1.1 The Classical Approach 
The classical approach to studying income smoothing involves an examination of the 
relation between choice of smoothing variable and its effect on reported income. 
Unfortunately, this approach does not study the existence of artificial smoothing because 
of shortcomings in the research design, which may be criticized as follows (Eckel, 1981). 
First, the studies typically utilize an expectancy model of “normalized” income that may 
not have adequately described the underlying earnings process. 183  Second, the 
concentration on one smoothing variable may result in biased results. Some companies that 
smooth may use that variable alone or in combination with others. Other companies that 
smooth may not use that variable. Third, some studies considered the effects of smoothing 
variables on one period only, ignoring the inter-temporal effects. Ronen and Sadan (1981) 
also criticize the early studies; their criticism is that the studies lack a behavioral model to 
explain why smoothing behavior occurs and predict when it might take place. 
 
2.3.1.2 The Income Variability Approach 
Imhoff (1977) was the first researcher to attempt to separate management’s artificial 
smoothing behavior from the confounding effects of real smoothing actions or naturally 
smooth income streams. Imhoff asserts that sales revenue represents the results of the real 
economic actions of a firm, and would therefore incorporate real smoothing activities if 
they exist. The existence of artificial smoothing behavior can thus be studied by comparing 
the variance of ordinary income to the variance of sales. No comparisons from his sample 
of 94 Compustat industrial firms met his smoothing criteria. 
A second researcher who investigated the existence of artificial smoothing behavior is 
Eckel (1981). His efforts were directed at separating the results of artificial smoothing 
from the real smoothing that management might take. Eckel’s research differed from 
Imhoff’s in that Eckel did not exclude firms that exhibited low variability of sales from this 
sample. Imhoff, implicitly assuming that artificial smoothing and real smoothing were 
mutually exclusive, investigated the effects of smoothing on only those companies that 
exhibited high sales variability. Eckel examined the financial statements for 62 industrial 																																																								183	Various expectancy models used have been exponential, such as linear, time-series, semilogarithmic time 
trend, first difference market income index, and Box-Jenkins. (See Ronen  and Sadan, 1981; or Imhoff, 1981, 
for a review).  	
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firms in four industries184 from 1951 to 1970 using Compustat data. Using net income as 
the measure of income, two firms (3%) were classified as artificial income smoothers. 
The Imhoff (1977) and Eckel (l981) studies do not show the degree of artificial income 
smoothing that Worthy (1984) suggests. One reason for this is that their results are 
influenced by the choice of firms selected for their studies. Imhoff only selected companies 
that had a high variability of sales, which indicates that the firms were experiencing a large 
amount of economic uncertainty. Eckel studied only four industries out of the entire 
economy. It is very possible that a cross-sectional study examining all strata of the 
economy would show different results. 
2.3.1.3 The Dual Economy Approach 
One means of studying firms in an organized manner is through a dual economy 
perspective. Averitt (1968, pp. 6-7) describes American capitalism as “a composite of two 
business systems” that have come to be called the core and the periphery. Bluestone, 
Murphy, and Stevenson [BMS](1973, pp. 29-30) provide a good description of these two 
economic sectors: 
The core economy includes those industries that comprise the muscle of 
American economic and political power. The core economy is by far 
the largest sector (…) in terms of financial resources. Entrenched in 
durable manufacturing, the construction trades and, to a lesser extent, 
the extraction industries, the firms in the core economy are noted for 
high productivity, high profits, intensive utilization of capital, high 
incidence of monopoly elements, and a high degree of unionization.  
Beyond the fringes of the core economy lies a set of industries that lack 
almost all of the advantages normally found in [core] firms. 
Concentrated in agriculture, nondurable manufacturing, retail trade, and 
sub-professional services, the peripheral industries are noted for their 
small firm size, labor intensity, low profits, low productivity, intensive 
product market competition, lack of unionization, and low wages. 
Unlike core sector industries, the periphery lacks the assets, size, and 
political power to take advantage of economies of scale or to spend 
large sums on research and development. 																																																								184	The four industries are pulp and paper, chemical, air transport, and rubber. All four of these  can be 
classified as core firms.  	
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Beck, Horan and Tolbert (1978) operationally tested the BMS185 definitions of the core and 
periphery sectors by classifying companies as core or peripheral on the basis of their two-
digit SIC codes, and examining company labor characteristics within each sector.186 They 
found that core-firm labor characteristics in fact differ from periphery-firm characteristics. 
Using this classification scheme, Belkaoui and Picur (1984) separated 171 companies from 
42 industries into 114 core sector firms and 57 periphery sector firms. They hypothesized 
that companies in the core sector of the economy would exhibit a lesser degree of 
smoothing behavior than would companies in the periphery sector because “firms in the 
periphery sector have more opportunity and more predisposition to smooth both their 
operating flows (for example, through their labor management) and reported income 
measures, than firms in the core sector” (p. 530). Their method was to compare the change 
in operating income and the change in ordinary income to the change in expenses.187 Their 
findings give evidence that firms in the periphery sector indeed show a greater depth of 
smoothing behavior than do firms in the core sector for both measures of income. 
 
 
2.3.2 When Insiders Know more than Outsiders 
The practice of income smoothing has a long tradition in corporate finance. For example, 
Harold Geneen ran ITT for eighteen years (1959-77), during which the company reported 
earnings increases for fifty-eight consecutive quarters. It was widely assumed that this 
streak depended on a certain amount of gray-area fiddling with the numbers, but it was also 
accepted that investors were not being misled about the big picture. ITT was in fact 
growing steadily during his tenure and the figures were, on average, a fair reflection of the 
company’s performance. More recently, Microsoft, General Electric, and American 
Express have all been labeled as “smoothers.” 
Why do firms smooth income?188 We argue that a primary reason for income smoothing is 
the pressure imposed on managers to meet the market’s (i.e., analysts’) earnings 																																																								185	Bluestone, Murphy, and Stevenson.	186	The industry dichotomy is represented by Core Sector (mining, construction, transportation, metal 
industries etc.) and Periphery Sector (agriculture, furniture and fixtures, retail trade, personal services etc.).	187	See Kamin and Ronen (1979) for a description of the method.  188	Companies indulge in this practice because investors are generally willing to pay a premium for stocks 
with steady and predictable earnings streams, compared with stocks whose earnings are subject to wild 
fluctuations. Related reasons often cited for income smoothing are: risk-averse insiders with limited access to 
external markets trying to insure themselves (Lambert 1984, Dye 1988), managers aiming to maximize their 
tenure (Fudenberg and Tirole 1995) or to minimize taxes (Graham 2003). Income smoothing can signal good 
prospects (Ronen and Sadan 1981) or low volatility to reduce the cost of debt (Trueman and Titman 1988). 
Income smoothing can also encourage liquidity trading by uninformed investors (Goel and Thakor 2003).  
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expectations. Although shuffling cash flows backward and forward (“financial 
smoothing”) to level out income fluctuations may be harmless, income smoothing has a 
darker side.189 First, managers who are at risk of missing the earnings target may cut 
investment expenditure and in doing so destroy value. Second, in an attempt to meet 
market expectations, managers proactively manage expectations by distorting real 
decisions by doing things like smoothing sales.  
In a survey by Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) among more than 400 executives, 
80% of survey participants report that they would decrease discretionary spending on 
R&D, advertising, and maintenance to meet an earnings target.190 More than half (55,3%) 
state that they would delay starting a new project to meet an earnings target, even if such a 
delay entailed a small sacrifice in value (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005, 30-31). 
Their survey results are supported by a series of empirical studies that show that managers 
are prepared to destroy value in order to meet the market’s expectations.191 There is also 
evidence that managers proactively manage expectations. Bouwens and Kroos (2011) 
examine how retail store managers reduce their sales activity in response to target 
ratcheting. They find that managers with favorable sales performance in the first three 
quarters reduce their sales activity in the final quarter in an attempt to mitigate the increase 
in the next year’s sales target (see Indjejikian, Matejka, and Schloetzer (2014) for a review 
on target ratcheting and incentives). Proactive expectations management also arises 
endogenously in our model. 
Although this interplay between market expectations and managerial incentives is widely 
acknowledged, it begs the question as to how it is possible that in equilibrium firms can 
keep managing earnings and expectations, and get away with it -in many cases indefinitely. 
Why do investors not intervene, or why does the smoothing equilibrium not unravel? If 
income and expectation management lead to value destruction, why then do insiders and 
outsiders engage in this game in the first place? Our theory answers these questions by 
																																																								189	Jensen (2005, 8) notes: “Indeed, earnings management has been considered an integral part of every top 
manager’s job for at least the last two decades. But when managers smooth earnings to meet market 
projections, they are not creating value for the firm; they are both lying and making poor decisions that 
destroy value...when numbers are manipulated to tell the markets what they want to hear (or what managers 
want them to hear) rather than the true status of the firm it is lying, and when real operating decisions that 
would maximize value are compromised to meet market expectations real long-term value is being 
destroyed”.  190	Related theories that explain income manipulation (but not smoothing) are linked to insiders’ myopia 
(Stein 1989, Bebchuk and Stole 1993) or career concerns (Gibbons and Murphy 1992, Holmström 1999).  191	See, e.g., Baber et al. (1991), Perry and Grinaker (1994), Bange and DeBondt (1998), Bushee (1998), 
Cheng (2004) and Gunny (2010), among others.  
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providing a rational expectations equilibrium featuring income smoothing and expectations 
management that are driven by the pressure imposed on managers to meet income 
expectations. 
We consider a neoclassical firm in which insiders set output on the basis of marginal 
revenues and marginal costs. Each period, outsiders demand their share of the income that 
they believe has been generated. Marginal costs are latent and observed by insiders only. 
Outsiders observe sales, a measure of the firm’s output level. Because sales are a 
monotonically decreasing function of marginal costs, outsiders can perfectly infer the 
corresponding level of the latent marginal cost variable, and therefore also the level of 
income. Outsiders’ indirect inference of income through sales creates, however, an 
incentive for insiders to distort production: insiders under produce in an attempt to 
downplay the firm’s fundamentals and to lower outsiders’ income expectations. Outsiders 
rationally anticipate what insiders are up to, but nevertheless this type of value- destroying 
manipulation persists in this signal-jamming equilibrium because both parties are 
“trapped” in a type of prisoners’ dilemma. Conditional on outsiders believing that insiders 
will “behave” it is optimal for insiders to manipulate (i.e., under produce). As a result, 
underinvestment and expectations management always prevail in equilibrium. Outsiders 
infer the correct value of the firm’s income, and payout moves in lockstep with realized 
income (i.e., there is no financial smoothing). Underproduction causes both parties to be 
worse off than under a first-best policy. Furthermore, the absolute amount of lost output is 
higher in economic booms than in recessions. This reduces the output variance, a 
phenomenon we refer to as real smoothing. In our model, underproduction and real 
smoothing are two sides of the same coin. This direct link between underproduction and 
real smoothing is not an obvious one. If, for example, insiders were to reduce output at all 
times by a constant absolute amount, then underproduction would not coincide with real 
smoothing. 
Next, we consider the case where outsiders observe sales with measurement error or 
“noise.” This noise is value-irrelevant, transitory, normally distributed, and independent 
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) over time. When observing an increase in noisy sales, 
outsiders cannot distinguish whether the increase is due to a reduction in marginal costs 
(and therefore represents a real increase in income), or whether the increase is due to 
value-irrelevant measurement error. Because measurement errors are transitory and shocks 
to costs persistent, the underlying source of change becomes clear only as time passes by. 
Therefore, outsiders calculate their best estimate of income on the basis of not only current 
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sales but also past sales, by solving a Kalman filtering problem. 
Then, in rational expectations equilibrium, outsiders form their expectation of actual 
income on the basis of the complete history of sales and of what they believe insiders’ 
optimal output policy to be. Conversely, in each period, insiders determine their optimal 
output policy given outsiders’ beliefs. We obtain a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which 
insiders’ actions are consistent with outsiders’ beliefs, and outsiders’ expectations are 
unbiased conditional on the information available. Each period, outsiders receive a payout 
that equals their share of what they expect income to be. Insiders also get a payout, but 
they have to soak up any under- (over-) payment to outsiders as some kind of discretionary 
remuneration (charge): if actual income is higher (lower) than outsiders’ estimate, then 
insiders cash in (make up for) the difference in outsiders’ payout. 
Consequently, income and payout are smooth compared with actual income not because 
insiders want to smooth income, but because insiders have to meet outsiders’ expectations 
to avoid intervention. With imperfect inference, two types of smoothing take place 
simultaneously: “payout” (or “financial”) smoothing and “real” smoothing.192 The former 
is value-neutral and merely alters the time pattern of payout to outsiders without changing 
the firm’s underlying cash flows as determined by insiders’ production decision. Insiders 
also engage in real smoothing by manipulating production in an attempt to manage 
outsiders’ expectations. However, because outsiders’ income estimate is now based on the 
complete history of sales, the instantaneous effect of sales on outsiders’ beliefs is 
weakened. Measurement error and the resulting asymmetry information therefore mitigate 
the effect of indirect inference on production and real smoothing. 
Importantly, real smoothing also has a lagged effect. With imperfect inference, the current 
output decision affects not only current sales levels but also outsiders’ expectations of 
current and future income. This exacerbates the previously discussed underinvestment 
problem for insiders because bumping up sales now means the outsiders will expect higher 
income and payout not only now but also in future. The instantaneous effect of 
measurement error dominates, however, the lagged effect so that, on balance, measurement 
error and asymmetric information mitigate underinvestment and reduce real smoothing. 
However, in the presence of measurement error, outsiders’ estimate of the firm’s income, 
although unbiased, is not exact. Payout no longer moves in lockstep with realized income 
but is smooth relative to income. 																																																								192	In Ronen and Sadan (1981), various smoothing mechanisms are discussed and illustrated in great detail. 
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2.3.3 Income Smoothing Attributes 
Earnings management has been defined as an attempt by the managers to mislead some 
stakeholders about the economic performance of the company or to influence the outcomes 
of contracts that may affect their compensation (Healy and Wahlen, 1999).  
Academic research, however, has not found pervasive earnings management practices 
among US firms (Dechow and Skinner, 2000). Theoretically, earnings management may 
not be problematic for three major reasons. First, earnings management is a process of 
estimating accruals, and estimation of accruals is the heart of financial reporting (Beaver, 
2002). Systematic accrual accounting choices made within GAAP should be differentiated 
from fraudulent reporting.193 Second, accrual management is problematic only if the 
motive is opportunistic (Beaver, 2000).194 Third, earnings management does not matter 
under the efficient market hypothesis.195 Empirically, earnings management has not been 
found problematic mainly because current research methodology is not good at identifying 
firms that manage earnings (Dechow and Skinner, 2000).196 
Academic research also has not found a large effect of earnings management on financial 
reporting. Dechow and Skinner (2000) argue that earnings management relates to 
managerial incentive and managerial incentive, in turn, has been linked increasingly to 
stock price performance. Research in earnings management, therefore, should be more 
fruitful if the focus is on firm valuation. 
One form of earnings management is income smoothing (Dechow and Skinner, 2000). The 
study of income smoothing in general has been more successful than the study of other 
forms of earnings management for two reasons. First, income smoothing has been defined 
more precisely. For example, Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) defined income smoothing as: 
The process of manipulating the time profile of earnings or earnings 
reports to make the reported income stream less variable, while not 
increasing reported earnings over the long run (p. 75). 																																																								193	The purpose of estimating accruals is to record the financial effects of transactions, rather than to just 
report the cash effects of transactions. The problem, therefore, is not accrual accounting choices per se, but 
the appropriateness of the choices (Dechow and Skinner, 2000). 194	Motives for accrual management are either opportunistic or signaling. Beaver (2000) argues that the 
former is problematic because the managerial intent is to mislead and influence while the latter is not because 
the managerial intent is to inform. 195	Academics may argue that under the efficient market hypothesis earnings management does not matter as 
long as it is fully disclosed or the cost of obtaining the information and observing the managerial intent is low 
(Dechow and Skinner, 2000). 196	The main difficulties are the measurement of managerial intent, the determination of the appropriateness 
of accrual accounting choices, the operationalization of the definition of earnings management, and the 
differentiation among different forms of earnings management. 
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Managers will take actions to increase earnings when earnings are relatively low and to 
decrease earnings when earnings are relatively high.197 Second, the differentiation between 
smoothers and non-smoothers has been operationalized successfully in numerous studies 
(e.g., Belkaoui and Picur, 1984; and Michelson et al., 1995 and 2000). There are several 
income smoothing descriptors, although the basic idea of those descriptors is to compare 
the variability of earnings with the variability of sales.198 The variability of earnings is 
smaller than the variability of sales for a smoother.199 
Income smoothing has been examined in the setting of different economic sectors. 
Belkaoui and Picur (1984) and Albrecht and Richardson (1990) compare the income 
smoothing behavior of companies in the core sector with those in the periphery sector.200 
Albrecht and Richardson (1990) also study the size effect on smoothing behavior. 
Companies in the core sector and larger companies exhibit a lesser degree of smoothing 
behavior. 
Income smoothing has also been examined in the setting of different countries with diverse 
results. Gray (1988) argues that accounting follows different patterns in different parts of 
the world because of the differences in culture, societal value, and accounting sub-culture. 
Accountants in Anglo countries (such as Canada, the UK and the US) and Nordic countries 
(such as Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden) are independent professionals. They focus 
on presenting a true and fair view of a company’s financial position, instead of 
implementing detailed legal requirements. They are more concerned with consistency and 
comparability subject to the need for flexibility instead of uniformity. Their practices are 
more transparent and optimistic. Accountants in Germany, Belgium, and France focus 
more on uniformity. 201  Their practices are less transparent and more conservative. 
Accountants in Japan and less developed Asian countries (such as Malaysia) focus more on 
uniformity and statutory control. Their practices are also less transparent and more 																																																								197	The latter is an important characteristic of income smoothing since the mangers’ actions are not always to 
exaggerate earnings. 198	Imhoff (1981) claims that generating sales is a real economic activity of firms. Real income smoothing, 
therefore, is reflected in sales revenue. Artificial income smoothing, on the other hand, is not reflected in 
sales revenue. The detection of artificial income smoothing, therefore, can be achieved by comparison of the 
variability of earnings with the variability of sales. The variability of earnings is smaller than the variability 
of sales for an artificial income smoother. It should be noted that both real smoothing and artificial smoothing 
are intentional smoothing, not natural smoothing. 199	The comparison of the variability of earnings and the variability of sales has been the most widely used 
descriptor of smoothing behavior. It, however, can be argued as suggested by the referee that managers can 
also manipulate the timing and recording of sales. 200	Albrecht and Richardson (1990) listed industries in the core sector and industries in the periphery sector 
in their Table 1 (p. 716). 201	Belgium and France are classified as more developed Latin countries by Gray (1988) in his Figure 1. 
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conservative. 
Income smoothing studies on Japanese companies have found that (1) managers incline 
more to use R&D investments to smooth net income than their US counterparts (Nagy and 
Neal, 2001), and (2) managers engage in smoothing behavior even though management 
bonuses are not significantly affected by earnings (Hermann and Inoue, 1996). The 
smoothing behavior is caused by the less transparent practices and the pressure to signal 
growth and stability to shareholders (Nagy and Neal, 2001). Income smoothing studies on 
Malaysian companies, however, have not found smoothing behavior of managing 
discretionary accruals (Roubi and Richardson, 1998). 
Companies in Germany do engage in smoothing behavior. Good or bad performance in a 
particular year is not necessarily considered as a representation of what a company 
ordinarily achieves. Smoothing, therefore, is needed for obtaining economic reality 
(Oliverio and Newman, 1997). Belgium companies also engage in smoothing behavior. 
One of the attributing factors is the lack of auditor litigation (Vander Bauwhede et al., 
2003). 
Companies in Anglo countries and Nordic countries engage in smoothing behavior too 
(e.g., Beattie et al., 1994; and Michelson et al., 1995 and 2000). Although classified as 
similar in accounting characteristics by Gray (1988), they engage in smoothing behavior 
for different reasons and with different degrees.202 For example, Swedish companies are 
allowed to create untaxed reserves to serve as buffers for future losses (Sunden and 
Jansson, 1999). Forty percent of Finnish firms in a sample have smoothed their income 
(Booth et al., 1996).203 In Canada, a variation in one quarterly net income is generally 
followed by a reverse in the next three quarters. This phenomenon is interpreted as the 
evidence of income smoothing (Fortin et al., 1997). 
Given the voluminous international evidence, one can conclude that managers’ income 
smoothing behavior may be considered legal and normal (e.g., Oliverio and Newman, 
1997; and Sunden and Jansson, 1999), and may not significantly affect managers’ bonuses 
(e.g., Hermann and Inoue, 1996). Culture, societal value, and accounting sub-culture are 
attributing factors. An important question, however, can be raised: What is the effect of 
income smoothing on stock price if it is observed in a country that has transparent and 																																																								202	In a related study, Weetman and Gray (1991) have found that UK GAAP and Dutch GAAP are less 
conservative than US GAAP while Swedish GAAP is more conservative than US GAAP. 203	The sample consists of 31 Finish firms listed in the Helsinki Stock Exchange from 1989 to 1993. The 
coefficient of variation of change in sales is compared with the coefficient of variation of change in income 
for the sample firms. Natural income smoothing is reported in 40% of the cases. 
	 124	
optimistic accounting practices? 
Income smoothing indeed has been studied in the context of firm valuation as suggested by 
Dechow and Skinner (2000). Results, however, are mixed. For example, Michelson et al. 
(1995) have found that US smoothers have a lower ten-year annualized return than non-
smoothers while Michelson et al. (2000) have found that US smoothers have a higher 
cumulative average abnormal return than non-smoothers. 
Beaver (2002) argues that any form of earnings management can improve or impair the 
quality of financial statements and earnings. Income smoothing, therefore, can also 
improve or impair the quality of earnings. This study is an extension of previous income 
smoothing studies. Following Beaver (2002), it argues that although the variability of 
earnings is smaller, smoothers’ earnings quality is not guaranteed, i.e., a smaller variability 
of earnings does not guarantee a higher firm value. Instead, reported earnings of smoothers 
are hypothesized to be more value-relevant (consistent with the results of Michelson et al., 
2000) if the reported earnings are of high quality. Reported earnings of smoothers are less 
value-relevant (consistent with the results of Michelson et al., 1995) if the reported 
earnings are of low quality. 
This study first classifies sample firms along two dimensions: smoothers versus non-
smoothers (Michelson et al., 1995 and 2000), and quality earnings firms versus non-quality 
earnings firms (Sloan, 1996). Sample firms are then divided into four groups: quality 
earnings smoothers, quality earnings non- smoothers, non-quality earnings smoothers, and 
non-quality earnings non-smoothers. Value relevance of reported earnings (between the 
smoothers and the non-smoothers, between the quality earnings firms and the non-quality 
earnings firms, and among the four groups) is examined using both the levels and the 
changes approaches (Kothari, 1992). Indicator variables (Barth et al., 1999) are 
incorporated into the levels and the changes regressions to compare the significance of 
price-earnings and price change-earnings change multiples.204 Results show that (1) the 
multiples are not significantly different between smoothers and non-smoothers when 
quality of earnings is not explicitly considered, (2) quality earnings firms’ multiples are 
significantly higher than non-quality earnings firms’ multiples when smoothing behavior is 
not explicitly considered, (3) quality earnings smoothers have a higher price change-																																																								204	The price-earnings multiple is the regression coefficient when regressing price on earnings. A higher 
price-earnings multiple indicates a higher association between price level and earnings level. The price 
change-earnings change multiple is the regression coefficient when regressing price change on earnings 
change. A high price change- earnings change multiple indicates a higher association between price change 
and earnings change. 
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earnings change multiple and a lower price-earnings multiple than quality earnings non- 
smoothers, and (4) non-quality earnings smoothers have a higher price-earnings multiple 
and a higher price change-earnings change multiple than non-quality earnings non-
smoothers. The practical implication is that analysts and investors should consider 
smoothing behavior and earnings quality for firm valuation. 
Income smoothing involves the repetitive selection of account measurement or reporting 
rules in a particular pattern, the effect that is to report a stream of income with a smaller 
variation from trend than would otherwise have appeared.205 An accounting practice 
measurement rule must possess certain properties before it may used as a manipulative 
smoothing device. Of all available account alternatives (rules, practices), some will always 
have smoothing potential while others will only smooth under special circumstances never 
at all. A perfect smoothing device must possess all of the follow characteristics: 
A. Once used, it must not commit the firm to any particular future action. 
B. It must be based upon the exercise of professional judgment be considered within the 
domain of “generally accepted accounting principles”. 
C. It must lead to material shifts relative to year-to-year differences in income. 
D. It must not require a “real” transaction with second parties, only a reclassification of 
internal account balances. 
E. It must be used, singularly or in conjunction with other practices over consecutive 
periods of time. 
Effective smoothing devices should not establish a precedent to which the “principle” of 
consistency may apply. Practices, which, once used, commit the firm to report particular 
amounts in the future, may smooth current income; however, use of them may cause anti-
smoothing in the future. Future freedom of action is vital for long-run smoothing. For 
example, the inter-period income tax allocation procedure has often been called a 
smoothing device.206 However, when a firm adopts inter-period allocation in one year, it 
commits itself to use the same procedure in future periods, and future allocation may have 
undesired effects. 																																																								205	An operational test of smoothing was suggested by Gordon, as follows: for each firm fit a curve to a 
stream of income calculated two ways, (a) excluding the manipulative variable, and (b) including it. “If the 
variation of the observations around the curve are smaller in the latter case, income smoothing has been the 
consequence of transactions in the account”. M.J.Gordon, Discussion of the Effect of Alternative Rules for 
Non-subsidiary Investments, Empirical Research in Accounting: Selected Studies, 1966, sup. Vol.4, Journal 
of Accounting Research, p. 223.	206	See T. F. Keller, Accounting for Corporate Income Taxes (Bureau of Business Research, University of 
Michigan, 1961), p.48.	
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The term “smoothing” implies adjustments to income in two or more consecutive periods 
and detection thereof requires analysis of data for at least three periods. While a two-year 
comparison may indicate that the second year’s income had increased or decreased, it is 
not sufficient for determining a pattern of behavior in any one firm. 
 
 
2.3.4 Classification of Firms into Smoothers Categories  
Albrecht and Richardson (1990) claim that there are two types of income smoothing: 
natural smoothing and intentional smoothing.207 A natural smoothing is the result from an 
income generating process that produces a smooth stream of income, i.e., there is no 
manipulation by the managers. Following Fudenberg and Tirole (1995), this type of 
smoothing is not earnings management since there is no manipulation. Intentional 
smoothing can either be a real smoothing or an artificial smoothing. A real smoothing is 
the result from managers’ change of the economic (revenue generating) events while an 
artificial smoothing is the result from managers’ change of the timing of accounting entries 
(Albrecht and Richardson, 1990). The type of intentional income smoothing, therefore, 
depends on managerial intent. 
Managers’ income smoothing behavior whether real or artificial, like any other forms of 
earnings management, cannot be observed directly. Classification of firms into the 
smoothers and the non-smoothers categories, therefore, has to be inferred using 
descriptors. The most widely used income smoothing descriptor is the comparison of the 
coefficient of variation of one period change in earnings with the coefficient of variation of 
one period change in sales (Albrecht and Richardson, 1990; Booth et al., 1996; and 
Michelson et al., 1995 and 2000). This idea originates from Imhoff (1981) who argues that 
(1) generating sales is a real economic activity of a firm, (2) real income smoothing is 
reflected in sales revenue (because managers change revenue generating economic events) 
while artificial income smoothing is not reflected in sales revenue, and (3) the variability 
of earnings, therefore, is smaller than the variability of sales for an artificial income 
smoother. A firm is classified as a smoother if the former is smaller than the latter. 
Different definitions of earnings, such as operating income after depreciation, pre-tax 
income, income before extraordinary items, and net income are used. Empirical results 
based on different earnings definitions generally are consistent (Michelson et al., 1995 and 
2000). 																																																								207	We have already seen the definitions in the previous paragraphs.	
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Income smoothing behavior is inferred from the variability of earnings since managers’ 
smoothing behavior cannot be observed directly. The critical question is whether a firm 
with a smaller variability in earnings always generates a higher firm value. Empirical 
results are mixed. The results of several studies indicate that a smaller variability of 
earnings means a lower risk, and a lower risk leads to a lower firm value (e.g., Beidleman, 
1973; Lev and Kunitzky, 1974; and Michelson et al., 1995). Empirical evidence from event 
studies also documents this significant relation between stock price and variability-
reducing events. 
The results of several studies, on the other hand, indicate a smaller variability of earnings 
leads to a higher firm value. Several studies suggest that institutional investors generally 
avoid firms showing large variability of earnings, and investors generally are not attracted 
to firms with fluctuating earnings, i.e., the consequence, therefore, is that prices of those 
stocks are reduced (Badrinath et al., 1989; and Michelson et al., 2000). Several other 
studies show that decrease in variability of earnings improves earnings persistence, and 
therefore stock prices (e.g., DeFond and Park, 1997; and Hand, 1989). 
The results of prior studies indicate that using variability of earnings as income smoothing 
descriptor perhaps cannot provide a definitive answer to the question of its effect on firm 
value. A possible remedy is to also consider the quality of the reported earnings. 
The concept of earnings quality has been widely used without a uniform definition. The 
US Securities and Exchange Commission, for example, has referred to the importance of 
this concept in its Accounting Series Release No. 159 as: 
The purpose of the explanation of the Summary of Earnings is to 
enable investors to assess the source and probability of recurrence 
of net income, and thus of earnings quality. 
Beaver (2002) suggests that earnings management can improve or impair the quality of 
earnings. Income smoothing, therefore, can also improve or impair the quality of earnings 
since it is a form of earnings management. Theoretically, if quality of earnings is 
improved, then the association between firm values and reported earnings should also be 
improved. If quality of earnings is impaired, then the association between firm value and 
reported earnings should also be impaired. Prior empirical results do show that smoothers 
sometimes have higher returns than non-smoothers (e.g., Michelson et al., 2000), and 
sometimes have lower returns than non-smoothers (e.g., Michelson et al., 1995). A 
plausible explanation is that smoothers have higher returns when they are quality earnings 
firms, and have lower returns when they are non-quality earnings firms. The critical 
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question then is how to measure quality of earnings of a firm. 
 
2.3.5 Accounting techniques for smoothing  
Probably the most fundamental point to be made in these years is the distinction between 
monetary and real income. Current accounting practice is almost exclusively concerned 
with the measurement of the difference between monetary costs consumed or expired and 
monetary proceeds realized in connection therewith. This may be described as a purely 
monetary conception of income. If, on the other hand, we consider income to represent an 
increase in command over goods or services, an entirely different result may emerge. 
Consideration of income in the real sense embraces numerous problems typically identified 
with stabilized accounting. Hence, income will be considered from a strictly monetary 
point of view, although little thought is necessary to visualize the shortcomings of such a 
position. 
We may consider the term income to be indicative of the “normal earning power” of a 
business enterprise. This is the usual connotation of the term “operating income” or 
“operating profit”, as employed by accountants, and is generally measured by the 
difference between gross revenue from the major activity of the enterprise and applicable 
costs of a regular or recurring nature, but exclusive of “abnormal” or non-recurring items. 
From this point of view, it is apparent that considerable “juggling” of income may be 
accomplished by management decision as to the normality or abnormality of an item of 
revenue or expense, and the resulting statement classification.  
 
 
2.3.5.1 Motivation of income smoothing 
From a practical point of view, there is little doubt but what the most compelling 
motivation for income smoothing is the existence of tax levies, based upon income. Even 
with the existence of a non-progressive corporate income tax (except for the smallest 
concerns) and the availability of the carry-forward or carry-back provisions relating to 
operating losses, there may be distinct tax advantages to income shifting or smoothing. 
This is most apparent in the case of changes in tax rates or the addition or removal of types 
of income taxation.  
A less tangible, but perhaps more fundamentally important type of advantage of a 
relatively stable level of periodic income lies in the area of management relations with 
investors and workers. Certainly the owners and creditors of an enterprise will feel more 
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confident toward a corporate management which is able to report stable earnings than if 
considerable fluctuation of reported earnings exists. The stable dividend policy which level 
earnings facilitate does nothing to lessen satisfactory stockholder relations. The absence of 
peaks and valleys in the earnings record of an enterprise may do much to maintain 
continuing satisfactory industrial relations. A sharp increase in reported profits is very 
likely to produce the feeling in the minds of the members of the working force that they 
should participate to a greater extent in such profits, with resulting demands for wage 
increases, strikes and general industrial unrest. Finally, in the case where a considerable 
amount of the fluctuation in income may be attributed to changing price levels, the 
recognition of this cause may be vitally significant to corporate management as a guide to 
dividend policy, in order to assure preservation of corporate capital.208 
The above factors are significant from the point of view of an individual firm. 
It seems essential to mention a further point incident to the smoothing of income 
fluctuations that may well be of considerable importance to an entire economy. It is 
reasonably well recognized by economists that psychological factors, particularly in the 
area of producers’ expectations, are an important factor in the determination of economic 
activity. By the same token, changes in such psychological attitudes or expectations are 
significant in the explanation of cyclical upswings and downswings in business activity. 
Since, in the formulation of expectations, prediction of future events and conditions is an 
extremely hazardous process current conditions have a very important influence upon 
future expectations. Hence, a current condition of declining business income may cause 
expectation of further decline, bringing upon actions, which make these expectations a 
reality, and a cumulative process is initiated resulting in substantial stagnation of business 
activity, employment, etc. The opposite process may occur in the other direction when 
rising income appears. It would seem that the maintenance of a relatively stable level of 
periodic income might do much to reduce the effect of “waves of optimism and 
pessimism” on the level of business activity. It should be emphasized that the author is not 
subscribing exclusively to a completely psychological theory of business cycles, but is 
merely indicating that psychological expectations, motivated by fluctuations in income, are 
of some significance in this connection. 
 																																																								208	As illustrated by an analysis of the effect of price level changes on nine major steel companies. See Effect 
of Inflation on Capital and Profits: The Record of Nine Steel Companies, Ralph C. Jones, The Journal of 
Accountancy, January, 1949, pp. 9-27. 
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2.3.5.2 Gross Revenue Manipulation 
A rather direct approach to the objective of income smoothing may be made through the 
process of inter-period shifting of gross revenue. Given actual knowledge of or 
expectations about the operating results of two accounting periods, speeding or delaying 
the shipment of and billing for product and hence the recognition of revenue, may 
accomplish some degree of leveling of the income of the two periods. The effect of shifting 
gross revenue may be particularly significant in service rendering enterprises where the 
amount of direct costs related to such revenue would be relatively much smaller than in a 
manufacturing or merchandising enterprise. In many concerns the magnitude of the effect 
upon periodic income from this source would be minor, since only transactions occurring 
relatively near the closing date would be susceptible to such shifting. How- ever, in an 
enterprise, which has a relatively small number of revenue transactions, each involving a 
sizable money amount, the effect of such inter-period shifting on period revenue could well 
be substantial. Similarly, the use of production as a criterion for revenue recognition by a 
concern engaged in a small number of large and extended construction or manufacturing 
contracts, would tend to produce a more stable level of periodic income that would strict 
application of the conventional accrual basis. However, it is hardly appropriate to consider 
this as a method of artificially smoothing income, but rather as the use of a realistic and 
logical method of gross revenue booking.  
 
 
2.3.5.3 Inventory Accounting 
Alternative techniques of inventory valuation may provide a very significant method of 
income smoothing. This has become particularly true with the emergence and wide 
adoption of the last-in, first-out method of inventory pricing. The effect of the use of LIFO 
may be described, in summary form, as causing the matching of sales revenue expressed in 
terms of the current period price level with cost of merchandise or product expressed in 
similar terms. This is accomplished by valuing the inventory of unused material or unsold 
product substantially in terms of a fixed base price, the aggregate thereof being changed 
only to the extent of changes in physical inventory quantities. It is apparent that this 
matching of “current cost with current revenue” will have a decidedly stabilizing effect on 
income, as compared with the results of the more traditional first-in, first-out assumption. 
This will be particularly true in the case of an enterprise with a lengthy manufacturing 
process, using substantial quantities of raw materials subject to fluctuating supply prices 
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and, in particular, during a period of rapid price level changes. It seems appropriate to 
remark that the recent extension of last-in, first-out to such concerns as department stores 
can be defended by few of the theoretical arguments, which may be applied in the case of 
certain types of manufacturing enterprises. It would appear that smoothing of income, 
particularly due to the income tax effects thereof, represents the principal motivation for 
the use of LIFO in many (if not most) cases. Other pricing techniques, more recently 
suggested, which will produce the same general effect are next-in, first-out; highest-in, 
first-out; and, more-in than-out. Since no general use of these methods exists, it seems 
adequate to merely indicate their existence, without attempting detailed discussion thereof. 
Less fundamental methods of income smoothing through the inventory valuation process 
are also available. These arise through the subjective decisions made by management 
relative to reduction of inventory value for unsalable, obsolete, or damaged material or 
merchandise. The timing of adjustments for these conditions may well produce a 
smoothing effect on periodic income. 																										
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2.4 Profit smoothing and corporate finance 
The issue of financial manipulation and accounting fraud has long been felt in the public 
opinion for some years, following the known financial scandals that have occurred 
indiscriminately throughout the Western world. What is not always clear is that such 
events are the tip of the iceberg of a certain business management style that, driven by a 
perverse system of economic incentives for managers, has the dominant goal of 
maximizing value for shareholders in the short term. The financial statements, which 
should be a faithful mirror of business activity and a transparent guide to investors’ use, are 
so often the instruments to positively impact the markets to the detriment of true and 
trustworthy markets. 
Before analyzing quantitatively the concept of profit smoothing, it is appropriate to make 
an excursus on other fundamental concepts that insist on the company’s corporate profile. 
One of these, from a business point of view, is the phenomenon of earning management.209 
It is necessary to state that accounting is not a precise science, so it does not exactly 
describe the facts. Accounting, and consequently the measurement of financial results and 
the state of the firm’s resources, is based on conventions and a series of estimates that can 
be more or less made for their own interest. To counter this possibility, reference is made 
to accounting principles that must be respected by companies that make use of it, 
punishable by penalties and, where appropriate, in the most extreme cases, exclusion from 
the market. It is not always easy to understand when a manipulation or accounting fraud 
occurs. Business managers have the ability to manipulate market-driven information, 
artificially increasing profits, even without violating accounting rules and therefore without 
risking being punished. To describe this practice of changing budget data commonly used 
are terms such as manipulation, correction, adjustment, attenuation, etc. The most common 
term in specialist literature is “earnings management”. It is a neutral expression that does 
not intend to suggest moral judgments. 
For Schipper (1989), earnings management is the strategic intervention by managers in the 
process of reporting financial data to the outside public with the aim of gaining personal 
gain. The basis for this behavior is the availability of data managers who are not accessible 
by external stakeholders: in other words there is an information asymmetry that allows the 
earnings management practice. The concept of information asymmetry is therefore 
fundamental in the analysis of earning management. Information asymmetry occurs when 																																																								209 As we see, also cites the previous paragraphs.	
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in a relationship or a commercial transaction one of the parties involved has an informative 
advantage over the other or on the other. According to Schipper, such asymmetry exists in 
the relationship between managers and other interest groups and cannot be completely 
eliminated by changing contractual arrangements. 
Davidson, Stickney and Weil (1987) say that earnings management is the process by which 
managers, while remaining within the accepted accounting principles, try to reach a desired 
level of useful returns back to the outside.210 This optics focuses on the issue of managers’ 
judgment in defining financial data. There are several ways in which it can exercise its own 
judgment to influence financial relationships. For example, estimates that relate to the final 
value and duration of a certain asset, or about possible future expenses that have not yet 
occurred. 
Beneish (2001) analyzes different earnings management definitions and notes that while 
the opportunistic perspective has been well studied, little relevance in the literature has 
been given to the information perspective, for which managerial arbitration is a means for 
managers to reveal to investors their expectations regarding the future cash flows of the 
company. However, he believes that the informational approach does not it has always 
been positive: in fact the signals that managers throw on the firm’s prospects and which 
should help investors choose between good and bad companies can also be deceptive. For 
example, a manager can deceive stakeholders by hiding gains in positive moments (for 
example by overestimating lending losses or infrastructure obsolescence) and “using them” 
to improve results when needed. 
Technically, earnings management includes a spectrum of actions ranging from 
conservative accounting to fraud through aggressive and neutral accounting through a wide 
range of accounting choices.211 In other words, such choices can be applied to each of the 
accounting entries and, with the exception of fraudulent accounting that is obviously 
manipulative. 
Bhattacharya, Daouk and Welker (2002) speak of “opacity” of profits as a result of 
earnings management. Three are the opacity measures identified: 
• earnings aggressiveness, that is, how much profits are the result of risky accounting 
choices and too optimistic estimates by executives; 																																																								210	This is the definition of Healy and Wahlen (1999): “Earnings management is needed when managers use 
their judgment in reporting financial data and structuring transactions with the aim of altering financial 
relationships to deceive interest in the company’s core business performance or to influence the 
consequences of contracts that depend on the reported data”.	211	Giroux 2004.	
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• loss avoidance, that is, the incentives to communicate positive benefits disturb the 
relationship between profits and economic performance and thus harm the informative 
nature of the returns reported; 
• earnings smoothing, that is, how much information profitability are corrupted by the 
activity of artificially lowering earnings and then using them later.  
Literature has given great emphasis on verifying the presence in the contemporary 
economic system of earnings management and later on profit smoothing. Despite the 
common sense that earnings management and the profit smoothing phenomenon actually 
exist, it has not always been easy for researchers to confirm this hypothesis with concrete 
evidence. Recently, numerous studies have been able to show that this activity actually 
takes place in a widespread manner.212 
Healy and Wahlen (1999) examine the evidence of earnings management, profit 
smoothing, and implications for updating accounting standards. The authors conclude that 
the general evidence states that companies “maneuver” the profits in line with a next public 
offering of shares. Teoh, Wong and Rao (1998) go into more detail and report that 
approximately 62% of companies making a public purchase offer have unexpected higher 
accruals than a sample-control of similar companies. This is considered to be a signal of 
earnings management. 
Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999), instead, introduce a model based on the thresholds 
of profits. Considering that executives maneuver their profits with the aim of influencing 
the perception of outsiders and since they judge the activities of managers precisely on the 
basis of certain earnings targets, the authors assume that executives focus their attention on 
the thresholds to be taken in consideration to assess the firm’s performance. Degeorge, 
Patel and Zeckhauser identify three thresholds that would be kept in mind by executives 
when they convey the profits: 
• communicate positive profits, that is, profits greater than 0; 
• support recent performance, that is to do at least the same benefits as the previous year; 
• to meet the expectations of analysts, in particular to focus on the consensual forecast of 
earnings. 
Analyzing a series of corporate results from 1974 to 1996, the authors come to the 
conclusion that when managers are motivated to reach these thresholds, the distribution of 
reported returns becomes abnormal: historically there are too many companies that exceed 																																																								212	Also cites the previous and the following paragraphs.	
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the thresholds of profits compared to those Which do not exceed them. For example, with 
regard to the “support for recent performance” threshold, there is a big leap in the 
distribution of profits around the value 0. The value in this case refers to the difference in 
earnings per share between one year and the other (EPS = EPSt - EPSt-1).213 In other 
words, in the region of small negative EPS changes the distribution seems to have been 
“limed”: part of the density that would normally be between -1 and 0 of EPS in normal 
distribution seems to have moved to the area slightly higher than 0. Declining falls, though 
for an inertia, for a manager is a problem especially at the image level: it is easier then, in 
these limiting situations, to artificially increase the profits of that minimum amount that 
will allow you to match or slightly improve the results of the previous period so as not to 
alarm the investors. This phenomenon is proof of the existence of earnings management. 
Moreover, according to the authors, a hierarchy of thresholds emerges: the most important 
goal for managers is the threshold of positive profits, which prevails indifferently from the 
other thresholds; once this is achieved first threshold is trying to improve profits from the 
past; the last in the order of importance is instead the threshold of analysts’ expectation.214  
Concerning the results that often appear to be better than they actually should be before 
offering new shares in the financial markets, Beneish (2001) recalls that, despite the 
certification bodies and the rules prohibiting fraudulent communications, the information 
asymmetry remains and consequently there is the potential to deceive potential investors. 
A search by Myers, Myers and Skinner (2005) that analyzes a set of companies with 
positive earnings per share (EPS) for at least 20 consecutive quarters shows that the 
number of companies that are part of this group between 1963 and 2004 is greater than you 
would expect. This phenomenon is de finite earnings momentum, or “the ability to report 
quarterly positive earnings per share for several consecutive years”, and is a proof of 
earnings management. To succeed in this business, the managers of the companies under 
review would act to increase the EPSs reported when they were declining and, conversely, 
to decrease them when they would otherwise be growing more than needed. More in detail, 
managers would tend to bring positive or negative items into account to mitigate profits. 
																																																								213	EPS: Earning per share, also called net income per share, is a market prospect ratio that measures the 
amount of net income earned per share of stock outstanding. In other words, this is the amount of money 
each share of stock would receive if all of the profits were distributed to the outstanding shares at the end of 
the year.	214	Degeorge, Patel & Zeckhauser, Earnings management to exceed thresholds, 1999; see also Kellog, I. & 
L.B. Kellog, Fraud, window dressing and negligence in financial statements, 1991, McGraw Hill. 
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Beneish (2001) concludes that the set of evidence suggests that earnings management tend 
to increase earnings is more rampant than that with the aim of decreasing them. Obviously, 
situations where a company goes too well with expectations and goals, and therefore 
profits can be “put in safe” for worse times, are less frequent than when each extra income 
has a positive effect on the manager utility function. 
 
 
2.4.1 Profit’s strategic reasons 
The complexity of the phenomenon of the economic value of the firm as such and the high 
difficulty of its measurement, representation, analysis and interpretation is certainly not 
inferior to the extraordinary interest that arouses the subject for the scholar as for those, 
entrepreneurs, executives, shareholders, stakeholders and professional analysts who, in 
their respective roles, have to evaluate, decide and behave accordingly. 
The analysis of value, even before its strategic proposition, can be suitably conducted on 
two distinct levels: one, in a conception, exquisitely economic-business, enterprise 
strategy, the other according to a vision of corporate and financial, of corporate strategy,215 
obviously not leaving the interdependencies between the two plans of study and analysis. 
As a business strategy, value is primarily the economic determinants of value that 
contribute to its profitability and profitability, given the pseudo-axiom “more profit more 
value”. The strategic economic determinants of value are therefore identified in the 
structure of the firm in its organizational and functional system and in the consequent 
processes of production, distribution and sale of the products. Auxiliary and administrative 
processes, albeit indirectly, contribute to the formation of value to the extent that they 
effectively support economic and financial processes; it goes without saying that, in any 
case, operating efficiency and cost-effectiveness contribute directly to increasing the 
profitability of the firm. 
The proposed analytical model involves the construction of an original “matrix value” that 
features, on the one hand, the “strategic business units (product/market - SBU)” previously 
selected and, on the other, the development of value, distinctly, for “activities” that are 																																																								215	From Andrew to Porter, and in a generalized orientation, agrees to put the business strategy (the 
competitive) and the corporate strategy (of value) approaches but different. Andrew writes: “Corporate 
strategy is an organization process, in many ways inseparable from the structure behavior and culture of the 
company in which it takes place. However, we can abstract from the process two important aspects, 
interrelated in real life but separable for the purposes of analysis. The first of these we may call formulation, 
the second implementation”. See K. Andrew, The Concept of Corporate Strategy, Homewood, 1987 and M. 
Porter, From Competitive Advantage to Corporate Strategy, Harvard Business Review, May-June, 1987.	
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functional to production processes. Obviously, the more numerous the SBUs, the more 
complex the value breaks down on the matrix, while in the case of a company that 
produces only one product for a single market, everything would be simplified in the 
strategic analysis of the “value chain” (see the “Porter” sense),216 for traditional processes 
and/or business activities. Within each functional process sequence (from production to 
distribution, to sales), they can then find evidence (if one can have an appropriate 
managerial accounting progress) matrix data of the further disaggregated value for both 
“by activity” and “for strategic business areas”. By way of example only, could a number 
of “value options” be highlighted far beyond the classic make or buy? dilemma. This may 
be the case for a whole range of arbitrations between outsourcing, processing for or on 
behalf of third parties, decentralization of production in developing countries, complete 
automation of plant and machinery, reformulation of firm logistics, from that in production 
support to sales distribution and so on. It should be noted in this regard that the strategic 
orientation towards excessive “outsourcing” or other formulas that would otherwise lead to 
the abolition of increasingly important value-added quotas could lead to the gradual de-
structuring of the firm, the loss of skills in human resources, know-how and, ultimately, 
loss of value, not to mention social and territorial reflections. 
At the level of product and market policies, the value strategy could go further by 
searching for an optimal combination of earnings leverage. We remember how, by acting 
on sales revenues and/or the contribution margin, the “leverage effect” (equal to the ratio 
between the contribution margin and operating income) would lead to a more than 
proportional increase in the income that can be achieved. Conversely, acting on fixed costs, 
a similar structural leverage effect (equal to the ratio between fixed costs and operating 
income) would be obtained but inversely proportional. Clearly, the complexity of the 
determinants at stake and the close ties between them do not make the leverage maneuver 
easy with the risk of modifying the income equilibrium formula without a clear strategic 
design to be achieved; a design that, in order not to end itself, should be framed within the 
firm’s competitive strategy (with particular emphasis on SBUs) where they enhance those 
entrepreneurial and managerial skills that are a highly critical factor in the process of 
creating value.217 																																																								216	A value chain is a model that allows describing the structure of an organization as a limited set of 
processes. Michael Porter theorized this model in 1985 in his best seller Competitive Advantage: Creating 
and Sustaining Superior Performance. According to this model, an organization is seen as a set of nine 
processes, of which five primary and four supporters.	217	According to the authors of “A new management philosophy”, managers demand that their business be 
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However, the value strategy does not exhaust its mission by optimizing operating income, 
on the one hand, and by affirming the firm on the market, both in terms of strategic 
positioning and the acquired competitive advantage, on the other.  
Ultimately, but not least, the financial value of the value process remains to analyze. The 
firm’s economic activity requires capital investments, both fixed and current, that 
determine the financial needs to which it is covered by self-financing, capital and financial 
indebtedness. When self-financing for indivisible dividend consolidates together with 
equity, it constitutes the equity or venture capital of the enterprise, which, in turn, together 
with the financial indebtedness (net of any financial assets), expresses the total of the 
sources of invested capital in the firm. This is due to the fact that the financial debts are, by 
definition, for an expense, the interest expense paid (net of any assets that may have been 
received) to absorb part of the value generated by the economic operation in relation to the 
net financial exposure, the technical nature of the financial transactions carried out and, of 
course, the essays of interest and, ultimately, the weighted average effective test. If 
financial management is essentially irrelevant to the value generated, it is true that in the 
transfiguration from operating income to gross tax revenue, the financial charges incurred 
can absorb a portion more or less significant up to the limit of zeroing the economic result, 
or even, make it a negative sign. 
The targeted value strategy for corporate finance must therefore carefully consider 
opportunity-options to reduce capital requirements by “differentiating” or “disposing” non-
strategic or unproductive investments, “accelerating” the rotation of working capital, or 
“de-structuring” some auxiliary activities opting for outsourcing or other tactical strategies. 
Emphasizing the value strategy on the containment of invested capital or emptying the 
industrial content of a company may, however, prove to be detrimental to its equilibrium 
over the middle to long term. The exasperation of the managerial doctrine implicated in the 
known formula called Economic Value Added -EVA can induce high-risk business 
policies, such as postpone renewal or technological upgrading of plants or disincentive 
investment in research and development. Of course, the intent -indeed very little strategic- 																																																																																																																																																																								
considered as “value creators” rather than as “value-appropriators” -and consequently: “the shift of emphasis 
is a great inside firms. In the logic of a turbulent organizational economy, competitive advantage is anchored 
in the company's ability to innovate its way temporarily out of frelentless market pressures. As companies 
change focus from value appropriation to value creation, facilitating cooperation between people takes 
precedence over enforcingcompliance, andinitiative becomes more valued than obedience. The manager's 
primary task is refined from institutionalizing control to embedding trust, from main taining the status quo to 
leading change”. See S. Ghoshal - C. A. Bartlett - P. Morgan, Strategy and Value Creation in Strategic 
Thinking, MIT-SLOAN. Jossey Bass, San Francisco, 2001. 	
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to highlight short-term profitability indicators on ROI and ROE respectively. Moving from 
the sources of invested capital, one sees how the value strategy can leverage several levers, 
including, first of all, the classic, financial, which is capable of acting as a leverage to 
increase net profitability compared to operating profitability (ROE>ROI) to the condition 
that the “weighted average interest rate” corresponding to the financial indebtedness, is 
lower (with a reasonable margin of security) than ROI. The imprudent use of the leverage 
without a clear strategic view of induced and collateral effects can seriously compromise 
the structural balance of assets where, for example, a company should be excessively 
undercapitalized with respect to the value of immovable or inalienable investments, just as 
be strategic. 
Still others can be business finance interventions, with the aim of maximizing profitable 
strategy. Among the most commonly used, we note the buy-back transactions, i.e. the 
purchase of stock shares by a company with the dual effect of supporting the stock market 
value and, on the other hand, reducing the net capital, thereby raising the profitability of 
the enterprise to its level of profitability. Always in consistency with the aim of 
accentuating the profitability of the enterprise and, in its reflection, its economic value is 
recalled by the discontinuing operations through which it is possible to contract, even very 
significantly, the invested capital by shedding down branches of business or assets 
considered not strategic or, in any case, not adequately contributing to the process of value. 
And yet, for the same purpose, a further hypothesis of reduced invested capital could be 
represented by a significant excess of liquidity (free-capital) if these were disbursed in the 
form of extraordinary dividends to be allocated to shareholders (more rarely below form of 
reduction of share capital). Lastly, it could be noted that limiting the self-financing policy 
to a high return on equities through a high payout of dividends compared to net profit as 
well as meeting the financial market appreciation would in turn, to contain risk capital and, 
on the other hand, to further increase its level of profitability. 
The second moment of the strategy of value -a strategy, however, formulated on the search 
for the economic equilibrium conditions of the firm over time or, more explicitly, of 
“lasting profitability”- concerns the very value of the firm, as already initially laid down. 
There is no doubt about the fundamental correspondence between the value of profit and 
that of economic capital as it is the “expected gradient of profitability” to offer the merit of 
investing in a firm for the commitments to be taken, for the uncertainty of the future and 
the consequent risks. If the fundamental determinant of its economic value can be well 
recognized in the profitability of the firm, so that a company strategy aimed at maximizing 
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profit is a priority, it is true that there are still other conditions and circumstances that 
influence the valuation of the firm’s economic capital. The first of these conditions lies in 
the value risk, more precisely as a system of risks, endogenous and exogenous, to the 
enterprise that is reflected in its ability to generate profits. Profit risk is an integral part of 
the economic value of the enterprise but, due to its difficult, if not impossible, safe 
weighting, without prejudice to the decisive weight of the balance of the corporate system, 
the appreciation it takes may be, objectively, changing in the relativity of space and time, 
as well as subjective is propensity, no less than individual expectation. This explains how, 
while having the same data, the valuation theorem of the enterprise’s economic capital can 
find the most contradictory solutions, even by a same subject in the short-term. The value 
strategy, as a business strategy, is thus defined by the enhancement of the economic capital 
derived from prospective profitability (possibly integrated with intangible values). 
The awareness of the economic value of the company is a major component of strategic 
control over mission objectives pursued. In the individual, family or personalized business, 
the firm is the dominant economic entity, factor and arbitrator of the company, in his own, 
prevailing, if not exclusive, personal interest; interest that, in the background, collides with 
the company’s vital life. Equally, it cannot claim to be in capitalist firms, in the form of 
equity firms and, more specifically, for those listed on a widely traded stock exchange. For 
the latter, and for so-called public companies in particular, the economic entity assumes a 
much more complex connotation. Even the economic value of the firm, sought and 
achieved through profitability, can no longer be considered an end to gender as an extreme 
indicator of the effectiveness of entrepreneurial skills, useful in verifying and comparing 
strategic profit choices. 
 
 
 
2.4.2 Gordon’s model related to managerial goals 
The time has come to introduce the concept of dividends and equity stocks into the 
analysis, including in the broader model defined by Gordon.218 Equity stock should be 
valued with the same logic as for bonds. The difference is the greater difficulty in 
estimating the cash flows that can be obtained from them. Several equity-rating models 
have been presented, depending on the type of growth that firms anticipate. All models 																																																								218	Gordon M. (1962). The Investment, Financing and Valuation of the Corporation, Homewood Illinois: 
Irwin. 
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have their intrinsic validity, provided that the implicit hypotheses are taken into account in 
the application. This paragraph highlights how the price of the shares can be divided into 
two parts: one linked to the current yield (dividend yield) and one linked to growth 
opportunities. A proper valuation of value must allow understanding the possible rebalance 
between the two components of value. For the shares, the general principle is that the value 
depends on the future cash flows that they will produce. For an investor with a one-year 
time horizon, the cash flows generated by an action are: 
- dividends (if paid by the firm); 
- the price after one year (in case of perfect liquidity of the investment). 
The price of the stock will be equal to the present value of those two flows on the basis of 
an “r” rate appropriate to the risk. 
Then: 
 𝑃! = 𝐷𝑖𝑣!1+ 𝑟 + 𝑃!1+ 𝑟 
 
The same applies to the stock valuation at the following time: 
 𝑃! = 𝐷𝑖𝑣!1+ 𝑟 + 𝑃!1+ 𝑟 
 
By proceeding with the appropriate substitutions then you will come up with a general 
formula: 
 𝑃! = 𝐷𝑖𝑣!(1+ 𝑟)!!!!!  
 
It is deduced from the fact that if the financial market is properly applied to whether to 
choose a dividend distribution or to take the road to capital gain, the answer is 
“indifferent”.219 
The newly viewed formula poses the problem of defining the dynamics of dividend flow 
produced by a firm. The analytical forecast of all streams appears to be an abstract exercise 
compared to the actual achievability. On the other hand, it is more realistic to hypothesize 																																																								219	The dividend is the share recognized to the shareholder. Its amount depends on the management 
decisions of the firm and is influenced by the economic and financial results achieved during the year. 
Sometimes listed firms decide to distribute extraordinary dividends by drawing on the provisions set aside in 
previous years. 
Capital gains, on the other hand, represent the positive difference between the sale and purchase value of 
equity (investments, warrants, convertible bonds and options).	
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some middle or long-term dividend trends and to look for appropriate valuation models. 
The trends considered are usually the growth that dividend flows can have in the future. 
The first example is the simplest case: with zero growth the share becomes a sort of life 
annuity (risky) and as such is evaluated. 
The case analyzed220 is where the company still carries out the activities (including 
investments) necessary to maintain the ability to compete (e.g., replacement investments). 
It should be noted that the dividend flow that is discounted is uncertain: in the formula, an 
expected dividend value is entered. 
Therefore in the formula: 
- the dividend entered will be the one expected; 
- the rate to be applied must include a risk premium. 
In the case of constantly growth, it is assumed that dividends can grow on a perpetual “g” 
rate. The “g” growth rate of dividends is the result of a similar growth of the enterprise in 
all its components (profits, assets, debts, cash flows, etc.). It would therefore be more 
appropriate to talk about “company expansion”. Consequently, the dividends obtainable by 
the firm may be represented by a geometric progression where the growth factor is 
expressed by the quotient between: 
- 1+ g, expression of corporate growth; 
- 1+ r, expression of the cost of risk capital. 
By solving geometric progression, we get the “Gordon’s” formula (from the name of the 
scholar who first dealt with this problem). 
 𝑃! = 𝐷𝐼𝑉!𝑟 − 𝑔 
 
This is a very used formula in professional practice as a result of it simplicity. It is 
necessary to know only three elements: 
- DIV, i.e. dividends expected at the end of the year in which analysis is carried out; 
- g, i.e. growth’s rate; 
- r, i.e. the cost of the venture capital. 
We will also see that this simplicity can be a trap in which it is easy to underestimate the 
importance of certain implicit hypotheses to the formula. 
One of the limits of Gordon’s formula is to hypothesize a single “g” growth rate. More 
often than not, companies with different growth periods are observed: 																																																								220	With zero growth.	
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- higher in a first phase (e.g. exploiting the innovative aspects of a new product); 
- constrained (and coupled to an average of the economic system) in longer periods. Hence 
the need for a formula capable of capturing these two moments of growth: 
 
 
𝑃! = 𝐷𝐼𝑉!(1+ 𝑔!)!(1+ 𝑟)! + 𝐷𝐼𝑉!!!𝑟 − 𝑔!(1+ 𝑟)!!!!!  
 
 
Growth in earnings (and dividends) basically depends on two factors: 
- amount of profits made available; 
- rate of return obtainable on such provisions. 
 
1 + g = 1+ [(% useful retention) x (yield)] 
 
For example, a 10% growth rate can be obtained: 
- holding 50% of the profits to reinvest them to 20%; 
- holding 80% of the profits to reinvest them to 12,5%. 
Historical ROE values can be good starting points to estimate the yield rate obtainable. It 
should also be recalled that the significance of the firm’s historical data depends on its 
degree of commitment. 
As for the second variable, the market based on the implied risk on the company should fix 
the “r” rate. This assumes the ability to properly interpret the financial market equilibrium. 
Alternatively we can get “r” through the following expression: 
 𝑟 = 𝐷𝐼𝑉 𝑃! + 𝑔 
 
Where: 
- the first part of the formula represents the immediate yield of the title (dividend yield); 
- the second part expresses the growth rate. 
The formula highlights an important relationship: increasing the “growth” component of 
expected performance can reduce the “immediate” component. Finally, estimating the level 
of dividends would seem to be the most “simple” component. For this reason, it often 
triggers gross errors. In the formula we must enter always the value of dividends expected 
for the period. Gordon’s formula imagines that the retention rate of earnings is perpetually 
constant. If this varies, it is necessary to make analytical estimates of the value. The 
formulas considered are net of all tax effects. Sometimes, however, dividend policies can 
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be affected by the tax treatment of non-distributed profits compared to those reserved for 
dividends. This helps explain why there are good-value companies in the financial markets, 
despite low paybacks.221 
The general model allows some reflections: a) growth of profits does not generate a secure 
growth of the value of the company: the former grows if the reinvestment profits are 
positive, the second grows only if reinvestment creates value (makes more than “r”); b) 
there is no difference between analyzing profits and dividends only in the case of 
companies that do not grow. In other cases there is a clearing between increased value 
driven by growth and lower value as a result of incomplete distribution of profits in the 
short-term; c) there may be firms that do not distribute dividends provided that promises of 
growth (equivalent to future dividend promises) are probable. 
The basic model for assessing the intrinsic value of an stock -also from the chronological 
point of view, as developed as the first model of stock valuation- is that based on the 
discounting of dividends. According to this model, the value of a stock is given by the 
present value of the dividends it expects from it. In an infinite valuation horizon, the book 
value is a perpetual dividend annuity, where the discount rate is the cost of equity 
(determined using CAPM, for example). The Dividend Discount Model (DDM), which is 
based on the same logic of bond rating, works properly for investments with a defined time 
horizon. One of the fundamental features of the stock is the indeterminacy of their 
expiration. For this reason, in order to calculate the value of a stock over a time horizon 
defined with DDM, it is necessary to estimate the expected price of the stock at the end of 
the period. In this regard, the main theoretical limit of DDM emerges immediately: the 
current intrinsic value of the share is based on a forward price estimate, which is, 
moreover, the value that is sought to estimate. Although the value of a stock is based on 
dividends, the estimated dividend time horizon does not provide an adequate intrinsic 
value. Indeed, firms that cannot generate value can in the middle term distribute dividends 
using debt, while companies with good profitability may decide not to distribute any 
dividends. A solution to solve this problem is to assume that the dividend paid in the last 
year of the explicit estimate period will be kept forever. In such a case, the expiring price 
will be equal to the capitalization of a perpetual annuity at constant rates (obtained by 
dividing the dividend at the cost of equity). 
																																																								221	It should also be recalled that the risk of the two components is not always comparable.	
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An alternative is to assume that the perceived dividend at the end of the explicit forecast 
period will continue to grow indefinitely at a steady growth rate (known as “g”). In this 
case, the value of the forward price is obtained by capitalizing on a perpetual rent with 
increasing rates = DIV/(Equity cost - g). This model, as we have seen before, is known as 
Gordon Growth Method. The main limit of the Dividend Discount Method is that dividends 
do not represent a value creation measure over a defined time horizon, despite the value of 
a stock being determined by the same dividends. A firm that does not create value can in 
fact be indebted to distribute dividends, while highly profitable firm may decide not to 
distribute any dividends. One way to overcome the DDM limits, while adopting the same 
focus on cash flows, is the Discounted Cash Flow Method (DCF).  
The Gordon Growth Model (GGM) links the value of the share to the expected dividends 
in the following period, the rate of return required by the share (expressed by equity cost) 
and the expected growth rate of dividends. As emerged from the application of the 
Dividend Discount Model, a solution used to estimate the forward price to be used in 
calculating the intrinsic value of a share is to assume that the dividend received in the last 
year of the explicit forecast period will continue to grow to a constant rate “g” to infinity. 
If it is assumed that growth does not begin at the end of the forecast period but 
immediately (i.e. in the first year after the estimate), the intrinsic value of the share is given 
by the capitalization of a perpetual rent with increasing rates: 
= 𝐷𝐼𝑉!((Equity Cost - g). This method is known as the Gordon Growth Model. The 
Gordon Growth Model can be used to evaluate a firm that is in a stable growth phase that 
is when its dividends grow at a constant rate. If is true that Gordon’s Growth Model is a 
simple and powerful approach to evaluating stocks, it is also true that its use is limited to 
firms that are in a steady growth phase. 
Profit smoothing insists on the dividends’ phenomenon. It should be noted how profit 
smoothing is used to keep shareholders’ expectations on profits222 constant from one 
period to another. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								222	As dividend.	
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2.4.3 Culture of extra profit as a threat to the shareholder value 
The value created is the result of appropriate managerial choices. The management choices 
that have the greatest effect on the value of the business are those that relate to the 
complexity of the business formula, are mainly strategic, long-term choices. The choices 
that induce the most incisive growth in value in the middle to long term are almost always 
those that are linked to innovation. There is, unfortunately, no effective and direct 
instrumentation for measuring the link between these choices and the value created. 
Choices about technological investments, for example, are very difficult to judge; the 
evaluation tools are almost always of a qualitative and unstructured type. There are no 
convincing and effective quantitative tools that can allow us to evaluate a technological 
strategy in the effects on the value created. Very often, value orientation is not taken for 
long-term choices -because of the difficulty of verifying a useful link- but has a precise and 
constant application for short-term choices simply because they have a much faster and 
safer impact on business results. By acting on variables that can be maneuvered in the short 
term, the value maximization for shareholders passes through three master classes: a) 
growth in profits; b) growth in the level of indebtedness whenever the return on the 
resources used exceeds the cost of the financial charges, c) rationalization of invested 
capital. There are several short-term mechanisms along the aforementioned guidelines that 
improve performance even at a very rapid pace. These mechanisms are widely and 
progressively widespread. All these roads mean, however, that if they are not embedded in 
a wider logical framework, they are also possible perverse, dangerous, sometimes fatal 
operative events. Growth of profits can be forced simply by alleviating the investments 
needed to support subsequent strategic cycles. Investment in R&D is likely to be 
attenuated, as they have a reduced effect on the value created in the near future and an 
incremental, otherwise uncertain, effect for the farthest exercises. Beside investment in 
R&D, there are several other cost cuts that amplify, but only in the very short period, the 
value created. There are a lot of cost items that lend themselves to a “harvest” strategy. 
Creating value, with a strategy of this class, means “squeeze” everything achievable in the 
shortest time possible. It is clear that such a strategy, if implemented with measure, 
corresponds to the implementation of an appropriate efficiency recovery plan. However, 
the value model does not stop at achieving a good level of efficiency, but continues to 
point out the convenience of further cost cuts in addition to the actually appropriate level. 
Profitability recovery is done to the detriment of customers, or suppliers, or employees, or 
those shareholders who are interested in a long-term growth profile, or the environment. 
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The exasperation of the level of indebtedness is entirely consistent with the culture of 
value, but it undermines the firm’s financial prospects and makes it more vulnerable in 
difficult times. The optimal level of indebtedness, according to the logic of value, is 
consistently higher than the level that would be termed more traditional logical follow-up, 
especially for successful businesses. On this point there is a wide empirical anedoptics. 
Managing invested capital for value creation is often carried out by the sale of “non-
strategic” assets or the spin-off of real estate or intangible assets (trademarks and patents). 
These transactions impoverish creditors and shareholders of tomorrow, anticipating the 
value of today’s shareholders, and considerably increase the prospective risk of the 
company. A stock option incentive system impoverishes the same shareholders today. This 
is a mechanism that pushes toward short-term strategies for recovering value. In addition, 
the risk of opportunistic behavior or market abuse is extremely high. Empirical evidence 
largely confirms this fear.223 
Value culture hampers therefore the pursuit of middle to long-term goals and undermines 
the survival of the enterprise in an intergenerational perspective. The pervasiveness of 
short-term goals is counterproductive, as is clear in the literature and found in business 
practice. The cases of companies managed with a strict logic of value are very frequent and 
formally adopted the models that some years later faced important moments of crisis. 
Value growth for shareholders can therefore be virtually based on short-term opportunities, 
the above-mentioned behavior has provided some specification, or virtuously based on 
innovation paths. Frequently, value growth can occur, in the context of opportunistic 
opportunities, without any virtue, at the expense of customers, suppliers, employees, 
communities, and the environment with which the business interacts. 
Corporate Social Responsibility or codes of conduct and ethics are just about to put a brake 
on extra-profit situations. These are measures of “self-limitation” in the path to value.224 
However, recent studies (Omran, Atrill and Pointon 2002) demonstrate that stakeholder-
view business management does not necessarily result in lower stock returns than the 
returns offered by managed businesses in shareholder-view logic. 
																																																								223	See Johnson, S. A., & Tian, Y. S. (2000). The value and incentive effects of nontraditional executive 
stock option plans. Journal of Financial Economics, 57(1), 3-34. 
Core, J. E., & Guay, W. R. (2001). Stock option plans for non-executive employees. Journal of financial 
economics, 61(2), 253-287. 
Core, J., & Guay, W. (2002). Estimating the value of employee stock option portfolios and their sensitivities 
to price and volatility. Journal of Accounting research, 40(3), 613-630.	224	See M. Onado, Azionisti, clienti e valori d’impresa, Il sole 24 Ore, 26 Marzo 2006.	
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The culture of value is, in effect, a culture of extra profit. The fair profit is that measure of 
income that remunerates the risk of firm (endorsed by the shareholders) and which allows a 
reinvestment rate necessary and sufficient to preserve the prospective profitability of the 
enterprise. In a free competition market, it is not possible to generate and defend long extra 
profits. But this is just a logical reference model; reality often differs. Value culture does 
not recognize merit in achieving a profit, but only in achieving something more. Value 
culture strongly pushes businesses towards creating rents and the abuse of acquired 
dominant positions. The verbal expression “extra-profit” evokes an idea of danger for the 
community, abuse, short-term, undeserved outcome; the expression “created value”, which 
has the same intrinsic meaning, evokes managerial foresight. 
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3.1 Introduction 
The development of corporate governance225 in China is entering a new phase in which 
effective governance mechanisms and practices have become the necessary prerequisite for 
seeking lasting prosperity through an open, open market economy that can compete 
globally. While Chinese corporate governance could have been considered an obscure 
topic and in the hands of a few academics and practitioners, it is now a very important part 
of financial language for various stakeholder groups, including investors, managers, 
corporate directors, as well as government organizations and non-governmental. China 
cannot go further, this is the time to support its momentum of growth, develop credibility 
and the various forms of business organizations that implement their corporate governance. 
In order for the Chinese model of corporate governance, adapted from the Anglo-American 
version, actually functions, it is necessary that the formal and substantial market as well as 
the social institutions actually develop and work226. While we have continued to introduce 
and use an impressive number of corporate governance practices and mechanisms, there 
are some systematic and related issues that require the introduction of a fully effective 
corporate governance system. 
Among these issues, for example, there are: the current family problem of the management 
implications for domain ownership by state-owned companies in listed firms, in major 
banks and in unlisted companies; insider control; publicity and information reporting 
system, as well as poor monitoring; the actual exercise of the rights and the stakeholders’ 
protection; the effectiveness of the board; and the applicant’s weakness as well as the 
uneven application of laws and regulations. There are also major struggles such as the 
corporate governance role of the Communist Party organization, overlapping regulatory 
issues, transparency, administrator remuneration, and the development of a functioning 
market and social institutions, as well as a corporate culture compatible with a modern 
corporate governance system that the Chinese government is trying to build. The 
development of the corporate governance in China can serve in many ways of linking and 
guiding to develop other key areas in the economic and regulatory context. For example, in 
recent years the listing of major state-owned and foreign-owned companies in foreign 																																																								225 	Cook J., Deakin S., Stakeholding and corporate governance: theory and evidence on economic 
performance, Research center for business research, University of Cambridge, 1999. 
Keasey K., Thompson S., Wright M., Corporate Governance: Economic Management and Financial Issues, 
in Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997. 226 KIT T.O., The development of Corporate Governance in China, Cheltenham, Northampton, MA, USA, 
Edward Elgar, 1999. 
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equity markets has provided the necessary boost to ensure governance and governance 
change that Chinese authorities would find fit for their benefit because foreign investors 
and lawmakers they will demand compliance with international standards. 
At this stage China is moving from a generic introductory framework of formal norms and 
regulations to the creation of comprehensible institutions to run the system in the interest 
of all stakeholder categories. The initial development of corporate governance has been 
limited to setting what is needed in a formal context for listed firms. After about twenty 
years of development, there is now an urgent need to reform the country’s financial system 
and respond to the growing demand of domestic and corporate sectors to access the capital 
market and invest more effectively, as well as providing answers to the public sector which 
needs to be equipped with institutions and tools that make it possible to exercise indirect 
control over the economy. The Chinese government has decided to change its line of 
business, ranging from the usual routine management of state-owned enterprises to the 
control and guidance of industries that are thought to be strategic at national level by 
promoting a select group of large-scale, directly owned businesses From the central 
government, to make it the industry leader, both in size and in the position of natural or 
regulated monopoly. To achieve these goals, state-owned banks will be a key strategic key 
to allow the government to exercise discretionary macroeconomic initiatives to guide the 
growth path of the Chinese economy. The massive expansion of bank lending in the short 
term as a Chinese response to the global financial crisis in 2009 was a clear confirmation 
of the Chinese government’s modus operandi. This, the experience of financial scandals 
and the restructuring of state-owned Chinese banks in separating outstanding loans227, 
highlighted the importance of good corporate governance to ensure that the banking 
industry can deliver results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								227	Non-performing loans.	
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3.2 China’s development: a powerful imperialist pole emerges  
The last twenty years of the life of capitalism are characterized by strong changes in the 
international scene. Alongside the US as the only gendarmes in the world, the consequence 
of the fall of the Soviet empire, the European attempt to start the process of establishing a 
new imperialist pole able to cope with the American side and alongside Japan, the 
economic colossus of the extreme east, sustained by a persistent stagnation that seems only 
for one year being overtaken, the East is experiencing a period of great economic viability, 
characterized by rates of development far superior to those of the Western world, which 
starts to impose a decisive change to the world economic equilibrium. While on the one 
hand there is the tedious and cramped progression of American and European capitalism, 
characterized by a structural crisis, on the other hand, the unprecedented development and 
the swirling growth of the Asian area, an area that could soon assume a decisive global 
weight. India and China, but especially the latter, are the engines of this development that 
will soon bring new problems to the whole world. This is undoubtedly a very important 
phenomenon that cannot be neglected because it will lead to major changes in the coming 
years. China, with the impressive strength of the vastness of its territory and its population, 
is trying to become an economic power capable of returning to the world scene with 
renewed vigor and credentials of true imperialistic power endowed with all the numbers to 
treat par with the American and European giants. This is an epochal change that also 
deserves our attention in the effort to understand the future imperialistic dynamics. 
 
3.2.1 Chinese development 
China has been expanding for about twenty years at an average annual rate of 9%.228 The 
World Bank forecasts that China’s gross domestic product surpassed the US in 2014, 
bringing the country to the top spot in the world. Another indicator confirms it: the per 
capita GDP has risen from 248 renminbi in 1970 to 1,633 in 1990 to 6,648 in 1999 to 
54,003 renmibi in 2016 and continues to grow.  
Synthesizing the internal components of development, we see that the weight of the 
industrial and service sector is constantly growing (+9.9% between 1979 and 1991) while 
agriculture is declining steadily (+5.3% average in the same period). However, China 
continues to be one of the largest agricultural producers in the world (it has a cultivated 																																																								228	See China a boom of clay feet reported on Prometheus No. 7 of 2003. In particular see also Chapter 4 of 
The Miracle of China by Maria Weber, edited by Il Mulino, 2003. 
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area of only 10% of the total). This is the result of the de-cultivation process of agricultural 
enterprises started in 1974 which fragmented the distribution of land, thereby reducing 
labor productivity and has produced the phenomenon of peasant escape in the cities due to 
their increasing economic difficulties (today peasants and their families still account for 
870 million people on a total of about 1 billion to three hundred thousand men). In the last 
decade, the peasant farmers’ urbanization process was such that the ninth five-year plan 
(1996-2000), fully grasping the gravity of the problem, paid particular attention to the issue 
of re-launching agriculture through the introduction of technologies and more advanced 
work organizations. 
The industrial sector has been reformed since 1979 (with a decisive acceleration in 1984 
when foreign investment was strongly encouraged), the year in which the process of 
economic liberalization that has progressively led the state to lose ownership of the 50% of 
the industries. In about twenty years, state-owned, large-scale, state-of-the-art economy has 
dropped considerably, thus generating 77.6% of the total gross industrial product at about 
25%. In the same period, small and low-tech companies, economically free from the plan’s 
economy and managed in function of the local market, increased from 22.4% to 35-40%. 
Considerable is the development of private and foreign-owned enterprises since the 
nineties, which, of course, have settled in the most innovative and technologically 
advanced sectors of the market. These ranged from a modest 4.4% in 1990 to a more 
robust 17.9% in 1997 (we do not have the latest data available) but it is reasonable to 
assume that later this sector has recorded a real boom given the inflow huge foreign capital 
of recent years. The significant figure is that, in addition to traditional manufacturing 
sectors (especially textiles where there is the largest world production), China is 
developing considerably in the fields of mechanics, transportation, chemicals and food. If 
the silk, cotton and wool industry are in trouble due to product quality still lower than that 
of the most advanced countries and the lack of the centrally administered price regime (in 
September 1999 the government abolished the price guaranteed for cotton production), 
high tech industry marks important developments giving a particular connotation to the 
growth of the economy by the fact that beside the traditional sectors of capitalist 
development, with low organic composition of capital, coexist technologically advanced 
sectors who can compete well on the international market. While the former bases the 
success of their exports basically on lower production costs due to wages significantly 
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lower than those of competitors, the latter may also have a much higher product quality.229 
Consumption development also highlights the peculiarities of Chinese development; for 
example, in the country there is a progressive diffusion of fixed telephony (still limited to 
high-income consumers, mostly resident in cities), alongside the mobile one, based on the 
use of the most advanced mobile phones. Consumption today, especially in cities, is a good 
indicator of this phenomenon: the so-called four luxuries of the Maoist period (watch, 
bicycle, radio, and sewing machine) replaced the current seven televisions by color 
television, video recorder, refrigerator, washing machine, phone, camera and cell phone. 
So, alongside a backward, low-consumption, low-value economy, especially in rural areas, 
there is an ever-growing economy in cities that is more like the Western economy. 
 
 
3.2.2 Development’s reasons 
First of all, economic reforms. In 1978 Deng Xiaoping’s reform plan was announced. It is 
a program run from above, by the Communist Party, to introduce the free market into the 
Chinese economy. In practice, this is to reduce the economic area managed by the plan and 
controlled by the state that holds it fully, to progressively increase the free market and 
businesses held by collective, individual and strong foreign capital. The program is started 
starting from the rural areas where the de-collectivization of agricultural enterprises is 
realized, returning to the family as the core of production. Alongside this, three special 
economic zones (Sez) are created in Guangdong (Shenzen, near Hong Kong, Zhuhai, near 
Macao and Shantou) and one in Fujian (Xiamen, near Taiwan). This is the open door 
policy that wants to make the country available for foreign capital investment, a policy that 
is articulated at various points and that it intends to engage in intense commercial, financial 
and industrial relations with the major powers of the world. The project envisages the 
experimentation of these relationships in the Sez and then progressively extends them to 
wide areas throughout the country. Of course, many facilities are granted to foreign 
capitals, including the main taxation, which provides for corporate taxation reduced to 10% 
at the same time as the government’s absolute commitment to not proceed to any 
confiscation and intrusion into corporate management. Subsequently, in 1992, the 
agreement on the annulment of the expiry date of joint ventures (which after a certain 
number of years the Chinese state could become the owner of the company) and the right 																																																								229	See the interesting article on Xian's Technology Park on Il Sole24Ore of November 18th, 2004.	
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to appoint the presidency of the board of administration by the government. To other 
companies, they agreed to accept the rules of the market, with a tax rate of 15%. 
Sez’ economic success drives the extension and intensification of the liberalization 
program. The second phase of the reforms takes place starting in 1984 and involves urban 
areas: the inhabitants of the cities are granted what they had been given to peasants in 
1978, namely the freedom to engage in commercial activities and to start up a family 
business. In state companies, however, attempts to introduce the principle of managerial 
responsibility by introducing the figure of the professional manager who would have to 
replace the centrally appointed bureaucrat in different business directions. Only a decade 
later, the reform of state-owned enterprises becomes more pronounced. In 1993, the 
Constitution was amended. The concept of free-marketed socialism is officially introduced, 
which mulled the planned socialist economy. In practice, economic categories, typical of 
liberal capitalism, are declared socialist, which have been adopted by the reform program 
justifying them with the necessity of developing the country and constitutionally affirms 
the principle of the responsibility of management of enterprises and farms to link the 
income individual to the company's economic results. In the same year, tax reform began 
to adapt the taxation system to the spirit of deregulation. The fiscal disbursement, which is 
no longer rigidly centralized, is divided into three levels of competence: central, regional 
and local. In spite of this, and this evidence shows that behind the reforms there is a bit of 
interdependent contention for the appropriation of wealth, the central government, in 
exchange for greater tax autonomy of the periphery, reserves with a special measure 60% 
of the tax revenue overall rising from the previous 38%. At the same time, the VAT is 
raised from 9 to 17%. 
The results of the reforms are surprising; China’s trade flows with the rest of the world are 
rising dramatically, recording a surplus of $16.7 billion in 1995, 12.3 billion in 1996, 40.3 
billion in 1997 (the year in which the Asian financial crisis exploded), 42,8 billion in 1998 
and only 29.16 billion in 1999, an abnormal year in which imports (+18.2%) increase in 
exports (+6.1%) due to a sharp increase in high-consumption goods tech market in the 
domestic market. In summary, the share of Chinese exports in the world has risen from 1% 
in 1950 to 5% in 2002. In the same year, if trade flows between China, the USA, Japan and 
Europe are considered, the country has in any case a surplus, particularly marked with the 
US, with which, as a result of imports for 22 billions of dollars, has exports worth $ 134 
billion. More balanced the relationship with Japan from which it imports for 53 billion and 
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exports it to 62. From Europe, however, China imports 32 billion dollars but exports 77 
billion. 
The second reason for the Chinese boom is foreign financial investment. Open door policy 
has led to a huge influx of capital around twenty years, equivalent to about a third of 
foreign investment worldwide (approximately $40 billion annually on average), two-thirds 
of which come from Asia. They are enormous figures that no country in the world has 
enjoyed to finance their own economy. 
The third reason for the development is the enormous availability of raw materials of all 
kinds and of low-cost labor. China is a very large country whose subsoil is rich in raw 
materials of all kinds, including oil, coal and natural gas, which guarantee energy supplies, 
even though, at this moment, it does not disdain to even supply it on the market 
international. Even more important is the overabundance of arms working in factories 
under inhumane exploitation with massive working hours and with wages far lower than 
those of the most advanced capitalist countries. This means a company's ability to have 
large amounts of surplus value to be reinvested at each production cycle. Here we do not 
have the space to deal with the subject in detail, but we only point to the conditions of 
intense exploitation of the forced labor force at shifts and defamation times, accidents at 
work that often ripen hundreds of lives whenever they happen, to the harm caused by the 
use of deadly pollutants used indiscriminately in production processes. This is a 
phenomenon that even remembers the wage and living conditions of that unfortunate 
working class of the first British industrial development. 
China, especially in its eastern part, today is a huge open landfill that, with its poisons, is 
poisoning the surrounding environment by even polluting the skies of the neighboring 
states. In these inhumane conditions, the Chinese proletariat leads its laborious existence 
into a state of slavery that guarantees the Chinese bourgeoisie an enormous competitive 
advantage over international competition. In the countryside it is even worse: the 
conditions of wage earners are simply extreme poverty, a poverty that deny access to the 
most elementary products of the so-called industrial economy. 
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3.2.3 China in the world market 
It has already been mentioned that China is a net importer of capital from the rest of 
the world as a country in which foreign investments are in a good position to be 
valued. We now see the trade flows between China and the most important 
economic areas. It is interesting to analyze the 2002 data, which is quite recent, 
broken down by the three main economic areas, North America, Western Europe 
and Japan (we do not have data for Asia as a whole). In North America (mainly 
US), China exports $134 billion and imports for just $22 billion; in Europe it 
exports for 77 billion and imports for 32, in Japan it exports for 62 billion and 
imports for 53 billion dollars. As you can see, almost 50% of Chinese exports are 
directed to the US, while the remaining 50% is divided between Japan and Europe 
with a certain prevalence of the latter. For imports, however, there is a certain 
balance with Japan, there is a marked imbalance with Europe and very sharp with 
the US (here for every dollar of imports there are 6 exports). So China, at least in 
traditional manufacturing sectors, is a real threat to the American industry, which is 
taking away ever-larger market shares (another sign of US decline) and is equally 
dangerous for the European one. Charging the price of Chinese competition is the 
most backward sectors of the respective industrial equipment, those with lower 
organic capital composition. China in this case is unsurpassed given the wage levels 
of its workforce, which are, for example, 3% of the US. 
If we look at a longer period, the years ranging from 1990 to 2002, we see that 
China has continued, continuing the trend in place since the fifties, to take on more 
and more importance on the world market; its exports went from just under $800 
billion annually in 1990 to about 1700 billion in 2002 with steady growth. Imports 
also followed, with lower values, the same trend, however, growing gradually less 
in exports, indicating how China goes progressively to occupy an increasingly 
important position on the world market as an exporter with economic relations that 
develop intensively in several continents. We can conclude that, with current 
growth rates, its weight in the world economy is bound to grow a lot. 
Even from a financial point of view it is necessary to find out how China is now a 
giant; we mention only a couple of situations that confirm what they said even if the 
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topic deserves a thorough discussion. At present, Japan holds about one-third 
(between 850 and 900 billion) of all dollar-denominated world currency reserves; 
China holds nearly a sixth (about 400 billion); together they account for the largest 
share of US government securities that are the countries that mainly finance and 
support, with significant daily purchases of Treasuries, the US public debt. China, at 
the end of November 2004, signed an agreement with Brazil for $100 billion in ten 
years. It is a huge figure that it will deliver to a Latin American country belonging 
to that geographic area considered by the US as its “backyard”. This is a 
demonstration of how China is able to export its financial capital in open 
competition with the American superpower and the rest of the world.230 
 
 
3.2.4 Economic and global issues 
First aspect: State-controlled state companies (still around 118,000 that absorb two-thirds 
of the total workforce, producing only about 27% of total industrial production) are not at 
all competitive and are very indebted. The government estimates that at least 30% of 
workers are in excess. This is a huge problem, which would require drastic corporate 
restructuring and massive redundancies. 
Secondly, the banking system is exposed, with rates comparable to those of other 
Southeast Asian countries, to bad debts owed by financing to state-run chronically-owned 
enterprises. At the end of 2003, the total non-performing loans (recoverable loans) of the 
banking system amounted to 17.8% of the loans granted (to understand the importance of 
the data it is known that in Italy the same period amounted to about 2%). Therefore, China 
has the problem of urgently reforming the banking system, which is easier said than done, 
as this would entail a drastic cut in funding to the state industrial sector with all the 
consequences that one can easily imagine (even if some credit limitations imposed by the 
financial authorities reduced the bad debt to 13.3% in the second quarter of 2004). 
Third appearance. The dependence of the Chinese economic system on exports to 
international markets. China, so as not to explode the problem of unemployment, both in 
cities and in the countryside, must maintain, if not increase, the current (already high) pace 
of development and therefore continue to export intensely. This means that it is 
																																																								230	Baldesserini, F. (2016). Lo sviluppo dell’economia cinese e la recente crisi.	
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dangerously exposed to the slowdown in the international economy and the internal social 
consequences that this could entail. 
Fourth appearance. The dangerous habitat that is being created between cities and 
countryside. Rural income is extremely lower than those of cities, especially coastal, which 
have been invested by the phenomenon of economic development. This means that every 
year millions of poor peasants, literally hungry and lacking in any assistance, pour into the 
metropolis looking for a job, aggravating the problem of unemployment (official 
government statistics now account for it at 8%). This, as we said before, requires that 
development rates should not diminish the burden of the social issue. 
Fifth appearance. The condition of the urban and peasant proletariat is at the limits of 
tolerance. The repudiation, with liberal economic reforms, of any form of welfares has 
eliminated virtually every social expense from the state. Everything has been privatized 
and, consequently, the essential health services (in the countryside the state has reduced to 
1 euro per capita per capita spending), social security (63% of the population, the total 
number of proletarian peasants, is not entitled to the retirement) and school are paid with 
the result that today the majority of the population, the urban and peasantry proletariat, can 
not access it. Certainly economic development has allowed the formation of a small 
wealthy bourgeoisie in the cities where private initiatives have developed, but in the face 
of this phenomenon, the condition of the proletariat as a whole has significantly worsened. 
In summary, social inequalities have been dramatically sharpened. This is a potentially 
very dangerous situation according to the same Academy of Sciences, which with its recent 
report titled “Opulent society, a new problem for China”, warned the government to pay 
attention to the problem. 
 
 
3.2.5 Political implications of Chinese development 
After this brief overview I want to highlight the main political conclusions of my analysis. 
China is becoming an economic giant able to compete increasingly on world commodity 
and capital markets and this process is likely to progress in the coming years; as a result, it 
seeks to widen its sphere of commercial and political influence in the world and first of all 
in Asia, rivaling directly with Japan; its imperialist role is destined to become more 
important and will be a problem for the US. China’s development, its transformation into 
imperialistic power able to compete with the other imperialist world poles, the US and 
Europe in the head, is part of the process of rewriting the frontiers and international 
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alliances launched in the last period, a process not yet concluded and that it still has to 
define future alliances among nations. It is another element of the threat to the US world 
domination and its international position, along with the outcome of the process of 
establishing the European imperialist pole, the international political position of Russia and 
the outcome of the destabilization process of the Middle East, is a determining factor for 
understanding the future structure of the imperialist clash. China, but we could extend the 
same speech to united Europe, is not a factor of international stabilization and pacification, 
but an element of further destabilization of the current situation, which is already 
characterized by accentuated tensions and precarious balances of traditional political 
alliances. 
China is not such a development area to reverse the economic cycle of capitalism marked 
by the structural crisis, a crisis destined to aggravate and produce its most devastating 
effects. That is, one cannot argue that capitalism finds outlets in the Chinese market to start 
a new expansion phase capable of inverting the cycle of accumulation and overcoming the 
current crisis. In fact, western capital investment is primarily investment for productions 
that are substitute for the same mother-of-mother's, productions that in China enjoy the 
great privilege of a significantly lower labor cost. In a word, what capital is going to 
produce in China, almost always the same capital stops producing it in its own country, 
giving rise to the so-called phenomenon of re-location. Therefore, the Chinese market, as 
the outlet of commodities and capital, is only one element of counter-tendency to the fall of 
the average profit rate, a counter-tendency that can only slow down this fall but not stop it. 
This is confirmed by the fact that over the last twenty years, despite the sustained growth 
of China and its openness to foreign capital, the causes of international tension and 
instability have increased and not decreased. 
China is not going to retrace the same steps as the western capitalist development through 
three industrial revolutions. In particular, its domestic market will not be characterized by a 
high-consumption economy capable of raising the Chinese proletariat’s living standards to 
the standard of the US or Europe. Its economy is predominantly exported and its ability to 
compete on international markets is based on an accentuated differential in the cost of its 
workforce; consequently, it cannot afford a marked rise in wage levels. Moreover, the 
change of the Chinese state’s role in the economy, with the consequent restructuring of 
public spending, will not only not allow the Chinese proletariat to receive the social 
services offered by Western capitalist states since the mid-twentieth century, but it will 
impose a precarious condition on it even more pronounced than it had when the economy 
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was totally centered in the hands of the state. China will increasingly be a country 
characterized by intense contradictions, first of all that of a powerful and rich bourgeoisie 
opposed to a proletariat reduced to a condition of semi-slavery. 
Chinese development is not a stimulus factor of “collaboration between peoples and 
nations”. Its exported products are substitutes for those made in other economic areas at 
higher costs and hence the Chinese economy is a threat to the economy of its importing 
countries. Thus, it compels Chinese workers with those of other nations. The export of 
financial capital follows the same laws as the western one, and consequently China, with 
the false and usual ideology of aid to arrears and international cooperation, lends money 
simply for the purpose of obtaining a financial annuity and widening the its own political 
influence. With this, it contributes to the robbery carried out by large banks and financial 
institutions to the detriment of the proletarians of the backward countries who thus have to 
produce with their work the surplus value needed to remunerate in the form of interest the 
capital lent to their states. In summary, China contributes to developing nationalism, a 
powerful ideological weapon to counter the proletarians of the various countries and bring 
them to the general disaster caused by economic competition and ultimately military 
clashes.231 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								231	Caccavaio, M. (2009). The Effects of the Reform of the Chinese Financial System. Equilibri, 13(2), 185-
192.	
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3.3 China and the responsibility of power  
Realists believe that liberal arguments for engaging China are based on shaky ground. It is 
true that economic interdependence between China and the world economy is intensifying. 
Economic interdependence alone, however, is insufficient to change Chinese behavior 
decisively and is at the mercy of Chinese leadership’s cold calculation of cost and benefit. 
It is also true that China’s participation in regional and global international institutions is 
growing. Regional international institutions in East Asia, in contrast to Europe, are, 
however, too weak to exert any real influence in modifying China’s security policy and 
behavior in the region. While engagement policy may encourage the Chinese government 
to liberalize internally, other domestic variables such as succession politics and the 
vulnerability of the political system are more decisive of the future of China’s 
democratization. 
The contributors share many common concerns with the current debates. We also believe 
that the rise of China is central to the future shape of the regional and global international 
order and China’s international behavior will change as its power grows. Further, China’s 
growing power needs to be managed carefully to minimize its disruptive effect on the 
international system. We differ, however, on the assessment that the rising Chinese power 
is necessarily and inevitably destabilizing and threatening. A crucial variable here is 
China’s attitudes towards the responsibility of its rising power in international relations. 
Does China view power as a means or an end, and a means to what end? What is the 
conception among Chinese elites of China’s responsible role in international relations? As 
a rising power, does China share with other Great Powers similar understanding of their 
responsibility for managing the international system? Where is the gap? How can 
international society induce a rising China to play an increasingly responsible part in the 
emerging international order? Answers to these questions, we argue, have important 
bearings on our understanding of the implications of an ascendant China for the future 
international order. 
We seek therefore to join the debate by investigating this missing dimension in the current 
discourse on the rise of China and to invigorate the debate by taking us beyond the sterile 
discussions of a rising power vis-a-vis a pre-eminent power. Regardless of one’s 
theoretical preferences, the role of theory is to aid in understanding and explaining. There 
are two additional reasons why this line of enquiry should be pursued. First, China has 
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often been stigmatized as an irresponsible power and a “rogue state”232.  
Evidence drawn from, for example, China’s evolving arms control policy and its policies 
towards North Korean nuclear and missile programs, as well as its behavior during the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997-98 and its missile exercise in the Taiwan Strait in 1996 is, 
however, inconclusive and contradictory at best. Such contradictions need to be analyzed 
carefully. Second, unique among Great Powers, China has developed a set of uneasy and 
unusual social relations with global international society. Our investigations must be 
embedded in that social context and are to contribute to our understanding of that social 
context. 
Power exacts responsibility. Even in the anarchical and hierarchical world of international 
relations, this conventional wisdom remains unpalatably true.233 Hedley Bull 234 once 
explicitly argued that it is precisely because of the embedded inequality of states in terms 
of power in international society that Great Powers enjoy special rights and privileges at 
the same time when they assume duties and managerial responsibilities for maintaining and 
sustaining international order. Great Powers also have a greater stake in the existing 
international order.235 Bull argues more specifically that Great Powers contribute to 
international order by managing their relations with each other; and by exploiting their 
preponderance in such a way as to impart a degree of central direction to the affairs of 
international society as a whole. The persistent vitality of G7 (now G8), the 
uncompromising privileged status of the exclusive nuclear powers club, and recent debates 
over the reform of the United Nations Security Council are testimony of the continued 
relevance of Bull’s arguments after the end of the Cold War. Two points need to be made 
here, though. First, the concept of the responsibility of Great Powers is fundamentally 
different from that of the state responsibility. Whereas state responsibility is legally and 
explicitly defined in international law (for example the responsibility to protect aliens and 
their property),236 Great Power responsibility is politically as well as morally postulated 																																																								232	For a caricature of different perceptions of China, see David Lampton, China, Foreign Policy, no.l I0 
(Spring 1998), 13-27. 233	For the most recent debate, see Alberto R. Coli, Introduction: American power and responsibility in a 
new century, Ethics and International Affairs, 14, (2000), 3-1 0; and Tony Smith, Morality and the use of 
force in a unipolar world: the “Wilsonian moment”? Ethics and International Affairs, 14, (2000), 11-22. 234	Was Professor of International Relations at the Australian National University, the London School of 
Economics and the University of Oxford.	235	See Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: a study of order in world politics (London: Macmillan, 1977), 
200-29. 236	For state responsibility in international law, see, among others, lan Brownlie, System of the Law of 
Nations: state responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983).  
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implicitly rather than explicitly. It rests on shared understanding principally among Great 
Powers. Collective expectations of international society therefore underlie the 
conceptualization of the responsibility of power. Second, in his discourse on the duties and 
stake of Great Powers in international order (largely conducted in the 1970s), Bull dearly 
privileges order over justice in world politics, although he is not entirely comfortable, and 
is sometimes ambivalent, as to where he situates justice vis-a-vis order. As lan Harris has 
noted, Bull’s ambiguity in his treatment of justice results from lack of an enquiry into 
international ethics.237 Further, Bull’s discussions suggest that the rights and duties of 
Great Powers are mostly, if not exclusively, structurally determined. There is little 
elaboration in Bull’s discussions about how the domestic constitutions of individual states 
shape their attitudes towards power and their understanding of the responsibility associated 
with it. Discourse on the responsibility of power, which is deprived of normative content 
and blind to the role of domestic institutions and ideas can no longer be either justified or 
left unchallenged. 
The responsibility of power, arguably one of the most fundamental concepts in 
international relations, remains one of the most underexplored in international relations 
theory. We are not here, however, to launch a study of the ethics of power and 
responsibility in international relations. Important as it is, it belongs to an entirely different 
enquiry.238 Our purpose here is simply to highlight how notoriously difficult ethical 
considerations of power and responsibility can be and why they are likely to remain 
contentious and controversial. Ethical judgment of how and whether a power fulfills its 
responsibility is ultimately subjective. Difficulties in investigating Chinese behavior in this 
kind of analytical construct are further amplified by the differences in Chinese 
philosophical tradition and political culture that sustain China’s historical assumptions 
about power and responsibility.239 Whereas a system of legal and institutional checks on 
the exercise of political power has been developed in the Western political tradition, the 
Chinese political tradition has relied more on the ethical and moral character of rulers to 																																																								237	Ian Harris, Order and Justice in The Anarchical Society, International Affairs, 69, no.4 (October 1993), 
725-41.  238 	See for example, Daniel Warner, An Ethic of Responsibility in International Relations (Boulder, 
Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1991); and Stanley Hoffmann, Political ethics of international relations, Seventh 
Morgenthau Memorial Lecture on Ethics and Foreign Policy (New York: Carnegie Council on Ethics and 
Foreign Affairs, 1988).  239	For a succinct and vigorous discussion of historical assumptions of power and responsibility in the 
Western political thought, see Leonard Krieger, Power and Responsibility: historical assumptions, in 
Leonard Krieger and Fritz Stern (eds), The Responsibility of Power: historical essays (London: Macmillan, 
1967), 3-33.  
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restrain the abuse of power. 
This is not in the least the only complexity to consider. Chinese revolutions in the 
twentieth century and China’s turbulent relations with other Great Powers have also 
conditioned its understanding of the responsibility of power. In particular, China’s unique 
experience of socialization into international life in the second half of the twentieth century 
has helped produce a special set of social relations between China and the changing 
international society. As Yongjin Zhang argued, Revolutionary China’s relationship with 
international society in the 1950s and the 1960s is best characterized as alienation rather 
than isolation.240 It is not hard to imagine why Revolutionary China did not feel obliged to 
take any social responsibility to an international society of which it was not regarded part 
and in which its legitimacy was tenaciously denied. In this context, it also makes perfect 
sense to talk about how and whether China is (re) joining the world.241 
Yet, China’s position in international society remains a curious one. China has been a 
declared nuclear power for almost forty years and has been one of the Permanent 5 in the 
United Nations Security Council for more than thirty years. It is now universally regarded 
as a rising power. Its membership in the Great Power club is nevertheless at best 
contentious. In the post Cold War international society, inference more often than direct 
reference is made to China being a “rogue state”. China’s full membership in international 
society continues to be questioned, but from a different angle. Human rights and 
democratization are now the litmus test, as Rosemary Foot argues in her chapter.242 As the 
lingering Westphalia system becomes less tolerant of political heterogeneity,243 the nature 
of the domestic political system, democratic process and institutional set-up become 
increasingly significant in defining not only the domestic legitimacy but also the 																																																								240	See Yongjin Zhang, China in International Society since 1949: alienation and beyond (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1998).  241	Oksenberg and Economy, China Joins the World, is the most recent example.  242	This follows a similar line of arguments by Andrew Nathan and Strobe Talbott, among others. Andrew 
Nathan, for example, argues that China should “behave in a way [in terms of human rights] that does not 
offend the conscience of that [international] community” in return for the benefits of full membership. 
Andrew Nathan, Influencing human rights in China, in James R. Lilley and W L. Willkie (eds.), Beyond 
MFN: trade with China and American interests, 80. Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State of the first 
Clinton Administration was more explicit, stating, “We believe China cannot be a full partner in the world 
community until it respects international obligations and agreements on human rights, free and fair trading 
practices, and strict controls on the export of destabilizing weapons and military technology”. Strobe Talbott, 
“US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott’s speech to the Japan National Press Club on 25 January 1995” 
(Washington, DC: US Department of State, 1995). For theoretical arguments on human rights as legitimizing 
norms, see Jack Donnelly, Human rights: the new standard of civilization? International Affairs, 74, no. I 
January  1998), 1-23.  243	See K.J. Holsti, Dealing with dictators: Westphalia and American  strategies, International Relations of 
the Asia-Pacific, I (200 I), 51-65.  
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international legitimacy of a particular regime. 
 
 
3.3.1 Responsibility: an evolving concept and a moving goalpost 
The idea of “responsible power” began to take hold in Chinese thinking roughly in the 
mid-1990s, and Chinese scholars seem to agree that it became China’s national self-
identification in 1997.244 Scholars have emphasized that certain ideas acquire their appeal 
because of their utility as “road maps” in guiding policy.245 But sometimes ambiguity 
explains their attractiveness as well. In the case of “responsible power”, its meaning was 
never officially spelled out. U.S. politicians never clarified specific yardsticks on specific 
issues, although this did not prevent academics from trying to make explicit the U.S. 
conditions on its China policy.246 In fact, demand on Chinese responsibility marked a 
retreat from Clinton’s earlier linkage policy, explicitly listing concrete Chinese 
concessions for renewal of its most-favored nation (MFN) status. Apart from academic 
exercises in clarifying what China had to do, the United States never specified a set of a 
priori obligations expected of China. 
Its ambiguity notwithstanding, expectations, both domestic and international, for self-
change in Chinese foreign policy in line with international standards were loud and clear. 
For instance, domestic institutional reforms were a requirement for membership in the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). Reformist leaders led by Premier Zhu Rongji had to 
restructure China’s state-owned enterprises, many functions of the state, and the domestic 
legal framework in order to both comply with the international trade regime and compete 
in the global marketplace. Improving China’s image as a trusted regional player in Asia 
and as an international citizen was imperative if China was to shed some of the fear and 
suspicion gathering toward it from the outside world. To credibly project a peaceful and 
constructive image, as Harvard professor Iain Johnston argues, China needed to show it 
cared about its international standing and played by the rules. Thus, “the ‘responsible 
major power’ identity discourse has had a distinctively multilaterals and status quo content 
to it.” 247  Indeed, the most visible manifestation lay in China’s attitude toward 																																																								
244  Li Nan, Summary of the China’s International Responsibility Concept Seminar, Dangdai Yatai, 
November 20, 2008, pp. 150–155. Open Source Center. 245	Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds. Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and 
Political Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). 246	James Shinn, ed., Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China (New York: Council on Foreign 
Relations, 1996). 247 	Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980–2000 (Princeton: 
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multilateralism -the swift turnabout from anti- to pro-multilateralism in the late 1990s was 
one of the few radical shifts in contemporary Chinese foreign policy. 
The 1997–98 Asian financial crisis became a seminal event. It crystallized for the Chinese 
leadership what responsibility meant in terms of expectations and benefits. Amidst extreme 
volatility in currency values in East Asia, the right thing for Beijing to do was to not 
devalue the Renminbi (RMB), even if this meant acting against its own immediate interest 
in keeping its export sectors competitive. And it did exactly that -did not devalue the 
RMB- thereby helping stabilize the regional economy. Moreover, unprecedentedly, China 
offered its share of financial support for struggling neighboring countries in tandem with 
international rescue efforts. Because the crisis concerned neighboring economies, the idea 
of responsibility became more real and pertinent to China than other seemingly remote 
global concerns. The fact that Chinese acts were a response to its distressed neighbors also 
internationalized “responsibility” beyond a call from the United States. In this case, 
responsibility ultimately served China’s interest, earned it praise, and enhanced its regional 
influence. As a result, the idea spawned a whole spate of concepts and refrains reflecting 
not only a fresh spirit of multilateralism but also a new worldview befitting its deepening 
globalization.248 
So, the Chinese did not just passively accept a role assigned by the reigning Western 
powers. Instead, China took “responsible power” as a calling to act as an active participant 
in world affairs, challenging the long-standing self-portrayal as a victim of the strong. The 
idea also suggested that the threats to China transcended nation-states, and so did solutions 
to them. This effectively eroded its traditional notion of rigid sovereignty. Reflecting the 
tremendous inroads the idea had made into China’s worldview, the liberal scholar Wang 
Yizhou openly advocated that China’s national interest should include attentiveness to 
international responsibilities, in addition to domestic self-strengthening reforms and 
defense of territorial integrity.249 
Around the mid-1990s, China officially identified itself as a “responsible power” because 
of U.S. power and pressure. When Europe, Japan, and the rest of Asia immediately joined 
the call in their engagement policies toward China, it effectively turned the U.S. objective 																																																																																																																																																																								
Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 148. 248	Pang Zhongying, Zhongguo De Yazhou Zhanlue: Linghuo De Duobian Zhuyi [China’s Asia Strategy: 
Flexible Multilateralism], in Niu Jun, ed., Zhongguo Waijiao Juan [China’s Foreign Affairs] (Beijing: New 
World Press, 2007), pp. 132–42; Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and 
International Security (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), pp. 119–128.  249	Wang Yizhou, Tanxun Quanqiu Zhuyi Guoji Guanxi [Exploring International Relations from a Globalist 
Perspective] (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 2005), pp. 340–357.  
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into a collectivized international demand. The Asian financial crisis and the requirements 
for China’s impending WTO membership, which it eventually obtained in 2001, 
crystallized for the Chinese leadership that China’s domestic fate was deeply tied to the 
world. 
China’s self-identification as a “responsible power” was, ironically, simultaneously clear 
and ambiguous. It was clear in the sense that China had to make changes in order to clean 
up its tarnished international image after the bloody Tiananmen Square crackdown in 
1989, and reforms in line with international expectations represented the best opportunity 
to do that. Domestically, people like Premier Zhu Rongji leveraged China’s bid for WTO 
membership in order to push for painful economic restructuring and institutional reforms. 
But the “responsibility” moniker also left much room for the Chinese leadership to 
interpret the concept to suit its own agenda, thus the ambiguity. 
In dealing with the outside world, leaders separated “responsibility” from domestic 
politics. Acting as a “responsible power” gave no license for international interferences on 
China’s human rights practice, nor did it suggest the Chinese government’s tolerance with 
the slightest inkling of a color revolution in the country. It contained no risk of 
jeopardizing the legitimacy of the Communist Party-state. Rather, international 
responsibility could potentially compensate for political differences with the West, 
differences that historically were a major source of strategic fissure between great 
powers.250 To the extent that responsibility involved China’s restraint and compliance 
within the international status quo, it became both a credible signal and a new launch pad 
for China’s “peaceful rise.” All in all, during the first phase from about 1989-1998, 
Chinese conception of national interest turned open and porous enough to seamlessly 
incorporate “international responsibility” as its new identity. Responsibility facilitated 
China’s ascent in status. It suited the reformist leadership’s agenda of reforms and 
economic globalization. Striving to become a “responsible power” helped deepen China’s 
globalization, reduce fear of Chinese power, and steer active participation in the existing 
world order as the overriding objective in Chinese foreign policy. “International 
responsibility” might have started out as a foreign import. Established powers or the 
Chinese never spelled out the terms of “responsibility”. As Yongjin Zhang and Greg 
Austin point out, “Great Power responsibility is politically as well as morally postulated 
																																																								250	Mark Haas, The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789–1989 (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2005).  
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implicitly rather than explicitly.” 251  Through political acumen and internalization, 
reformist Chinese leaders were able to adapt the “international responsibility” idea to serve 
Chinese needs and help navigate the significant confusion and uncertainty it faced in both 
domestic and international politics during this tumultuous time. 
As such, it became self-identification and a choice rather than surrendering to foreign 
demands. But, to the extent that the idea put a premium on compliance with international 
norms, embracing it did represent arguably the most “liberal” moment in Chinese foreign 
policy. Chinese officials took for granted that prevailing global institutions and norms were 
a critical part of the frame of reference, if not the guide, for Chinese domestic reform and 
its ongoing transition. Chinese leaders and analysts, conversely, often openly resented and 
resisted the unfairness of the Western-dominated international hierarchy. But they also 
believed a “multipolar world” could only slowly evolve from the existing order. And for 
the foreseeable future at the turn of the century, being a better citizen of the international 
society served its agenda at home and abroad. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
251 Yongjin Zhang and Greg Austin, Introduction, in Yongjin Zhang and Greg Austin, eds., Power and 
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3.4 Chinese Financial System 
The strong economic growth of China, which began with the implementation of the first 
reforms in 1979 and still in progress, is attracting increasing interest from both scholars 
and policy makers. Numerous works are concerned with the analysis of “takeoff” and the 
development of the Asian colossus (see Sachs-Woo, 1997). However, in the face of this 
impressive literature that has focused mainly on the “real sphere”, the contributions that 
investigated the “financial sphere” and especially the structure of its financial system are 
still relatively scarce (see Boyreau-Debray and Jin-Wei, 2005). Recent contributions by 
Allen et al. (2002; 2005; 2007) are therefore particularly important and constitute, to date, 
a benchmark for analyzing the financial system in China. According to the analysis carried 
out in these works, the Chinese economy would be a real puzzle: even though it has a 
financial system that is still not very developed and poorly market-oriented, it has recorded 
very impressive growth rates.252 More specifically, Allen and his associates correctly 
emphasize the role played by informal funding channels -which would have been partially 
replaced by traditional ones in favoring the strong development of companies belonging to 
the so-called hybrid sector253 (non-state, non-listed firms). 
Taking these observations, I try to show how China has significant specificities also for the 
step-by-step approach that has followed in the implementation of the reforms that have 
invested its financial system.254 This contrasts with traditional shock or “big bang” therapy 
(see McMillan-Naughton, 1992; Chen-Jefferson-Singh, 1992; McMillan, 1994; Stiglitz, 
2002), adopted by other emerging or transition countries,255 based on principles inspired by 
the so-called Washington Consensus, which, as we know, prescribe the immediate and 
indiscriminate introduction of market-oriented systems through massive liberalizations and 
privatizations. 
The gradual analysis, in the implementation of the financial structure reforms, highlights 
the evolution and development of the latter over the years, and compares China with the 
so-called “bank-based systems” and “market-based”. As I will try to demonstrate, although 
it has guaranteed a certain macroeconomic stability so far, the reform process of the 																																																								252	See Yueh, China Statistical Yearbook.	253	This is a very varied sector, consisting of (see Allen et al., 2007): 1) private non-listed companies 
controlled by both Chinese citizens and investors from Taiwan or Hong Kong and foreign companies or 
citizens; 2) collective companies, where property is often a mix between public (government and local 
institutions) and private.	254	As is well known, “gradualism” has characterized most of the reforms that have undergone the Chinese 
economic system (see McMillan-Naughton, 1992).	255	As Russia and the ex-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe.	
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Chinese financial system has not prevented problems of financial fragility in the banking 
sector and corporate governance for businesses that could threaten, in the absence of 
appropriate interventions, the sustainability of growth in the future (see OECD 09/2005, 
Yueh, 2004). 
 
 
3.4.1 Importance of the financial structure 
The financial structure is traditionally a mix of tools, institutions and markets that 
characterize the country’s financial system.256 The consideration of the latter becomes 
crucial as it moves away from the “ideal world” of Arrow-Debreu257 to analyze a concrete 
economy characterized by incomplete markets, the presence of large transaction costs and 
imperfect and asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders enterprise: all 
aspects particularly evident when considering an emerging and transition country like 
China.258 In order to limit the problems mentioned above, the financial system performs, as 
is well known, several functions (Levine, 1997): saves money; permits diversification and 
risk sharing; produces and disseminates information; enables managers to monitor and 
improve corporate governance; facilitates investment and innovation. From the structure of 
the financial system, therefore, both the efficiency of resource allocation and the stability 
of the economic system depend (see Allen et al., 2004) and hence the growth of an 
economy.259  
As is well known, the literature on comparative financial systems is still characterized by 
the presence of the classic dichotomy (see Allen-Gale, 1999; Levine, 2002), which 
contrasts the bank-based view to the market-based view. The two types of financial 
structure referred to above would in fact be alternatives having applied in very different 
economic systems, such as Germany and Japan (bank-based systems), and the United 
States and the United Kingdom (market-based systems) other. 																																																								256	This is still true despite the process of strong globalization that has occurred in recent years: in fact, many 
countries still face substantial differences from the point of view of the structure of the financial system (see 
Allen et al., 2004).	257	In a perfect capital market, the financial structure is irrelevant to actual decisions -as Modigliani and 
Miller show in their famous theorem of 1958- furthermore, in this context, the role of the financial system 
would be suppressed by the actions of the same investors (cf. Campbell-Cracaw, 1980; Fazzari-
Papadimitriou, 1992).	258	The degree of uncertainty and the “imperfections” within the economic system obviously characterize 
both developed and developing countries. However, as I will try to show by referring to China, in the case of 
emerging countries these aspects are particularly relevant especially during early stages of development (see 
Mishkin, 1996; Sau, 2003).	259	Indeed, there are models of “endogenous” growth that consider the role of the financial system (see 
Pagano, 1993).	
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Bank-based viewers emphasize, in particular, how a monetary economy260 develops thanks 
mainly to the coordination action guaranteed by the presence of institutions, among which 
credit firms play a decisive role. In fact, banks play a very special and central information 
role (Stiglitz, 1985): they are “social accountants”; carry out the activity of “screening” of 
potential customers and that of “monitoring” towards those who obtain credit; finally, they 
not only acquire but also produce information.261 Banks would therefore be the most 
efficient resource allocation intermediaries because, better than others, they minimize costs 
due to the presence of asymmetric information (i.e., the standard debt contract is optimal, 
see Diamond, 1991).262 
Market-based viewers, however, emphasize the virtues of particularly wide, widespread 
financial markets (equity, bonds and private equity) (Boot-Thakor, 1997; Allen-Gale, 
1999). In fact, they favor the financing and the creation of new businesses and hence the 
most innovative projects (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993); improve corporate control by 
creating, through the possibility of takeovers, disincentives to the opportunistic action of 
managers (Jensen-Murphy, 1990); finally, they can avoid many of the problems related to 
the relationship-based relationship that exists between banks and businesses and which can 
generate collusive behaviors that can damage other creditors and prevent efficient 
corporate governance (Wenger- Kaserer, 1998). 
Most recent “financial services views”, however, tend to show that both systems (bank-
based or market-based) have both advantages and disadvantages and therefore cannot be 
asserted (see Levine, 2002)) that a system universally better than another.263 According to 
the “financial service view” (Merton and Bodie, 1995; Levine, 1997), bank-based and 
market-based systems would be complementary rather than alternative in favor of efficient 
resource allocation and economic growth. In this way, the clear contrast between the two 																																																								260	That is, it is based on a complex network of financial and debt interrelations in a context characterized by 
imperfect and asymmetric information.	261	The opening up of credit to an entrepreneur is in fact a “signal” given to the firm of trustworthiness of the 
same, which promotes the emergence of long-term relationships between the firm itself, its customers and its 
suppliers (Boot et al. 1993, Boot-Thakor, 1997). The bank-based view specifically states that these functions 
can not be carried out by “securities” markets due to the occurrence of the “free rider” phenomenon (cf. 
Stiglitz, 1985): the acquisition and sale of information would in fact to be prevented by the possibility that 
someone may appropriate information without any cost. This means that the two phenomena of moral hazard 
and adverse selection are difficult to eliminate.	262	The analysis of the “information” role of banks has tried to give endogenous foundations to the presence 
of these intermediaries. Their function would not give rise to the “free rider” phenomenon because they 
provide for internal debt contracts, which provide that the creditor can access or even participate in the 
decision-making process, but that these activities cannot be negotiable.	263	Both bank-based systems (Germany and Japan) and market-based ones (USA and UK) recorded fairly 
moderate growth rates.	
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approaches is overcome and the role of financial markets and banks is emphasized in 
limiting the imperfections and coordination problems present in a given economic system. 
In this regard, Tadesse (2002, 2005) shows how the optimal financial structure should not 
be considered statically as it depends on a set of factors specific to the country over a given 
period such as: 
a) The development of institutions and the legal system within which banks and markets 
operate (see La Porta et al., 2002, Rajan-Zingales, 1998); 
b) Incompleteness and imperfections in the economic system (see Boot-Thakor, 1997); 
c) The “technological” characteristics of enterprises that need to be funded, that is, the 
structure of its industrial system (i.e. traditional firms versus innovative companies, see  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Allen-Gale, 1999, Rajan-Zingales, 2001). 
Taking this perspective into account, during the transition phase from planning to the 
market economy, China is in a critical situation, both in terms of the first aspect and the 
second (see McMillan-Naughton, 1992). But instead of the structure of its industrial 
system, it was mainly characterized by manufacturing firms. According to the analysis of 
Tadesse (2002) above, if a country has these characteristics it would be preferable to first 
Market Oriented System 
Figure 2. Sourch: Tadesse (2005).  
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strengthen a bank-based system264 and only when the specific factors mentioned above 
have improved and/or changed, point towards a market-based financial system (see Figure 
2). 
This approach is, in my view, particularly significant as it allows us to understand why 
China has a still rather bank-based financial system and moves only gradually towards 
effective strengthening of national financial markets and an opening to international ones. 
		
3.4.2 Gradual reform of Chinese financial system 
This paragraph focuses on the origins and development of the complex of intermediaries 
and markets that characterize the Chinese financial system. As I will try to show, this is an 
evolution that is still in place and that has been initiated by the implementation of gradual 
reforms since the end of the 1970s to the present. 
With regard to the banking system, it is necessary to take a step backwards and recall how 
the advent of the People’s Republic of China (1949)265 resulted in the entire nationalization 
of firms and financial institutions, in a single year. For this reason, almost thirty years 
(1950-1978), the financial system of this country has been anchored to one and only bank: 
the People’s Bank of China. The latter was entirely state-owned and was, until 1978, 
directly controlled by the Ministry of Finance. By acting as a central bank and commercial 
bank, the People’s Bank of China was in the privileged position of controlling almost all 
the financial transactions that took place in the country. 
Thus, 1978 is a kind of “watershed” for the analysis of China’s financial structure, on the 
one hand, it coincides with the “divorce” between the People’s Bank of China and the 
Ministry of Finance (which made the former an entity partially autonomous being kept 
under government supervision); on the other hand, the period after 1978 is important for 
the transformations in the credit system because it was the birth of three new state-owned 
banks that had been abandoned by the People’s Bank of China, many of its commercial 
banking functions. The three new state-owned banks were: the Agricultural Bank of China, 
which would direct its activities to support agricultural and rural areas; the Bank of China, 
																																																								264	The analysis carried out by Tadesse (2002) considers 36 countries, distinct according to the development 
of their respective financial and legal systems. He shows that if specific factors are characterized by a low 
development of these indicators and by highly accentuated agency issues (typical features of emerging 
countries), it is preferable to first strengthen a bank-based system.	265	Before 1949 China had a rather developed financial system that revolved around Shanghai.	
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which would specialize in currency transactions; the People’s Construction Bank of China, 
which would resort to the financing of real estate investments. 
These three major banks joined a fourth only in 1984: the Industrial and Commercial Bank 
of China, which completely eliminated the business activities that still depended on the 
People’s Bank of China, making it a full-fledged Central Bank and giving rise to the so-
called “Big Four” state-owned credit bloc, which, as will be shown, is the core of China’s 
banking system (see Chiarlone-Amighini, 2007). 
During the second half of the eighties, new local financial intermediaries such as Regional 
Banks (partly owned by the local government) began to develop; the Rural Credit 
Cooperatives network under the supervision of Agricultural Bank, and finally Urban Credit 
Cooperatives; even the first non-bank intermediaries and the first foreign financial 
institutions began to emerge in recent years but their function was rather limited. 
Considering the period (2000-05), it can be seen how the so-called Big-Fours dominated266 
within the Chinese banking system, both for the volume of total assets (RMB 16,932 
billion in 2004, of which 10,086 billion), which in terms of deposits (14,412 billion RMB 
in 2004) having recorded higher values than other types of private, foreign and local 
commercial banks. This fact has, for a long time, led to the presence of a low degree of 
competition within the banking system. Comparative analysis carried out by Demirguc-
Levine (2001) for China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan shows that, for the majority of 
the 1990s, the Big Four concentration index -assets on the total- proved to be around 91% 
and was the highest compared to the Asian countries considered. 
However, the entry of new private banks and new intermediaries has gradually pushed for 
greater competition since 1997 (see Allen et al. 2007). Banking reform, implemented under 
the supervision of the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), then followed a 
mixed strategy 267  between the so-called “rehabilitation approach” and “new entry 
approach” (cf. Claessens, 1996), preferring, however, between the two, the first. China has, 
as seen above, primarily aimed at strengthening the state-owned banking sector (i.e. 
rehabilitation approach for the big four) before enabling new national and foreign banks 
(i.e. new-entry approach) and thus increasing the degree of competition in the intermediary 
sector. 
																																																								266	The fact that the Big-Fours have had an almost exclusive weight in lending and collecting deposits does 
not mean that they have been also efficient in allocating resources.	267	In this sense, the reform of the Chinese banking system is very different from that adopted in Russia and 
Estonia, and is more similar to that implemented in Hungary and Poland.	
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The capital market has only begun to be operational since the 1990s, even if the launch as 
the second “pillar” of the financial system, distinct from the credit market, can also be 
traced back to 1978 (cf. Gordon-Wei Li, 1999). Before that, the small savings268 were 
deposited at the People’s Bank of China. The elimination of part of the constraints on 
private property, resulting in numerous private or quasi-private companies, has allowed the 
savings to gradually find an alternative use to deposit with the only bank. 
As has been mentioned the official activation of the two “national” stock market, the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) took place in the 
early 1990s, respectively in 1990 and 1991. They will then be joined by Hong Kong269 
Stock Exchange (HKSE), where larger firms are listed and more innovative. 
During the 1990s, however, the Chinese capital market developed rapidly, but from the 
comparison with the most important world equity markets (see Allen et al., 2005), in terms 
of total capitalization at the end of 2002, it was only eleventh (Mainland China: SHSE and 
SZSE); while it was tenth with regard to HKSE. However, the two Chinese stock markets 
were considered jointly and already in 2002, fifth, preceded by the United States, Japan, 
the United Kingdom and France.270 In terms of the concentration index (fraction of the 
stock market capitalization of larger firms), China had fairly low values of 29.4%, i.e. less 
than half of Japan; while the turnover index is the highest (224%)271 compared to other 
developed countries, demonstrating that stock market trading was very frequent. 
As is well known, one of the peculiar characteristics of the Chinese stock market, when 
faced with other international financial markets, is the high segmentation: there are indeed 
many types of actions (see Gordon-Li, 1999; Beltratti-Caccavaio, 2006; Allen et al. 2005). 
A first method of classification, which is particularly useful for the comments that will be 
made about the impact of this market within the financial system, concerns the distinction 
between tradable shares (TS) and non-tradable shares (NTS). While the first can be traded 
freely, NTSs (State Shares and Restricted Institutional Shares) can only be sold privately 
and are therefore not subject to public bargaining on the market. The latter were issued in 
favor of the founders and employees of a state-owned company and have the dual function 
of preventing the State from being removed and maximizing the subsequent listing through 																																																								268	In 1978, roughly 6% of GDP (State Statistical Bureau, 1997).	269	Hong Kong has remained a special status region and is considered separately from the so-called 
“Mainland China” in many of the countries and international official statistics (see International Financial 
Statistics).	270	By calculating capitalization taking into account the PPA, China is ranked first (see Allen et al., 2005).	271	Since at the end of 2002 many of the shares were still non-tradable, such a large turnover index is 
significant due to the high speculation on the stock market.	
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IPO. Green and Black (2003) observe that the first aspect is related to the government’s 
attempt to prevent “wild privatizations” during the restructuring of public enterprises. At 
the beginning of 2005, non-tradable shares were still about two-thirds of all outstanding 
shares (see Beltratti-Bortolotti, 2006). 
Regarding tradable shares, they can be classified into domestic shares (i.e. A Shares) as 
they are held and traded only by domestic investors and foreign shares (i.e. B and H 
shares)272 denominated in foreign currencies and reserved to foreign investors.273 
As of April 29th, 2005, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) has given 
rise to an important reform project that should have effects very important on the future 
structure of the structure of the Chinese financial system. It foresees the gradual reduction 
of non-tradable shares. More in in particular, this reform has affected the period from April 
2005 to September 2006 and foresees that NTS holders have to pay TS holders in various 
forms (cash, bonus shares, warrants) to have the right to sell their shares (see Beltratti-
Caccavaio, 2006; Beltratti-Bortolotti, 2006). 
The reform process consists of two phases: in the first phase, every firm concerned 
announces the sale; however, before the transaction can be performed, clearing methods 
are established. In this way, the shock associated with the increase in the stock price bid 
should be slower. 
At the end of 2006 in terms of total capitalization, HKSE alone, sixth, with an increase 
over 2005 of 62.6%; SHSE and SZSE are still eleventh, but show a variation, compared to 
the previous year, respectively by 220.6% and 97.1% respectively. By comparing this data, 
with those previously seen and analyzed by Allen and his associates relative to 2002, it can 
be seen how the stock market is gaining an increasing weight within the structure of the 
Chinese financial system. 
Concentration index has also improved for the two mainland stock markets being 
respectively 71.2% for Shanghai and 37.7% for Shenzen; turnover index in 2006 is still 
quite high, indicating the presence of high exchanges, and stands at around 153.8% for 
Shanghai and for Shenzen around 251.7, instead of 62.1% for Hong Kong. As a result of 
stock market reform, non-tradable shares declined from 66% (of total shares) to 23.66% in 
February 2006 and reached 57% in June of the same year, resulting in the tradable share 																																																								272	H-shares differ from B-shares as they are listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.	273	Another feature of the Chinese stock market is the fact that the price of domestic shares is generally 
higher than that of the shares subscribed by foreign investors. Gordon-Li (1999) observe how this is due to 
the government’s decision to act as a sort of discriminating monopoly on the financial market while 
maintaining a lower internal interest rate in order to favor the financing of the state deficit.	
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from 34% to 43% (of which 35% is A-shares). Additionally, the change in% of the float in 
2006 was, compared to 2005, 208.7% for SHSE and 174% for SZSE (see world-
exchanges.org, 2006). 
As for the Chinese bond market it can be seen as the most significant increase in new bond 
issues mainly concerned the state sector: treasury bonds with a 32.8% increase over the 
period (1990-2002), and bonds issued by state-owned banks that recorded an increase in 
38% over the same period. Bonds issued by private firms, in comparison with the previous 
ones, almost nonexistent 8.2% (see Stastistical Yearbook of China 1990-2002). The next 
period (2002-2006) marks a slow improvement in the issuance of corporate bonds, 
recording an increase of 20.4% (see Statistical Yearbook of China, 1990-05). 
The end of the 1990s marked the rise of institutional investors even though their role in the 
economic system was still low. The first two Chinese mutual funds were set up in 1998 
(Guo Tai and Nan Fang), and nowadays 46 out of them also have 13 foreigners (Qualified 
Foreign Institutional Investors or Joint Ventures). There is no evidence of hedge funds as 
short or short term financial transactions are still prohibited within the country;274 it should 
be added that pension funds are stalling to take off (see Allen et al 2005, 2007). The OECD 
report on China (09/05) highlights that, just as the small institutional investors’ weight is 
one of the major shortcomings of the Chinese financial system, it must be tackled as soon 
as possible. 
 
 
 
3.4.3 Evolution of the financial structure in China 
After describing the main reforms that have undergone the Chinese financial system, this 
section will look at the structure of this system, trying to show the evolution of the relative 
importance of the various forms of funding. In this regard, reconsider the repeatedly 
quoted contributions of Allen et. alt. (2002, 2005, 2007), taking into account the effects on 
the Chinese financial system caused by the most recent reforms.275 The comparative 
analysis of China with that of other countries is based on structural indicators computed by 
																																																								274	Since summer 2007, the Government has allowed Chinese residents in the Mainland to purchase any 
amount of shares traded in Hong Kong; this shows the tendency to gradually reduce control over short-term 
capital movements (see The Economist, 25/8/2007).	275	The analysis of Allen et al. (2005, 2007) mainly refers to 2002, therefore, at an earlier date than the stock 
market reform.	
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the method proposed by Levine (2002) and Demirguç-Kunt and Levine (2001), relative to 
the sample studied and classified by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998).276 
Following the approach of Allen and his associates (2005; 2007), I first consider a size that 
provides information on the size of the bank credit market with respect to the stock market 
from a macroeconomic point of view and relative to 2002. 
To this end, the total bank credit277 in relation to the bank credit ratio (GDP) allows to state 
without any doubt that the incidence of the banking system within the Chinese financial 
structure is very significant, even being greater than the unit (1.11). But the surprising 
thing and that it is superior to what in the sample considered by La Porta et al. is calculated 
for the “Germanic countries”278 (0.99), and should be emblematic for so-called bank-based 
systems. However, when the data on credit extended to the so-called hybrid sector is 
observed, the fall in value (0.24) shows that the majority of bank loans granted by Chinese 
banks favored state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or listed firms. 
As far as the capital market is concerned, the situation prevails: China only records a ratio 
of 0.32 (32%) (Total stock market capitalization/GDP or market capitalization ratio). It is 
in fact among the lowest and well below the average considered to be 47%. The result then 
falls to 11% if the floating or floating supply of the market should be considered in relation 
to GDP (i.e. Float supply ratio or total value traded ratio). This latter figure is particularly 
significant as, unlike total capitalization, the float is equal to the value of the shares traded 
on the market. Allen et. to the. (2002, 2007) are aware that the mere comparison between 
the data that considers the volume of total credit granted and the total stock capitalization 
(in relation to GDP) is not sufficient to draw conclusions on the relative importance of 
banks compared to the capital market within the Chinese financial system; that is, the 
structure is bank-based rather than market-based. 
In this regard, the analysis is extended to consider the so-called “structural indices”. In this 
regard, if I consider the structural measure or structural activity index obtained by 
considering the log (float supply ratio/bank credit ratio) and the index that measures the 
structural dimension or “structure size” in turn, by making the log (market capitalization 
																																																								276	La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), consider 49 countries, both developed and emerging, with the exception of 
China.	277	In the calculation of bank credit Levine (2002) excludes all loans deposited by banks for the public sector 
and local public bodies. However, in the case of China, these loans are, for the reasons that we see, very 
important and therefore cannot be overlooked.	278	This is a sample of countries that, by legal and financial system, are very similar to those of Germany 
(i.e., the Rhineland capitalism); including Japan.	
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ratio/bank credit ratio), China is among the countries with the lowest indices compared to 
the sample considered by La Porta et al. they are in fact equal to: (-1.07) and (-1.24). 
This makes it possible to draw significant conclusions about the predominance of the 
banking sector with respect to the stock market. Indeed, as seen in both volume and index 
terms, the structure of the Chinese financial system was dominated by the role of banks 
and, especially from public ones (i.e. SOB). 
If we then consider some of the efficiency measures in the banking credit market, we can 
see that it is quite disappointing: general overhead costs, relative to the total of banking 
assets, compared with those of the other sample countries, are in fact among the highest 
(0.12). Also, the index that measures the relative efficiency of the financial market with 
respect to banking, the so-called Structure Efficiency Index obtained by making the Log 
((capitalization ratio) x (overhead cost ratio)) provides a very high value (-1.48) compared 
to the same indexes of other sample countries, demonstrating that the financial market is 
more efficient than the banking credit market279 in allocating resources due to the high cost 
of brokering in China.  
From the analysis of Allen and his collaborators (2005; 2007), therefore, it is clear that the 
Chinese financial system has been centered on the banking market but that this has been 
inefficient. On the other hand, the stock market is still very small, but in terms of 
efficiency, by the best results. 
As the “financial service view” approach has been seen, it prefers to take into account the 
role played by the entire financial system rather than that of the banking and financial 
markets, taken separately. For this reason, Allen et al. (2005) obtained indices using the 
method of Levine (2002) related to the overall development of the financial system (i.e. 
financial development indices). They are essentially of three types, depending on their size, 
development and efficiency. 
The finance-activity index is obtained by making the Log (float supply ratio x private 
credit ratio); as far as the bank credit is concerned, only the companies belonging to the 
Hybrid Sector are eligible for financing. 
The finance-size index will be obtained by considering the Log of the total market 
capitalization ratio x private credit ratio. The two indexes are rather low compared to the 
average, especially with regard to finance size (-1.02). In terms of efficiency of the entire 
financial system, the finance efficiency index is the Log of (floating supply ratio/overhead 																																																								279	See also Boyreau-Debray-Jin Wei (2005) regarding the distorting effects of the Chinese financial system 
for allocating resources.	
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cost ratio) is also rather low, indicating that the Chinese financial system is still not very 
developed in relation to other countries. 
Based on the above-mentioned indices, I am now able to show the evolution of the 
structure of the Chinese financial system taking into account the period following the stock 
market reform. As already mentioned, in 2006, in terms of total capitalization, HKSE 
alone, was sixth with an increase of 62.6%; SHSE and SZSE are still at the bottom of the 
list but mark a change (%) over 2005, respectively, by 220.6% and 97.1% respectively. 
As in the previous section, in June 2006, the -Tradable shares/Total- mark a good increase 
of 43%. By comparing stock market data (2002 vs. 2006), we see how the latter are taking 
on a growing weight within the Chinese financial structure. As a result of the stock market 
reform, it can be seen that, both in absolute terms and taking into account the indices, the 
Chinese financial structure is evolving vs. a more market-oriented system.280 
Macroeconomic observations can be further strengthened if data on the financial structure 
of Chinese firms are observed, that is, the use of the various sources of funding. As I have 
in part anticipated, Chinese firms can be distinguished in: state sector firms; listed sector 
firms; unlisted private companies (hybrid sector firms). For the first two types of business, 
the most commonly used sources of funding for fixed capital investments are: bank 
lending, direct funding of funds (internal financing or self-financing), direct issuance of 
shares and bonds and local government funding (excluding the state budget). The 
importance of state funding has been decreasing over the last few years due to the 
privatization process in progress by many firms. Their relative weight is, to this day, 
comparable to that of the state sector, although in perspective it should increase, given that 
China, following its accession to the WTO in 2001, is becoming an increasingly open 
economy. The incidence of bank credit is particularly significant for companies belonging 
to the state sector and the listed sector but not for hybrid sector companies (see China 
Statistical Yearbook). 
The direct collection of funds by issuing shares and bonds it is mainly characterized by 
state sector firms and listed sectors firms, even though for small amounts compared to 
bank financing (as we have seen by analyzing macroeconomic data). Obviously, internal 
finance is particularly significant for businesses in the hybrid sector. This is not surprising 
as the latter are rationalized both in the credit market and in the equity and bond market; 
internal sources often come from direct financing of the firm’s founders or their family 																																																								280	This process is in tune with Tadesse’s approach (see Figure 2).	
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members. To be more precise, however, in the hybrid sector of seed phase, the informal 
financing takes the form of “angel finance” by relatives and friends, then an important role 
is played by the cash flow (i.e. internal finance), financial support networks between 
enterprises, but also forms of illegal fundraising such as hehui, biaohui, taihui (see Allen et 
al 2005; OECD Report 9/05). These so-called “informal” funding channels are key to the 
survival and development of this type of business. 
 
 
3.4.4 Problems with the structure of the Chinese financial system 
As previously explained in the preceding paragraphs, China’s financial system is still 
fragile. The gradual reforms that invested the financial system did not prevent problems 
such as financial turmoil in the banking sector, poor transparency in financial markets and 
insufficient corporate governance for businesses. 
With regard to the first aspect, the most significant problem is certainly the presence of a 
large amount of non-performing loans (NPLs) as well as a low capitalization of the major 
banks (see Chiarlone-Ferri, 2005). The high amount of non-performing loans mainly 
concerns the grants granted by Big Four to state-owned enterprises. The latter have often 
been granted for political reasons rather than economic ones and have accumulated over 
the years. At the base of this process, there has certainly been the fact that many public 
banks have found themselves lending to public companies that often were their 
shareholders, creating a sort of “Siamese brotherhood” that prevented the implementation 
of an adapted screening and monitoring of the debtor requesting the funds. 
Allen et al. (2006), based on the data of the Asian Banker database, shows that, both in 
relation to the total amount of new loans and in relation to GDP, China has the highest 
ratios especially in the period 2000-02. This result is even more significant if we take into 
account the fact that Japan was faced with one of the most serious banking system crises in 
the period under review. Even in terms of profitability (calculated in both ROE and ROA) 
China, there are some indicators that are among the lowest if compared to those of other 
Asian countries. Slowly improving thanks to massive bank recapitalization efforts but 
remains a major concern by many international observers (see OECD, 09/2005). 
As far as the financial markets and, in particular, the so-called Mainland stock markets are 
concerned, as they have been trying to show in this work, they are gaining an increasing 
weight within the structure of the financial system but still have too low concentration 
indexes and turnover too high, indicating that there are still a few big companies and a high 
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speculation on the stock market. Additionally, stock prices do not properly reflect core 
values of listed companies due to the lack of or ineffective regulation. There are problems 
related to both ex-ante (adverse selection) and ex-post (moral-hazard) asymmetries 
information. With regard to the first aspect, non-governmental corporations belonging to 
the hybrid sector seeking to be listed often find it much more difficult than state 
enterprises. The process leading to the stock market share is, in fact, the first, particularly 
long, expensive and carried out by an auditor little independent of political pressures. 
These aspects lead to a genuine adverse selection against firms and its equity-rationing 
phenomenon, which prevents many firms that are profitable to get quoted. Even with 
regard to the problems of moral hazard by public managers, the lack of transparency and 
the almost total impossibility of takeovers by potential competitors favor the possibility of 
recurring opportunistic phenomena by the same managers, with distorting effects in terms 
of economic efficiency. These last comments allow us to connect to another major issue 
within the Chinese financial system: corporate governance. Regarding listed firms, the 
traditional mechanisms are rather weak and limited; listed companies are governed by an 
organizational system that is based on two levels: the Board of Directors and the Board of 
Supervisors. The most significant issue is that the members of these Boards rather than 
being elected by the shareholders are public officials elected by the government following 
a once unpopular process. The government in China plays the role of regulator and 
shareholder of many listed firms, of many banks and financial institutions, creating 
obvious conflicts of interest that go once again at the expense of economic efficiency. 
Even on the legislative front, corporate and bankruptcy law has been and still remains very 
weak. In fact, despite the bankruptcy law being passed in 1986, the first law governing 
company law came into force only in 1999. 
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3.5 Corporate governance and development of Chinese Financial 
Economy 
Since 2009, 60 years after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, China has 
begun to become a world-class economy in size, for its continued growth, and for its 
strongest exporting country in the world. These results are clearly the product of the 
country’s success in economic reform and openness to world markets. Nevertheless, 
serious problems remain that may threaten the stability and sustainability of these 
outstanding results if they are not fully addressed and resolved. One of the major battles is 
the rhythm and quality of the country’s financial development. It is a widespread belief 
that a properly functioning capital market and effective corporate governance at an 
industrial level are mutually reinforcing. Looking at macroeconomic perspectives at the 
current stage of China’s reform and modernization, it is believed that the implementation 
of the economic system can push the improvement of the corporate governance system. 
For a long time, the pace and scope of the reforms of the Chinese financial system have 
fallen behind other sectors of the economy. With the rapid transformation into a market-
oriented economic system with a very high level of investment and trade, the need to speed 
up financial development is urgent because China can not afford to be a simple attendant in 
the globalization process where massive volumes of trans-frontier economic flows, goods, 
services and investment funds must be efficient and orderly. From the Chinese national 
economic outlook, the reasons for a faster pace of growth in financial development are 
increasingly pressing. Despite household savings remain significant, they have been 
overtaken by corporate savings. Household savings have traditionally been a cheap and 
simple resource for Chinese banks, in the form of low-interest bank deposits, which in turn 
has allowed Chinese banks to rely on interest rate differentials as an additional form of 
entry. It has been noted that there is a need to address the lack of alternative financial 
investment channels for most households, other than low-performing bank deposits or 
investments in the most volatile capital market. Increasing business savings, principally in 
the form of unallocated profits, provided a further boost to a broad and profound reform of 
the Chinese financial system and the creation of a variety of financial products and services 
for firms and families that would yield better returns their investments. Financial 
development can be defined as the set of factors, policies and institutions that enable 
effective financial intermediation, the functioning of financial markets, and broad access to 
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the capital market and financial services.281 In an attempt to measure the country’s 
financial development, the World Economic Forum identifies key criteria for the necessary 
institutional and commercial context, which are: 
- Liberalization of capital; 
- Liberalization of the national financial sector; 
- Amount of incentive-based remuneration; 
- Efficiency of the board of directors; 
- Trust in professional administrators; 
- Robustness of control and monitoring measures; 
- Protection of the interests of minorities; 
- Regulation of exchanges of financial instruments; 
- Property rights; 
- Independence of judgment. 
Most of these elements also belong to the series of essential internal and external 
governance mechanisms required for an effective corporate governance system. Of course, 
since a country’s financial system needs to provide more and more specialized services for 
investors and savers to manage their capital more efficiently and optimize their economic 
positions, the development of these essential elements equates to the development of an 
effective corporate governance system. While various advances have been made in 
enhancing proprietary rights, establishing rules for securities exchange, and strengthening 
disclosure in listed firms, much remains to be done in these and other key areas. The 
Chinese banking system, dominated by state property, has traditionally been designed to 
serve the state industry, resulting in a number of related issues that are well known. 
Corporate governance practices in Chinese financial institutions have not kept pace with 
the rich industry of management techniques and tools that have been introduced in recent 
years. Given the overwhelming majority share of the state in the four major Chinese banks, 
it is not surprising that most of China’s corporate governance issues concern the banking 
sector. In any case, given the central role of the banking sector, and the potential systemic 
risk that bank failures may bring to the economy, the importance of having effective 
corporate governance is increasingly urgent and relevant. With the fixed rate trading 
system and the growing foreign exchange system, the resulting monetary expansion 
certainly requires prudent monetary management based on an efficient banking and 																																																								281	World Economic Forum, The Financial Development Report 2009, 2009. 
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financial system. The continued liquidity injection created by the growing foreign 
exchange reserve can fuel inflation in property and stock market prices, causing a serious 
distortion in the composition of bank credit and the allocation of resources in general. 
Unfortunately, given the state of financial development in China, the possibility for central 
bank intervention to sterilize such a liquidity expansion is quite limited.282 The need for the 
Chinese financial system to increase the ability to handle these systemic solicitations 
properly is urgent. There is another factor that is pressing for a progress in the development 
of corporate governance. 
The second most important pillar in the development of a modern financial system in 
China is the stock market, through which state-owned enterprises have undergone a 
transformation from open public listing to a partial privatization, initially to increase 
financing capital and revitalize investment capability, but more recently and more 
significantly as a means of establishing a corporate governance reform. Capitalization of 
the Chinese equity market as a percentage of GDP has experienced significant volatility 
over the last twenty years. Particularly noteworthy is that the proportion of negotiable 
shares remains about one-third of equity capitalization for most years until 2009 when the 
share ownership reform started in 2006 slowly began to trade in the other two-thirds of 
issued shares who were formally non-negotiable and held by state and other state 
organizations in the form of “legal person” actions. The non-negotiable dominant state 
holding was one of the major issues highlighted in the development of corporate 
governance in the most modern forms of business organizations in China, listed 
companies. The predominance of the state as a direct or indirect owner of two-thirds of 
shares issued in over 80% of listed firms in the country has aggravated the governance 
issues a joint stock company has to face. The fact that state-owned and state-owned shares 
could not be negotiated, along with the widely recognized problem of internal controls in 
many of these firms,283 have ended up generating a number of practices and results that can 
be assimilated specifically to corporate issues governance in China. In recent years, a rich 
corpus of literature has been developed based on empirical studies that tested and tested the 
characteristics of corporate governance and ownership, and their possible impacts on the 
																																																								282	Wu X., Deputy Governor, People’s Bank of China, 2007, Conversation notes by the author (Tam) with 
Mdm Wu in Beijing, 26 September 2007. 283 Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) 2006, Corporate Governance Annual Report, available at 
www.sse.com.cn.	
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firm’s results of Chinese companies.284 In 2009, China had more than 1.700 listed firms in 
the two stock exchanges, with 120 million shareholders. These two markets have 
experienced several corporate governance scandals and failures in large and small 
companies over the years. These problems were the weakest link in the Chinese financial 
system, whose efficient corporate governance would provide vitality and robustness.  
The future of China’s capital market development is moving beyond opening to the world, 
as its dimensions have quickly reached a level appropriate to China’s overall economic 
position. In this context, the Chinese authorities now clear that their main task is to 
integrate into the Chinese capital market and the business environment the most advanced 
forms of financial institutions, products and market mechanisms in the world to improve 
the effectiveness and operational criteria of the country’s capital market system.285 In 
China’s economic reform environment, where market institutions and law enforcement 
practices are still under varying degrees, the effectiveness of the financial system is 
inseparable from the progress in other key areas, including the reforms in finance public 
and corporate law, the legal system and the rules governing the entry into the market and 
the operations of both internal and external participants. Both in direct financing and in 
financial intermediation, the effectiveness of the state-dominated financial system in China 
was considered unsatisfactory. Regardless of the pace at which the Chinese government 
will liberalize currency controls on its capital accounts, there is no doubt that to fully 
develop the banking system, stock markets and listed companies, standards and 
performance of corporate agreements and practices governance must be raised. 
 
 
3.5.1 The “public-private” business structure in China 
In the last fifty years, the liberalization of the Chinese market and corporate governance 
reforms have triggered start-ups of privatization and stunning economic growth. China is 
increasingly moving towards a complete privatization through the use and adaptation of 																																																								284	Xu X.N. and Wang Y., Ownership structure and corporate governance in Chinese stock companies, 
China Economic Review, 1999, 10(1), pp. 75-98; Qi D., Wu W. e Zhang H., Shareholding structure and 
corporate performance of partially privatized firms: evidence from listed Chinese companies, Pacific-Basin 
Finance Journal, 2000, 8(5), pp. 587-610; Sun Q., Tong J. et al., How does government ownership affect firm 
performance? Evidence from China’s privatization experience, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 
2002, 29, pp. 1-27; Wei Z. and Varela O., State equity ownership and firm market performance: evidence 
from China’s newly privatized firms, Global Finance Journal, 2003, 14(1), pp. 65- 82; Chong V.K. and 
Eagleton I.R.C., The impact of reliance on incentive-based compensation schemes, information asymmetry 
and organizational commitment on managerial performance, Management Accounting Research, 2007, 
18(3), pp. 312-342. 285	Qi B., Report on China’s capital market, 21th Century Business Herald, November 13th 2009. 
	 188	
foreign models of the most industrialized countries. However, the characteristic that still 
today distinguishes Chinese firms is the proprietary structure, especially in large 
companies, that is to safeguard the connection between public and private. These are firms 
mainly financed by private capital, but whose management is actually under the 
supervision of the public. Chinese institutions therefore essentially seek to imitate the 
Western corporate governance model without adopting it in all its features,286 as ownership 
and control are not shifted from managers to shareholders and no real market for corporate 
governance is created. 
I then analyze the evolution of the governance in China. 
Prior to the introduction of the first corporate law in 1904, during the imperial period, both 
in the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) and in the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), there were large 
family businesses in China, producing and distributing local products, even in long 
distance trade, and whose success was largely due to state support.287 The strong presence 
on the international market of Chinese firms led China to imitate288 Western corporate 
governance to adapt to the development of the international economy. They thus began to 
highlight the weaknesses of the State in addressing foreign policy and economic 
aggression.289 The first industrial establishments were undertaken with the aim of regaining 
military strength and defending national pride, without challenging the status quo of 
government and society,290 rather than triggering economic development. This led to the 
absence of an industrial revolution and modernization of the economy. The domestic 
capital market, created following the distribution of capital on the market for obtaining 																																																								286	“Although China’s first corporate code contained many elements of the modern formula for privatization 
– including some requirements for transparency, separation of ownership and control, and annual auditing 
and reporting requirements – it ultimately failed to effectively transform Chinese business enterprises into 
full-blown corporate institutions.” Goetzmann W., Koll E., The History of Corporate Ownership in China. 
State Patronage, Company Legislation, and the Issue of Control, in Morck R. K., A History of Corporate 
Governance around the World. Family Business Groups to Professional Managers, The University of 
Chicago and London, Chicago and London, 2005, p. 150. 287	The state financed the firms in return for contributions to military companies and high donations in favor 
of public or imperial projects.	288	The process was rather driven by a sense of competition against the West.	289	“In the so-called Self-Strenghthening Movement during the Tongzhi Restoration period between 1862 
and 1874, reform-minded government officials – mostly politically powerful provincial governor-generals – 
attempted to revive the national economy and military after the devastating Taiping Rebellion.” Goetzmann 
W., Koll E., The History of Corporate Ownership in China. State Patronage, Company Legislation, and the 
Issue of Control, in Morck R. K., A History of Corporate Governance around the World. Family Business 
Groups to Professional Managers, The University of Chicago and London, Chicago and London, 2005, p. 
153. 290	General Governor Li Hongzhang (1823-1901) demanded that the Chinese government should fight to 
improve its technology and military equipment to defend itself from the Western power that had shown its 
military superiority at the expense of China.	
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funding from small investors, even foreign, fell in 1883 due to strong speculations. Thus, a 
new form of enterprise based on government support (gaundu shangban) was established: 
private people were providing capital and managing the enterprise, while the state was in 
control of production.291 However, when the state was no longer in a position to carry out 
effective business control because of corruption phenomena, financial problems were again 
posed to businesses, and as the firm’s risk fell again only on private investors, who did not 
have the power to control the management, they got low profits and consequently invested 
less and less in the firms. To overcome this new wave of problems, guanshang heban was 
set up, a more attractive type of corporation in which the management function and the 
allocation of invested capital was partly transferred to the same private investors. From 
1895 onwards, a privatization process began and began to set up the first foreign 
companies in China. Still, the stock market was still very weak and businesses were mostly 
family-friendly. 
In 1904, the first law on corporations (Gongsi Lü) was finally introduced,292 which was 
based on legislative orientation in Japan and England, but in a shorter form. The goal was 
to meet the popular demand for change and modernization of the economy by creating 
legal protection for the best investors, so as to encourage private investment leading to 
national prosperity. Many firms listed on the market becoming limited liability companies, 
however, the internal business organization did not change radically, as the hierarchical 
line remained unchanged. 293  The novelty arising from the legal transformation of 
companies into private companies was the introduction of an annual meeting for 
shareholders, as they increased the weight of their consultations. In addition, under the 
legislation of 1904, it became mandatory to appoint two auditors responsible for examining 
the financial positions, but nothing was specified about the principle of independence, as a 
result, auditors often belonged to management and did not undertake their role of 
representatives of the interests of the shareholders.294 Strong changes were introduced in 
																																																								291	These were quasi-monopoly situations.	292	Goingsi Lü was the latest reform of the Qing monarchy to meet the desire to introduce legal, institutional, 
and reformative reforms to modernize the Chinese economy, trying to maintain the conservative political 
status quo of imperial monarchy.	293	In particular, there is strong collusion between majority shareholders and managers in China at the 
expense of minority shareholders.	294	In general, the new legislation did not bring any real improvements to the protection of shareholders’ 
rights and the control of managerial power.	
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terms of financial control and transparency: companies were obliged to produce annually a 
report295 on their economic, financial and commercial situation. 
In essence, the hope was to create a capital market that could support the development of 
the national economy in relation to world growth, but the effects were limited due to 
cultural factors. The importance of personal relationships has brought about conflicts of 
interest within corporate organizations and institutional factors due to the lack of effective 
market regulation for corporate control and the development of the Chinese domestic 
market has been stymied by a series of crises involving a substantial mistrust of the 
exchange of actions. 
Currently, China, in a situation of vigorous economic development, is focusing on the 
importance of protection and rights of shareholders by developing a new corporate 
governance regulation aimed at eliminating persistent problems in companies and the 
market national equity.296 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								295	The annual report did not provide for a uniform standard compilation system for all businesses. “Modern, 
Western-style bookkeeping methods found their way into China only in the 1930s, and to judge from archival 
evidence, most companies officially started using standardized, modernized accounting systems only in the 
1940s”. Goetzmann W., Koll E., The History of Corporate Ownership in China. State Patronage, Company 
Legislation, and the Issue of Control, in Mork, R.K., A History of Corporate Governance around the World. 
Family Business Groups to Professional Managers, The University of Chicago and London, Chicago and 
London, 2005, p. 170.	296	“Our results also provide some insights for policy makers. We suggest that policymakers pay particular 
attention to the collusion between tunneling participants rather than merely prohibiting certain tunneling 
tactics. As long as the separation of control and cash flow rights triggers tunneling motives and controlling 
shareholders can smoothly establish collusion with managers, controlling shareholders can develop more 
subtle and more invisible ways to tunnel. We also recommend that regulators strengthen corporate 
governance norms, improve the corporate governance environment, and enhance shareholder protection.” 
AA.VV. Controlling Shareholder-Manager Collusion and Tunnelling: Evidence from China, in “Corporate 
Governance. An International Review”, Vol. 22, Issue 6, 28 August 2014, p. 456. 
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3.6 Institutional framework and challenges 
At the beginning of the process, the Chinese government adopted a top-down approach to 
develop corporate governance.297 Last decade has shown that the operation of regulation 
and government agencies such as China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration (SASAC) has been instrumental in 
promoting the development of effective corporate governance practices between Chinese 
firms and state-owned enterprises. Indeed, without the push for regulation, the considerable 
progress in creating many of the conditions necessary for such work practices would be 
untenable. 
A considerable part of literature based of the agency theory has examined a multitude of 
problems stemming from the conflict of interests between shareholders and corporate 
directors, although the dominant agency theory in corporate governance research has 
always been questioned.298 With blockholder prevalence in Europe and Asia, the issue of 
protecting minority interests has attracted more attention from researchers.299 Recent 
financial theory300 has shifted and expanded the analysis perspective from the theory of the 
dominant agent based on the conflict between shareholders and managers to the increasing 
concern about the decline and subtraction of the interests of minority shareholders in favor 
of controlling shareholders in large corporations. For countries with poor investor 
protection, ownership concentration is seen as an internal governance mechanism to 
replace the inadequacy of external governance of institutions. 
In East Asia, where protection of investors is generally recognized as weak, the 
concentration of family property is supported in various ways by cross-ownership of 
shares, corporate pyramids and financial companies, and is a common strategy adopted by 
the founders of a company in replacing the legal protection of investors.301 In China, where 																																																								297	Tam O.K., The development of Corporate Governance in China, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, 
MA, USA, Edward Elgar, 1999. 298	Judge W.Q., Thomas Kuhn and corporate governance research, Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 2009, 18(2), pp. 85-86. 299	Shleifer A. and Vishny R., A survey of Corporate Governance, Journal of Finance, 1997, 52, pp. 737- 
783. 300	La Porta R., Lopez-De-Silanes F. and Shleifer A., Corporate ownership around the world, Journal of 
Finance, 1999, 54, pp. 471-517; La Porta R., Lopez-De-Silanes F., Shleifer A. and Vishny R., Investor 
protection and corporate governance, Journal of Financial Economics, 2000, 58, pp. 3-28. 301	Bebchuck L.A., Kraakman R.H. and Triantis G., Stock pyramids, cross-ownership and dual class equity: 
the mechanisms and agency costs of separating control from cash-flow rights, 2000, in Morck R., 
Concentrated Corporate Ownership, Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Claessens S., Djankov S. and 
Lang L. H. P., The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporation, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 2000, 58 (1-2), pp. 81-112. 
	 192	
there is a high concentration of state property, major governance issues generally revolve 
around the issue of state property, internal members’ control, and lack of law enforcement. 
In fact, the ownership of the Chinese state of affairs and the related governance issues have 
increasingly attracted the attention of scholars for some years.302 The Chinese government 
has transformed thousands of state-owned firms over the last twenty years, with the 
privatization. However, it is unanimously recognized that the reform did not lead to the 
desired results. Building on an international OECD study of corporate governance in state-
owned enterprises, two common problems are identified for the State in the performance of 
its responsibilities due to property: undue intrusions and political interference; or totally 
passive or confidential properties. The demonstrations given in the literature show that 
China particularly suffers from the first problem. For example, it was found that more than 
a quarter of the delegated directors in a sample of 790 recently privatized companies are 
former or current government bureaucrats.303 However, with the pervasive problem of 
insider control304 that is often interwoven with the collusion of government officials, the 
second problem manifested itself in the form of the absence of the state as a true owner, a 
phenomenon widely discussed in China in the nineties. 
In order to better understand the significance of the milestones in the development of 
Chinese corporate governance, the logic and implications of key governance issues 
involved must be illustrated. And to understand the relevance of some of these issues it is 
also necessary to discuss the challenges for state-owned commercial banks. 
By adopting modern corporate governance as a means of improving the performance of 
state-owned enterprises, the Chinese authorities therefore reaffirm their conviction that 
state-owned enterprises can operate effectively and remain competitive.305 In any case, 																																																								302	Jefferson W., Hu A., Guan X. e Yu X., Ownership, performance and innovation in China’s large -and 
medium- size industrial enterprise sector, China Economic Review, 2003, 10(1), pp. 75-89; Han D., Wang F. 
e Yue H., Board structure, political influence and firm performance: an empirical study on publicly listed 
firms in China, Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2004, 11(1); Bai C., Liu Q., Lu J., Song 
F. e Zhang J., Corporate governance and market valuation in China, Journal of Comparative Economics, 
2004, 32(4), pp. 519-616; Tian L. e Estrin S., Retained state share holding in Chinese PLCs: does 
government ownership always reduce corporate value?, Journal of Comparative Economics, 2008, 36(1), pp. 
74-89. 303	Fan J. P. H., Wong T. J. and Zhang T., Politically connected CEOs, corporate governance and post- IPO 
performance of China’s newly partially privatized firms, Journal of Financial Economics, 2007, 84, pp. 330-
357. 304	Qian Y., Reforming corporate governance and finance in China, 1995, in M. Aoki e H. Kim, Corporate 
Governance in Transition Economies: Insider Control and the Role of Banks, Washington, DC: The World 
Bank; Lee K. e Hahn D., From insider-outsider collusion to insider control in China’s SOE’s, Working 
Paper Series n. 44, 2001, Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University. 305	Li Y., Feng Y. and Liu Y., An empirical study of SOE’s market orientation in transitional China, Asia 
Pacific Journal of Management, 2006, 23(1), pp. 93-113. 
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several scholars argue that only the complete restructuring of state property and 
privatization can really transform state-owned enterprises into efficient business entities 
because state property dilution has been judged to limit impact.306 Recent literature shows 
that the performance of partially privatized Chinese companies has worsened in the years 
following privatization and poor governance is the most decisive factor.307 An alternative 
theory suggests that state-owned enterprises can achieve effective performance as long as 
modern corporate governance and modern management procedures are adopted and 
effectively implemented.308 It has been argued309 that the effect of state property on 
corporate value is U-shaped so that beyond a certain threshold, the government can 
actually improve corporate value. This result has been attributed to the consequences of 
ownership concentration and preference for government. Despite corporatization and 
privatization in the reform of Chinese companies, the Chinese Government clearly believes 
that the state still has a role in maintaining state ownership of enterprises. In fact, in a new 
political move, since 2002, the Chinese government has begun to consolidate and merge 
the nation’s largest state-owned enterprises into large-scale central enterprise groups and in 
designated industrial sectors. At the same time, the government has also decided to impose 
modern corporate governance mechanisms in these companies to exercise state ownership 
rights more effectively and achieve better business performance. The Chairman of the 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration, Li Rongrong, said the improvement 
of corporate governance was the core and the most difficult problem in reforming the state-
owned enterprise system.310 
 
 
3.6.1 Institutions and regulatory sources in corporate governance 
When CSRC was founded in 1992 and the National People’s Congress approved corporate 
law in 1993, most state-owned enterprises in China were still at the beginning of the firm’s 
work and the long process of modernization and partial privatization. Both theories and 																																																								306	Tenev S., Zhang C. and Brefort L., Corporate Governance and Enterprise Reform in China: Building the 
Institutions of Modern Markets, 2002, Washington DC: World Bank. 307	Allen F., Qian J. and Qian M., Law, finance and economic growth in China, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 2005, 77(1), pp. 56-116. 308	Liu G. S. and Sun P., The class of shareholdings and its impacts on corporate performance: a case of 
state shareholding composition in Chinese public corporations, Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 2005, 13(1), pp. 46-59. 309	Tian L. and Estrin S., Retained state share holding in Chinese PLCs: does government ownership always 
reduce corporate value?, Journal of Comparative Economics, 2008, 36(1), pp. 74-89. 310	Rongrong L., State owned asset supervision and administration commission, Shanghai Securities Daily, 
December 19th, 2009. 
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corporate governance practices were quite unknown to the new and emerging corporate 
sector. The nod of political debate and academic discussion in China was at the same time 
the problem of withdrawing businesses from the social welfare responsibilities inherited 
from the expected socialist model, and clarifying the ownership rights and responsibilities 
between business management, and ministers of government. At the same time, a growing 
number of empirical studies began to study the possible links between property types, in 
particular property in the hands of the state, and business performance.311 Suffice it to 
recall that the gradual approach to a market-oriented reform based on the opening up of the 
Chinese economy continued to be the guiding principle. In terms of corporate governance 
development, the Chinese government has maintained its proactive and top-down approach 
to introducing formal governance rules and structures and increasing its use. 
The end of the nineties led to a wave of new regulatory measures and major laws (1998) 
and accounting (1999) that provided and formalized some key components of the legal 
foundations for the development of a corporate sector and a modern financial market. The 
rules on the Shanghai Stock Market are clearly an important part of building effective 
corporate governance. In fact, Shanghai’s Stock Exchange has also taken an active part in 
promoting better corporate governance by publishing an annual Corporate Governance 
Report from 2002. 
Another often overlooked administrative measure that had had a significant impact on the 
way China’s corporate governance is conducted is constituted by the “Administrative 
Rules for Registering the Company’s Legal Representative” promulgated by the State 
Bureau of Industry and Commerce Administration In 1998. These rules established that the 
position of the chairman of the board is a legal representative of the company, thus 
unintentionally creating the status of a powerful corporate leader with the potential to 
intervene in corporate governance. It is commonly acknowledged in China that board 
chairpersons often use that capacity. However, we do not know much about the scope and 
impact of this, and there is little academic research on this important area of the dynamics 
and processes of corporate management. 
New regulatory measures aimed specifically at the development of corporate governance 
were introduced by CSRC between 2000 and 2002. The most significant in this context 
were the Corporate Governance Code for listed companies introduced jointly by CSRC and 
the SETC (State Economic and Trade Commission) in 2002 and the requirement 																																																								311	Wei Z. B., Varela O., D’Souza J. e Hassan M. K., The financial and operating performance of China’s 
newly privatized firms, Financial Management, 2003, 32(2), pp. 107-126. 
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introduced by CSRC since 2001 for listed companies to have independent directors in the 
board of one-third of members of the board of directors by the year 2003. Together, these 
two initiatives set a more systematic procedure course integrated to bring about effective 
corporate governance reform for Chinese companies. 
The CRSC has also launched two other measures to strengthen and support such changes: 
“Opinions on strengthening the work of monitoring and regulation of listed companies” 
(2000) and, given the important role of board chairmen in the structure China’s corporate 
practice and government practices, the document on “Implementation of the 
Discussion/Interview System with Presidents of Board of Directors of Listed Companies” 
(2001). In fact, the interest of the research on the various relationships and the impact of 
independent directors and the structure of the board of directors have grown with the 
release of several studies, both inside and outside the Chinese context.312 In 2002, the 
China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) also published two similar documents on 
corporate governance lines and independent bank-owned administrators, thus expanding its 
attention to the major banking sector. In 2005, the CBRC also announced line guidance for 
board administrators and a Code of Conduct for commercial banks. A year later, CSRC 
announced the Corporate Governance Code for investment fund management companies 
alongside changes to the Securities Act. 
 
 
 
3.6.2 SASAC (State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration) and Central 
Bank Governance 
During this period, another important institution, SASAC, was founded in 2000. It is 
entrusted with the responsibility to exercise the property rights on behalf of the State, the 
firms owned by the country’s largest state, the central enterprise groups. The first 
predecessor of SASAC was initially founded as a Bureau of State Assets Administration 
under the Finance Minister in 1998 with a limited supervisory power. Since 2004, SASAC 
has begun its strategic adaptation of central companies through breaks and bouts to speed 
up the creation, desired by the government, the profile and the structure of the national 																																																								312	Chen G., Firth M., Gao D. N. and Riu O. M., Ownership structure, corporate governance, and fraud: 
evidence from China, Journal of Corporate Finance, 2006, 12, pp. 424-448; Clarke D. C., The independent 
director in Chinese corporate governance, Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, 2006, 31(1), 125-228; Lin X. 
e Zhang Y., Bank ownership reform and bank performance in China, Journal of Banking & Finance, 2009, 
33(1), pp.20-29; Lo W. C. and Ng M. C. M., Banking reform and corporate governance, Chinese Economy, 
2009, 42(5), pp. 21-39. 
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economy through the strengthening of influence and control over central companies. With 
a significant but largely neglected move at the same time, in 2004 SASAC announced its 
first list of business centers for 49 central companies in November. Defining a core 
business is important because it is necessary to ensure that these strategic businesses 
provide market outcomes to help achieve national development goals. Equally important is 
the government’s concern about the tendency of many central firms to divide into 
profitable property development business, which differs from their mission of becoming 
efficient and globally competitive in the designated business sectors. Building on risky but 
highly profitable property developments, along with the benefits of easy access to bank 
credit, state-owned enterprises will not only distort the allocation of resources but may hide 
poor performance in strategic sectors for which they receive considerable resources and 
regulatory support. From a corporate governance perspective, easy profits can disguise 
government failures. However, the definition of strategic sectors for these huge groups has 
been highly controversial and political because of the multitude of stakeholder interests. 
One of the most powerful “stakeholders” in this context, besides the firms concerned, is the 
local level of government, which receives a substantial part of its income from property 
development activities within its jurisdiction. 
It is interesting to note that only two central firms have been authorized in the property 
development list as strategic sectors in the first list of 49 central companies. In any case, 
within a year, SASAC’s list of companies having a proprietary development as a strategic 
sector grew rapidly up to 13. At the end of 2009, the number grew up to 16 out of a total of 
128 core businesses. It can be assumed that SASAC has been put under pressure by a 
variety of stakeholders and this has made its task difficult to accomplish. This is because 
SASAC is actually one of the many government ministerial agencies, and the economic 
logic of producing state-owned enterprises’ profits, as a commercial entity was, after all, 
not in contrast to official rhetoric, although it was certainly put questioning that so many 
subsidiary firms and state-sponsored companies should all be competing in this area. The 
formal designation of strategic sectors, however, does not mean that businesses that do not 
have property development in their strategic sectors will not engage in it. In its latest 
attempt, SASAC announced on March 23rd, 2010 that those companies that have not listed 
ownership development in their strategic areas would have to plan to withdraw from these 
activities. 
Traditional agency theory requires remuneration for performance-based directors to better 
align the interests of managers and shareholders. After a mixed debate over policy makers 
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and academics in China in the mid-1990s, CSRC in 2005 was able to announce measures 
that would allow the use of stock or stock options as incensed for major administrators (i.e. 
“Administrative rules on equity incentives in listed companies” in a non-definitive 
version). For central firms, SASAC first introduced in 2004 temporary calculation methods 
to safeguard the state’s wealth and growth in these large groups. Five years later, in 2009, 
SASAC announced the “Transactional Rules for the Performance Evaluation of People 
Responsible for Central Businesses”, with performance evaluations based solely on 
strategic business matters, using a method of computing performance indicators more 
sophisticated. From the perspective of corporate governance development, this represents a 
significant step in the improvement of the SASAC transition methods adopted in 2000 and 
2004, since it for the first time connects incentives and benefits to a set of performance 
indicators determined more objectively and to accurately identified responsibilities. This 
also strengthens the political intent of encouraging directors to focus on strategic business 
objectives. 
 
 
3.6.3 Challenges of administration regulation 
In China, there are several overlapping governmental organizations that directly and 
indirectly exercise regulatory and administrative powers over firms, particularly state ones. 
The following key national organizations have different objectives and degrees of 
responsibility on listed companies, government companies and financial institutions in 
determining corporate governance rules, procedures, and practices: 
- China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 
- China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) 
- China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) 
- State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) 
- Central Huijin Holding Ltd. 
- Communist Party of China 
- People’s Bank of China 
- Ministry of Commerce 
- State Administration for Industry and Commerce 
- Ministry of Finance 
- Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 
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Among these national organizations, most have some of the branches of local government 
that are delegated to implement and enforce monitoring and control functions often with 
different degrees of rigor and ability. There is a need to clarify, streamline and reconfigure 
the roles and responsibilities of various government agencies and ministries so that clear 
responsibilities can be established and implementation of standards enforced. 
For example, if SASAC acted as the owner of state-owned enterprises, would the Chinese 
government allow it to exercise the common stockholders’ rights, including the ability to 
have a proper power in appointing the chief executive officer and councilors? Should the 
various forms of monitoring and the supervisory power of state-owned enterprises be 
streamlined and managed by a major organization? Or as suggested an OECD Survey on 
State Enterprise Governance in 2005, how could SASAC be “the body acting as a fiduciary 
of the Chinese people” and is committed to achieving priorities that include difficult 
challenges such as “limiting behaviors Irregular state as a shareholder”? 
In fact, the current role of SASAC is quite different from what one might ideally seek to 
have or how the government initially understood it. With regard to one of the major 
governmental roles in the appointment, remuneration and dismissal of top managers, 
directors and directors of central firms and their subsidiaries, including listed companies, 
the final decisions on these matters remain firmly in the organization of the Chinese 
Communist Party. The Party should have over 90 million members that include most of the 
elite, so much so that it can assume that it is capable of creating a group of talents that are 
broad enough to presumably imitate a form of internal market competition to produce 
qualified subjects in the best possible way for any position. However, without really open 
and competitive markets for managerial talents, it will be difficult for the type of corporate 
governance model China is building to operate effectively. In the context of Chinese firms, 
in addition to the role of the Chinese Communist Party, the supervisory board since its 
inception in the early 1990s has also increased the complex duplicity of less transparent 
government agreements. The supervisory board has, however, been generally ineffective313 
although some ways have been suggested to improve its transparency governance 
function.314 
 
 																																																								313	Tam O. K. and Hu H.W., Supervisory board in Chinese corporate governance, in R. Ash e L.S. Ho, 
China, Hong Kong and the World Economy, 2006, London, Palgrave Macmillan. 314	Tam O. K., The development of Corporate Governance in China, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, 
MA, USA, Edward Elgar, 1999. 
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3.6.4 Conclusion on the Chinese system 
As in other areas of economic reform in China, the development of corporate governance 
has been a gradual development, research and experimentation of ideas and modalities 
from abroad and within to create its own system and useful to the national aspiration of 
economic growth and modernization. While rural reforms and the liberalization of 
centralized production quotas and prices are often driven by the logical appearance of 
market forces, for example, China’s approach to this important area of corporate 
governance development is led primarily by policy makers and regulators to wait for the 
construction of modern corporate and financial sectors. Since the Chinese government 
started its approach from the top down to the development of corporate governance in the 
early 1990s, there has been considerable progress in creating the many key elements and 
mechanisms it needs. The wave of laws and regulations introduced in the mid-1990s will 
play the role of establishing effective corporate governance devices while the country 
undergoing further reforms to create more of the economic and social institutions and 
business culture to effectively operate such devices. Government’s attempts to remove 
some of the obstacles as the initiative to allow most non-negotiable state-owned shares to 
become negotiable is a recognition by the Chinese authorities of the importance of 
developing a corporate governance and a position signal more active in making the 
corporate governance platform that has already been established work better. Clearly, there 
are still great challenges to building a truly functioning corporate governance system in 
China. In addition to rapid and steady economic growth in China, recent news reports of 
corporate scandals and crimes have also become commonplace in particularly recent years. 
Some of these scandals have involved the leaders of the largest business firms in the 
country, including the major state-owned banks. These are certainly symptoms of 
inadequacy and failures of national corporate governance devices. As noted in the 2005 
IFC 315  report, part of the problem is that, even with companies involved in good 
governance, the outcomes are often bankrupt or unsatisfactory with respect to the best 
practices that are expected to be implemented due to the lack of deeply rooted business 
traditions and corporate culture in China. In addition, the effectiveness and professionalism 
of the multitude of regulators is questionable,316 and the traditional problem of controlling 																																																								315	International Finance Corporation (IFC), Step-by-Step Corporate Governance Models in China: the 
Experience of the International Finance Corporation, 2005, Washington, DC: International Finance 
Corporation. 316	Cai H. W., Bonding, law enforcement and corporate governance in China, Stanford Journal of Law, 
Business and Finance, 2007, 13, pp. 82-120. 
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controllers must be addressed. However, China has not shown the phenomenon found in 
other developing countries where formal governance mechanisms are only foreseen for 
external electoral constituencies to achieve legitimacy and not being implemented.317 
Indeed, given that corporate governance could be a specific institution,318 its development 
in China will require continued vigilance and perseverance by all stakeholders to shape and 
operate the system. From the perspective of research that can offer new ways of thinking 
and insights into theoretical and empirical problems of corporate governance in general 
and China’s development experience in particular, there are excellent opportunities. For 
example, while state-owned enterprises still dominate the leverage of strategic industrial 
sectors in China, the private business sector, which is ninety percent of households’ 
ownership, 319  is gaining momentum in China’s economic growth. In 2009, private 
businesses created 11.4 million new jobs, contributing over ninety percent of the whole 
new urban use. In fact, private companies took more than 72 million people in 2007, 
exceeding the 61 million assumed by state-owned enterprises. At the end of 2008, 
households accounted for 31 percent of China’s listed companies.320 Family businesses are 
prevalent not only in Asia but also in rivals to widespread businesses and other non-family 
businesses in Europe, the Middle East and America.321 While family businesses are gaining 
increasing importance in the Chinese economy, the development of their corporate 
governance is often overlooked and not well understood or deepened. Given China’s 
potential growth, it will be very important to study what would be the best corporate 
governance in the world’s largest and rapidly expanding economy. 																																																													317	Wanyama S., Burton B. and Helliar C., Frameworks underpinning corporate governance: evidence on 
Ugandan perceptions, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 2009, 17(2), pp. 159-175. 318	Yoshikawa T. and Rasheed A. A., Convergence of corporate governance: critical review and future 
directions, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 2009, 17(3), pp. 388-404. 319	Zhang H. Y., Ming L. Z. e Liang C. Y., Development Report of Chinese Private Enterprises 2001, 
Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Press, 2002. 320	Zhou J., Tam O. K. and Zhao C., Do family managers outperform non-family managers? Evidence from 
Chinese public family firms, 2010, paper presented at the Corporate Governance and the Global Financial 
Crisis Conference, Wharton Business School, September 23rd 2010. 321	Claessens S., Djankov S. and Lang L. H. P., The separation of ownership and control in East Asian 
Corporation, Journal of Financial Economics, 2000, 58 (1-2), pp. 81-112; Faccio M. e Lang L. H. P., The 
ultimate ownership of Western European corporations, Journal of Financial Economics, 2002, 65(3), pp. 
365-395; La Porta R., Lopez-De-Silanes F. e Shleifer A., Corporate Ownership around the world, Journal of 
Finance, 54(2), pp. 471-517, 1999. 
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CHAPTER 4. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PROFIT SMOOTHING 																											
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4.1 Empirical study on accounting and financial data 
The study that is addressed in the following chapters has the purpose of understanding, 
through empirical analysis, the phenomenon of profit smoothing. 
With the definition of “data analysis”, a set of statistical methods is used to study a 
plurality of quantitative/qualitative variables detected on multiple units. The fundamental 
objective is to search for a pattern in the data, which, in the first approximation, can be 
considered to be the establishment of relationships between variables and the identification 
of similarities between the units. 
The analysis of the data is therefore the modern revision and extension of the part of the 
traditionally defined “descriptive” statistic. But the emphasis is on the joint treatment of 
multiple variables, and this aspect is often underlined by the specification: 
multidimensional data analysis. 
The novelties of the data mining322 are mainly due to the ability to process sets with a very 
high number of observations, in the order of hundreds of thousands of statistical units, but 
also millions, and the integration and harmonization of the various techniques in the field 
of a single procedure, in such a way as to offer a guided and facilitated path in the 
interpretation of the results. The enormous amount of data poses in the first place computer 
problems, both for the limitations of statistical software in the number of variables and 
units that they are able to handle, with dilations even in computing time, and because the 
data of nature corporate or administrative information are often stored in the data 
warehouse or in the banks in formats that are not immediately usable for statistical 
processing, so laborious conversion operations need to be done. New methodological 
approaches are becoming increasingly frequent, as pre-processing is essential to “clean up” 
the data set, eliminating errors, inconsistencies, abnormal values, and establishing 
appropriate treatments for missing data. This phase, in the presence of millions of units, is 
very long and complex and often requires ad hoc procedures. 
Data mining broadly considers information types that are not the subject of traditional data 
analysis methods, focused on quantitative and qualitative variables. The most important 
types of interest are the following: 
																																																								322	Data mining is the set of techniques and methodologies that have the object of extracting a knowledge or 
knowledge from large amounts of data (via automatic or semi-automatic methods) and scientific, industrial or 
operational use of this knowledge.	
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• Text mining, which examines statistical methods of words (newspaper articles, 
advertising messages) in order to locate recurring expressions more frequently and 
to group documents by topic, based on the words contained in them;323 
• Web mining, which takes into account the characteristics of visitors to a website 
(number of visits within a certain time frame, sequence of page views, duration of 
stay); 
• Data stream, i.e. information generated continuously in time or at very close time 
intervals, such as the electricity consumption continuously detected for different 
users, the levels of pollution measured by monitoring stations of a city, 
transactions on stock exchanges made by telematics; 
• Symbolic data, meaning those that do not translate into individual values, but are 
represented by lists, intervals, and distributions.324 
Often in data mining, data collection is performed automatically by means of computer 
tools. 
It is to be emphasized that the coordinated, but also mechanical, application of various 
statistical techniques of data mining, on the one hand, provides a guide to research, but on 
the other hand it risks neglecting the logical premises of each methodology and its 
limitations of applicability. The inexperienced researcher can see the results to which it can 
be obtained as the product of a black box, which ignores the effects and actions. The 
researcher should, however, always ask “why the phenomena” and deepen the meaning of 
every step of the analysis. 
For this reason, in the chapter presented, the various methods of analyzing 
multidimensional data will be described in detail, trying to explain and clarify the 
underlying ratio, the advantages and limits, the scope of application in the business field. 
The financial statement indices that are analyzed in the following paragraphs are generally 
the ratio between the economic, capital and financial amounts contained in the balance 
sheet and the income statement reclassified. Recurring analysis scheme is: (a) 
reclassification of the income statement and balance sheet; (b) identification and 
calculation of the most significant quotients; (c) comparison with reference values. At this 
																																																								323	See Bolasco, 1999; Weiss, 2005; Feldman and Singer, 2007.	324	See Liu, 2007.	
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point, the analysis stops to determine and verify the possible signals that are found and 
then further deepen through coordination systems.325 
The index classes considered are: 
1. Profitability; 
2. Productivity; 
3. Liquidity and working capital; 
4. Financial structure; 
5. Development. 
Profitability indices illustrate the level of profitability of the firm and the contribution of 
the various areas of management. 
 𝑅𝑂𝐸% = 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟!𝑠𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 
 
ROE (Return on Equity) represents the overall profitability of its own funds and is an 
index that approximates the level of self-financing that is intended to earn income. 
For a first estimate of the investment in the firm, a comparison is made with expected 
returns and with alternative investment returns. 
It is an indicator of the profitability actually obtained by the enterprise and hence the 
degree of risk remuneration sustained by the entrepreneur and associates. This index refers 
to all business management: feature, accessory, financial and extraordinary management. 
In other words, it can be summed up as the overall profitability of its own resources and 
approximate the level of self-financing (understood in the income statement). 
 𝑅𝑂𝐼% = 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 
 
ROI is an index that expresses the remuneration that management can produce for the 
financial resources collected. It is an indicator that measures the company’s income 
potential, regardless of extracurricular events, financial events, and the tax burden on 																																																								325	The co-ordination system is a set of techniques that foster the harmonization of many corporate functions 
in order to achieve the set goals. 
The main coordination tools are: 
- Determining the goals by which the various actions of the organizational units are directed towards a 
specific outcome; 
- Formulation of plans and programs; 
- Determination of rules to be followed by different organizational units;  
- Hierarchical determination.	
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which enterprise income is being met. Assess therefore, as mentioned above, the efficiency 
of the characteristic management.326 
 𝑅𝑂𝐴% = 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡  
 
It expresses the economical nature of its management. It is influenced by the growth rate of 
new investments and by the degree of amortization, in fact, by entering only the operating 
activities in the denominator, a more specific indication of the profitability of the asset 
management is obtained. 
 𝑅𝑂𝑆% = 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 (𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝑎𝑥)𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠  
 
The ROS% index highlights the profitability of sales as a direct expression of the link 
between selling prices, volumes and operating costs, given the net revenue generated. It 
also contributes to determining the level of ROA and tends to vary considerably depending 
on the sector of affiliation. 
The firm’s income capability is directly related to the productivity of invested capital and 
labor productivity. The higher the productivity of the factors employed, the higher the 
company’s earnings. 
Productivity indices express the amount of output obtained in relation to the resources used 
to obtain it. They are also defined as efficiency indicators for the use of production factors 
and are more significant when compared to the values of other companies in the same 
sector. 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 = 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 327 
 
This index identifies the number of times the invested capital returns in liquid form as a 
result of sales revenues. 
 
																																																								326	Capital Invested, net of non-typical management components, which are hard to find in the reclassified 
balance sheet, should represent ROI denominator.	327	Mutual (Total Assets/Net Income) expresses the intensity of capital: the volume of investments made to 
produce a sales unit.	
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𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 = 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 
 
It is an indication of the efficiency in the use of capital permanently invested in the 
company. Gross denominator values facilitate comparison with other firms. 
Liquidity and working capital indices put the financial risk at the center of the analysis. It 
can be measured by short-term solvency (liquidity) or through medium to long-term 
solvency (asset strength). Solvency affects the ability of creditors to renew their 
outstanding loans and the granting of new loans. 
The structure and financial performance indices measure medium to long-term solvency, or 
capital strength, which depends on the coherence between stable funding sources and 
durable loans and the degree of indebtedness, that is, dependence on third-party lenders. 
 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟!𝑠 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 328 
 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡!𝑠 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑁𝐹𝑃)𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡  
 
The net financial position (NFP) indicates the difference between financial payables, 
regardless of maturity, and financial assets (immediate liquidity) excluding equity 
investments. 
This is a more restrictive indicator on the financial coverage of financial charges.  
 
EBIT/FC = (EBIT/NI x NI/NFP) / (FC/NFP) 
 
This indicator allows you to simultaneously analyze the financial profile with the firm’s 
financial and economic size. 
In finance the result before financial charges or even operating income is the expression of 
the firm’s result before taxes and financial charges. The acronym EBIT is also widely used, 
which is derived from the Earnings Before Interests and Taxes expression. EBIT expresses 
the income that the firm can generate before the remuneration of the capital, including with 
this term both the capital of third parties (indebtedness) and equity (equity). In the 																																																								328	Degree of capitalization or equity participation in business risks.	
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formulation of the financial statement indices, it is used to obtain ROI (Return on 
Investment, EBIT/Net Capital Investment), which is the expression of the total return on 
capital invested in the firm, irrespective of their origin.329 
“Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization” represents the profit 
before interest expense, taxes and depreciation on tangible and intangible assets. 
This indicator, EBITDA, is useful for comparing the results of several firms operating in 
the same sector through comparative multiples (useful when price decisions are made in an 
initial public offering). Because EBITDA is a quick approximation of the value of cash 
flows produced by a company, it is often used, together with other more accurate and 
reliable methods, to approximate the value of a business. EBITDA can also be used to 
calculate the operating result of a firm, starting from gross profit, removing the company’s 
taxes, depreciation and interest. If costs will be higher than revenues, you will have a loss, 
respectively, if you will have higher cost revenues, you will have a profit. 
Among the indices that will be used in the following analysis is the gross profit. It is a term 
used in the economic and corporate sectors to define gross profit, i.e. the difference 
between revenues and costs incurred. This financial statement indicator represents the 
firm’s profit without going to consider extraordinary costs, taxes and any other items to be 
deducted from gross profit to get the firm’s net profit. The market usually rewards a listed 
company that reports a growth in gross profit with an increase in the value of the shares on 
the list or on the price lists where it is traded. A growing gross profit company often falls 
well within the orbits of fund managers who buy shares on the market. 
Finally, the last fundamental variable to be categorized and analyzed is the wage. Wages, 
like all remuneration for individual production factors, are a price but a price that does not 
follow the general market laws, as labor is not comparable to any commodity. In fact, work 
is inseparable from the worker’s person and therefore cannot be conveyed as capital or 
land; the market cannot withdraw it for a long time and its offer has a very particular trend, 
while job application obeys the usual laws of the application. In the context of free 
competition where the determination of the wage is left to the market and the individual 
workers contract individually with the employer outside any agreement between them, 
where there is a large number of workforce and limited employment opportunities, it is 
																																																								329	EBIT is often associated with the Net Operating Margin (or NOM) but does not coincide conceptually 
with it: in addition to the operating income components, EBIT includes the charges and income from 
ancillary management (e.g. real estate management for civilian use for a manufacturing company), as well as 
financial income from so-called active financial management.	
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fatally forced to go down to minimum levels. This is the situation that took place at the 
time of the Industrial Revolution, when the use of machines initially reduced demand for 
labor (while the influx of labor from the campaigns increased the supply) and workers, 
shrinking corporations, they found themselves without defense. It was precisely on the 
basis of the experience of that period class economists formulated their pessimistic theories 
of wages and that Marx elaborated his theory of surplus value. The natural wage, for Smith 
and Ricardo,330 is in fact the minimum sufficient to ensure the existence of the working 
class, which always ends up matching current or marketing wages. 
Economic reality has denied such pessimism and, as a result of both technical progress and 
reduced production costs, and the rise and strengthening of trade union organizations and 
social legislation, wages have progressively increased, regardless of monetary causes, and 
the working class’s living standards are largely favorably altered. The labor market is not 
taking place today in conditions of competition but in bilateral monopoly, and collective 
bargaining, backed by the weapon of the strike, has changed the strengths between the 
contractors. The wage, defined in the collective agreements between the employers’ 
organization and the corresponding organization of workers, is the result of a comparison 
of forces, while being naturally contained within the two extreme limits acceptable to the 
parties, employers are willing to pay, taking into account the marginal productivity of 
workers and without it being necessary to reduce the number of employees, and the 
minimum that workers are willing to accept in relation to the cost of living without a 
contraction of production. In such circumstances, it is not possible to say beforehand what 
the wage equilibrium is, but only what is the bargaining zone within which it will be 
determined peacefully or as a result of conflicts and possible interventions of the authority 
(conciliation attempts, arbitration, etc.). 																																																																				330	Or also wage necessary, according to J.S. Mill.	
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4.2. Empirical Review 
Several studies have been undertaken to study Profit alterations by Managers (Nonari, 
2002; Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; Degeorge, Zeckhauser & Patel, 1999). To accomplish 
this, managers can either alter the earnings number via accounting manipulations or 
changes to real operations. There is a vast body of literature that investigates the 
management of earnings through accounting manipulations designed to meet a variety of 
incentives (Healy, 1985; McNichols & Wilson, 1988; DeAngelo, 1994; Teoh, Welch & 
Wong, 1998; Kasznik, 1999).  
There is the belief that managers engage in profit smoothening taking actions that will 
reduce fluctuations in firm’s reported earnings. Ronen & Sadan (1981) found that 
managers engage in profit leveling with belief that investors prefer firms with smoother 
income. Lambert (1984) and Dye (1988) showed that a risk adverse manager who is 
precluded from borrowing and lending in the capital market has the incentive to smooth 
firms reported earnings. Trueman & Tiwan (1988) contrast from Dye & Lambert (1988) 
that within a market setting an incentive exists for a manager to smooth profit that is 
independent of either risk aversion or restricted access to capital markets. Graham et al 
(2005) report “an overwhelming percentage of respondents indicate that they prefer a 
smooth earning path”.  
Contemporary research has shown that managers used reporting discretion, which are 
categorized into garbing or efficient communication of private information. Managers may 
smooth reported earnings to meet bonus target (Hearly, 1985) or to protect the job 
(Fuderberg & Tirrole, 1995; Arya et al, 1988). The contracting theory argues that profit 
garbling is an equilibrium solution because the principal would otherwise pay a high 
premium to compensate the agent, who has information advantage for taking additional 
risk (Lambert 1984; Demski & Frimor 1999). Under this scenario even under efficient 
contract the communication has been garble and therefore the reported earnings is less 
informative about a firm’s profit and cash flows.  
In contrast, other studies show that managers use profit smoothing to bring to the fore 
private information and future earnings (Kirscheneiter & Melumad, 2002; Ronen & 
Sandan, 1981; Demski, 1988; Sankar & Subramaanyan, 2001). The reported 
communication can be either active or passive. According to Kirschenheister & Melumadd 
(2002) the level of reported earnings permit investors to predict level of permanent future 
cash flows. Fluctuation of earning increases uncertainty and reduces ability of investors to 
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predict permanent cash flows. The dual role motivates managers to smooth earnings. 
Ronen & Sadan (1981) argues that it is only firms with good future prospects that smooth 
earnings as borrowing from the future could have negative consequences on poorly 
performing firm. Michelson et al. (2000) smoother firms report higher abnormal return 
mean compared to non-smoother firms. Norani (2002) profit smoothing had no significant 
effect on the return of firms. Furthermore, the study found nature of industry firm belongs 
and size of the firm can influence abnormal accruals. Bao & Bao (2004) investigated effect 
of profit smoothing and earnings quality and concluded that no significant differences exist 
between earnings per share and share price of smoother and non-smoother firms.  
Despite rich literature on profit smoothing, few studies have been carried out in developing 
countries especially in China about effect of smoothing on performance of firms. This 
paper attempts to fill this gap and study the effect of smoothing and quality of earnings of 
firms quoted on Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 
 
 
4.2.1 Profit Smoothing Hypothesis  
Profit smoothing is the leveling or averaging of profit generated by entities to smooth the 
income from fluctuations from period to period.331 It is aimed at approximating reported 
income over the reporting period to create impression of stability of entities earnings. This 
is based on assumption that buyers of shares are willing to invest in entities with stable 
earnings. It is assumed that the preferences by investors of firms with stable earnings 
motivate some firms to indulge in creative accounting. Gordon (1964) suggested that 
managers could smooth income (or security) with assumption that stable income growth 
rate will be favored ahead of higher average income flows with more variations.  
The following prepositions were made. First, managers will aim to maximize utility. 
Secondly, utility increase with job security, growth and level of manager’s income and 
firm size. Thirdly, the satisfaction of shareholders motive of increasing income determines 
job security. Fourthly, shareholders satisfaction depends on increases with the average rate 
of growth in the firms’ income (or the average rate of return on its capital) and the stability 
of its income. It follows therefore that if the assumptions above are justified management 
within the latitude provided by accounting rules will smooth reported income as well as the 
rate of growth in income.  																																																								331	The definition of “profit smoothing” has been widely debated in the previous chapters.	
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Underlying the profit smoothing hypothesis there are two research questions: 
1. Whether among various firms’ components the apportionment of risk sharing can 
be quantified? 
2. If the risk can be diversified through different smoothing channels, which 
percentage of demand shock is smoothed by which smoothing channels? 
 
 
 
4.2.2 Smoothing Criterion and detecting approaches 
In order to test whether firms in the periphery sector are more likely to engage in artificial 
smoothing than companies in the core sector, I first selected a classification criterion. 
Because artificial smoothing behavior is the variable of interest, income variability may be 
compared to sales variability to control for the effects of real smoothing and naturally 
smooth income streams.  
According to Copeland (1968), profit smoothing could be discovered through three ways. 
First, get ascertain from management by interview or questionnaire. Second, contact other 
parties, such as auditors. Third, examine the financial statements. But the first two methods 
are difficult to depend on because management and auditors maybe unwilling to cooperate. 
In this regard Bao and Bao (2004) argued that profit smoothing behavior couldn’t be 
observed directly. This means that the available way to detect profit smoothing is through 
examining the financial statements. 
Among other approaches for detecting profit smoothing through examining the financial 
statements is Eckel’s (1981) approach (income variability approach), which has been the 
most popular and most used one.332 To build his model, Eckel (1981) stated the premises 
that: income is a linear function of sales and is equal to sales minus variable cost and fixed 
cost; the variable costs as percentage of sales remains constant over time; fixed costs may 
remain constant or increase from period to period, but may not be reduced; and the gross 
sales can only be intentionally smoothed by real smoothing but cannot be artificially 
smoothed. Accordingly, the following conclusions were stated: if	 I	=	S-(VC%	*	S)-	FC	and	 FC>0																																																									332	See for example: Albrecht and Richardson 1990, Ashari et al. 1994, Kousenidis et al. 2003, Iñiguez and 
Poveda 2004, Bao and Bao 2004, Prencipe et al. 2011, Kangarlouei et al. 2012, Hamad and Abu- Nassar 
2013, Alexandri and Anjani 2014, Aljuaidi and Aldaoor 2014, Harnovinsah and Indriani 2015, Bora and 
Saha 2016.	
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and	 FC!!! ≥ FC! 
and 0 < VC% <1  
and VC%!!! = VC%! = VC% 
then CV!!  ≤  CV!! 
 
In the current study, I applied Eckel’s (1981) method, in which the coefficient of variation 
is used to measure income and sales variability.333 Under this approach, a firm is not 
classified as an income smoother if  
 𝑆𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = 𝐶𝑉!!𝐶𝑉!! ≥ 1 
 
Where ΔI= one period change in income,  
ΔS = one period change in sales,  
CV = coefficient of variation. 
      = !"#$"%&'!"#$%&$' !"#$% 
 
So, when the variability of income is lower than the variability of sales, the firm is 
classified as a “smoother”: |CV ΔI ÷ CV ΔS| ≤ 1. 
If the ratio of the coefficients of variation is less than 1, some measure of income is being 
smoothed. Note that even if the ratio is not less than 1 for a particular firm, the firm may 
still be engaging in artificial smoothing behavior. 
Four measures of income that are possible objects of smoothing attempts are:  
(1) Operating income (OI), defined as sales less cost of goods sold and less operating costs 
other than depreciation and amortization,  
(2) Income from operations (IO), defined as OI less depreciation and amortization,  
(3) Income before extraordinary items (IE),  
(4) Net income (NI).  
 
 
 
 																																																								333	The coefficient of variation is a dimensionless measure of the variation of a group, and allows  for a 
comparison of variances between groups according to the SAS Users Guide: Basics (1985).  
	 213	
4.3 Methodology of research 
I now analyze in detail the methodology and model prepared to study the phenomenon of 
inter-temporal profit smoothing. 
 
 
4.3.1 Dataset and Data Collection 
This dataset was made using the financial statement information of n° 3304 companies 
listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE: total analyzed companies 1315) and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange (SZSE: total companies analyzed: 1989) from 2003 to 2016 via CSMAR 
database for Chinese companies. Domestic-only share (A-share) is listed in either 
Shenzhen or Shanghai; foreign-only share are listed in Shanghai or Shenzhen (B-share) or 
Hong Kong (H share). In order to maintain a homogeneous database and consistent for the 
analysis, it was cleaned from the B share type (listed in $) and only A-share were kept 
(listed in Yuan-RMB). 
A study that focuses on a single country needs to be carefully designed so as to avoid 
biased results, as pointed out by Ruland, Shon, and Zhou (2007). The adopted model and 
sample selection in our study avoid such implications as they take into consideration 
potential biases and control for associated effects334 as discussed below.  
The Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) was founded on November 26th 1990, and 
commenced operation on December 19th of the same year. The China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) directly governs it. SSE bases its development on the 
principles of rule of law, regulation, self-discipline, and compliance in order to create a 
transparent, open, secure and efficient marketplace. SSE endeavors to perform a variety of 
functions such as providing marketplace and facilities for the securities trading, 
formulating business rules, accepting and arranging listings, organizing and monitoring 
securities trading, regulating members and listed companies, and managing and publicizing 
market information. After 27 years of development, SSE has evolved into an exchange 
with a sound market structure and four major securities categories: equities, bonds, funds 
and derivatives. It has put into operation the world’s leading exchange system and 
infrastructure communication facilities that can contribute to the efficient running of the 																																																								334	Ruland et al. (2007) suggest that a properly designed test for within country experiments needs to control 
for firm specific attributes (e.g., size and profitability), industry effects, and self- selection bias. My tests do 
control for all these factors. 
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Shanghai securities market. Besides, a self-regulatory framework has been put into place 
regulating listed companies, SSE members and the securities market. By the end of 2016, 
SSE altogether had 1182 listed companies with the total market capitalization hitting 28.5 
trillion RMB. Its total annual turnover in 2016 stands at 50.2 trillion RMB and the average 
daily turnover reached 205.6 billion RMB. The total capital raised in the equities market in 
2016 was 805.6 billion RMB. The bond market consists of 8077 listed bonds with the 
outstanding value totaling 6.2 trillion RMB, the annual turnover standing at 224.7 trillion 
RMB. There are 137 funds with the annual turnover hitting 8.9 trillion RMB. The total 
value of premium of the derivatives market was 43.19 billion RMB in 2016. The number 
of registered accounts of investors has reached 224.85 million by the end of 2016. 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), established on 1st December 1990, is a self-regulated 
legal entity under the supervision of China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). It 
also organizes, supervises securities trading and performs duties prescribed by laws, 
regulations, rules and policies. Its main functions include providing the venue and facilities 
for securities trading, formulating operational rules, receiving listing applications and 
arranging securities listing, organizing and supervising securities trading, supervising 
members; regulating listed companies, managing and disseminating market information 
and other functions as approved by the CSRC. 
SZSE is committed to developing China’s multi-tiered capital market system, serving 
national economic development and transformation and supporting the national strategy of 
independent innovation. The SME Board was launched in May 2004. The ChiNext market 
was inaugurated in October 2009. Thus SZSE has basically put in place a framework of 
multi-tiered capital market comprising the Main Board, SME Board, and the ChiNext 
market. SZSE’s products cover equities, mutual funds and bonds. The product lines 
include A-shares, B-shares, indices, mutual funds (including ETFs and LOFs), fixed 
income products (including SME collective bonds and asset-backed securities), and 
diversified derivative financial products (including warrants and repurchases). SZSE plays 
an increasingly important role in supporting the real economy and transforming the 
nation’s economic growth model. 
Since 2000, SZSE has signed MOUs with 30 major stock exchanges and financial 
institutions in the world and enhanced cross-border cooperation and communications. It 
has also taken an active part in international securities organizations. SZSE is a member of 
both the World Federation of Exchanges (WFE) and the Asian and Oceania Stock 
Exchanges Federation (AOSEF). It is also an affiliate member of the International 
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Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). 
 
4.3.2 Variables 
Based on review of the literature, the model already tested and very useful for me to 
understand the variables to be used in my model, is of the following general form: 
Smoothing index = f(accounting risk, market risk, agency costs, political costs, ownership 
structure, industry). 
Accounting and market risk: drawing on the same literature reviewed in Moses (1987), 
they hypothesize a positive association between the smoothing of accounting earnings 
numbers and risk (both market and accounting). To the extent that smoothing can provide 
signals which enhance the accuracy of earnings forecasts, and given that unexpected 
earnings are positively associated with levels of systematic risk (Givoly and Lakonishok, 
1983, quoted in Moses), it is argued that wealth-maximizing managers would be anxious to 
smooth accounting earnings in order to maximize firm value. Similarly, Beidleman’s 
(1973) argument that smoothing tends to reduce a firm’s beta, suggests that managers of 
firms with high levels of market risk would have more incentive to smooth. Accounting 
risk has been included in the model in addition to market risk for two reasons. First, Moses 
(1987), in the only prior smoothing study, which adopts a positive accounting theory 
perspective, found this to be a significant explanatory variable. Second, in addition to the 
effect of systematic risk on the appropriate discount rate, total risk can have a negative 
effect on the firm’s expected cash flows because the expected costs of financial distress are 
related to total risk (Shapiro and Titman, 1985). 
Agency costs: three variables are used to proxy agency costs: dividend cover, gearing and 
managerial holdings of share options. I hypothesize a negative association between 
smoothing and dividend cover. Three arguments can be put forward to support such an 
association. First, by generating a more stable earnings stream, smoothing behavior is 
deemed to support a higher level of dividends and hence a higher share price (Gordon, 
1964). Second, smoothing reduces the probability of management having to cut dividends, 
an action usually associated with bad news and a negative share price response. Third, 
given the observed stability in dividend payout, smoothing reduces the expected 
transactions costs associated with the funding of an uncovered dividend (Rozeff, 1982). I 
hypothesize a positive relationship between smoothing behavior and gearing. Given that 
gearing proxies’ closeness to financial ratio covenants in debt agreements, it follows that 
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smoothing reduces the probability of breaching these covenants and hence reduces the 
expected costs of default and/or renegotiation. I therefore expect managers in more highly 
geared firms to undertake a greater degree of smoothing. I also hypothesize a positive 
relationship between smoothing and the level of managerial holdings of share options. This 
variable is a measure of the direct impact of any increases in share values (achieved by 
smoothing) on managers’ wealth, and represents an important accounting choice variable, 
which has been omitted in many previous studies (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990, p. 145). 
Political costs: the firm’s level of sales is used to proxy for the potential political costs, 
borne by the firm, arising from the impact of external groups on the firm’s activities. Such 
costs can arise in a number of ways: the impact of a regulatory directive, the impact of the 
firm having to pursue non-profit maximizing behavior and the cost of lobbying. This 
external intervention might be motivated by the firm’s supply of politically sensitive goods 
and services (Sutton, 1988) or the potential exercise of monopoly power (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986). Given that large unexpected earnings fluctuations can attract the 
attention of government regulators and/or the public, I hypothesize a positive association 
between political visibility and smoothing behavior, motivated by management’s wish to 
minimize the expected costs of potential external intervention. 
Ownership structure: I hypothesize that smoothing is negatively associated with the degree 
of outside ownership concentration. This tests the early smoothing studies’ argument that 
the incentive to smooth is largely confined to firms with diffuse share ownership, i.e. 
manager-controlled firms. It has become clear, however, that a single variable may not 
capture the full effects of ownership structure, especially the impact of significant 
managerial ownership (Hunt, 1986). To overcome this possible limitation, we therefore 
also include a managerial ownership variable, which captures two offsetting effects. First, 
as managerial ownership increases, the incentives of managers and outside shareholders 
become more closely aligned (Niehaus, 1989), and there is less incentive for wealth 
transferring activities. This suggests a negative association between smoothing and the 
level of managerial ownership. Second, however, as managerial ownership increases, the 
managerial labor market and the market for corporate control become less effective means 
by which managers are forced towards value-maximizing decisions. This is because a 
manager who owns a significant proportion of the firm’s equity often has sufficient voting 
power to guarantee future employment (Morck et al., 1988, p. 294). In the face of 
managerial incentives to smooth, an increase in managerial discretion can be expected to 
result in greater smoothing. The direct wealth effects of any increases in share values 
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(achieved by smoothing) are also suggestive of a positive association. A pion’, it is not 
clear which effect will dominate. 
Industry: industry sector dummies are included to control for any differential industry 
effects on smoothing incentives (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990, p. 145).  
Starting from this assumption, the variables calculated for each year (2003-2016) 
highlighted in my work are: 
Value Added (VA) is defining as (Sales-Cost of Materials); 
Gross Operating Margin (GOM) is equal to (VA-Wages); 
Net Operating Margin (NOM) is equal to (GOM-Depreciation); 
Operating Income (OI) is equal to (NOM-General and Administrative Expenses); 
After Interests Profits (AIP) is equal to (OI-Interests); 
After Tax Profits (ATP) is equal to (AIP-Taxes); 
Net Profit (NP) is equal to (ATP-Extraordinary Items). 
 
 
4.3.3 Model 
Following Asdrubali, Sørensen, and Yosha (1996) and Asdrubali and Kim (2004), who 
identify different levels or channels of smoothing to decompose the cross-sectional 
variance in gross-state product, I propose a framework to quantify the contribution of each 
smoothing channels at the firm level. I build on the variance-decomposition method 
delevoloped by Asdrubali, Sørensen, and Yosha, who have used a panel SUL (Nota: 
Seemingly Related Regression) to regress successively smoother idiosyncratic income 
measures on idiosyncratic GDP (in growth rates) and I develop a methodology that leads to 
a relationship such as the following:  
1= 𝛽!+𝛽! + 𝛽! + 𝛽! + 𝛽! + 𝛽! + 𝛽! + 𝛽! 
Where 𝛽!+𝛽! + 𝛽! + 𝛽! + 𝛽! + 𝛽! + 𝛽! + 𝛽! are the fractions of sales shock smoothed 
respectively via Materials ( 𝛽! ), Wages ( 𝛽! ), Depreciation ( 𝛽! ), General and 
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Administrative Expenses (G&A Expenses, 𝛽!), Interests (𝛽!), Taxes (𝛽!), Extraordinary 
Items (𝛽!) and 𝛽! is the fraction unsmoothed.  
In order to obtain a measure of smoothing from the identity in 1= 𝛽!+𝛽! + 𝛽! + 𝛽! +𝛽! + 𝛽! + 𝛽! + 𝛽!, I estimate the following model which takes the first differences of all 
variables: 
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠!! − ∆𝑉𝐴!! = 𝑣!,! + 𝛽!∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠!! + 𝑢!,!!  
∆𝑉𝐴!! − ∆𝐺𝑂𝑀!! = 𝑣!,! + 𝛽!∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠!! + 𝑢!,!!  
∆𝐺𝑂𝑀!! − ∆𝑁𝑂𝑀!! = 𝑣!,! + 𝛽!∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠!! + 𝑢!,!!  
∆𝑁𝑂𝑀!! − ∆𝑂𝐼!! = 𝑣!,! + 𝛽!∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠!! + 𝑢!,!!  
∆𝑂𝐼!! − ∆𝐴𝐼𝑃!! = 𝑣!,! + 𝛽!∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠!! + 𝑢!,!!  
∆𝐴𝐼𝑃!! − ∆𝐴𝑇𝑃!! = 𝑣!,! + 𝛽!∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠!! + 𝑢!,!!  
∆𝐴𝑇𝑃!! − ∆𝑁𝑃!! = 𝑣!,! + 𝛽!∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠!! + 𝑢!,!!  
∆𝑁𝑃!! = 𝑣!,! + 𝛽!∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠!! + 𝑢!,!!  
Using the above system of equations, I measure the extent to which changes in sales affect, 
e.g., value added and operating income. 
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4.4 Results 
As already defined, profit smoothing is the phenomenon that, through empirical study and 
analysis, can interpret the correlation between an income shock335 with respect to business 
variables. This allows us to understand how much of that shock is absorbed by one or the 
other specific channels within a reclassified scalar economic account. 
From this definition new visions are opened with respect to a profit interpretation: it can no 
longer be defined as a residual variable, as it has already been said, on the contrary it must 
be defined rather as a managerial objective.336 
To begin the empirical study, it is necessary to make a descriptive statistic analysis of the 
variables mentioned in the previous paragraph.337 
 
 
4.4.1 Descriptive analysis  
The tables below show the descriptive analyzes of the variables examined year by year 
(2003-2016) in order to have a clearer context of the database being examined. 
 
2003 
Variable N° of obs. Mean Stand. Dev. 
VA 1378 4.38e+08 2.76e+09 
GOM 1378 1.39e+08 1.20e+09 
NOM 1378 1.35e+08 1.19e+09 
OI 1378 1.58e+08 1.23e+09 
AIP 1378 1.51e+08 1.08e+09 
ATP 1378 1.12e+08 8.09+08 
NP 1378 1.09e+08 6.71e+08 
Figure 3: Profit Statement variables 2003. 
 
2004 
Variable N° of obs. Mean Stand. Dev. 
VA 1466 5.33e+08 3.68e+09 
GOM 1466 1.85e+08 1.73e+09 
NOM 1466 1.78e+08 1.72e+09 
OI 1466 1.99e+08 1.78e+09 
AIP 1466 1.91e+08 1.53e+09 																																																								335	Positive or negative.	336	Indeed, those who behave according to this canon have greater survival opportunities (shareholders are 
more willing to invest, banks consider them more trustworthy and have more resources from self-financing) - 
an evolutionist approach.	337	See §4.3.2.	
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ATP 1466 1.39e+08 1.09e+09 
NP 1466 1.41e+08 1.10e+09 
Figure 4: Profit Statement variables 2004. 
 
2005 
Variable N° of obs. Mean Stand. Dev. 
VA 1461 5.58e+08 3.73e+09 
GOM 1461 1.66e+08 1.63e+09 
NOM 1461 1.60e+08 1.62e+09 
OI 1461 1.83e+08 1.68e+09 
AIP 1461 1.85e+08 1.77e+09 
ATP 1461 1.27e+08 1.24e+09 
NP 1461 1.29e+08 1.25e+09 
Figure 5: Profit Statement variables 2005. 
 
2006 
Variable N° of obs. Mean Stand. Dev. 
VA 1544 1.05e+09 8.74e+09 
GOM 1544 4.92e+08 5.87e+09 
NOM 1544 4.54e+08 5.44e+09 
OI 1544 4.76e+08 4.95e+09 
AIP 1544 4.80e+08 4.99e+09 
ATP 1544 3.81e+08 4.42e+09 
NP 1544 3.86e+08 4.41e+09 
Figure 6: Profit Statement variables 2006. 
 
 
2007 
Variable N° of obs. Mean Stand. Dev. 
VA 1658 1.83e+09 1.50e+10 
GOM 1658 9.72e+08 9.07e+09 
NOM 1658 8.83e+08 8.33e+09 
OI 1658 1.05e+09 9.85e+09 
AIP 1658 1.08e+09 9.88e+09 
ATP 1658 8.62e+08 8.50e+09 
NP 1658 8.60e+08 8.51e+09 
Figure 7: Profit Statement variables 2007. 
 
2008 
Variable N° of obs. Mean Stand. Dev. 
VA 1712 2.00e+09 1.70e+10 
GOM 1712 9.96e+08 1.08e+10 
NOM 1712 7.60e+08 8.87e+09 
OI 1712 8.28e+08 9.75e+09 
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AIP 1712 8.93e+09 9.87e+09 
ATP 1712 5.59e+08 9.02e+09 
NP 1712 7.75e+08 9.05e+09 
Figure 8: Profit Statement variables 2008. 
 
 
2009 
Variable N° of obs. Mean Stand. Dev. 
VA 1860 2.05e+09 1.73e+10 
GOM 1860 9.52e+08 9.71e+09 
NOM 1860 8.67e+08 9.04e+09 
OI 1860 9.90e+08 1.02e+10 
AIP 1860 1.01e+09 1.02e+10 
ATP 1860 8.43e+08 8.96e+09 
NP 1860 8.45e+08 8.99e+09 
Figure 9: Profit Statement variables 2009. 
 
 
2010 
Variable N° of obs. Mean Stand. Dev. 
VA 2215 2.45e+09 2.07e+10 
GOM 2215 1.21e+09 1.17e+10 
NOM 2215 1.10e+09 1.07e+10 
OI 2215 1.22e+09 1.18e+10 
AIP 2215 1.26e+09 1.18e+10 
ATP 2215 1.04e+09 1.03e+10 
NP 2215 1.05e+09 1.04e+10 
Figure 10: Profit Statement variables 2010. 
 
 
2011 
Variable N° of obs. Mean Stand. Dev. 
VA 2449 2.73e+09 2.34e+10 
GOM 2449 1.32e+09 1.30e+10 
NOM 2449 1.19e+09 1.16e+10 
OI 2449 1.31e+09 1.26e+10 
AIP 2449 1.36e+09 1.26e+10 
ATP 2449 1.11e+09 1.09e+10 
NP 2249 1.12e+09 1.10e+10 
Figure 11: Profit Statement variables 20011. 
 
 
2012 
Variable N° of obs. Mean Stand. Dev. 
VA 2577 2.83e+09 2.46e+10 
GOM 2577 1.32e+09 1.39e+10 
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NOM 2577 1.16e+09 1.24e+10 
OI 2577 1.28e+09 1.33e+10 
AIP 2577 1.34e+09 1.33e+10 
ATP 2577 1.09e+09 1.14e+10 
NP 2577 1.07e+09 1.17e+10 
Figure 12: Profit Statement variables 2012. 
 
2013 
Variable N° of obs. Mean Stand. Dev. 
VA 2621 3.10e+09 2.62e+10 
GOM 2621 1.46e+09 1.52e+10 
NOM 2621 1.30e+09 1.37e+10 
OI 2621 1.45e+09 1.48e+10 
AIP 2621 1.51e+09 1.48e+10 
ATP 2621 1.24e+09 1.28e+10 
NP 2621 1.25e+09 1.29e+10 
Figure 13: Profit Statement variables 2013. 
 
2014 
Variable N° of obs. Mean Stand. Dev. 
VA 2736 3.26e+09 2.77e+10 
GOM 2736 1.54e+09 1.66e+10 
NOM 2736 1.30e+09 1.44e+10 
OI 2736 1.49e+09 1.56e+10 
AIP 2736 1.55e+09 1.57e+10 
ATP 2736 1.27e+09 1.34e+10 
NP 2736 1.28e+09 1.35e+10 
Figure 14: Profit Statement variables 2014. 
 
 
2015 
Variable N° of obs. Mean Stand. Dev. 
VA 2924 3.32e+09 2.79e+10 
GOM 2924 1.53e+09 1.73e+10 
NOM 2924 1.20e+09 1.42e+10 
OI 2924 1.47e+09 1.62e+10 
AIP 2924 1.54e+09 1.63e+10 
ATP 2924 1.26e+09 1.42e+10 
NP 2924 1.27e+09 1.43e+10 
Figure 15: Profit Statement variables 2015. 
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2016 
Variable N° of obs. Mean Stand. Dev. 
VA 3217 3.29e+09 2.70e+10 
GOM 3217 1.60e+09 1.78e+10 
NOM 3217 1.26e+09 1.46e+10 
OI 3217 1.48e+09 1.62e+10 
AIP 3217 1.54e+09 1.62e+10 
ATP 3217 1.29e+09 1.45e+10 
NP 3217 1.30e+09 1.46e+10 
Figure 16: Profit Statement variables 2016. 
 
The predominant role of a first phase of analysis, the descriptive one, has already been 
clarified. Descriptive statistics are a set of techniques used to describe the basic 
characteristics of data collected in an experiment/study. They provide a simple synthesis of 
the sample and the measurements collected. Along with simple graphic analysis, they are 
the initial starting point for any quantitative data analysis. While with descriptive statistics 
it is simply describing what we observe or what the data points in their essential traits, with 
inferential statistics, then we will try to reach conclusions that extend beyond the data 
collected in their immediate and which can be valid and relevant to a wider context than 
that of the single experiment/study data. To describe and summarize the sample 
information of a numeric interest phenomenon, the descriptive statistic focuses on three 
main aspects:  
1. Description and form of the distribution;  
2. Central position or tendency;  
3. Variability or dispersion.  
The tools provided by the descriptive statistics can be both graphical and numeric. In the 
last case, these are appropriate synthesis indexes, which in a single value express a specific 
characteristic of the data distribution: the central tendency, variability, and the form of the 
distribution. Summary indices are divided into middle or middle trend indices a) average, 
median, and mode; b) indices of variability or dispersion variance, standard deviation, 
range, and quantile range; asymmetry index. In this case, a descriptive study of the main 
variables on which the profit smoothing phenomenon is being studied has been made. Note 
how the individual variables are rather constant from one year to another indicating that 
there were no obvious economic shocks that influenced the analysis. The analysis was 
carried out through the indexes of position, highlighting the mean values and the standard 
deviation.  
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4.4.2 ANOVA test: general effects 
The table below (table number) shows the results for the percentage of shock (variation) of 
sales that is absorbed, for each smoothing level. Statistical inference is a process of 
generalization of the results obtained through partial sampling, limited to the consideration 
of some units or individual cases of the phenomenon of study, to the totality of the units or 
cases of the phenomenon, on the basis of plausible hypotheses. 
Taking into account the data highlighted in paragraph above, 338  profit-smoothing 
phenomenon is described in a variance fragmentation model and the results are apparent in 
the following tables: 
 
Percentage of shock to sales absorbed at each level of smoothing 
Variable 
(2003-2016) Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err. z P>|z| 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Wald 𝝌𝟐 
(13) 
Materials (β!) .87930 .0656 13.57 0.000 .7617 1.0189 3034.01 
Wages (β!) .06518 .0310 2.13 0.033 .0052 .1269 224.46 
Depreciation (β!) .00819 .0053 1.56 0.119 -.0021 .0188 118.25 
G&A Expenses339 
(β!) .00335 .0021 1.58 0.114 -.0008 .0076 57.41 
Interests (β!) -.00800 .0014 -5.77 0.000 -.0109 -.0053 433.79 
Taxes (β!) .00977 .0042 2.31 0.021 .0014 .0183 141.26 
Extraordinary Items 
(β!) -.00059 .0004 -1.62 0.105 -.0015 .0001 54.93 
Unsmoothed (β!) .04276 .0246 1.76 0.078 -.0049 .0915 135.21 
Figure 17: ANOVA, table for regression model to understand the channel of smoothing. 
Percentage of shock to sales absorbed at each level of smoothing. In this panes equation, the β coefficient s a 
weighted average of the year-by-year cross-sectional regression. That is, I interpret β!, β!, β!, β!, β!, β!, β! as the GLS estimate of the risk sharing equation regression, i.e. the incremental amount of smoothing 
achieved at each level, β! is the amount not smoothed.  
 
Table 17 shows my empirical results for the percentage of shock to sales absorbed at each 
level of smoothing. Consider the decomposition of smoothing into its various channels. 
One can easily notice that “Materials” (87.93%) plays the biggest part in absorbing shock 
sales. Such results imply that material costs –external costs- tend to provide insurance 
almost in order to 88.00% reduction in the standard deviation of sales. In addition, my 
breakdown shows that the amount of smoothing accomplished by “Wages” and 
“Depreciation” are respectively 6.51% and 0.81%, and are both significant as the previous 																																																								338	See § 4.3.	339	General and Administrative Expenses.	
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components. Such findings are consistent with most existing literature (e.g. Barefield and 
Comiskey, 1971; Michaely and Roberts, 2012), and at the same time they somewhat 
confute the latter, at least for what concerns the impact of firm depreciation policy on sales 
volatility. Indeed, based on the premise that “effective smoothing device should not 
establishing a precedent to which the principles of consistency may apply”340 does not 
acknowledge the use of depreciation to produce a smoother income stream. Although the 
smoothing effect of depreciation being small, my evidence instead implies that 
depreciation is mot irrelevant for income smoothing. In addition it signals that a lower 
amount of smoothing is accomplished through “G&A Expenses” (0.33%), and “Taxes” 
(0.09%) considerations. Contrary to claims found elsewhere in the literature (Beattie et al., 
1994; Craig and Walsh, 1989), “Interest” and “Extraordinary Items” have a dis-smoothing 
effect.  
Finally, the amount of smoothing at the last level, i.e. the unsmoothed fraction, equals to 
4.42%, and suggests that the residual share of income, i.e. what is commonly conceived as 
owners’ profit, is less likely to be used as a major time-varying risk-sharing device. All in 
all, the evidence from Table 17 suggests that most of my findings be not explained solely 
by firm material costs considerations.  
 
 
 
4.4.3 Profit Smoothing and sign of demand shock 
To gain further insight and ensure the robustness of my inferences, I analyze the 
differential response of sales to negative and positive demand shocks. The results are 
presented in Table 18 and 19. Interestingly, given a similar smoothing impact of 
“Materials”, my evidence here emphasizes that a different smoothing mechanism tends to 
be used in the two cases. In case of a negative demand shock, a considerable part of such 
shock is absorbed by “Taxes” (2.05%), also we can see a dis-smoothing effect by 
“Depreciation” (-2.09%). Conversely, in case of a positive demand shock, the major part of 
income smoothing (11.41%) is achieved by maneuvering “Wages” versus -0.93% for a 
negative shock for the same variable. There is thus an asymmetry in shock absorption. 
 
 
 
 																																																								340	Copeland, 1968 (p.102).	
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Percentage of negative shock to sales absorbed at each level of smoothing: sign of shock to 
sales 
Variable 
(2003-2016) Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err. z P>|z| 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Wald 𝝌𝟐 
(13) 
Materials (β!) .95462 .0027 347.5 0.000 .9395 .9502 121107.5 
Wages (β!) -.00939 .0013 -7.09 0.000 -.0119 -.0067 95.10 
Depreciation (β!) -.02091 .0008 -23.46 0.000 -.0224 -.0190 610.10 
G&A Expenses 
(β!) .00889 .0008 10.72 0.000 .0071 .0104 137.51 
Interests (β!) -.00424 .0006 -6.52 0.000 -.0055 -.0029 59.84 
Taxes (β!) .02020 .0004 46.21 0.000 .0192 .0209 2176.56 
Extraordinary 
Items (β!) .00001 .0000 0.50 0.618 .0000 .0000 105.85 
Unsmoothed (β!) .05081 .0013 37.68 0.000 .0477 .0529 1460.85 
Figure 18: Test for Negative Shock. 
 
Percentage of positive shock to sales absorbed at each level of smoothing: sign of shock to 
sales 
Variable 
(2003-2016) Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err. z P>|z| 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Wald 𝝌𝟐 
(13) 
Materials (β!) .82239 .0018 446.5 0.000 .8123 .8195 200801.3 
Wages (β!) .11410 .0007 162.4 0.000 .1118 .1146 26589.25 
Depreciation (β!) .01733 .0006 27.94 0.000 .0160 .0184 888.56 
G&A Expenses 
(β!) -.00181 .0008 -2.18 0.029 -.0035 -.0001 42.03 
Interests (β!) -.01007 .0003 -32.95 0.000 -.0106 -.0094 1097.45 
Taxes (β!) .00796 .0003 23.86 0.000 .0073 .0086 723.29 
Extraordinary 
Items (β!) -.00100 .0001 -5.35 0.000 -.0014 -0.006 47.03 
Unsmoothed (β!) .05110 .0014 34.06 0.000 .0478 .0537 1246.58 
Figure 19: Test for Positive Shock. 
 
 
4.4.4 Firms’ Size and Profit Smoothing  
Continuing the analysis more profoundly of the profit smoothing phenomenon, I was 
thinking of widening the study also through a business-size classification. The size of the 
enterprise was assessed by the number of employees involved in a firm (2003-2016). I 
wanted to point out the size analysis, as business choices can be very dissimilar between 
big corporations and small firms. Since there are no specific regulations classifying for 
Chinese companies according to the classic (small-medium-big) dimensions, I’ve 
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considered updated directives and EC parameters (European Community, 2016) as the 
source of reference. 
The EC provides the following dimensional classifications of enterprises considering the 
variable of employees: 
A. Small businesses: 0-49 employees; 
B. Medium businesses: 50-249 employees; 
C. Large businesses: >250 employees. 
 
Dimensional classification of firms (variable: employees) 
Dimensions Number of firms 
Small (0-49) 58 
Medium (50-249) 185 
Big (>250) 3061 
TOTAL 3304 
Figure 20: Sample dimension. 
 
 
Percentage of shock to sales absorbed to each level of smoothing: small dimension 
Variable 
(2003-2016) Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err. z P>|z| 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Wald 𝝌𝟐 
(13) 
Materials (β!) .80688 .0078 102.9 0.000 .7903 .8210 10946.24 
Wages (β!) .08995 .0037 24.22 0.000 .0825 .0971 622.84 
Depreciation (β!) -.00035 .0040 -0.09 0.929 -.0082 .0075 21.69 
G&A Expenses 
(β!) -.00528 .0022 -2.30 0.021 -.0097 -.0007 20.13 
Interests (β!) -.00223 .0024 -0.93 0.353 -.0069 .0024 11.49 
Taxes (β!) .01926 .0014 13.46 0.000 .0164 .0220 211.34 
Extraordinary 
Items (β!) -.00005 .0005 -0.10 0.918 -.0011 .0010 13.97 
Unsmoothed (β!) .09180 .0071 12.74 0.000 .0776 .1058 176.64 
Figure 21: Small dimension. 
 
 
Percentage of shock to sales absorbed to each level of smoothing: medium dimension 
Variable 
(2003-2016) Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err. z P>|z| 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Wald 𝝌𝟐 
(13) 
Materials (β!) .82468 .0064 126.8 0.000 .8115 .8370 16692.75 
Wages (β!) .07654 .0037 20.62 0.000 .0692 .0692 472.03 
Depreciation (β!) .00124 .0021 0.57 0.568 -.0030 .0055 26.73 
G&A Expenses 
(β!) .00469 .0031 1.49 0.137 -.0014 .0108 22.74 
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Interests (β!) .00187 .0034 0.54 0.591 -.0049 .0087 22.24 
Taxes (β!) .02563 .0012 19.99 0.000 .0231 .0281 416.44 
Extraordinary 
Items (β!) .000099 .0003 0.27 0.791 -.0006 .0008 11.88 
Unsmoothed (β!) .065616 .0063 10.39 0.000 .0532 .0779 136.17 
Figure 22: Medium dimension. 
 
 
Percentage of shock to sales absorbed to each level of smoothing: big dimension 
Variable 
(2003-2016) Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err. z P>|z| 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Wald 𝝌𝟐 
(13) 
Materials (β!) .87940 .0015 587.0 0.000 .8873 .8932 345677.3 
Wages (β!) .06512 .0007 92.77 0.000 .0646 .0674 8690.58 
Depreciation (β!) .00817 .0005 16.04 0.000 .0073 .0094 387.40 
G&A Expenses 
(β!) .00334 .0006 5.16 0.000 .0021 .0047 73.64 
Interests (β!) -.00805 .0003 -27.03 0.000 -.0087 -.0075 751.59 
Taxes (β!) .00968 .0002 38.35 0.000 .0093 .0103 1598.95 
Extraordinary 
Items (β!) -.00059 .0001 -4.97 0.000 -.0009 -.0004 41.24 
Unsmoothed (β!) .04266 .0009 47.12 0.000 .0414 .0450 2310.13 
Figure 23: Big dimension. 
 
 
 
4.4.5 Profit smoothing: sectorial breakdown 
An interesting question is whether smoothing channels vary according to the industry in 
which organizations operate. The following Tables show evidence concerning the sectorial 
breakdown of my results. Although it is confirmed that “Wages” absorb the largest 
percentage of shock in all sector (without considering “Materials”), some interesting 
differences emerge among primary, manufacturing and service sectors.   
Given the Chinese database, before starting the sector analysis, I have highlighted the areas 
of reference. In particular, I have highlighted six sectors: 
1. Financial; 
2. Utilities; 
3. Real Estate; 
4. Integrate (Mining & Transportation); 
5. Manufacturing; 
6. Service, Retail & Wholesale. 
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Compare Shanghai Stock Exchange to Shenzhen Stock Exchange by Sector (2016) 
Sector Shanghai Stock Exchange Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
Financial 32% 7.2% 
Utilities 14.5% Less than 3% 
Real Estate Less than 3% 14.9% 
Integrate 4.5% 3.6% 
Manufacturing 43% 60% 
Service, Retail & 
Wholesales 
Less than 3% 11.3% 
Figure 24: Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange by Sector. 
 
To understand my analysis is necessary specify even the number of the firms in the 
Chinese Database: 
Sectorial breakdown 
Sector Numbers of firms 
Financial 332 
Utilities 378 
Real Estate 158 
Integrate 123 
Manufacturing 2202 
Service, Retail & Wholesales 111 
TOTAL 3304 
Figure 25: Dimension of Sectorial Breakdown. 
 
 
Percentage of shocks to sales absorbed at each level of smoothing. Sectorial composition: 
Financial 
Variable 
(2003-2016) Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err. z P>|z| 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Wald 𝝌𝟐 
(13) 
Materials (β!) .05182 .0042 10.77 0.000 .0370 .0535 138.69 
Wages (β!) .29031 .0034 72.58 0.000 24.63 .2600 5447.62 
Depreciation (β!) .16457 .0059 24.19 0.000 .1319 .1552 674.19 
G&A Expenses 
(β!) .03255 .0091 3.10 0.002 .0104 .0464 39.65 
Interests (β!) -.00149 .0004 -3.06 0.002 -.0022 -.0005 28.61 
Taxes (β!) .00150 .0004 3.06 0.002 .0005 .0022 28.61 
Extraordinary 
Items (β!) -.08118 .0023 -30.24 0.000 -.0754 -.0662 1014.58 
Unsmoothed (β!) .54199 .0091 51.81 0.000 .4549 .4906 2729.79 
Figure 26: Financial. 
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Percentage of shocks to sales absorbed at each level of smoothing. Sectorial composition: 
Utilities 
Variable 
(2003-2016) 
Coef. Robust 
Std. Err. 
z P>|z| [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Wald 𝝌𝟐 
(13) 
Materials (β!) .84338 .0042 191.2 0.000 .7952 .8117 37214.04 
Wages (β!) .10599 .0017 58.40 0.000 .0975 .1043 3517.90 
Depreciation (β!) .00539 .0009 50.19 0.000 .0031 .0070 62.85 
G&A Expenses 
(β!) -.00395 .0018 -1.99 0.047 -.0074 .0000 25.07 
Interests (β!) -.00190 .0008 -2.21 0.027 -.0035 -.0002 25.38 
Taxes (β!) .00199 .0008 2.21 0.027 .0002 .0035 25.38 
Extraordinary 
Items (β!) -.02574 .0010 -23.75 0.000 -.0265 -.0224 625.84 
Unsmoothed (β!) .07493 .0033 21.37 0.000 .0648 .0779 541.23 
Figure 27: Utilities. 
 
 
Percentage of shocks to sales absorbed at each level of smoothing. Sectorial composition: 
Real Estate 
Variable 
(2003-2016) Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err. z P>|z| 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Wald 𝝌𝟐 
(13) 
Materials (β!) .82397 .0054 146.3 0.000 .7835 .8048 21707.74 
Wages (β!) .13436 .0021 60.94 0.000 .1252 .1336 3844.01 
Depreciation (β!) .02608 .0034 7.34 0.000 .0183 .0317 79.92 
G&A Expenses 
(β!) -.03218 .0020 -15.46 0.000 -.0349 -.0270 286.08 
Interests (β!) -.00068 .0007 -0.74 0.460 -.0021 .0009 11.39 
Taxes (β!) .00058 .0007 0.74 0.460 -.0009 .0021 11.39 
Extraordinary 
Items (β!) -.02842 .0011 -23.90 0.000 -.0296 -.0251 617.87 
Unsmoothed (β!) .07620 .0035 20.46 0.000 .0664 .0805 439.59 
Figure 28: Real Estate. 
 
 
Percentage of shocks to sales absorbed at each level of smoothing. Sectorial composition: 
Integrate 
Variable 
(2003-2016) Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err. z P>|z| 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Wald 𝝌𝟐 
(13) 
Materials (β!) .47892 .0170 27.70 0.000 .4392 .5061 800.93 
Wages (β!) .06925 .0034 20.11 0.000 .0616 .0750 435.83 
Depreciation (β!) .03355 .0051 6.43 0.000 .0230 .0432 43.81 
G&A Expenses 
(β!) .01279 .0051 2.45 0.014 .0025 .0226 14.65 
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Interests (β!) .00553 .0065 0.84 0.399 -.0073 .0183 16.30 
Taxes (β!) -.00563 .0065 -0.84 0.399 -.0183 .0073 16.30 
Extraordinary 
Items (β!) -.00792 .0019 -4.05 0.000 -.0116 -.0040 21.85 
Unsmoothed (β!) .41339 .0173 23.56 0.000 .3740 .4419 614.77 
Figure 29: Integrate. 
 
 
Percentage of shocks to sales absorbed at each level of smoothing. Sectorial composition: 
Manufacturing 
Variable 
(2003-2016) Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err. z P>|z| 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Wald 𝝌𝟐 
(13) 
Materials (β!) .91864 .0012 715.9 0.000 .9134 .9184 514751.7 
Wages (β!) .05509 .0007 72.97 0.000 .0534 .0563 5366.30 
Depreciation (β!) .00063 .0002 2.23 0.026 .0000 .0011 83.25 
G&A Expenses 
(β!) .00314 .0002 12.36 0.000 .0026 .0036 185.74 
Interests (β!) -.00880 .0003 -23.57 0.000 -.0095 -.0080 573.52 
Taxes (β!) .00801 .0003 23.57 0.000 .0080 .0095 573.52 
Extraordinary 
Items (β!) -.00624 .0002 -29.01 0.000 -.0066 -.0058 923.69 
Unsmoothed (β!) .02879 .0006 43.10 0.000 .0273 .0299 1982.15 
Figure 30: Manufacturing. 
 
 
Percentage of shocks to sales absorbed at each level of smoothing. Sectorial composition: 
Service, Retail & Wholesales 
Variable 
(2003-2016) 
Coef. Robust 
Std. Err. 
z P>|z| [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Wald 𝝌𝟐 
(13) 
Materials (β!) .95581 .0019 493.0 0.000 .9455 .9530 246663.7 
Wages (β!) .03565 .0017 20.71 0.000 .0320 .0388 476.74 
Depreciation (β!) .00241 .0003 6.87 0.000 .0017 .0031 58.80 
G&A Expenses 
(β!) -.00596 .0007 -7.76 0.000 -.0073 -.0043 90.54 
Interests (β!) -.00099 .0003 -2.56 0.002 -.0015 -.0002 19.39 
Taxes (β!) .00109 .0003 2.56 0.002 .0002 .0015 19.39 
Extraordinary 
Items (β!) -.00395 .0002 -18.00 0.000 -.0043 -.0035 381.70 
Unsmoothed (β!) .01587 .0008 18.23 0.000 .0140 .0174 394.88 
Figure 31: Service, Retail & Wholesales. 
 
First, my finding demonstrates that the fraction of smoothing occurring through wages 
tends to be higher (25.32%) in the “Financial” sector rather in the remainders.  
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Second, a di-smoothing effect of “Extraordinary Items” is registered in all sectors. 
Furthermore, a di-smoothing effect of “General & Administrative Expenses” is registering 
in “Utilities” (-0.37%), “Real Estate” (-3.09%), and “Service, Retail & Wholesales” sectors 
(-0.58%) as compared to the “Financial”, “Integrate”, and “Manufacturing” sectors. 
Conversely, “General & Administrative Expensive” in such sectors might be said to absorb 
a rather small but positive amount of demand shocks to sales (2.84%; 1.25%; and 0.31%). 
Third, “Depreciation” sector seems to play a bigger part in determining depreciation 
smoothing in all sector, especially in the “Financial”, “Real Estate”, and “Integrate” sector 
(14.35%; 2.50%; and 3.31%). I interpret these results as a consequence of the fact that 
depreciation burden passed between sectors varies from one sector to the others, and 
accordingly the role of net profits as a smoothing channels changes.  
Fourth, my results clearly indicate an increasing importance (47.27%; 7.14%; 7.35%; and 
40.79%) of smoothing occurring through profits (i.e. the unsmoothing percentage) in the 
“Financial”, “Utilities”, “Real Estate”, and “Integrate” sectors, rather than in the 
“Manufacturing” and “Service, Retail & Wholesales” sectors. 
Finally, another important factor to note is that sectors that have a third party as 
counterparts into the company can absorb (and thus smooth) a shock in sales to external 
costs (Materials). Instead, if the sectors that fail to blur outside (“Financial” and 
“Integrate” sector) must somehow find the internal channel to smooth the shock of sales. 
As we can see, especially in “Financial” Sector, Material can absorbed just 5.18% of shock 
because this channel means that those who support this shock are just those who deposit 
money into financial companies and therefore customers. Much higher is the level of non-
smooth (Unsmoothed), that is, the level of profit that cannot be blunted. In this case, as we 
can see, there are not many channels to go to touch to absorb a shock; all the shock is 
poured into profit (54.19% for “Financial” Sector and 41.33% for “Integrate” Sector versus 
7.4% in “Utilities”, 7.6% in “Real Estate”, 2.8% in “Manufacturing” and 1.5% in “Service, 
Retail and Wholesales”. 
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CHAPTER 5. 
MANAGEMENT BEHAVIOR AND PROFIT SMOOTHING. 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY 
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5.1 Country breakdown analysis 
In order to further understand the role of each smoothing channels, I now turn to the 
analysis of risk sharing by country. Compared to the general case, some relevant 
differences are detected at the country level. In particular, the insurance function provided 
by G&A Expenses is confirmed in most countries, the only exception being Belgium and 
Estonia. However, inter-country differences emerge in term of risk sharing via other 
channels. Consider, in particular, Extraordinary Items. Whereas Extraordinary Items 
register a dis-smoothing effect in the general case, one can note how such effect turns to 
positive and significant in such countries as Austria, Spain, Norway, Romania, Sweden, 
Slovenia, and Portugal especially (18.14%). The result obtained for Portugal is particularly 
and further assesse what has been already demonstrate in previous studies on the 
implications of tax policy (Marques, Rodrigues, and Craig, 2011) and accruals be regarded 
as one country in which firms mostly tend to smooth income via extraordinary items and 
taxes due to tax savings incentives and higher accounting discretion.  
Finally, it should be noted that a sort of substitution pattern for income smoothing occurs 
between wages and profit within specific countries. In particular, I register lower 
percentage of wages smoothing whereas higher profit smoothing in Estonia, Italy, Poland, 
Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Ukraine. Conversely, the case if Germany is somewhat 
singular in that wages smoothing is considerably high (17.03%) whereas profits have a dis-
smoothing effect. I interpret such findings in light of the differences in terms of labor 
protection and trade unions role between the considered countries. For instance, if one loos 
at the OECD data on trade union density and labor protection for the period 2003-2013 
(OECD, 2014) one might easily notice that the above mentioned countries are featured by 
considerably high levels of protection of workers against individual and collective 
dismissals, as signaled by average values of the OECD indicator of labor protection for the 
period 2003-2013, which assume values grater than 2. Thus, the average indicator for 
Portugal (4.19) confirms my previous intuition that income smoothing tends to occur 
through channels other than wages. The same holds if one looks at trade union density. 
According to OECD estimate, Estonia, Italy, Poland, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, and 
Ukraine have the highest trade union density (i.e. the percentage of employees who are 
members of a trade-union), which makes it difficult to maneuver wages in such countries. 
Again one exception is Germany where wages smoothing is considerable in split of 
comparably high levels of workers unionization and protection.  
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Under a different viewpoint, country variations in smoothing channels might also be 
related to institutional ownership of publicity-listed companies. Thus, particularly high 
levels of profits smoothing in such countries as Sweden might be explained by similarly 
high percentages of GDP in term of assets under management by institutional investors, 
which usually push firm managers to focus on long-term profitability rather than be pre-
occupied with smoothing income on a year-by-year basis. Indeed, there are studies 
showing that, when institutional investors collectively own a large percentage of 
outstanding shares, managers are deterred from fully pursuing opportunistic earnings 
management through discretionary accrual choices (Chung, Firth and Kim, 2002). Thus, a 
lower percentage of smoothing via profits relative to wager might be seen as a 
consequence of the corporate governance function of large institutional investors. Such 
observation helps further explain the unexpected results obtained for Portugal, where 
profits appear to have a strong dis-smoothing impact (-13.64%). Indeed, OECD average 
2003-2013 percentage of asset owned by institutional investors on GDP for Portugal is one 
of the highest (60.7%) in the sample of OECD countries.  
 
Risk sharing country breakdown (percent) 1/2 
Figure 32: Sample of OECD countries 1/2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 AT BE BG CZ DE EE ES FR IT 
Materials (𝛃𝐊) 81.9 92.0 64.7 80.4 62.6 94.05 71.53 79.1 76,2 
Wages (𝛃𝐅) 4.45 1.42 0.64 2.90 17.0 1.03 4.46 5.03 1.80 
Depreciation 
(𝛃𝐂) 1.13 0.90 1.22 2.30 3.98 0.25 2.75 1.26 6.13 
G&A 
Expenses (𝛃𝐃) 11.5 3.55 30.1 7.73 18.5 2.35 14.6 12.4 9.36 
Interests (𝛃𝐄) -1.19 1.63 1.78 1.47 0.94 -0.77 1.47 0.24 2.93 
Taxes (𝛃𝐆) 0.57 0.28 0.31 1.11 -0.45 0.04 1.55 0.37 3.09 
Extraordinary 
Items (𝛃𝐇) 0.09 -2.2 -0.02 -0.12 -0.47 0.00 0.45 -0.4 -2.5 
Unsmoothed 
(𝛃𝐔) 1.46 2.36 1.20 1.20 -2.16 3.06 3.17 2.84 2.94 
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Risk sharing country breakdown (percent) 2/2 
Figure 33: Sample of OECD counties 2/2. Source: Asdrubali, Vagnani, Ventura (2014). 
Note: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Bulgaria (BG), Czech Republic (CZ), Germany (GE), Estonia (EE), 
Spain (ES), France (FR), Italy (IT), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Romania (RO), Serbia (RS), 
Sweden (SE), Slovenia (SI), Slovakia (SK), Ukraine (UA). 
 
My framework considers the full range of firm constituents, rather than a single smoothing 
variable or technique, thus providing insight on which channels firm tend to use mostly as 
a “shock absorbed” in order to provide insurance to specific constituents. Each firm 
constituent, upon joining the firm, seems to agree accepting a more or less large fraction of 
its income in the form of a share of the residual, depending for instance on the degree of 
mobility (and relatedly on the extend of transaction costs incurred in changing 
employment) and information that each factor can leverage (Schumpeter, 1934). Firms 
might thus been said ho have the two-faced nature of both work-sharing and risk-sharing 
entities (Eisenhardt, 1985). However, most of previous studies on risk have contemplated 
only the perspectives of shareholders or managers and often considered dividends as a 
natural shock absorbed. This study instead shifts attention to the overall firms’ costs 
structures. More generally, I analyze the properties of different smoothing device in order 
to uncover as whether and to what extend they abide by Copeland’s (1968) original 
definition of a “perfect smoothing device”.  
Going on, I extend extant empirical works on income smoothing by analyzing the 
decomposition of income variance in a wider inter-temporal and spatial perspective. 
Concerning the spatial dimension, in particular, I show the extent to which results on 
income smoothing at the firm level can be generalized across different sample size and EU 
 NO PL PT RO RS SE SI SK UA 
Materials (𝛃𝐊) 62.6 33.7 44.5 58.1 68.9 53.0 85.6 89.1 16.4 
Wages (𝛃𝐅) 6.06 1.67 3.09 1.43 6.33 6.37 2.64 1.04 1.30 
Depreciation (𝛃𝐂) 10.6 0.68 4.10 1.34 2.75 -1.59 0.86 0.23 0.35 
G&A Expenses 
(𝛃𝐃) 8.55 55.2 41.4 31.4 15.0 30.0 8.21 8.35 77.8 
Interests (𝛃𝐄) 4.08 -0.3 1.99 0.24 -3.2 1.18 -0.9 -0.1 0.54 
Taxes (𝛃𝐆) 8.22 0.90 0.31 0.72 0.96 2.19 0.38 0.26 1.24 
Extraordinary 
Items (𝛃𝐇) 1.94 -0.06 18.1 0.01 -0.4 0.51 0.24 -0.04 -1.62 
Unsmoothed (𝛃𝐔) -2.14 3.80 -13.6 6.68 9.64 7.94 3.02 1.10 3.87 
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counties.341  
Furthermore, I shed some light on the relationship between firm size and income 
smoothing behavior, and relatedly on how risk sharing tends to occur at the “Small” and 
“Medium-Sized” Enterprise (SMEs) level. Under this perspective, my findings might 
contribute to understand the magnitude of insurance provide for specific SMEs’ 
constituents, such as e.g. financial intermediaries, through which most resources are 
channeled to SMEs.  
Finally and more generally, this work allows gaining insight on firm income smoothing 
behavior by employing a more robust and accurate methodology than those traditionally 
based on the use of the coefficient of variation to measure income and sales variability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								341	Magni D., Profit Smoothing. Verso una implicazione strategica del ruolo del profitto, 2014. EAI, 
Edizioni Accademiche Italiane.	
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5.2 Summary of findings and future research directions  
The economic and financial press regularly comments on the accounting manipulations of 
managers to modify their firms’ published results. In this respect, income smoothing has 
attracted substantial attention in the literature. We saw that there are many studies in the 
international literature that indicate that firms engage in practices to reduce the variance of 
earnings. This work adds to this evidence, showing empirically that Chinese companies 
listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange engage in smoothing, i.e., they take 
advantage of the inherent leeway in accounting rules to artificially smooth out their 
earnings. 
Based on the analysis of a sample of firms over the period from 2003 to 2016, this work 
presents empirical evidence that Chinese companies that engage in smoothing on average 
stand apart from those that do not with respect to risk, return, size and industrial sector. 
The results can be summarized by the hypotheses investigated, as follows in Table 34, 35 : 
 
Summary of Findings: general effect 
Channels 2003-2016 
Materials 87.93% 
Wages 6.51% 
Depreciation 0.84% 
General and Administrative Expenses 0.33% 
Interests -0.80% 
Taxes 0.97% 
Extraordinary Items -0.05% 
Unsmoothed 4.27% 
Figure 34: General effect. 
 
Summary of Findings: Negative and Positive shock 
2003-2016 
Channels Negative shock Positive shock 
Materials 95.46% 82.23% 
Wages -0.93% 11.41% 
Depreciation -2.09% 1.73% 
General and Administrative Expenses 0.88% -0.18% 
Interests -0.42% -1.00% 
Taxes 2.02% 0.79% 
Extraordinary Items 0.001% -0.11% 
Unsmoothed 5.08% 5.11% 
Figure 35: Negative and Positive shock. 
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Summary of Findings: Size 
2003-2016 Size 
Channels Small Medium Big 
Materials 80.68% 82.46% 87.94% 
Wages 9.00% 7.65% 6.51% 
Depreciation -0.03% 0.12% 0.81% 
Gen.& Adm. Expenses -0.52% 0.46% 0.33% 
Interests -0.22% 0.18% -0.80% 
Taxes 1.92% 2.56% 0.96% 
Extraordinary Items 0.00% 0,00% -0.05% 
Unsmoothed 9.18% 6.56% 4.26% 
Figure 36: Size 
 
Summary of Findings: Industry 
2003-2016 
 Industry 
Channels Financial Utilities 
Real 
Estate Integrate Industry Business 
Materials 5.18% 84.33% 82.39% 47.89% 91.86% 95.58% 
Wages 29.03% 10.59% 13.43% 6.92% 5.50% 3.56% 
Depreciation 16.45% 0.53% 2.60% 3.35% 0.06% 0.24% 
Gen.& Adm. 
Expenses 3.25% -0.39% -3.21% 1.27% 0.31% -0.59% 
Interests -0.14% -0.19% -0.06% 0.55% -0.88% -0.09% 
Taxes 0.15% 0.20% 0.05% -0.56% 0.89% 0.10% 
Extraordinary Items -8.11% -2.57% -2.84% -0.79% -0.62% -0.39% 
Unsmoothed 54.19% 7.49% 7.62% 41.33% 2.87% 1.58% 
Figure 37: Industry. 
 
 
The results of this study are particularly important for risk-averse investors who wish to 
obtain higher returns by structuring their portfolios. The results indicate that strategies can 
be formulated from classifying firms as smoothers and non-smoothers because the sample 
portfolios formed of companies showing smoothing behavior in all cases obtained better 
returns than those formed of non-smoothing firms. I detected a progressive decline in the 
adjusted returns for each risk level, from positive sale’s shock to negative one. In all the 
returns calculated with the corresponding risk adjustment, as well as alternative 
adjustments, as in the case of the market portfolio, in all cases there was sufficient 
evidence to consider the results significant and robust in light of the multiple refinements 
proposed in the comparison of abnormal returns. 
With respect to the systematic risk of the stocks, both on an individual basis, I detected that 
the risk declines with the degree of smoothing by firms, with the riskiest ones being those 
that did not show any evidence of smoothing behavior and the risk significantly lower in 
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firms engaging in smoothing. 
However, my results should be interpreted with care, leading to suggestions for more 
comprehensive and complex future studies on the theme. A possible extension would be to 
include firms from several different countries. Besides allowing for more robust statistical 
tests, this would permit extending the time frame and making broader comparative 
analyses of income smoothing (determining whether this practice exists in the same 
intensity and for the same reasons in different countries). The questions addressed here can 
also be developed further in various ways. Among the points for future research are: How 
does the practice of income smoothing dynamically affect firm value? How can the 
difference in abnormal returns between smoothers and non-smoothers be explained? A 
critical point of any study is the definition of alternative metrics for classifying companies. 
Another interesting extension would be to examine the relationship between smoothing 
and the cost of equity capital. 
Among the main implications of this study, perhaps the main one is that financial 
managers can find scientific evidence here justifying earnings management with positive 
effects (beneficial smoothing). From this perspective, the practice of managing earnings to 
reduce variability could be beneficial by reducing possible distortions in stock prices. 
Smoothing signals value to the market to the extent it reduces systematic risk and 
constitutes an unquestionable guide to value. Since the objective function of management 
is to increase the firm’s value, and since managers have a certain degree of discretion to 
manage accounting numbers, smoothing out earnings can generate value for shareholders. 
However, a caveat is in order here. Since less variability in the series of reported earnings 
can boost the value of the firm, this can lead to abusive smoothing, where in a market with 
asymmetric information, the pooling equilibrium in signaling, in the context of game 
theory, prompts managers to engage in pernicious smoothing to mimic firms with 
genuinely smooth earnings series. In such a context, it is important to have regulatory 
instruments to discourage the abusive manipulation of the risk perception of investors. 
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5.3 Conclusive remarks on the profit smoothing phenomenon 
There is inherently a part of profit that is not smooth, that is, is not literally “blanched” or 
“unsmoothed” by the initial shock of the proceeds. The higher this part no smooth, the 
more variance342 will insist on other business items, especially on labor costs. 
We cannot comment, at an absolute level, on whether this mechanism is good or bad for 
the company. It can be noted, however, that if management decides to increase the smooth 
profit side, it is implementing a policy of profit implication as a true strategic variable,343 
which depends on the figure itself and the stability of the social structure firm and 
therefore management. 
As previously analyzed, a very important variable associated with operating profit is the 
dividend. From the empirical analysis of the dividend policy adopted by a large sample of 
US companies some empirical evidence can be observed:344 
- Dividends tend to partially follow the trend of profit: increases in profits generally result 
in dividend increases; but if earnings decrease, dividends tend to be “rigid downwards”; 
- Dividend policy tends to be stable: managers are often reluctant to make changes in 
distribution policy; 
- From the first two points it follows that dividends tend to have, for this reason, a more 
regular trend of profits; 
- There are obvious differences in dividend policies adopted at different times of the firm’s 
life cycle; these differences reflect changes in growth rates and cash flows, in addition to 
the availability of sound investment opportunities. 
Based on the empirical observations described above, John Lintner elaborated, in the 
1950s, a business decision-making model, which could be synthesized in four points, on 
the distribution of dividends: 
1. Companies have long-term goals about the payout ratio; 
2. Managers focus their attention on dividend variations rather than absolute levels; 
3. Dividend variations follow changes in long-term profits; 
4. Managers avoid in all ways raising the dividends to avoid risk to have to return to lower 
levels. 
Therefore, the model in question, theorized, that the distributed dividend partly depends on 
																																																								342	Sales Shock.	343	See §1.	344	See Damodaran, 2006.	
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the period’s profits, partly from the dividend distributed in the previous periods.345 
Subsequently, additions to the original Lintner study substantially confirmed these 
findings, but added a further variable decision-making: the firm’s growth prospects. The 
touch point of the various studies is that an increase in dividends signals manager optimism 
about the future prospects of the company. An increase in dividends, therefore, is 
perceived by the market as “good news”, thus raising stock prices and confirming, 
implicitly, again the management structure. 
The dissertation attempted to integrate literature into the notion of profit study, within the 
dynamics of evaluation and statistics between the profit itself and other business variables. 
From this attempt came the proposal of a conceptual model that, leading to a re-reading of 
the traditional process of evaluating and designing correlation between business variables, 
appears to be loaded with multiple and significant implications for both business theory 
and managerial practices. 
Well-behaved, the advanced model also establishes a new, plausible relationship between 
business competitiveness and negotiating power of certain stakeholder and shareholder 
categories, capable of combining the development of new organizational skills, such as 
before a high competitiveness, with the presence of asymmetries of knowledge, which 
typically accompanies this development. 
From the point of view of managerial practice, the implications of the advanced conceptual 
proposal are developed on a double front. The first concerns the need for future research on 
issues related to smooth and no smooth profit. In particular, the need for a more in-depth 
exploration of the relationship between actions taken by specific stakeholder groups in 
order to influence the amount of the rent (ex-ante) and the total profit left to the vital needs 
of the enterprise. On the other hand, a second reflection point emerges in relation to the 
fact that a very important no smooth part in the profit variable may favor the configuration 
of the organizational structures of the firm to increase strongly the negotiating power of the 
top management within the enterprise, even though inadequate in the light of contextual 
conditions. 
Finally, it should be emphasized that, in the light of the contribution made to theory and 
practice, the proposed model does not appear to be free of any limitations and appropriate 
analysis integrations. In particular, the hypothesis that organizational planning is limited to 
the assessment of the variance of business variables introduces sufficient motivations, but 																																																								345	It also depends on the operating profit of the previous period. 
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no further and necessary integrations and research studies, in order to explain the 
programming choices related to the distribution of dividends. 
In any case, it is believed that the questions raised must lead to the overcoming of the 
proposed model’s limits by preparing a fertile soil on which future theoretical and 
empirical research may take place. 
By revisiting and re-evaluating the concept of profit, this model ends up showing again, the 
intrinsic multi-disciplinarily and inter-disciplinarily, to be understood as the concomitant 
presence and interrelation between distant disciplinary approaches but applied to the study 
of the same phenomenon. Inter-disciplinarily means in fact the ability to go beyond the 
variety of definitions, logic and metrics that arise from the mere overflow of many and 
different approaches to the concept of profit. To see, the model proposed in this thesis 
tends to face the challenge of inter-disciplinarily. 
In other words, the model depicts a unitary vision of the enterprise, interpreting the 
dynamics that characterize it through the peculiar lens of processes that preclude the 
generation and approximation of profit from key interest bearers. Finally, the study of the 
phenomenon of profit smoothing emerges as a fundamental concept associated with 
business variables. 
The aim pursued by the work of analysis and comparison between the different theories 
and the model presented in the thesis is an attempt to stimulate debate and orientate 
research on the complex phenomenon of profit smoothing. Lastly, it is believed that the 
search for meaning linked to the need to clarify the link between profit and enterprise 
dynamics can find a significant engagement in propositions based on the developed model 
as well as in the trend lines emerging from the vast corpus of analyzed and systematized 
theories. 
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